VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in these petitions is a Contractor and a registered dealer under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales tax Art, (hereinafter referred as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE brief facts which are not in serious dispute may be stated as here under. The Assessing Officer in the orders of assessment dated 1st january 2000 found that the petitioner is liable to pay sales tax in respect of the work carried out by him for the assessment years 1987-88 to 1992-93 for asphalting of roads under item 6 (SI No. 6) given to the Sixth Schedule of the Act. He took the view that asphalting of the roads done by the petitioner amounts to construction of roads. The Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) dismissed the appeal Nos. KST. AP. 422 to 433 of 1999 by his Order dated 6th April 2000, filed by the petitioner, thereby confirming the orders of assessment. The second appeal filed by the petitioner against the said orders in STA Nos. 736 to 747 of 2000 before the Tribunal came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by means of its order dated 31st July 2002. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner made two submissions. Firstly, he submitted that the liability to pay tax under item 6 of the Sixth Schedule would arise, if an assessee undertakes construction of buildings, bridges, roads etc. , and the work executed by the petitioner being only asphalting of roads, the Assessing officer as well as the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) and the Tribunal have seriously erred in law in assessing the petitioner to pay sales tax. Elaborating this submission, he submitted that it is only for execution of the work relating to construction of buildings, bridges, roads etc. , an assessee is made liable to pay the sales tax and not in cases, where the assessee carried out the work which is in the nature of asphalting of the road or repair of the road. He pointed out that applying the principles of ejusdem generis, it has to be held that only those works which are in the nature of civil works which relates to constructions of buildings, bridges, roads etc. , would attract item 6 of the Sixth Schedule. He pointed out that applying the principles of ejusdem generis, it has to be held that only those works which are in the nature of civil works which relates to constructions of buildings, bridges, roads etc. , would attract item 6 of the Sixth Schedule. In support of his submission, he relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of ANURAG enterprises vs. STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS and drew our attention to pages 17 and 18. Secondly, he submitted that even if it held that the petitioner is liable to pay sales tax, the imposition of penalty for non-payment of sales tax by the petitioner is requires to be set aside on the ground that there was no deliberate violation on the part of the petitioner in evading tax; and it is only in cases where there is a deliberate attempt made for evasion of tax, the assessing Officer could proceed to levy penalty. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, Sri Anand, learned Government Advocate repelling the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, firstly, submitted that the only conclusion one could arrive at on a proper reading of item 6 of Sixth Schedule of the Act is that the work relating to repairing of a building, bridge, or asphalting or repair of a road amounts to construction of a building, bridge, or a road; the word 'etc. ' indicates the wide range of work including repair of a building, bridge or repair of a road. Secondly, he submitted that when all the three authorities on a proper reading of item 6 of the Sixth Schedule have taken the view that asphalting of the road also amounts to construction of road, the said conclusion reached should be understood as a conclusion reached on a question of fact with regard to the nature of work and as such there is no question of law involved in the finding recorded in the orders impugned in these petitions, which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It is his third submission that since sales tax is levied on works contract executed by the petitioner and the definition of works contract given under section 2 (1) (v-i) of the Act includes repair, improvement or modification, the liability to pay tax would arise in respect of the works contract; and therefore, the petitioner would be liable to pay tax in respect of the repair work carried out by him. In other words, it is his submission that item 6 of the Sixth Schedule has to be understood in the backdrop of the definition given to works contract under Section 2 (1) (v-i ). So far as the penalty levied on the petitioner, it is his submission that since the petitioner has failed to pay tax in respect of the works executed by him for asphalting of roads, the only conclusion that could be drawn is that the petitioner had deliberately made an attempt to evade tax and as such the assessing Officer was fully justified in levying the penalty. He further submitted that when the authorities on consideration of the materials on record had reached the conclusion that the petitioner is liable to pay penalty for non-payment of the sales tax, the said finding is also not liable to be interfered with by this Court on the ground that there is no deliberate violation in payment of tax. ( 5 ) THE two questions that would arise for our consideration in these petitions in the light of the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, are:1) Whether the finding recorded by the Tribunal that asphalting of the roads by the petitioner would amount to construction of the roads is erroneous in law?2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in upholding the penalty levied on the petitioner under Section 12-B (4) of the Act?regarding first question: section 5b of the Act provides that every dealer should pay for each year a tax under the Act on his turnover on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract mentioned in column 2 of the Sixth Schedule at the rates specified in the corresponding entries in column 3 of the said Schedule. Column 2 of the Sixth Schedule sets out the description of various types of works contract. Column 2 of the Sixth Schedule sets out the description of various types of works contract. Column 3 sets out the rate of tax prescribed in respect of the various types of works contract set out in column 2. Item 6 of column 2 of the Sixth Schedule provides for levy of tax on "civil works like construction of buildings, bridges, roads etc. " therefore, the question is as to whether the work executed by the petitioner by asphalting of the roads would attract payment of sales tax under Section 5b read with item 6 of the Sixth Schedule of the act? The answer to this question depends upon the interpretation to be placed on the words "civil works like construction of buildings, bridges, roads etc". There cannot be any doubt that the asphalting or repair of a road or a bridge is in the nature of a civil work. Further, the definition of works contract set out under Section 2 (1) (v-i) also prescribes that the repair of buildings, bridges, roads is also works contract. The said Section reads as follows: "2 (1) (v-i) "works Contract" includes any agreement for carrying out for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, the building, construction, manufacture, processing, fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property;" ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the point that is required to be considered is, merely because the execution of work by asphalting of a road is either in the nature of a civil work or it is in the nature of a works contract, can the petitioner who had only carried out the work of asphalting of the road, be held liable for payment of tax under Section 5b read with item 6 of the Sixth Schedule? In other words, the asphalting or repairing of the road could be either treated as in the nature of a construction of a road or the works "like construction" employed in item 6 of the Sixth Schedule should be understood as to include the asphalting or repair of a road? The word "like", in our view, explains the nature of the work. It is illustrative of the nature of the work. When the legislation has used the word "like", the said word has to be given the same meaning. The word "like", in our view, explains the nature of the work. It is illustrative of the nature of the work. When the legislation has used the word "like", the said word has to be given the same meaning. The interpretation which we are required to place on item 6 of the Sixth Schedule relates to a taxing statute. It is well settled that if there be any ambiguity in respect of the right to levy tax, it is not removable by reasonable construction; and the taxing statute has to be strictly construed and the subject not to. be taxed without clear words for that purpose. It is also well accepted that there is no room for any intendment and there is no presumption as to tax and nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. While interpreting the taxing statute, the Court has only to look clearly at the language used are some of the well settled principles. In the case of JANAPADA sabha, CHHINDWARA vs THE CENTRAL PROVINCES SYNDICATE ltd. and ANOTHER, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while taking the view that if an Act does not by plain language used therein carry out the object, the Court will not be justified in supplying deficiencies in the Act, has at paragraph 7 observed as follows: "as observed by Rowlatt, J. , in Cape Brandy Syndicate vs commrs of Inland Revenue, (1921) 12 Tax Cas 358. "in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to by read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. " these observations were approved by the House of Lords in canadian Eagle Oil Co. , Ltd. v. King, (1946) 27 Tax Cas 206. This Court has also adopted the same rule in Commr. of Incometax v. Ajax Products Ltd. , 55 ITR 741 = ( AIR 1965 SC 1358 ) and commr. Of Income - tax v B. M. Kharwar (1969) 1 SCR 651 = ( AIR 1969 SC 812 ). " further, in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs kasturi and SONS LTD. , at paragraph 9 the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed as follows: "9. Of Income - tax v B. M. Kharwar (1969) 1 SCR 651 = ( AIR 1969 SC 812 ). " further, in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs kasturi and SONS LTD. , at paragraph 9 the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed as follows: "9. The principle that a taxing statute should be strictly construed, is well settled. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh. Sixth Edition 1966. the law is stated thus:- " The well established rule in the familiar words of LORD wensleydale, reaffirmed by LORD HALSBURY and LORD simonds, means: 'the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words. " in a classic passage LORD CAIRNS stated the principle thus: "if the person sought to be taxed, comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In otherwords, if there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable, construction, certainty, such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute". VISCOUNT SIMON quoted with approval a passage from rowlatt, J. expressing the principle in the following words; "in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for my intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. " Relying upon this passage Lord Upjohn said: "fiscal measures are not built upon any theory of taxation. " again in the case of ORISSA STATE WAREHOUSING corporation vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX at paragraphs 38 and 40, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: "38. The decision of this Court in Keshavji Raviji and Co. vs commissioner of Income-Tax, AIR 1991 SC 1806 : (1991 AIR SCW 1845) also lends concurrence to the view expressed above. " again in the case of ORISSA STATE WAREHOUSING corporation vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX at paragraphs 38 and 40, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: "38. The decision of this Court in Keshavji Raviji and Co. vs commissioner of Income-Tax, AIR 1991 SC 1806 : (1991 AIR SCW 1845) also lends concurrence to the view expressed above. This court observed (Para 6): " As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes impermissible. The supposed intention of the legislation cannot then be appealed to whittled down the statutory language which is otherwise unambiguous. If the intendment is not in the words used it is nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used in the statute are, on their terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intent of the legislature. . . Artificial and unduly latitudinarian rules of construction which, with their general tendency to 'give the tax payer the breaks' are out of place where the legislation has a fiscal omission. 40. In fine thus, a fiscal statute shall have to be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. No words ought to be added and only the language used ought to be considered so as to ascertain the proper meaning and intent of the legislation. The Court is to ascribe natural and ordinary meaning to the words used by the legislature and the court ought not, under any circumstances, to substitute its own impression and ideas in place of the legislative intent as is available, from a plain reading of the statutory provisions". Further, in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME - TAX, west BENGAL I vs VEGETABLE PRODUCTS LIMITED , the hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that if the Court finds that any of the taxing provision is ambiguous or capable of giving more meaning than one, then the Court has to adopt that interpretation which favours the assessee. In this connection it is useful to refer to the observation made in the said Judgment at page 195 which reads as hereunder:". . . . If the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision. In this connection it is useful to refer to the observation made in the said Judgment at page 195 which reads as hereunder:". . . . If the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision. It is for the legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. On the other hand, if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted. This is a well -accepted rule of construction recognised by this Court in several of its decisions. Hence, all that we have to see is, what is the true effect of the language employed in section 271 (l) (a) (i ). " ( 7 ) IF the principles referred to above are kept in mind, as noticed by us earlier, the work executed by the petitioner by asphalting of the road cannot be brought to tax under item 6 of the Sixth Schedule on the ground the work that was executed by him is a civil work like construction of a road. In a statute normally, no word is redundantly used and when a word is used while interpreting the statute, it is the duty of the Court to give meaning to the said word unless the interpretation placed would lead to an absurd result. Therefore, the word "like"has to be given a proper meaning and that cannot be rendered as superfluous. From the illustrative word "like" occurring in item 6 of the Sixth Schedule it is clear that the element of "construction" is predominant and the works, not involving that element cannot be made liable for payment of tax by giving extended meaning either to the word "construction" so as to include the work relating to repair of roads or asphalting of roads; or the word "like" which is prefixed to the word "construction" intending to represent various other types of work like "repair" and "improvement" which are really not in the nature of construction of a road, bridge or a building. If the intention of the Legislature was to levy tax on all types of civil works including the repairs of buildings, bridges, roads and also asphalting of the roads which is treated as civil works, nothing would have been easier than to include the words 'repair or improvement'. On the other hand, as noticed by us earlier, item 6 is specific and clear in its language. The language is not an inclusive phrase. If it is to be considered as an inclusive one, the language would have been "all types of civil works' including construction of buildings, bridges, roads etc. Now, the only other question that remains to be considered is whether the word "etc. " which is suffixed after the word "roads' should be understood as the Legislature intending to tax various other types of works like asphalting of the roads as contended by the learned Government Advocate. We find it difficult to accept such a contention. The word "etc" suffixed after the word 'roads' should be understood as meaning the type of work like construction of buildings, bridges, roads. The words "etc" referred to in item 6, in our view, is referable only to the civil works in the nature of construction of buildings, bridges, roads and the work relating to construction of other varieties of work in addition to construction of buildings, bridges, roads. As noticed by us earlier, while interpreting a taxing statute it is not permissible for the Court to supplement the deficiency in the language of the Statute and make a citizen liable for payment of tax. If there are two views on the question regarding the liability to pay tax or the right of the State to levy tax, the Courts will have to take a view in favour of the citizen. ( 8 ) THE next question is as to whether the definition of a works contract relied upon by the learned Government Advocate is of any assistance to him to support his contention that the definition of works contract if read along with item 6 of the Sixth Schedule, asphalting or repair also could be included for fastening the liability for payment of sales tax? The definition of works contract only explains what is meant by a works contract. The power to impose tax is to be traced to Section 5b read with item 6 of the Sixth schedule. The definition of works contract only explains what is meant by a works contract. The power to impose tax is to be traced to Section 5b read with item 6 of the Sixth schedule. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no merit in the said contention also. ( 9 ) FURTHER, we are also unable to accede to the submission of the learned Government Advocate that the finding recording by the tribunal and other subordinate authorities are in the nature of conclusion reach on questions of fact. The finding has been recorded by the Tribunal and subordinate authorities on the basis of the interpretation placed on item 6 of the Sixth Schedule. The interpretation of a provision of law or an entry in a taxing statute which empowers the State to levy the tax, in our view is a question of law. Therefore, in the light of the conclusion reached by us above that item 6 of the Sixth Schedule does not empower the State to levy tax on asphalting of the roads, we are of the view that the orders impugned are liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act. While considering the similar Entry, the Division Bench of the' allahabad High Court, in the case of ANURAG ENTERPRISES vs state OF U. P AND OTHERS (supra) has taken the view that the works of colouring and painting are not the works contract within the meaning of the 'works contract'. It is useful to refer to the observations made by the Allahabad High Court, which reads as follows:"whereas the contention of the petitioner is that the works of colouring and painting are not the works contract within the meaning of "works contract" of type No. 6 or of any other type as specified in a notification dated April 27, 1987, the stand of the respondent is that the contractual activity of the petitioner falls within the works contract of type No. 6 as specified in a notification dated April 27, 1987. The question for consideration is whether the contract of colouring and painting, admittedly carried out by the petitioner, comes within the works contract of type no. 6 as reproduced above. The definition of civil works at serial no. The question for consideration is whether the contract of colouring and painting, admittedly carried out by the petitioner, comes within the works contract of type no. 6 as reproduced above. The definition of civil works at serial no. 6 of the notification is illustrative and that is apparent from the word "like" which precedes the words "construction of buildings, bridges, roads, dams, barrages, sewage, spillways and diversions"the submission of the Standing Counsel is that when contract of type No. 6 gives illustrative definition of works contract, it will be legally permissible to include works of painting and colouring within the meaning of works contract of type No. 6. No doubt, the definition of works contract of type no. 6 is illustrative, but in our opinion that will not include all types of civil works. Type No. 6 of works contract in our view refers to civil works only of the nature which have been stated at serial No. 6 of the notification. This is clear from the principle of ejusdem generis which has to be applied to interpret the civil works as specified at serial No. 6 of a notification dated April 27, 1987. Applying the said principle, it must be held that only those works which are in the nature of the works as specified at serial No. 6 are civil works. The words "civil works" will take their colour and shade from the following words and that has to be given restricted meaning consistent to the illustrative words occurring at serial No. 6 of the notification. The word "like" is significant and that indicates that works of the type which are specifically mentioned at serial No. 6 only are the civil works and not beyond that. " therefore, we are of the view that it is not permissible for the state to levy tax for the work executed which relates to asphalting of the road. Regarding second question: since on the first question, we have answered in favour of the petitioner and held that the petitioner is not liable to pay tax in respect of the work relating to asphalting of roads, the question of levying penalty does not arise for consideration and therefore, the order levying penalty also has to be held as unsustainable in law. 11. 11. In the light of the discussion made above, we make the following order: - the order-Annexure-A dated 31st July 2002 made in STA Nos. 736 to 747 of 2000 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, bangalore; the order-Annexure-B dated 6th April 2000 passed by the joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) made in nos, KST. AP. 422 to 433 of 1999, and the orders of assessment- annexure-C to C5 dated 1st January 2000 made for the assessment years 1987 - 88 to 1992-93 by the Assessing Officer are hereby set aside. 11. In terms stated above, these petitions are allowed and disposed of. However, no order is made as to costs. 12. Sri B. Anand, learned Additional Government Advocate is given four weeks' time to file his memo of appearance. --- *** --- .