( 1 ) THE two appeals filed against the judgement and decree passed by Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bellary in RA No. 15/94 and RA 16/94 arising out of O. S. No. 168/85 and O. S. No. 286/88 respectively on the file of Prl. Munsiff, Bellary. The appellants in both the cases are the defendants in O. S. No. 168/85 filed by the respondents 1 to 3. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 168/85 filed a suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit schedule property described as a house site measuring 25x15 pictorially described in the rough sketch accompanying the plaint and form part of CTS No. 373/3a/1a/2/b in Block No. XXIV, Ward No. XXII, Devinagar, Bellary City. The plaintiffs claims title to the property by virtue of entries in the Municipality records. The suit site was originally granted by Municipality to one Thippanna in the year 1962 from whom one Siddalinganagouda purchased in the year 1971 under registered sale deed Ex. P. 2. One Narasimhappa purchased the suit property from Siddalinganagouda under Ex. P. 3 under registered sale deed in the year 1978. The plaintiffs purchased the suit site from Narasimhappa under Ex. P. 1 on 29-5-1985, two days after filing of the suit. It is said that the erstwhile owner Narasimhappa had mortgaged the property in favour of plaintiff. The mortgage deed is not produced. According to plaintiffs, the defendant had encroached in the portion of the suit property to an extent of 15x25 put an hutment about three years prior to suit, therefore, on the strength of title, the plaintiff seek relief of declaration of title and possession and also seek injunction against the defendant not to repair or put up any permanent structure on the suit site. The defendants filed the written statement denying the title of the plaintiff contending that the defendants are in possession of the premises since the year 1969 by putting up hutment and paying tax to the Municipality. The defendants also contend that the property is a Government land and they are in adverse possession of the property. A defence is also taken that the area has been declared as a slum area. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of O. S. No. 168/85, the defendants filed a suit in O. S. No. 286/88. A defence is also taken that the area has been declared as a slum area. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of O. S. No. 168/85, the defendants filed a suit in O. S. No. 286/88. The plaint averments are reproduction of the written statement in O. S. No. 168/85 and the written of the defendants in the said suit is the reproduction of the plaint in O. S. No. 168/85. Both the appellants and the respondents have filed suits separately. However, for convenient reference, the appellants would be hereinafter described as defendants and the respondents 1 to 3 would be described as plaintiffs. ( 3 ) THE trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 168/85 rejected the contention of plaintiffs title to the property and dismissed the suit. The suit filed by the appellants in O. S. No. 286/88 came to be allowed. The plaintiffs filed two appeals against the judgement and decree is O. S. No. 168/85 and O. S. No. 286/88 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bellary. In appeal, the appellant court set aside the judgement and decree of the trial court in O. S. No. 168/85 and O. S. 286/88 upheld the title of the plaintiffs and also granted relief of possession and thus allowed both the appeals filed by the plaintiffs. Hence, the Second Appeals are filed. ( 4 ) THE following substantial questions of laws are formulated by the Admission Judge. 1. Though the appellate court has concurred with the findings of the Prl. Munsiff regarding the appellants possession and enjoyment of the property even before the purchase of the property by the respondent, whether the appellate court was justified in dismissing the suit of the appellant for injunction which was decreed by the Prl. Munsiff?2. The suit schedule property which was declared by the Government as a slum area, the action of the Municipality in granting allotment of the same in favour of the other persons. Whether the Municipality has got the power to allow the site, which was declared as a slum area by the Government in favour of other persons? ( 5 ) THE following additional substantial questions of law are framed: (1) Whether the appellate court was right in declaring title of the plaintiffs on the basis of Ex. Whether the Municipality has got the power to allow the site, which was declared as a slum area by the Government in favour of other persons? ( 5 ) THE following additional substantial questions of law are framed: (1) Whether the appellate court was right in declaring title of the plaintiffs on the basis of Ex. P. 1 which came to be executed after filing of the suit in O. S. No. 168/85? (2) Whether the appellate court committed error in appreciating the oral and documentary evidence regarding the plea of adverse possession put forth by the defendants and the findings thereon are perverse and contrary to evidence on record? ( 6 ) A ticklish situation arises in the legal combat between the parties. When the suit O. S. 168/85 was filed, obviously the plaintiffs had no title to the property but seek declaration of title. In the absence of title, there was no basis for the plaintiffs to seek possession from the defendants. It is contended that the plaintiffs had taken the property as a security in a mortgage transaction from the erstwhile owner. The mortgage deed is not produced. There is nothing on record to show that it was a possessory mortgage. Unless the plaintiffs had some kind of title or possessory interest cannot seek relief of possession. ( 7 ) THE plaint averments lays much thrust upon the entries in the municipal records to support the case of the plaintiffs. In the absence of title of the plaintiffs as on the date of suit, I find the plaintiffs had no cause of action to maintain the suit, but two days after the institution of the suit, plaintiffs get title to the property by obtaining a registered sale deed. The courts have to adjudicate the rights of the parties as on the date of suit. It is also a well settled proposition of law that courts have power to take notice of the subsequent developments and can mould the relief. The right of court to mould the relief would arise only when there is a valid institution with proper legal cause of action. At the inception if there is no cause of action during the currency of the suit the subsequent facts giving rise to cause of action cannot be used as a supplement to sustain the suit instituted without cause of action. At the inception if there is no cause of action during the currency of the suit the subsequent facts giving rise to cause of action cannot be used as a supplement to sustain the suit instituted without cause of action. In the present case, the plaintiffs neither had legal title nor possessory title. Subsequent to the suit under sale deed Ex. P. 1 they acquire title. The legal predicament almost formidably threatened the dismissal of the suit in limine. But filing of O. S. 286/88 by the appellants herein brings about a new dimension to the proceedings. At the time of filing of O. S. 286/88 the plaintiffs had validly acquired title and set up plea of title as a defence in the written statement. Both he suits have been fused for recording common trial and disposal. Therefore in O. S. 286/88 also an issue of title of the plaintiff on the basis of averments in the written statement would arise for consideration. Although the plaintiffs failed to prove title on the basis of averments in O. S. 168/85 nevertheless in view of the issue regarding title in O. S. 286/88, the plaintiffs will have almost a second chance to prove their title and to resist the claim of the defendants. Accordingly, the first question of law is answered in affirmative. At the time O. S. 286/88 is filed the plaintiffs had validly acquired title. Had not the defendant filed a suit in O. S. 286/88, it would have made a total difference in the result. The plaintiffs were virtually disarmed to make use of Ex. P. 1. Accordingly additional first question of law is answered in affirmative. ( 8 ) THE appellants claim right by way of adverse possession. There is categorical pleading that the appellants are in possession of the suit property since the year 1969 by putting up hutment. According to plaint averments in O. S. No. 168/85 three years prior to the suit the defendants had put up hutment by illegal encroachment. The oral evidence of P. W. 2 although appears to be an eye witness does not inspire the confidence of the court to believe his veracity. According to P. W. 2 before purchase of property under Ex. P. 1, the defendants were made to vacate the property. Thereafter the defendants re-entered and put up hutment. The oral evidence of P. W. 2 although appears to be an eye witness does not inspire the confidence of the court to believe his veracity. According to P. W. 2 before purchase of property under Ex. P. 1, the defendants were made to vacate the property. Thereafter the defendants re-entered and put up hutment. The said version is totally in conflict with the plaint averments. P. W. 3 is eventually an interested witness and earlier he was looking after the liquor business of the plaintiffs. As against the evidence of the plaintiffs, the defendants have produced the municipal tax receipts to show the existence of hut and payment of taxes to the Municipality since the year 1970. Ex. D. 1 is a legal notice issued in the year 1974 by predecessor in title one Siddalinganagouda wherein it is alleged that the defendants have put up a hutment and he is in occupation of the suit premises and the said occupation is said to be a permissive occupation and that defendants were permitted by the erstwhile owner Thippanna to put up the hutment. The contention that it is a permissive possession as per the recitals in Ex. D1 is in dispute but the authenticity and issuance of notice under Ex. D1 is not n dispute. Ex. D1 acknowledge the defendants possession in the year 1974. ( 9 ) THE trial court and as well the appellate court take a concurrent and a consistent view that the defendants have not established the plea of adverse possession for the reason that their occupation is under the assumption that the property belongs to Government and that the defendants do not admit the ownership and title of the plaintiffs. Therefore holds that any possession on a wrong assumption of title or under any other wrong assumptions without admitting title of the real owner cannot constitute an adverse possession. The said view is totally untenable. The plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration of title. On the strength of a title if plaintiffs want to recover possession of the property a suit has to be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. The wrongful possession that had commenced during the time of predecessors in title, if continued would bind the successors in title. The documentary evidence produced by way of tax receipts in Ex. The wrongful possession that had commenced during the time of predecessors in title, if continued would bind the successors in title. The documentary evidence produced by way of tax receipts in Ex. P. 3 and P. 4 and subsequent tax receipts fully supports the claim of defendants being in possession of the properties since the year 1970. Ex. D. 1 a legal notice issued by the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs also corroborates the contention of the defendants that they were in possession during the year 1971. In the face of the abundant material, the view taken by the appellate court that the defendants have not pleaded the starting point of adverse possession is untenable and contrary to evidence on record. ( 10 ) THE defendants are in possession of the property openly without interruption and noticeable by world at large including the owner over a period of 12 years. Only by the fact that defendants are in possession under the mistaken assumption of title in himself or with the Government cannot be a ground to hold that the possession is not a hostile possession from the stand point of the real owner. The real owner when dispossessed under Article 64 of the Limitation Act has to seek possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession. In that view of the matter, the finding of the court below that the defendants have failed to prove the plea of adverse possession is perverse and contrary to law and evidence on record. However, the documents produced by the defendants do not fully establish the adverse possession to full extent of 15x75 but admitted case of the plaintiffs discloses that the defendants are illegally in occupation by putting up hutment to an extent of 15x25 as per plaint sketch and the said hutment is immediately abuts the club road. Therefore the stand of the defendants about the actual physical possession read with the admission of the plaintiffs I hold that the defendants have successfully established the plea of adverse possession to an extent of 15x25 as shown in the plaint sketch. Even otherwise the suit for possession to that extent not filed within 12 years of dispossession. Therefore the grant of decree for declaration of title and possession to that extent in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents is bad in law and liable to be set aside. Even otherwise the suit for possession to that extent not filed within 12 years of dispossession. Therefore the grant of decree for declaration of title and possession to that extent in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents is bad in law and liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeals are partly allowed as indicated above. --- *** --- .