CHAKRAPANI VYPAR PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER
2003-09-05
R.GURURAJAN
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is before me seeking to quash the detention order passed by the Deputy Commercial tax Officer, Group IV, Enforcement-Central, Chennai, vide annexure-E. Petitioner seeks for a further direction directing the respondent No. 1 to reimburse all the losses caused to him. ( 2 ) PETITIONER-COMPANY is having a registered office at Bangalore. He is registered under the karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Petitioner imported polypropylene from Exxon Mobile Asia Pacific, Singapore, five containers, weighing 99 M/ts under bill of lading under open general licence. The said goods were shipped from Singapore to chennai port on June 2, 2003. The goods reached Chennai port on June 16, 2003 and to ICD, bangalore (Customs Station), on June 21, 2003 and June 24, 2003. Respondent No. 1 passed an order of detention in terms of annexure-E. Petitioner filed objections in terms of annexure-F. In the meanwhile, petitioner filed an appeal before the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal, chennai, and during the pendency of the appeal, petitioner has filed this petition. Petitioner is questioning the detention order on various grounds in this petition. Essential ground raised by the petitioner is that Section 42 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case. No sale has occurred in Tamil Nadu warranting detention. Notice was issued. Respondents entered appearance. In the objection statement respondents state that the petitioner did file an appeal before the Tamil Nadu Tribunal, the matter was heard and it was reserved for orders. They say that petition deserves to be dismissed in the light of pending proceedings before the Tribunal. On merits they justify their stand by relying on various provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. On noticing the pendency in Tamil Nadu, I directed the petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of my order dated August 5, 2003. ( 3 ) PETITIONER thereafter filed another affidavit in this Court. In the subsequent affidavit filed in this Court, petitioner states that a memo was filed seeking permission to withdraw the petition and orders were passed on July 31, 2003. Petitioner says that the objections have been filed to the compounding notice. ( 4 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
In the subsequent affidavit filed in this Court, petitioner states that a memo was filed seeking permission to withdraw the petition and orders were passed on July 31, 2003. Petitioner says that the objections have been filed to the compounding notice. ( 4 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He invites my attention to the facts of this case to contend that there exits no jurisdiction for the Tamil Nadu sales tax authorities in the case on hand. Counsel refers to Article 286 in this regard. He refers to various judgments in support of his contention. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR2000 SC 3448 , 1999 (66 )ECC570 (SC ), 1999 (113 ) ELT753 (SC ), (2000 )10 SCC228 (Kiran Spinning Mills v. Collector of Customs) and judgment of the madras High Court reported in [2003] 129 STC 294 (State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) Per contra, learned Government Pleader supports the order. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, I have carefully perused the impugned order. A reading of the impugned order would show that the goods are ordered to be detained to verify genuineness of the import transportation with reference to the registration certificate of the imported goods and relevant import documents, to verify the genuineness of the existence of the importer and to verify the past imports and payment of sales tax. Time has been given to file objections with regard to the detention order. Objections are also filed by the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner did file an appeal before Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal and later he withdrew the same. In these circumstances, two points emerge for my consideration ; (a) conduct of the petitioner (b) merits of the matter. Reg : Conduct ( 6 ) IT is an admitted fact before me that the petitioner did file an appeal before the Tamil Nadu taxation Special Tribunal challenging the detention order. It is also an admitted fact that the tribunal posted the case on July 4, 2003, July 15, 2003, July 22, 2003, July 28, 2003 and July 31, 2003. Five hearings have taken place. Matter was heard and reserved for orders on July 31, 2003.
It is also an admitted fact that the tribunal posted the case on July 4, 2003, July 15, 2003, July 22, 2003, July 28, 2003 and July 31, 2003. Five hearings have taken place. Matter was heard and reserved for orders on July 31, 2003. In the petition filed before this Court, these facts were not made clear except a bald statement in para 7 of a notice by the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the petitioner. Only when the objections were filed, the matter was clear to this Court an appeal was filed in Tamil Nadu and the matter was heard finally on July 31, 2003 and the case was posted for orders. When the same was confronted, initially, petitioner stated that no argument took place but in the subsequent affidavit, it is stated as under : It is respectfully submitted that averments made in the affidavit are not true and they have no nexus to the truth. The truth is that appeal was filed along with an application for interim order of stay/release of goods, but the honourable Court went on adjourning the matter on July 4, 2003, July 15, 2003, July 22, 2003, July 28, 2003 and July 31, 2003. Further in the open court, tribunal directed the matter to be posted along with some other cases. These facts in terms of the subsequent affidavit have not been initially mentioned in the body of the petition. Therefore the learned Government Advocate is right in his submission that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It is also clear that when this writ petition was filed on July 9, 2003, the appeal was pending in Tamil Nadu. The appeal was withdrawn only on July 31, 2003. The conduct of the petitioner in withdrawing the appeal after filing of this petition in this Court that too without disclosing the various facts as referred to above, shows the unclean hands of the petitioner. Article 226 is available only to those who approach this Court with clean hands. Unclean hands have no place in this Court by way of proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) IN the given set of circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the submission of the petitioner that the matters were not heard and therefore the matter was withdrawn.
Unclean hands have no place in this Court by way of proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) IN the given set of circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the submission of the petitioner that the matters were not heard and therefore the matter was withdrawn. At any rate apart from expressing displeasure, this Court is of the view that costs have to be imposed to arrest this type of litigation. Litigants cannot be the choosers of the forum. Such choosing would ruin the very foundation of the justice delivery system. In these circumstances, I strongly deprecate the tendency of the petitioner in approaching this Court in this manner. Merits ( 8 ) MR. Paras Jain, learned Counsel however, argued that the facts of this case would not require any detention by the Tamil Nadu officers. Section 42 of the Act provides for establishment of check-post or barrier and inspection of goods while in transit. It further provides for detention in terms of Section 42 (3 ). In the case on hand, the authority has chosen to doubt the genuineness of the various documents. Therefore it cannot be said that the authority is wrong in detaining the goods in question. Such detention is permissible in terms of Section 42 of the Tamil Nadu general Sales Tax Act. However, what is contended before me is that there is no sale as such and that therefore no detention is permissible. In this connection it is necessary to notice certain judgments in identical circumstances. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in [1986] 63 STC 169 (Madras Marine and Co. v. State of Madras) it is ruled as under : a customs barrier does not set a terminal limit to the territory of the State for sales tax purposes. A sale, therefore, beyond the customs barrier may still be a sale within the State. ( 10 ) THE Andhra Pradesh High Court in [1996] 102 STC 345 (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh) has ruled as under : . . . that Central sales tax is liable to be collected in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced. It is that State alone which has the authority to collect the tax on behalf of the Government of India.
. . that Central sales tax is liable to be collected in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced. It is that State alone which has the authority to collect the tax on behalf of the Government of India. The rightful and authorised agent of the Government of India was identified by Section 9 (1) of the Central Sales Tax Act. If some other State assumes the role of an agent and proceeds to collect the tax, it will be outstepping its jurisdiction. Therefore, in respect of goods sent by the Hyderabad unit directly to site, albeit at the instance of the executing unit Central sales tax could be levied and collected by the State of Andhra Pradesh alone, even though the tax had been paid by the executing units in their respective States. ( 11 ) THIS decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the very same volume at page 373. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Union of India [1996] 102 STC 373. ( 12 ) A reading of these judgments would show that it cannot be said that there is absolutely no jurisdiction as contended by the learned Counsel. To find out the origin of sale, the authorities have to exercise their power of detention when they doubt the documents. If the argument of the petitioner is accepted, then there is every chance of tax evasion and the very object of Section 42 would be defeated. Therefore neither the object of Section 42 nor the case laws support the case of the petitioner. In these circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is lack of jurisdiction. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel relies on AIR2000 SC 3448 , 1999 (66 )ECC570 (SC ), 1999 (113 )ELT753 (SC ), (2000 )10 SCC228 (Kiran Spinning Mills v. Collector of customs), it is seen from the facts of the said case that it is not against a show cause notice. It was on the material available in that case. Here the materials are yet to be ascertained by the authorities and therefore the said case may not be of help to the petitioner.
It was on the material available in that case. Here the materials are yet to be ascertained by the authorities and therefore the said case may not be of help to the petitioner. ( 14 ) THE second case relied on by the learned Counsel reported in [2003 ]129 STC294 (Mad ) (State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) is again distinguishable on facts. In that case an admission was made that the sale effected by the dealer is not one which occasioned the import. It was in those circumstances, the court ruled against the state. Moreover, that was a case which was decided after the materials were considered by the adjudicating authority including the Tribunal. In the case on hand, the enquiry is still to be completed. Therefore the said judgment is distinguishable on facts. Conclusion ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner filed a memo on August 27, 2003. In the given set of circumstances, I am not inclined to entertain this petition. On the other hand, I deem it proper to direct the respondents to consider the objections already filed and pass appropriate orders. Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to file any additional reply within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If any such additional reply is filed, the authorities are to consider the original objections along with the additional objections to be filed in terms of this order and pass orders within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This time schedule is provided with a view to avoid demurrage liability. The authorities also may consider the release of the goods by way of accepting appropriate deposit in accordance with law in the light of a memo filed in this Court. ( 16 ) I have already held that the conduct of the petitioner requires to be deprecated. I have also ruled that such conduct is to be arrested by way of costs. In these circumstances, I deem it proper to direct the petitioner to pay costs of Rs. 6,000 to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund within four weeks. Ordered accordingly.