Madan Lal Bountra v. Ram Kishan (Dead) Through By Lrs.
2003-05-21
M.M.KUMAR
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity the Act) has been filed by Madan Lal Bountra the landlord-petitioner against the tenant-respondents. Challenge has been made to the judgment dated 19.12.1988 passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Rohtak, whereby the appeal of the tenant-respondents has been accepted by setting-aside the order of ejectment dated 18.5.1987 passed by the learned Rent Controller, Rohtak. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be noticed. The landlord-petitioner filed an ejectment petition under Section 13 of the Act against the tenant- respondents in 1983 alleging that shops No. 177 to 180 alongwith verandah in front of the shops and residential quarter at the back of shop No. 181 were let out by the father of the landlord-petitioner to Ram Kishan tenant- respondent No. 1 in the year 1949. The purpose of tenancy was residential as well as laundry work. The landlord-petitioner asserted that he has been a member of the armed forces and was posted in hard area. He set up the grounds of personal necessity, arrears of rent, sub-letting, change of user and material alterations. The grounds as mentioned in paras 3(d) and 3(e) of the ejectment petition furnishing particulars as required by Rule 4 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1976 read as under :- "3(d) In case of residential building the number of persons occupying the same and what portion, if any, is occupied by the landlord and his dependents and the number of members who are residing with him as his dependants.
The landlord-petitioner or any of the landlord-respondents No. 3 and 4 are not in occupation of any of the portion of the premises in dispute and the respondent No. 1 with his wife and one son used to reside in portion shown in yellow colour and marked by letters A.B.C.D. and on the back of shop No. 180 marked by letters I.C.G.H. and shops No. 177, 178, 179 and 180 with open covered verandah in front of the said four shops were let out to the respondent No. 1 for his business of running a laundry, whereas now the respondent No. 1 has completely parted with possession and has sublet the portion as shown in yellow colour and marked by letters A.B.C.I. to the respondent No. 2 who with his mother, wife and 2 children is now residing therein and the respondent No. 1 himself has started residing in shop Nos. 177 and 178 by converting their use from commercial to residential. (e) In case of non-residential building or rented land, the purpose for which the building or rented land is used and the number of employees, if any, working therein. The respondent No. 1 occupied the shop Nos. 177, 178, 179 and 180 as shown in green colour in the site plan for running his laundry business out of which he has now converted shops No. 177 and 178 into his residence in shops No. 179 and 180 by making additions and alterations in the verandah in front of the 4 shops." 3. The ground of arrears of rent ceased to exist because the rent was tendered and accepted. The Rent Controller on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed eight issues, which read as under :- "1. Whether the premises in dispute were rented out to respondent No. 1 alone by the petitioner as alleged ? OPA. 1-A. Whether the respondent No. 1 has sublet the portion of premises in dispute as shown in yellow colour to respondent No. 2 as alleged ? OPA. 2. Whether the petition is bad for misjoinder of parties and non- joinder of parties ? If so to what effect ? OPR. 3. If issue No. 1 is proved whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of subletting ? OPA 4. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent ? OPA 5.
If so to what effect ? OPR. 3. If issue No. 1 is proved whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of subletting ? OPA 4. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent ? OPA 5. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of change of user ? OPA. 6. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement of the petitioner ? OPA. 7. Whether the respondent has materially impaired the value and utility of the premises in dispute and he is liable to ejectment on this ground ? OPA. 8. Relief." Issues No. 1, 1-A and 3 were taken up together by the Rent Controller and it was held that the demised premises were let out to Ram Krishan tenant- respondent No. 1 and one Amir Chand, father of tenant-respondent No. 2. It was further held that they are in continuous possession of the demised premises as tenants and no portion of the premises has been sub-let. On issue No. 2 as to whether the ejectment petition was liable to be dismissed for mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, the Rent Controller held as under :- "It has been alleged that the petition is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. The hollowness or the contention raised by the respondents is exposed by their own document Ex.AX. An application under Section 6-A of the Rent Act was moved against the petitioner and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who happen to be his brothers. They all are the landlords of the premises in question and had inherited the same on the death of their father Shri Roshan Lal Bountra. The respondents have pleaded in Ex. AX that the petitioner and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are their landlords and that they are ready and willing to pay the rent to them. Ex. AY is the reply tendered by the landlords and Ex.A2 is the copy of statement of Ram Kishan respondent No. 1 who had tendered rent under Section 6-A of the Rent Act. This is a valuable admission and the respondents No. 1 and 2 just cannot wriggle out of it. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is further proved by these documents. Admissions are best proof of facts stated.
This is a valuable admission and the respondents No. 1 and 2 just cannot wriggle out of it. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is further proved by these documents. Admissions are best proof of facts stated. The respondents have miserably failed to prove that the petition is bad for misjoinder of parties or non-joinder of parties and issue No. 2 is decided against them." 4. On the issue concerning change of user, the findings also went against the landlord-petitioner because the landlord-petitioner failed to produce any rent note reflecting the purpose, for which the property was rented out. He was also unable to show that from which date the user of the demised premises was changed from commercial to residential one. The tenancy commenced in the year 1949 by inducting the tenant-respondents No. 1 and 2 on the demised premises, who were petty washerman. It is customary for the washermen to use a portion of their premises for residence and the remaining portion for commercial purposes like cleaning, storage and ironing of clothes. According to the Rent Controller, no evidence was produced to show that the tenant-respondents were living elsewhere before they shifted to the demised premises or that the building was purely commercial in nature. It was also required to be proved that the building has been changed into residential one during the period of tenancy. Therefore, the Rent Controller concluded that there was no substance in the ground concerning change of user. 5. The other ground of material alteration impairing the value and utility of the demised premises was also rejected by the learned Rent Controller by holding that some temporary structure was installed in the verandah, which would not amount to material alterations impairing the value and utility of the demised premises. The findings of the Rent Controller in this regard read as under :- "21. No doubt the covering of a verandah amounts to material alteration but the covering has to be of a permanent nature and not of this type. In the instant case wooden frames fitted with transparent glasses have been fitted in the verandah which only amount to a temporary structure capable of being removed at a short notice. The Local Commissioner could not tell the approximate age of the so called alteration pointed out by him.
In the instant case wooden frames fitted with transparent glasses have been fitted in the verandah which only amount to a temporary structure capable of being removed at a short notice. The Local Commissioner could not tell the approximate age of the so called alteration pointed out by him. The respondents are using the premises in question for commercial and residential purposes from the year 1949 onwards. These alterations are bound to be equally old. Lajpat Rai has testified in the Court that the condition of the building has been the same all through and no changes have been made to date. He is seeing the building in the same condition from the year 1970. Similarly Kessar Dass RW-2 has testified that no changes or alterations have been made in the shop in question in the recent past as could amount to material alterations capable of impairing value and utility of the building in question. 22. Shri Har Gobind (RW3) is the Vice President of Dry Cleaners Association, Rohtak, Ram Kishan respondent is doing dry cleaning business in the premises in question from the year 1950 onwards. The meeting of the association was held in the shop in question and he has not seen any change in the structure all though these years. 23. Amrit (RW4) worked with the respondents from 1955 to 1960 and he has not seen any change in the demised premises. All this evidence goes to prove that all these alterations were made at the time of the inception of the tenancy and that no changes have been made in the recent past. The petitioner has falled to prove this issue and the same is decided against him." 6. However, the only ground, which weighed with the Rent Controller for allowing the ejectment petition was the one incorporated under Section 13(3)(a)(v). According to the afore-mentioned provision, a member of the armed forces of the Union of India may seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he requires the demised premises for the occupation of his family. He is obliged to produce a certificate from the prescribed authority as referred in Section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (for brevity `the 1925 Act) stating that he has been serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act.
He is obliged to produce a certificate from the prescribed authority as referred in Section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (for brevity `the 1925 Act) stating that he has been serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. If he establishes the necessity of the residential premises being required by his family and that he is serving in hard area, the tenant can be ejected. The Rent Controller found on the basis of the pleadings of the parties that the tenant-respondents have admitted that the landlord-petitioner is a soldier serving in the Indian Air Force in hard area and that he required the demised premises for bonafide need of his family. Even a suggestion was given to the landlord-petitioner in the cross-examination that he was serving on Indo-Pak border, which show that he was still serving in hard area. Certificate A-2 has been relied upon for concluding that the landlord-petitioner is a member of the Indian Armed Force, which is issued by Group Capt. S.K. Sarin, Station Commander 507. It has also been certified that the landlord-petitioner was posted in a hard area and his family was not staying with him. The landlord-petitioner has deposed before the Court that he did not vacate any premises nor he possesses any property other than the demised premises. He further deposed that he required the demised premises for his bonafide needs. The afore-mentioned certificate has been considered to be conclusive evidence that the landlord-petitioner is serving in the armed forces and is posted in hard area. The tenant- respondents did not produce any evidence on the file to controvert the certificate Ex.A-2 and the statement made by the landlord-petitioner. It was on the basis of afore-mentioned findings that the Rent Controller decided issue No. 6 in favour of the landlord-petitioner and ordered ejectment of the tenant-respondents. 7. On appeal filed by the tenant-respondents, the learned Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the landlord-petitioner did not have a bonafide necessity to occupy the demised premises by his family because his family was living at Jodhpur. Moreover, an application was filed to substantiate that the landlord-petitioner owned a House No. 99, Hauzkhas, New Delhi since 1982 and the afore-mentioned fact has been concealed by him from the Court.
Moreover, an application was filed to substantiate that the landlord-petitioner owned a House No. 99, Hauzkhas, New Delhi since 1982 and the afore-mentioned fact has been concealed by him from the Court. The views of the learned Appellate Authority are that firstly the demised premises is a non-residential building within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act and, therefore, the benefit of Section 13(3)(a)(v) would not be available to him. The Appellate Authority further went on to examine the issue assuming the demised premises to be residential and opined as under :- "14. In sum, my finding on this point is that the premises fall within the definition of non-residential building as contained in the above- quoted section and do not fall within the meaning of residential building. This being so, landlord-applicant Madan Lal cannot seek ejectment on the ground of personal necessity, notwithstanding the fact that he is a member of the Armed Force of the Union. 15. Now let us examine the case assuming, for the sake of argument, that the premises are residential. In that situation, the landlord had to prove his case in terms of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. It is significant that the landlord has not claimed the protection and benefit of the special procedure contained in Section 13-A of the Act. Nor has be pleaded all the essential ingredients thereof. For example, he has not said that he is retiring within the time specified in that Section. And at present he is in service. So he is on the footing of any other landlord and had to prove his personal necessity like an ordinary litigant. 16. It is admitted by both sides that at present the family of Madan Lal is living at Jodhpur. Why he want to shift to Rohtak is not known. 17. It is not disputed that applicants father Sh. Roshan Lal was occupying as tenant a house within the municipal limits of Rohtak. It is also not disputed that on the death of Roshan Lal that tenancy was inherited. However, it is urged on behalf of the landlord that house is now in the occupation of applicants brother Sunil Kumar AW3. But if the tenancy has been inherited, then Madan Lal is also one of the inheritors. Why he has surrendered his rights in that tenancy, if he has surrendered them at all, is not known.
However, it is urged on behalf of the landlord that house is now in the occupation of applicants brother Sunil Kumar AW3. But if the tenancy has been inherited, then Madan Lal is also one of the inheritors. Why he has surrendered his rights in that tenancy, if he has surrendered them at all, is not known. In fact, the applicant admits in his statement as AW1 that he has right to live in that house. In this situation, it was incumbent on the applicant to prove that the accommodation falling to his share in that house was not enough for his family. But nothing of the sort has been done. 18. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant made an application for additional evidence saying that now it had come to his notice that Madan Lal was owning house No. 99 Hauz Khas, New Delhi since 1982 and was occupying the same but he had not disclosed this fact either in his ejectment application or in his statement in the Court. Appellant prayed that he be allowed to lead evidence to prove his allegations in this behalf. With the application, he filed photostat copies of documents including the possession slip. A notice of this application was given to the landlord who, in his reply, did not deny the appellants allegations of fact but only said that according to Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act, the only bar was that he should not be occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned. This plea is correct so far as the legal aspect of the matter is concerned. But here it is the fact of his having a house at Delhi which is relevant for determining the bonafides of his claim that he wants to shift to Rohtak. As stated above, no reasons have been given why he wants to shift to Rohtak and the fact of his having a house at Delhi further weakens his case on the bonafides of his desire to shift to Rohtak. So does his concealment of this fact. 19. In this situation, it has to be held that the landlord has failed to prove that he has bonafide personal necessity for the premises in question." 8. On all other issues namely issues No. 1, 1-A 3, 5 and 7, the findings of the learned Rent Controller were upheld.
So does his concealment of this fact. 19. In this situation, it has to be held that the landlord has failed to prove that he has bonafide personal necessity for the premises in question." 8. On all other issues namely issues No. 1, 1-A 3, 5 and 7, the findings of the learned Rent Controller were upheld. The appeal of the tenant-respondents was accepted and the cross-objections filed by the landlord-petitioner were dismissed. 9. Mr. S.C. Kapoor, learned counsel for the landlord-petitioner has argued that the purpose and nature of the demised premises whether it was residential or non-residential has to be determined at the time when it was rented. According to the learned counsel, the distinction between residential and non-residential premises has extinguished on account of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab, 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 672 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 857. For this proposition, the learned counsel has also placed reliance on the judgments of this Court, which had been rendered after following the judgment in Harbilas Rai Bansals case by this Court in respect of the provisions of the Act namely Ved Prakash Gupta v. State of Haryana, 1997(2) RCR(Rent) 160 (P&H) : 1997 HRR 461 and M/s Shiv Shankar House Private Limited v. Anant Pal Singh Grewal, 1997(2) RCR(Rent) 701 (P&H) : 1997 HRR 622. Accordingly, the learned counsel has stressed whether the demised premises is residential or non-residential, it would not have any material effect because after the judgments in Harbilas Rai and Ved Parkash Guptas cases (supra), the ground of personal necessity can be availed by a landlord even in respect of non-residential premises. According to the learned counsel, the Appellate Authority on 19.12.1988 could not have noticed the law as pronounced in the afore-mentioned judgments and, therefore, the view of the Appellate Authority is liable to be reversed. The learned counsel has further pointed out that house in Delhi owned by the landlord-petitioner as referred by the Appellate Authority in para 18 cannot be taken into consideration and is absolutely irrelevant because what is required to be shown is that the landlord-petitioner needed the demised premises for occupation of his family in that urban area. According to the learned counsel, to show the lack of bonafide any other house has to be situated in the urban area i.e. in the Rohtak urban area.
According to the learned counsel, to show the lack of bonafide any other house has to be situated in the urban area i.e. in the Rohtak urban area. Therefore, the learned counsel has asserted that the findings of the learned Appellate Authority are liable to be set-aside on issue No. 6 and the ejectment order deserves to be issued. The learned counsel has further urged that the observation made by the learned Appellate Authority in para 17 treating Sunil Kumar AW-3 as tenant would not be correct because under Section 2(h) of the Act, tenancy can be inherited by such heirs who are mentioned in the schedule and also who were ordinarily residing with the original tenant at the time of his death. Therefore, according to the learned counsel since Sunil Kumar was not residing in the premises as he lived outside, he would not acquire tenancy rights by inheritance. 10. The learned counsel referred to para 21 with regard to sub-letting of the demised premises and argued that once it was held that Ram Kishan and Amir Chand were inducted as tenants then Satish Kumar cannot be considered to have inherited the tenancy because according to the statement of RW-1 Lajpat Rai, Satish Kumar tenant-respondent No. 2 started living in the quarter at the back of shop No. 181 separately since 1976-77 as he has been working in a cooperative store. Therefore, the findings are contrary to the statement made by Lajpat Rai RW-1. The learned counsel has further argued that there has been change of user and the findings recorded in para 22 under issue No. 5 by the Lower Appellate Court are absolutely wrong because the shops were rented for business and there was a baithak, which was rented for residential purposes. The tenant-respondents converted the shop for residential purpose and, therefore, effected the change of user, which would result into their ejectment. 11. The learned counsel has also submitted that there are material alterations impairing the value and utility of the demised premises. For the afore-mentioned arguments, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the report of the Local Commissioner PW 2/3 and the site plan. He has also extensively referred to the statement of Lajpat Rai where he stated that there are separate ration cards for all the named persons, in front there are shops and at the back there are houses.
For the afore-mentioned arguments, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the report of the Local Commissioner PW 2/3 and the site plan. He has also extensively referred to the statement of Lajpat Rai where he stated that there are separate ration cards for all the named persons, in front there are shops and at the back there are houses. He also pointed out that the door at the back of the shop has been permanently closed. For the afore-mentioned proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on two unreported judgments of this Court in CR No. 685 of 1986, Jeevan Dass v. Rai Singh decided on 20.2.2003 and CR No. 3468 of 1998, Amrit Lal Kapoor v. Sunil Kumar and others decided on 21.8.1998. The learned counsel has argued that in the afore-mentioned judgments, the verandah was converted into residential or commercial purposes, which has been considered sufficient to sustain the ground of material alteration. He has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Eakir Chand v. Anguri Devi, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 416 (P&H) : 1998 HRR 444 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar v. Roshan Lal, 1993 HRR 341. 12. Mr. Harsh Kinra, learned counsel for the tenant-respondents has argued that in order to succeed in getting an ejectment order under Section 13(3)(a)(v) of the Act, the certificate is required to be issued by the competent authority as envisaged by the afore-mentioned provision namely prescribed authority under Section 7 of the 1925 Act. The learned counsel has made a reference to Section 5 of the 1925 Act which requires that the certificate has to be in form C as shown in the Schedule. The certificate issued in the present case is not on the prescribed form and, therefore, cannot be considered to have been issued by a competent authority. The learned counsel further argued that the landlord failed to state that he required the demised premises for occupation of his family. In the absence of any assertion by the landlord-petitioner in his deposition before the Court, the ground of necessity by the landlord-petitioner cannot be deemed to be established as has been laid down by this Court in the case of Raunki Ram v. Rajinder Pal Sood, 1984(2) Rent Law Reporter 146.
In the absence of any assertion by the landlord-petitioner in his deposition before the Court, the ground of necessity by the landlord-petitioner cannot be deemed to be established as has been laid down by this Court in the case of Raunki Ram v. Rajinder Pal Sood, 1984(2) Rent Law Reporter 146. The learned counsel has also argued that these are concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on the issue of change of user, material alterations and sub- letting which are on sufficient evidence and this Court in its revisional jurisdiction under sub-section (6) of Section 15 ordinarily would not enter into re-appreciation of evidence unless it is found that the findings are absolutely perverse and no reasonable man would reach the conclusion recorded by the Courts on the basis of the available evidence. 13. I have thoughtfully considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and am of the view that the views of the Appellate Authority on issue No. 6 reversing the findings of the learned Rent Controller deserve to be set aside and that of the Rent Controller merits to be restored because of radical change of law concerning personal necessity. It is no longer permissible to make a distinction between residential and non-residential premises as held by the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansals case (supra). Once the ejectment petition filed by the landlord-petitioner is found to be maintainable then the question for consideration would be whether the landlord-petitioner requires the demised premises for the occupation of his family bonafide or not. The distinction between commercial and residential accommodation has come to an end after Harbilass case (supra) for establishing the ground of personal necessity. This Court in Ved Parkashs case (supra) applied the principles laid down in Harbilass case (supra) to the provisions of the Act holding that any distinction between residential and commercial accommodation for establishing the ground of personal necessity is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The views of this Court in Ved Prakashs case (supra) read as under :- "It will thus be seen that by virtue of amendment made in the year 1956 the words "non-residential building" were omitted, meaning thereby that the ground for personal necessity was to be confined to rented land only.
The views of this Court in Ved Prakashs case (supra) read as under :- "It will thus be seen that by virtue of amendment made in the year 1956 the words "non-residential building" were omitted, meaning thereby that the ground for personal necessity was to be confined to rented land only. The Honble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the amendment of 1956 could not be justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, this amendment was constitutionally invalid and a further direction was issued that as a consequence, the original provision of the Punjab Act, i.e. prior to the amendment Act of 1956 was deemed to be restored. 6. As already mentioned above, Mr. Mittals arguments flow from the provisions of Section 13(3-A) of the Haryana Act which reads as under :- "In the case of non-residential building, a landlord who stands retired or discharged from the armed forces of the Union of India or who was a minor son at the time of death of the deceased landlord, and, requires for its personal use, may within a period of three years from the date of retirement or discharge or attaining the age of eighteen years, as the case may be, apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession : Provided that where the landlord has obtained possession of a non- residential building under this sub-section, he shall not be entitled to apply again for the possession of any other non-residential building of the same class". A bare look at this sub-section shows that only a limited category of landlord have been given this benefit, whereas the vast majority have been denied the same. Mr. Mittals argument stands repelled by the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansals case (supra) : "The observations of the Constitution Bench that "bona fide need of the landlord will stand very much on the same footing in regard to either class of premises, residential or commercial" fully support the view we have taken, that the classification created by the amendment has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in earlier part of the judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck down". 7.
We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in earlier part of the judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck down". 7. The stand of the petitioner in the present writ petition as also in Harbilas Rai Bansals case before the Supreme Court was that no distinction could be drawn with regard to the ground for ejectment between the residential or non-residential buildings on the ground of personal necessity. Merely because section 13(13-A) of the Haryana Act does give some relief to a certain category of landlords i.e. retired or discharged defence personnel and minor sons of the deceased landlord with regard to ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal necessary does not mean that the judgment of the Supreme Court becomes inapplicable. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the word "residential" in sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Section 13 of the Act is liable to be struck down and it has to be held that the ground for ejectment made out therein would be uniformly applicable to all categories of buildings." 14. The Appellate Authority did not take the correct view with regard to availability of the residential accommodation being 99 Hauz Khas, New Delhi because necessity to occupy the house has to be in the `urban area concerned. The bar created by Sections 13(3)(a)(i) and 13(3)(b) of the Act would not be attracted in cases where the property is situated outside the `urban area in respect of which personal necessity has been pleaded. The landlords may have other building situated in the other `urban area but no one can force him or his family to reside at a place other than the one requires to occupy or establish his business. It is the `urban area in respect of which an application for ejectment has been made which would be material and any building vacated or available for occupation in that urban area would attract the bar created by Sections 13(3)(a)(i) and 13(3)(b) of the Act. The building situated outside the urban area and not required by the landlord for occupation of his family would not be covered. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 354 (SC) : 2000(4) SCC 285 the Supreme Court considered the bar created by Section 13(3)(b) of the Act.
The building situated outside the urban area and not required by the landlord for occupation of his family would not be covered. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 354 (SC) : 2000(4) SCC 285 the Supreme Court considered the bar created by Section 13(3)(b) of the Act. The aforementioned provision provides that the landlord moving an application seeking ejectment of the tenant is required to show that he is not in occupation of any other rented land of premises and has not vacated any such premises. The Supreme Court held that the Court has to be satisfied that the land or building from which eviction has been obtained belong to the same class of building or rented land. A distinction has been made in the kind of properties or the land from which ejectment is sought situated within the same urban area. However, in the present case, the Appellate Authority has non- suited the landlord-respondent by refering in para 18 of the judgment that house situated at Hauz Khas, New Delhi would be a relevant factor for deciding whether he would need the residential accommodation in the `urban area of Rohtak. The house situated at Delhi would not be a relevant consideration because it is only the house/property situated in urban area concerned which is relevant for consideration of the bar created by the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(i) and 13(3)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the view taken by the Appellate Authority is unsustainable in the eyes of law. 15. The other argument that there is change of user, material alteration impairing the value and utility by covering the verandah into residential or commercial purposes by the tenant-respondent or that there is sub-letting cannot be entertained because it would involve re-appreciation of evidence which is impermissible in law. Both the Courts below have concurrently found all those grounds without any substance. It is well settled principle of law that revisional powers of this Court under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act cannot be treated equivalent to the appellate powers and the distinction between the revisional jurisdiction and the appellate jurisdiction has to be maintained as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rapat Ali v. Sugni Bai, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 660 (SC) : 1999(1) SCC 133.
Therefore, no interference is called for in the findings of facts on these issues which are hereby affirmed. 16. The argument raised on behalf of the tenant-respondent that no assertion has been made by the landlord-petitioner in his deposition before the Court that the demised premises are required for occupation for the member of the family of the landlord-petitioner would also not require any detailed examination because firstly, no such plea has been raised before the Appellate Authority and secondly specific plea has been raised in para 4(b) of the ejectment petition. On the contrary, the landlord-petitioner has made assertion in the replication that his family is presently residing at Jodhpur and needed the accommodation at Rohtak. Moreover he has specifically stated in his statement while appearing as PW 1 that he needed the accommodation for his personal use and he has not vacated any property. Therefore, it cannot be accepted in the revisional jurisdiction that the landlord-petitioner does not require the accommodation for his own use and to be occupied by his family. The other contention raised by the tenant-respondent that the certificate as required by Section 5 of the 1925 Act in Form C of the Schedule has to be rejected because it is not disputed that the landlord-petitioner has been a member of the Armed Forces and is posted in hard areas. The form of certificate would not change the afore-mentioned fact and it has to be held to be directory in nature. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention. For the afore-mentioned reasons this petition succeeds and the tenant- respondents are ordered to be ejected from the demised premises. They shall handover vacant possession of the demised premises within a period of four months from today.