JUDGMENT - KOCHAR R.J., J.:—The appellants, who were the original petitioners in the above mentioned Letters Patent Appeals, are the School Teachers who were aggrieved by their respective orders of termination from service by the school management and who had approached the School Tribunal by filing appeals under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") challenging the legality and validity of the impugned orders of termination. They appear to have been dismissed from the employment way of punishment for alleged acts of their misconducts after an enquiry held by the school management. The School Tribunal by impugned order dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants by a common judgment and order dated 27-3-1986. 2.The appellants were aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the school Tribunal and, therefore, they approached this Court by filing writ petitions invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of the School Tribunal on the grounds inter alia of the inquiry not being in accordance with the Rules 36 and 37 of the Rules. The appellants had also denied the charges of misconduct levelled against them and they also challenged the legality and validity of the suspension from service during the pendency of inquiry. According to the appellants they had no reasonable and adequate opportunity of defending themselves in the inquiry as the mandatory procedures prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act were not observed. The learned Single Judge by his common judgment and order dated 1-12-1999 was pleased to dismiss the writ petitions by recording the grounds and reasons for his conclusion to dismiss the petitions. The appellants have filed the present Letters Patent Appeals under Article 15 of the Letters Patent questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 3.Before we deal with the contention of Shri P.C. Madkholkar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, it is pertinent to note that one of the dismissed teachers viz., Smt. Nirmala Gowardhan Ukey appears to have approached the School Tribunal to challenge her order of dismissal from employment by filing an appeal under section 9 of the Act before the School Tribunal. She was earlier in the point of time. She was earlier in the point of time. She also appears to have raised the very same points before the School Tribunal and lost at that stage. The School Tribunal had dismissed her appeal by recording the reasons in his order dated 27-3-1986. The said school teacher was aggrieved by the said order and therefore, she filed a writ petition before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. At the relevant time, under the Rules of the High Court Appellate Side, the petition was placed before the Division Bench of this Court. On behalf of the said teacher, the very same points were urged before the learned Judges of the Division Bench. By their judgment and order dated 5-3-1990 the writ petition was dismissed. We have closely gone through the judgment of the Division Bench and we find that the learned Judges have dealt with the very same points of challenge to the orders of termination before us. The principal issues raised before the learned Judges were in respect of the Constitution of the Inquiry Committee not being in compliance with the Rules and that the nominee of the teachers in the Inquiry Committee was not intimated about the date of the inquiry and therefore, he was not able to take part in the inquiries held against the teachers. On both the points, the learned Judges have set out the facts in detail and have turned down the contentions of the petitioner teacher before them. The Division Bench entirely agreed with the findings recorded by the School Tribunal and dismissed the said writ petition. We may further add that the Division Bench has considered all the material aspects and grounds raised before them against the judgment and order of the School Tribunal. The Division Bench has concluded that the inquiry held against the teacher was not in violation of the prescribed Rules and therefore there was no illegality or infirmity in the order of termination and consequently in the final judgment of the Tribunal. The Division Bench positively held that Inquiry Committee was properly constituted and the intimation regarding the date of the enquiry was given to the petitioner and her nominee on the Enquiry Committee but both failed to participate in the enquiry proceedings. The Division Bench positively held that Inquiry Committee was properly constituted and the intimation regarding the date of the enquiry was given to the petitioner and her nominee on the Enquiry Committee but both failed to participate in the enquiry proceedings. 4.In the present appeals challenging the order of the learned Single Judge, we find that the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench was placed and cited before the learned Single Judge by the school management to urge that the Division Bench had already considered and concluded all the issues raised in the petitions before the learned Single Judge. In the aforesaid circumstances it was argued on behalf of the school management that these teachers were terminated from employment on account of the alleged acts of misconduct after holding an enquiry against each of them and they had failed before the School Tribunal in their challenge to the orders of the termination and one of them had filed her appeal before the Tribunal at an earlier point of time and she having lost in her appeal, she approached the Division Bench of this Court raising all the contentions which were similar and that the Division Bench had rejected all of them. Since the Division Bench of this Court has dealt with same and similar points which were being canvassed before the learned Single Judge, the writ petition should be dismissed as there was no scope for the learned Single Judge to take any different view from the decision of the Division Bench. 5.The learned Single Judge accepted the submissions urged on behalf of the school management and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the present appellants. The learned Single Judge has set out the grounds of challenges to the order of the School Tribunal and has specifically observed that the questions of facts which were urged before him were not pleaded nor urged in the appeal before the School Tribunal. At the same time, the learned Single Judge was duty bound to follow the judgment of the Division Bench on the said points as it was only a difference in the name of the teacher who was before the Division Bench. Otherwise all the facts and contentions raised before the Division Bench and before the Single Judge were more or less the same. Otherwise all the facts and contentions raised before the Division Bench and before the Single Judge were more or less the same. 6.We have heard Shri P.C. Madkholkar, the learned Counsel for the appellants and Shri Y.B. Phadnis, the learned Counsel for the school management. We have closely gone through the proceedings as we are called upon to finally decide these appeals at the admission stage itself. Shri P.C. Madkholkar in his usual fairness accepted that some of the contentions, which he has raised before us, were not raised before the Tribunal or before the learned Single Judge. He has, however, tried to urge that the entire action of the school management was contrary to the mandatory Rules 36 and 37 framed under the Rules. He also made out a point that the inquiry was not in strict compliance with the said Rules and, therefore, the orders terminating the appellants from employment were vitiated. According to him, the time schedule which is prescribed under the rules was not adhered to by the school management. The learned Counsel strenuously urged that the time table prescribed in the said Rules is of mandatory nature and must be strictly observed and if there is any infraction or departure from the time table the whole action would fall to the ground. According to Shri Madkholkar, the appellants had no opportunity of hearing before the Inquiry Committee which was not constituted in accordance with the rules. He further submitted that before receiving the written explanation to the charge-sheet the school management had hurriedly formed or constituted the Inquiry Committee. According to him, the Management could not constitute Inquiry Committee before receipt of the written explanation. As the management had already constituted an Inquiry Committee before receipt of the written explanation, the disciplinary proceedings smack of mala fides and, therefore, the action of the Management suffers from colourable exercise of the powers. He also pointed out that though the appellants had nominated their representative on 12-3-1985 he had no intimations of the enquiry which was held and concluded on 14-5-1985 in the absence of the representative of the appellants. The third point which the learned Counsel urged was that the termination of the appellants from service were with retrospective effect that is to say the appellants were terminated from service by a common order dated 31-5-1985 with effect from 4-2-1985. The third point which the learned Counsel urged was that the termination of the appellants from service were with retrospective effect that is to say the appellants were terminated from service by a common order dated 31-5-1985 with effect from 4-2-1985. Shri P.C. Madkholkar stressed that since the termination orders are with retrospective effect they are wholly illegal and totally vitiated and, therefore, the appellants must succeed even on that count, says the learned Counsel. The learned Counsel also whispered that all the facts and contentions were not properly placed before the Tribunal as well as before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, the appellants have suffered injustice. 7.The learned Counsel for the respondents has countered the attack of the learned Counsel for the appellants mainly on the basis of the trump card of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. According to him, all the facts and contentions were the same and similar and the Division Bench has squarely dealt with them and has concluded those issues. According to the learned Counsel, the judgment of the Division Bench, is binding on this Court and, therefore, even as a Court of Letters Patent Appeal, the judgment of the Division Bench in a writ petition is binding on the Appellate Court. He also pointed out that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and the Management could not be faulted with if the nominee of the appellants was not present at the time of the inquiry though he had intimation. The fact that he had intimation has been established before the school Tribunal and also before the Division Bench. He was the common nominee for all the teachers in the common inquiry. According to him, the learned Single Judge has rightly followed the judgment of the Division Bench and has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants and that there is absolutely no scope for this Court to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. He, however, had no reply to the submissions of Shri P.C. Madkholkar that the termination orders were with retrospective effect. He candidly submitted that, that was a fact that all the teachers were terminated from employment by the Orders dated 31-5-1985 with effect from 4-2-1985. He, however, had no reply to the submissions of Shri P.C. Madkholkar that the termination orders were with retrospective effect. He candidly submitted that, that was a fact that all the teachers were terminated from employment by the Orders dated 31-5-1985 with effect from 4-2-1985. He, however, submitted that by itself this fact will not vitiate the termination orders which were properly passed after following the procedure of issuing the charge-sheet, calling upon the delinquents to submit their written explanation and after holding a fair and proper enquiry which has been held by the School Tribunal and also the Division Bench of this Court to be fair and proper. 8.At the outset we wish to brush aside the whispering submissions made by the learned Counsel that all the points were not properly placed before the Tribunal and also before the learned Single Judge. We have perused the judgment of the School Tribunal and also the judgment of the Division Bench. We do not find any substance in the grievances made by the learned Counsel. According to us, whatever points were urged by Shri P.C. Madkholkar, the same were urged before the School Tribunal, before the Division Bench and also before the learned Single Judge in the case of the present appellants. It is also admitted that the contentions which are based on the facts were not pleaded before the Tribunal and, therefore, the Management had no opportunity to meet the same. It is only the question of language and form of submission that perhaps may make some difference but according to us the contents of the submissions are the same though the learned Counsel has skillfully elaborated his points stressing the time table part of the Rules 36 and 37. We, however, do not find any substance in the strenuous submission of Shri P.C. Madkholkar that the time table prescribed in the Rules was missed by the school management. Merely because there is some variation in the Schedule prescribed in the Rules, it cannot be said that the entire disciplinary action would vitiate only on the ground. We have to see whether the principles of natural justice have been substantially complied with or not before a delinquent is punished. We have to see whether he had reasonable and adequate opportunity to meet the charges and to defend himself in the enquiry. We have to see whether the principles of natural justice have been substantially complied with or not before a delinquent is punished. We have to see whether he had reasonable and adequate opportunity to meet the charges and to defend himself in the enquiry. It cannot be urged that as the management has constitutes an Inquiry Committee soon after the issuance of the charge-sheet without waiting for receipt of the written explanation within the prescribed period, the whole disciplinary action would fall to the ground. The learned Counsel has stretched the point of interpretation of the Rules too far and it is not possible for us to go that far with the learned Counsel to strike down the inquiry on the ground that though the charge-sheets were issued to the appellants, the action of the management in constituting Inquiry Committee before receipt of the written explanation, had caused any prejudice to the appellants. We do not see any illegality or impropriety in the innocent act of the management to constitute an Inquiry Committee even simultaneously with the issuance of the charge-sheet. It is no doubt true that the Rule is prescribed that the Inquiry Committee should be constituted after receipt of the written explanation to the charge-sheet. Merely because Inquiry Committee is constituted in advance before the last date of receipt of the written explanation as prescribed under the Rules, the enquiry cannot be said to suffer from any illegality on that account. The appellants have not shown any prejudice caused to them in that respect. The facts remain that the appellants were charge-sheeted and were called upon to submit their written explanation which they submitted. The appellants were also called upon to nominate their representative in the Inquiry Committee which was done by the appellants. The appellants were intimated the date of the inquiry on the specified date. The appellants failed to appear before the Enquiry Committee. Even their nominee was not present on a spacious ground that he had no intimation. It was the duty of the appellants to remain present before the Inquiry Committee with their nominee or to have prayed for adjournment to enable their nominee to attend the inquiry if he was not available. Even the appellants did not care to take part in the inquiry and, therefore, the Inquiry Committee consisting of the two members had proceeded ex parte. Even the appellants did not care to take part in the inquiry and, therefore, the Inquiry Committee consisting of the two members had proceeded ex parte. The findings and conclusion recorded by the Inquiry Committee were forwarded to the appellants for their reply as prescribed under the Rules. The appellants had submitted their replies on 22-5-1985. The School Management was not satisfied with the said replies and, therefore, had issued the orders to termination dated 31-5-1985. According to us, there is absolutely no illegality, impropriety or mala fides or colourable exercise on the part of the management in terminating the appellants from employment. The appellants had reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend themselves in the charges levelled against them. They knew what were the charges and they were called upon to submit their written explanation. They had accordingly submitted their written explanation. They were also required to nominate their nominee in the Inquiry Committee as required under the Rules. The nominee had accepted that nominations and had given his consent. The nominee, however, failed to attend on the specified date of the Enquiry i.e. 14-5-1985. On that date, the Enquiry proceeded ex parte in the absence of the appellants and their nominee. If the appellants have chosen to remain away from the inquiry, inspite of the due intimation, it cannot be said that the Management has violated the principles of natural justice or has violated the Rules. The Management had thereafter forwarded the summary and the enquiry proceedings and had called upon the appellants to submit their apply. The appellants had according submitted their reply. The School Management thereafter had passed the orders of termination of the appellants from employment. In the entire process, we do not find any infraction of the principles of natural justice or any prejudice caused to the appellants. The only factor which was given emphasis by Shri P.C. Madkholkar, was that the management had constituted Inquiry Committee before the last date of submission of the written explanation. It appears that the charge-sheet dated 21-12-1984 was issued to the appellants and the last date for written explanation was 7-1-1985 under the Rules. It appears that the management had constituted Inquiry Committee on 5-1-1985. It appears that the charge-sheet dated 21-12-1984 was issued to the appellants and the last date for written explanation was 7-1-1985 under the Rules. It appears that the management had constituted Inquiry Committee on 5-1-1985. According to Shri P.C. Madkholkar, the Inquiry Committee ought to have been constituted after 7-1-1985 and as that was not done, that was contrary to the mandatory Rules 36 and 37 to vitiate the whole inquiry. It is not at all possible for us to agree with the same far fetched submissions of the learned Counsel. The time frame, which is prescribed in the Rule, is to check and prevent the School Management from indulging in undue delay in the disciplinary proceedings to cause avoidable hardship to the teachers. The time frame cannot be taken as an iron structure. The time frame cannot be construed to be strict and mandatory nature to be observed and any deviation of a few days therein to be violative of the principles of natural justice unless a serious prejudice is caused to the delinquent is shown. In the present case the Management has followed the entire framework of the principles of natural justice and no prejudice of any nature is shown or established by the appellants who appeared to have deliberately abstained from the inquiry. Indeed they denied themselves the opportunity of hearing. We, therefore, do not find any fault with the judgment and order of the School Tribunal in upholding the termination orders passed by the School Management being legal and proper. Besides, all the points have been squarely discussed and decided by the Division Bench and we are in respectful agreement with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Division Bench. 9.We can not accept the submissions of Shri Madkholkar that the Single Judge has committed an error in rejecting the petitions of the present appellants. We have considered extensively the facts and we cannot find fault with the conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge. There is absolutely no scope for the Letters Patent Court to interfere with a well reasoned order of a learned Single Judge unless it is patently illegal. We have considered extensively the facts and we cannot find fault with the conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge. There is absolutely no scope for the Letters Patent Court to interfere with a well reasoned order of a learned Single Judge unless it is patently illegal. The intra Court Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not to be mistaken as an ordinary appeal under section 96 or a revision under section 115 of the C.P.C. The L.P.A. jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order/judgment of a writ Court under Article 226 is narrower than that of the writ Court. The learned Judges hearing the Letters Patent Appeals have no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal merely because they do not agree with the plausible view taken by the learned Single Judge on the basis of cogent material before him unless it is perverse or patently illegal. Very often the following parameters of the Letters Patent jurisdiction are forgotten and are lost sight of and even simple and ordinary orders of routine nature get interfered with in the Letters Patent Court of appeal for subjective considerations and prejuices. The Supreme Court has in the judgment in the case of (Milkhiram (I) P. Ltd. v. Chamanlal Bros.)1, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1698 has of served as under which we cannot afford to forget. "No doubt an appeal lies against it under the Letters Patent but that is merely an internal appeal in a High Court which is not like an appeal under section 96 or a revision application under section 115." We do not find anything palpably wrong or illegality or miscarriage of justice in the well reasoned order of the learned Single Judge to warrant interference under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Parameters of judicial review equally apply to this jurisdiction which is an extra ordinary intra Court Appellate jurisdiction to correct its own mistakes, a unique feature of the Chartered High Courts. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals with no order as to costs. 10.We, however, must agree with the submission of Shri P.C. Madkholkar that the termination orders dated 31-5-1985 could not have retrospective effect from 4-2-1985. We, however, find that this point was not raised before the school Tribunal and before the Division Bench or before the learned Single Judge. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals with no order as to costs. 10.We, however, must agree with the submission of Shri P.C. Madkholkar that the termination orders dated 31-5-1985 could not have retrospective effect from 4-2-1985. We, however, find that this point was not raised before the school Tribunal and before the Division Bench or before the learned Single Judge. As they had no opportunity to deal with the said point, we cannot find any fault with the aforesaid orders as it is ingenuinty of the learned Counsel to have discovered and placed before this Court the said point on retrospectivity of the termination orders. We are, however, not able to strike down the disciplinary proceedings and the termination orders only on this ground that a retrospective effect was purported to be given by the School Management. It is true that every termination or dismissal order will be effective from the date of the order and it cannot have a retrospective effect at all. The consequence or the sequittur of such orders would be only to the effect of grant of wages or salary to the appellants. We, therefore, direct the School Management to pay the salary to the appellants up to 31-5-1985. We clarify, if the appellants were under suspension till the date of their dismissal, they will get the salary in accordance with the Rules. The appellants shall be entitled to get the salary from the date 4-2-1985 to 31-5-1985 as per the Rules. The School Management shall compute and send salary to the appellants within four weeks from today. The Letters Patent Appeals fail and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. -----