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2003 DIGILAW 769 (MAD)

Rani & Others v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others

2003-04-30

B.SUBHASHAN REDDY, C.NAGAPPAN

body2003
Judgment :- The Hon'ble The Chief Justice These 5 writ appeals emanate from the common order dated 3.10.2002, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.Nos.15595 of 1997 and batch. While there were 7 writ petitions before the learned single judge, the writ appeals are five in number against the orders in 4 of the writ petitions, which are detailed below. Writ Appeal Writ Petition 3128 of 2002 4283 of 1998 3129 of 2002 1569 of 1998 3130 of 2002 1570 of 1998 3214 & 3215 of 2002 15596 of 1997 2. Ms.Rani is the petitioner in W.P.No.4283 of 1998 and the appellant in W.A.No.3128 of 2002; Fr.John Joseph is the petitioner in W.P.No.1569 of 1998 and the appellant in W.A.No.3129 of 2002; Mr.Santhanarajan is the petitioner in W.P.No.1570 of 1998 and the appellant in W.A.No.3130 of 2002. The above appeals have been filed aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge in not quashing the Charge Sheet No.865 of 1997 dated 3.12.1997 filed in PRC No.21 of 1997 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate I Class, Kuzhithurai. 3. Writ Appeals 3214 and 3215 of 2002 have been filed by respondents 8 and 9 respectively in W.P.No.15596 of 1997, aggrieved by the order of the learned single judge directing prosecution, filing of the charge sheet and the trial against them, for the offences alleged. 4. The entire case centres around the complaint lodged by one Mrs.Franciscal Jeya W/o Mr.Joseph Alphonse against 1.John Joseph, 2.Santhanarajan, 3.Maria John, 4.Rani, 5.Femi, 6.Dr.Nagakandi for the offences punishable under Sections 366 read with 511, 376, 376 read with 511, 201, 302, 312 and 506(ii) of I.P.C, basing upon which FIR was registered in Crime No.917 of 1997 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Kuzhithurai Police Station, Kanyakumari District. The same was later on numbered as PRC No.21 of 1997 on the file of Judicial Magistrate I Class, Kuzhithurai, and after making necessary enquiry, the case was committed to Sessions Judge, Nagercoil and numbered as Sessions Case No.25 of 1998 for trial, and the said sessions judge was seized of the matter. 5. The same was later on numbered as PRC No.21 of 1997 on the file of Judicial Magistrate I Class, Kuzhithurai, and after making necessary enquiry, the case was committed to Sessions Judge, Nagercoil and numbered as Sessions Case No.25 of 1998 for trial, and the said sessions judge was seized of the matter. 5. We refer to the parties as arrayed in Writ Appeal No.3128 of 2002, which is as follows; The 1st respondent is the State of Tamil Nadu, 2nd respondent is the Director General of Police, 3rd respondent is the Superintendent of Police, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, 4th respondent is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, 5th respondent is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagercoil Town, Kanyakumari District, 6th respondent is the Joint Superintendent of Police, Thuckalay, Kanyakumari District, 7th respondent is the Inspector of Police, Kuzhithurai, Kanyakumari District, 8th respondent is Nanjilkumaran, I.P.S., Inspector General of Police, Economic Offences Wing, Chennai, 9th respondent is Abash Kumar, I.P.S., Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District, 10th respondent is Premkumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Nagercoil, 11th respondent is Pannerselvam, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagercoil Town, 12th respondent is Shailesh Kumar yadav, I.P.S., Commandant, TSP VI Battalian, Madurai and 13th respondent is Kaliamoorthy, Inspector of Police, Kulasekaran Police Station, Kanyakumari. 6. The main contention of Ms.Rani, Santhanarajan, Fr.John Joseph, the appellants in W.A.Nos.3128 to 3130 of 2002 is that they are not guilty of the offences charged with, and on the other hand, false complaints have been alleged against them by Franscial Jeya, at the instance of her husband Joseph Alphonse, and that the police officials including respondents 10 and 11, who are appellants W.A.Nos.3214 and 3215 of 2002 have colluded with them and instead of prosecuting the real culprit namely Joseph Alphonse, they have tortured them by subjecting them to inhuman treatment, mentioning the said acts in detail. They voiced their concern that since the State police officials are hand in glow with the real culprits, they may not get any justice at their hands and any other agency like CBI should conduct the investigation in Crime No.917 of 1997 and the charge sheet so far filed by the State Police, which has been mentioned above should be quashed. 7. 7. In W.P.No.15596 of 1997, which is the subject matter in Writ Appeal Nos.214 and 3215 of 2002, the prayer is to launch prosecution against the police officials, who involved in the torture. It is apt to extract the common prayer in W.P.Nos.1569, 1570 and 4283 of 1998, which is to the following effect. "Issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to Charge Sheet No.867 of 1997 dated 3.12.1997 filed in PRC No.21 of 1997, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate I Class, Kuzhithurai, who stands committed to the District Sessions Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, and taken on file as Sessions Case No.25 of 1998, quash the same and direct an impartial investigation in Crime No.917 of 1997 by the C.B.I. 8. Insofar as the prayer in W.P.No.15596 of 1997 is concerned, it is to the following effect; "To issue a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent i.e., the State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary to Government, Home Department, to conduct enquiry into the conduct of respondents 8 to 11 namely., M/s.Prem Kumar, Panner Selvam, Shailesh Yadav, Kaliamoorthy, and other police officials and constables relating to the torture and inhuman treatment of the arrested persons in Crime No.917 of 1997 of Kuzhithurai Police Station and prosecute them, in accordance with law, and render justice. 9. Before the learned single Judge Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned counsel had appeared for the writ petitioners. His argument was that inasmuch as the State police officials are not fair in investigating the crime and are prejudiced against the accused/writ petitioners, the charge sheet filed should be quashed and investigation should be conducted by CBI and apart from that the police officials, who indulged in acts of torture against the petitioners-accused should be prosecuted and punished, according to law. 10. The matter first came up before Justice E.PADMANABHAN and the petitioners-accused were sent for medical examination and thereafter, a direction was issued to the Principal District Judge, Tirunelveli to conduct an enquiry with regard to the allegations of torture against the petitioners-accused by the police officials and then file a report. After the filing of the said report, objections have been preferred in the shape of affidavits by the police officials, against whom acts of torture were made. After the filing of the said report, objections have been preferred in the shape of affidavits by the police officials, against whom acts of torture were made. Then the matter was finally heard by Justice M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, and after hearing the arguments of both sides, a common order was passed on 3.10.1992. The learned single Judge had negatived the plea for quashing the charge sheet, but had acceded to the plea of prosecuting the police officials. Writ Appeal Nos.3128 to 3130 of 2002 have been preferred by the 3 accused named above for negativing their plea for quashing the charge sheet and in not directing the C.B.I. investigation. Writ Appeal Nos.3214 and 3215 of 2002 have been filed by two police officials against the direction for their prosecution. The directions are to the following effect; (i) The first respondent, namely, the State of Tamil Nadu is directed to launch prosecution through C.B.C.I.D. against premkumar, former D.S.P., Special Branch, Nagercoil and Panneerselvam, former D.S.P. of Nagercoil Town, who were involved in the offences relating to the illegal custody of the injured persons and torture committed on them, especially on women, viz., witness No.4 Sahaya Rani and witness No.5 Femina Rose. (ii) On passing suitable orders by the State Government, the C.B.C.I.D. shall record the statement of the injured Femina Rose and register F.I.R. against Premkumar and Panneerselvam, the D.S.Ps. for the appropriate offences and shall record the statements of the other injured persons and other witnesses examined before the Principal District Judge, Tirunelveli, the Team of Doctors and any other witnesses to be produced and collect other materials, if any, and launch prosecution against the two named police officials by filing the final report before the appropriate Court within three months from the date of receipt of this order. On entertaining the said final report launching prosecution against the police officials concerned, the Court concerned would go on with the proceedings in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order. (iii) The observations in this order would not affect the merits of the prosecution in S.C.No.25 of 1998. The trial Court can go on with the trial uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order. (iii) The observations in this order would not affect the merits of the prosecution in S.C.No.25 of 1998. The trial Court can go on with the trial uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order. Since the offences in S.C.No.25 of 1998 would relate to different transaction, the trial Court need not wait till the prosecution is launched against R8 and R9, the police officials, and go on with the trial in S.C.No.25 of 1998 and finish the same as expeditiously as possible. 11. While the above directives (i) and (ii) are assailed by Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the two police officials, by supporting the directive (iii), Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the 3 appellants-accused supports the said directives issued by the learned single Judge in Clauses (i) and (ii), but opposes to the one contained in Clause (iii) stating that the said proceedings contained in S.C.No.25 of 1998 are fit to be quashed by ordering fresh investigation by C.B.I. 12. Either side relied upon the judicial precedents of the Supreme Court. While Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned counsel for the accused relied upon the judgments rendered in RAM SARAN DASS V. THE STATE OF PUNJAB (1967 SLR 771); KASHMERI DEVI V. DELHI ADMN. (AIR 1988 SC 1223); ARVINDER SINGH BAGGA V. STATE OF U.P. ( AIR 1995 SC 117 ); and HEMANT DHASMANA V. CBI ( 2001 (7) SCC 536 ), the learned Public Prosecutor and Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel had relied upon the decisions in MATAJOG DOBEY V. H.C.BHARI ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ); ABHINANDAN JHA V. DINESH MISHRA ( AIR 1968 SC 117 ); STATE OF BIHAR V. J.A.C. ( 1980 (1) SCC 554 ); STATE OF BIHAR V. P.P.SHARMA (1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 192); MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN V. STATE OF GUJARAT (1997 (4) Crl. L.J. 4059); COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. S.VASUDEVA ( 2000 (2) SCC 439 ); and STATE OF KARANATAKA V. M.DEVENDRAPPA ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 13. L.J. 4059); COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. S.VASUDEVA ( 2000 (2) SCC 439 ); and STATE OF KARANATAKA V. M.DEVENDRAPPA ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 13. In Matajog Dobey Case (cited supra) a five Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with two issues vis., (i) Whether Section 197 of Cr.P.C., which mandates prior sanction of the Government for prosecuting its officials for the acts while discharging their official duties is discriminative, infracting Article 14 of the Indian Constitution vis-Ã -vis other non-official culprits; (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of that case, Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was applicable. We are not concerned with the first issue, as it is not relevant here. The second issue is important, as the facts in the said case, which are exactly similar in the instant one, have got bearing on the issue of applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. In the said case, the police officers were investigating into some offences on the complaints made and they were on two different dates. Two prosecutions were launched against them on the ground that they have tortured and assaulted the accused during the course of investigation, rendering themselves liable for punishment for the offences under Sections 323, 324 and 504 of I.P.C. Two cases went before two different magistrates. The first magistrate has upheld the plea of the police-accused that for want of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. the accused were liable to be discharged and they were so discharged. The said order of discharge was affirmed by the Chief Presidency magistrate and further by the High Court. But, it was contra before the 2nd magistrate, who has negatived the plea of applicability of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. But, ultimately the Bombay High Court held that protective umbrella of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was available. The matters ultimately landed in the Supreme Court. The argument advanced on the side of the complainant was threefold. But, it was contra before the 2nd magistrate, who has negatived the plea of applicability of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. But, ultimately the Bombay High Court held that protective umbrella of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was available. The matters ultimately landed in the Supreme Court. The argument advanced on the side of the complainant was threefold. (i) an act of criminal assault or wrongful confinement can never be regarded as an act done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty; (ii) that in a case where the duty is clearly defined by statute and warrant of authority, such acts could never come within the scope of employment; and (iii) that in any case, it was the duty of the Court to allow the prosecution to proceed and not stifle it in limine. Repelling the arguments, it was held by the Supreme Court that the accusation related to the acts committed by the police, which definitely related to the performance of their official duties and as such, sanction was necessary. 14. In the instant case also, the acts complained of by the writ petitioner relate to the investigation and the alleged excesses and criminal acts committed by the appellant police officials in the course of detection and investigation of the criminal offence in No.917 of 1997 on the file of the Kuzhithurai Police Station and as such, requires prior sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN's case, cited supra, deals with the effect of want of proper sanction for prosecution as contemplated under law. In the said case, an officer in the Medium Irrigation Project of Gujarat State was prosecuted for the offences under Section 161 Indian Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and was convicted by the Special Judge. The said conviction was sustained in the High Court. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, a prime contention was raised regarding the sustainability of the conviction for want of sanction for prosecution under Section 6 of the prevention of Corruption Act. The said conviction was sustained in the High Court. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, a prime contention was raised regarding the sustainability of the conviction for want of sanction for prosecution under Section 6 of the prevention of Corruption Act. Government had contested the said plea pointing out that there was in fact a sanction granted by it to prosecute the appellant therein, but the Supreme Court repelled the contention of the Government stating that the sanction granted by it was not voluntary and such involuntary sanction at the behest of the High Court was invalid in law. It is apt to extract some passages of the Judgment of the Supreme Court, and the same is as follows; "19. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution. 20. The narration of facts, set out in the beginning of the judgment, would show that while the matter of grant of sanction was under the consideration of the State Government, Harshadrai had filed a petition on behalf of his firm in the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government to grant sanction. In this petition, the Secretary of the Department who, originally was not impleaded, was, subsequently, arrayed as Respondent 7 and a direction was issued to him to grant sanction and the Secretary, acting in pursuance of the order of the High Court, granted the sanction." "33. The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant situation. While the Act gave him the discretion to sanction or not to sanction the prosecution of the appellant, the judgment gave him no choice except to sanction the prosecution as any other decision would have exposed him to an action in contempt for not obeying the mandamus issued by the High Court. The High Court assumed the role of the sanctioning authority, considered the whole matter, formed an opinion that it was a fit case in which sanction should be granted and because it itself could not grant sanction under Section 6 of the Act, it directed the Secretary to sanction the prosecution so that the sanction order may be treated to be an order passed by the Secretary and not that of the High Court. This is a classic case where a brand name is changed to give a new colour to the package without changing the contents thereof. In these circumstances, the sanction order cannot but be held to be wholly erroneous having been passed mechanically at the instance of the High Court." The Supreme Court has set aside the conviction on the ground of want of valid sanction for prosecution under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 16. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is analogous to Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 requiring previous sanction of the Government for prosecution. Admittedly, in the instant case, there is no such sanction obtained by the prosecution under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and even if a sanction is ordered by the Government pursuant to the directives issued by the learned single Judge, it would be invalid under law, as the same would be involuntary, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case mentioned supra. 17. Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned counsel has cited the decision in HEMANT DHASMANA's case (supra) for the purpose of construing the word 'police' as including CBI also. 17. Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned counsel has cited the decision in HEMANT DHASMANA's case (supra) for the purpose of construing the word 'police' as including CBI also. There is no difficulty in treating the CBI as also 'police' within the meaning of Section 173 (8) of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is also no difficulty to order investigation by CBI or CB CID as was ordered by the learned single Judge should the circumstances warrant. Even while facts differ in HEMANT DHASMANA's case, ABHINANDAN JHA's case, J.A.C. SALDANHA's case and M. DEVENDRAPPA's case (supra), the legal principles deducible from them are about the powers of the High Court in interfering either at the stage of investigation or at the stage of pendency of proceedings before the Magistrate or the Special Judge as the case may be. In P.P. SHARMA's case (supra) and M. DEVENDRAPPA's case (supra), the High Court interfered with the prosecution at the stage of pendency before the Court of Special Judge and Magistrate respectively, but the Supreme Court had reversed the said orders passed by the High Court laying down the legal principles clearly that unless facts, as stated by the prosecution without requiring the probe further, do not disclose any semblance of case for the prosecution against the accused, no interference is called for at the stage of enquiry by the lower court. In the above cases, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had exceeded its powers and consequently, the orders of the High Court were set aside paving the way for trial into the cases. More specific on the point are the decisions in ABHINANDAN JHA's case (supra) and J.A.C. SALDANHA's case (supra) as both relate to powers of the Court at the stage of investigation. In ABHINDANDAN JHA's case (supra), the question was whether Magistrate was having any power to direct the police to file a charge sheet in spite of the police filing a report under Section 169 of the Code that there was no case made out. It was held by the Supreme Court that when a final report is filed by the police that there is no case made out, the Magistrate may accept the report or take cognisance of the offence differing from the report and may even order further investigation. But the Court has got definitely no jurisdiction to direct to file the charge sheet per force. But the Court has got definitely no jurisdiction to direct to file the charge sheet per force. The Supreme Court held that, "the Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion on the investigation and to submit a report according to such opinion. That may be really encroaching on the sphere of the police and compelling police to form an opinion so as to accord with the decision of the Magistrate and send a report either under Section 169 or under Section 170 depending upon the nature of the decision. Such a function has been left to the police under the Code." The Supreme Court further held, "18. We have already pointed out that the investigation, under the Code, takes in several aspects, and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, so formed. The formation of the said opinion, by the police, as pointed out earlier, is the final step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority." In STATE OF BIHAR v. J.A.C. SALDANHA (supra 4), the Supreme Court was dealing with Sections 173 (8), 36 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said case, prosecution was launched for the offence under Sections 420/120-B, 418 and 368 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 105/106 of the Indian Railways Act on the ground of fraud and cheating being played thus depriving the railway of its revenue. Even while the issue was pending as to whether the investigation should be entrusted to Central Bureau of Investigation or not, under the orders of I.G. Vigilance, the final report was submitted before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate but on request, not to accept the said report and to keep it pending, the matter was kept pending. Even while the issue was pending as to whether the investigation should be entrusted to Central Bureau of Investigation or not, under the orders of I.G. Vigilance, the final report was submitted before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate but on request, not to accept the said report and to keep it pending, the matter was kept pending. In the meanwhile, the High Court was approached and the High Court has quashed the same on the ground that investigation of the case by the I.G. Vigilance was illegal inasmuch as I.G. Vigilance could not be entrusted in law with the investigation of the case registered with the railway police and consequently, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was in error in postponing the consideration of the final report. The High Court also gave various directions to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate how to dispose of the case. Two appeals, one by the State of Bihar and another by the Superintendent of Police, Railway, were filed. Two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration viz., (i) whether the State Government was competent to direct further investigation in a criminal case in which a report was submitted by the investigating agency under Section 173 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case and (ii) whether the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case committed an illegality in postponing consideration of the report submitted to him upon a request made by Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case till report on completion of further investigation, directed by the State Government, was submitted to him. A further question also arose as to whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the investigation, which was in progress, and prohibiting or precluding further investigation in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Dealing with the matter elaborately, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has no power to order further investigation and that the High Court was not entitled to interfere at the stage of investigation. The Supreme Court held as follows: "24. Dealing with the matter elaborately, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has no power to order further investigation and that the High Court was not entitled to interfere at the stage of investigation. The Supreme Court held as follows: "24. The next contention is that the High Court was in error in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 at a stage when the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate who has jurisdiction to entertain and try the case has not passed upon the issues before him, by taking upon itself the appreciation of evidence involving facts about which there is an acrimonious dispute between the parties and giving a clean bill to the suspects against whom the first information report was filed. By so directing the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate the judgment of the High Court virtually disposed of the case finally. As we are setting aside the judgment of the High Court with the result that the case would go back to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, it would be imprudent for us to make any observation on facts involved in the case. 25. There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounded duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in Section 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate. This had been recognised way back in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad(AIR 1944 PC 18), where the Privy Council observed as under: In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. 26. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. 26. This view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary. 28. Is there anything more required to write the final epitaph and say amen by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate after the finding is recorded by the High Court, more especially finding of fact that railway organisation has profited rather than lost by the unusual procedure? It is a clear case of usurpation of jurisdiction vested in the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to take or not to take cognizance of a case on the material placed before him. The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more." 18. RAM SARAN DASS's case (supra), which deals with the service law impinging upon Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, has got no bearing on this case. In KASHMERI DEVI's case (supra), the Supreme Court, on the facts of the case, held that the police, by converting the offence from Section 304 Indian Penal Code to the one under Section 323/34 of Indian Penal Code had, prima facie, acted in partisan manner to shield the real culprits and the investigation has not been done in a proper and objective manner, and opined that in the interest of justice, it was necessary to get a fresh investigation done through an independent authority so that truth may be known. That is not the situation here. In the instant case, the investigation has been done against the accused/police, charge sheet has been laid, case has been committed and is pending trial in Sessions Court. But the above Supreme Court judgment can be considered while issuing proper directions dealing with the allegations made against the police officials. That is not the situation here. In the instant case, the investigation has been done against the accused/police, charge sheet has been laid, case has been committed and is pending trial in Sessions Court. But the above Supreme Court judgment can be considered while issuing proper directions dealing with the allegations made against the police officials. 19. In ARVINDER SINGH BAGGA v. STATE OF U.P. (supra 7), the matter arose under Article 21 of Indian Constitution because of the police atrocities. A report was called for from the District Judge, basing upon which directions were issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh for taking immediate steps to launch prosecution against all the officers and apart from that, State was ordered to pay compensation for the illegal detention and for the humiliation caused. In the said case, the matter related to alleged abduction and forcible marriage and the persons were tortured. The report of the District Judge showed (i) fabrication, (ii) illegal arrest, (iii) without personal knowledge or credible information that the arrested persons were involved in a cognisable offence and (iv) illegality of verbal order of arrest not contemplated under Section 55 of Code of Criminal Procedure. But in the said case, there are no issues raised with regard to Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which is found to be applicable in the instant case. 20. In view of what is stated supra, we affirm the judgment of the learned single Judge that the Sessions Case No. 25 of 1998 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Nagercoil, shall proceed without undue delay and should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible but not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In so far as the directions issued by the learned single Judge for prosecuting the appellants in W.A. Nos. 3214 and 3215 of 2002 are concerned, in view of the law laid down in MATAJOG DOBEY's case, ABHINANDAN JHA's case and SALDANHA's case (supra), the order of the learned single Judge is modified as follows: (i) The telegrams dated 4.9.1997 sent by Ms. 3214 and 3215 of 2002 are concerned, in view of the law laid down in MATAJOG DOBEY's case, ABHINANDAN JHA's case and SALDANHA's case (supra), the order of the learned single Judge is modified as follows: (i) The telegrams dated 4.9.1997 sent by Ms. Anjela Rajan to the Chief Justice of India with copies to the Chief Justice of Madras as also the Chairman, National Human Rights Commission, which is to the following effect, "The Police (Thuckalay A.S.P. and Party) arrested 6 persons with two ladies from Charismatic Service Trust, Marthandam (Father John Joseph, Bro. P. Sandana Rajan, Bro. Maria John, Sister Sahaya Mary Jaya Rani, Sister Wiseline Femina Rose and Bro. Gnanaakhan) at 5.30 p.m. 4th but we don't know the reason and where they dept them. So please take the necessary action immediately" shall be registered as the First Information Report by the C.B. C.I.D. and the investigation be taken up basing on the same by obtaining necessary sanction from the Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (ii) The above investigating agency as also the Government has to proceed independently in accordance with law. The Writ Appeals are disposed of accordingly. Consequently, connected W.A.M.P. Nos. 5195 to 5199, 6254, 5335, 5336, and 5337 of 2002 are closed.