JUDGMENT R. P. Misra, J.—Heard Sri M.D. Singh, ‘Shekhar’, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the impugned order dated 1.2.2003 passed by Additional District Judge (Court No. 32), Ghaziabad, and also for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Additional District Judge (Court No. 3), Ghaziabad, the District Judge, Ghaziabad and his subordinate officers, not to interfere in the right of the petitioner to appear, plead and act on behalf of the party in a civil case on the basis of the special power of attorney executed in favour of the petitioner. 3. By the aforesaid order dated 1.2.2003, passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 57 and 58 of 1995, learned Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, has refused to permit the petitioner to advance arguments in the aforesaid appeals on behalf of the appellants on the basis of special power of attorney executed in favour of the petitioner and has directed the appellants to engage counsel within 15 days. 4. According to the petitioner, the appellants are unable to engage any legal practitioner due to poverty and are also unable to advance arguments due to lack of legal knowledge, therefore, they have executed the special power of attorney in favour of the petitioner to appear, apply and act for them. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that in view of the provisions contained in Order III, Rules (1) and (2) read with Section 2 (15) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’), the petitioner has right to appear, act and plead for the party who executes special power of attorney in his favour. He further submitted that the provisions of Sections 32, 33 and 55 of the Advocates Act, if read together, do not put any restriction on the right of petitioner to plead, apply and act for a party who executes special power of attorney in his favour. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decisions in case of Ram Swaroop Jatav v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (31) ACrC 311 and Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma and another, 1978 ACrR 363 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 1019 . 6. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decisions in case of Ram Swaroop Jatav v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (31) ACrC 311 and Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma and another, 1978 ACrR 363 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 1019 . 6. Before adverting to deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears necessary to point out that this writ petition has been filed by a person who himself is neither a party to the proceeding pending before the Additional Distt. Judge, Ghaziabad, nor was a legal practitioner immediately before coming into force of the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, nor is an Advocate within the meaning of Advocates Act, 1961 and none of the parties to the said proceeding has joined as petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that he has not charged a single penny for pleading and acting on behalf of the party concerned. If that be so, how the petitioner is a person aggrieved and then how this writ petition is maintainable only on his behalf. Any way, as the elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner, it appears too technical to look into so deeply the question of maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of petitioner alone ; therefore, I proceed to decide the writ petition on its merits. 7. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under Order III, Rules (1) and (2) read with Section 2 (15) of the Code, the petitioner has got a right to plead, apply and act for the parties who execute special power of attorney in favour of the petitioner and the Court below has no power, authority and jurisdiction to deny the said right to the petitioner. 8. Section 2 (15) of the Code defines the term ‘pleader’ to mean any person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a vakil and an attorney of a High Court. There is no quarrel with the definition of the term ‘pleader’ and wherever this term is used with reference to the Code, it will mean as per its definition. 9. The provisions of Order III, Rules (1) and (2) of the Code read as under : “1. There is no quarrel with the definition of the term ‘pleader’ and wherever this term is used with reference to the Code, it will mean as per its definition. 9. The provisions of Order III, Rules (1) and (2) of the Code read as under : “1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognised agent or by pleader.—Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf : Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. 2. Recognised agents.—The recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are : (a) persons holding powers of attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, appli-cations, and acts on behalf of such parties ; (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such appearances, applications and acts.” 10. A bare perusal of the above quoted provisions makes it crystal clear that these provisions will have full application, if otherwise is not expressly provided by any law for the time being in force. Here, it may be noted that the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in the year 1908 and the Advocates Act enacted in the year 1961 is a law for the time being in force and, therefore, it is to be examined as to whether or not, otherwise is expressly provided in the Advocates Act. 11. Section 33 of the Advocates Act reads as under : “33. 11. Section 33 of the Advocates Act reads as under : “33. Advocates alone entitled to practice.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, on or after the appointed day, be entitled to practice in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under this Act.” 12. Thus, Section 33 of the Advocates Act expressly provides that no person is entitled to practise in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under this Act. Admittedly, the petitioner is not enrolled as an advocate ; therefore, he is not entitled to practice in any Court or before any authority or person. 13. Further, Section 29 of the Advocates Act specifically provides that subject to the provisions of the Advocates Act and Rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed day, be only one class of persons entitled to practice the profession of law, namely advocates. 14. No doubt, Section 55 of the Advocates Act, is a saving clause, and protects rights of certain existing legal practitioners who were practicing as such immediately before the date on which Chapter IV of the Advocates Act came into force. The protection of Section 55 of the Advocates Act is available only to those who were practicing as such immediately before the said date. But in the instant case, the present petitioner is admittedly not a legal practitioner and was not a pleader or vakil, practicing as such, immediately before the said date, therefore, this provision is of no avail to the present petitioner. 15. However, Section 32 of the Advocates Act is a non obstante clause having overriding effect over other provisions of Chapter IV of the Advocates Act and reads as under : “32. Power of Court to permit appearances in particular cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, any Court, authority or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an advocate under this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular case.” 16. Thus, by virtue of Section 32 of the Advocates Act, a person may appear before the Court in any particular case but for that, the condition imposed by the Statute is permission of the Court. Thus, by virtue of Section 32 of the Advocates Act, a person may appear before the Court in any particular case but for that, the condition imposed by the Statute is permission of the Court. The provisions confers authority on the Court to permit or not to permit such person to appear before it. The permission referred above is confined ‘to appear’ and not to ‘practice the profession of law’. The word used in Section 32 is ‘may’ and not ‘shall’. Therefore, the power to permit is discretionary and not mandatory. The provision does not confer ‘right to appear’ on the person seeking permission to appear before the Court. It is the discretion of the Court to permit or not to permit appearance, considering the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 17. In the instant case, the Court below has refused to permit the petitioner to appear before it considering the facts and circumstances of the case, for the reasons detailed in the impugned order itself. This Court does not find any justification to disagree with the reasons assigned by the court below. The findings recorded by the court below are findings of fact and are not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. So far as the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned, Ram Swaroop Jatav v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (31) ACrC 311, is a case wherein learned single Judge of this Court, considering various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, has held vide paragraph 20 of the judgment that the difference between professional and non-professional is while an advocate acts as of right and can barge into the Court and claim to argue for a party but a private person who is not an advocate has no such right and he must get prior permission of the Court for which the motion must come from the party himself as stated above. This power is discretionary. Thus, this case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no avail for the present petitioner and also for the reasons that the concept of criminal law differs from that of the civil law. 19. This power is discretionary. Thus, this case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no avail for the present petitioner and also for the reasons that the concept of criminal law differs from that of the civil law. 19. As far as the other case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma and another, 1978 ACrR 363 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 1019 , is a case where Apex Court has held as under : “4. Having regard to this conspectus of considerations, I hold that a private person who is not an advocate, has no right to barge into Court and claim to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party himself. It is open to the Court to grant or withhold permission in its discretion. In fact, the Court may, even after grant of permission withdraw it halfway through if the representative proves himself reprehensible. The antecedents, the relationship, the reasons for requisitioning the services of the private person and a variety of other circumstances must be gathered before grant or refusal of permission”. In this case Apex Court has also observed as under : “Such other person cannot practice the profession of law habitually representing parties in Court. If non-advocate specialises in practicing in Court, professionally he will be violating the text of the interdict in the Advocates Act. I cannot allow him to do so.” However, following the policy of Criminal Procedure Code, his lordship permitted the petitioner in that case to appear before the apex Court in that particular criminal case. The present case arises out of proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure and in this case, permission has been refused by the Court concerned considering the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not help the present petitioner. 20. Learned Additional Distt. The present case arises out of proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure and in this case, permission has been refused by the Court concerned considering the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not help the present petitioner. 20. Learned Additional Distt. Judge has refused the permission to the petitioner placing reliance on Hari Om Rajender Kumar and others v. Chief Rationing Officer of Civil Supplies, AIR 1990 AP 340 , which is a case under the Code of Civil Procedure, and wherein considering various provisions of the Code, Advocates Act and the case laws on the point, vide paragraphs 11 and 13 of the judgment, it has been held that a non-advocate, when he seeks permission to ‘appear’ cannot be permitted to address the Court on the strength of the power-of-attorney. 21. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered opinion that in a civil case, a non-advocate cannot assert appearance in Court as a matter of right and cannot claim a right of audience. Such right is confined to the litigant himself, to the advocates enrolled under the Advocates Act and the legal practitioners practicing as such immediately before coming into force of the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act. To hold otherwise would mean that the non-advocates are also allowed to practise. A non-advocate holding a power-of-attorney has no right of audience but he may address the Court only with the leave of the Court, which is discretionary. 22. In view of the premises aforesaid, no case for issuance of the writ of mandamus, as prayed by the petitioner is made out nor the order impugned is liable to be quashed, consequently the writ petition is dismissed summarily.