ORDER Viney Mittal, J. - This order shall dispose of Crl M. No. 10592-M of 1995 and Crl M. No. 11273-M of 1995 as the common questions of facts and law are involved in the case. 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from Crl. M. No. 10592-M of 1995. An FIR No. 21 dated February 3, 1990 was registered against Arvinder Singh and others under Sections 392, 397, 411 Indian Penal Code read with section 3 of the TADA Act. 3. The car was released to Balbir Chand vide order dated February 26, 1990. While releasing the aforesaid care on superdari, he was directed to furnish a bond for the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount. Petitioner Sohan Singh furnished the aforesaid surety alongwith superdar Balbir Chand. A further direction was issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate not to change condition of car and colour and not to sell the car and also produce the same on the every date of hearing. On February 8, 1995 when the case was fixed before the learned Designated Court then the aforesaid car was not produced. Accordingly, proceedings under Section 446 Criminal Procedure Code were conducted against aforesaid Balbir Chand and the surety Sohan Lal. Vide the impugned order dated February 11, 1995, the learned Designated Court, Kapurthala ordered that a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000/- be imposed upon petitioner Sohan Lal. Similarly, penalty of Rs. 1,00,000/- was imposed upon aforesaid Balbir Chand also vide order dated September 10, 1994. The petitioners have now impugned the aforesaid orders passed by the learned Designated Court. 4. Shri J.S. Chahal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in fact the car owned by Balbir Chand was financed by some financers and since aforesaid Balbir Chand could not repay the loan, therefore, the same was re-possessed by the financers as per terms of the hire-purchase agreement. After that the said financers had sold the car to one Harmeet Singh. In fact, aforesaid Harmeet Singh had even filed an affidavit dated September 26, 1994 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge seeking time to produce the car, since at that time the car was stated to be in Uttar Pradesh. 5. After that the said financers had sold the car to one Harmeet Singh. In fact, aforesaid Harmeet Singh had even filed an affidavit dated September 26, 1994 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge seeking time to produce the car, since at that time the car was stated to be in Uttar Pradesh. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid facts, the learned counsel has maintained that there was no wilful default ever committed by the petitioner and circumstances for non-production of car were beyond his control. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all the circumstances should have been taken into consideration by the learned Designated Court while passing the aforesaid order. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter. 7. In my considered opinion, the present petition deserves to succeed. 8. The detailed facts noticed above showing that although the car in question had been released on superdari to Balbir Chand and petitioner Sohan Singh had also furnished surety bond for production of car on each and every date but the said financers who originally financed the car had re-possessed the car. In fact, the said financers had taken the possession of the car without permission of the Court. Neither Sohan Singh nor Balbir Chand could have any say in the matter. 9. When an affidavit in this regard had been filed by Harmeet Singh that he would produce the car on the next date of hearing, then there was no question of taking proceedings under Section 446 Criminal Procedure Code against the petitioner and imposing penalty as noticed above. 10. It may not be out of place to mention here that vide order dated February 8, 1995, aforesaid accused Shivraj had been acquitted by the learned trial Judge. In these circumstances when the case has been finally disposed of and the accused acquitted, then there was no question of taking proceedings under Section 446 Criminal Procedure Code against the present petitioner. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated February 11, 1995 is quashed. Petition allowed.