JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, J.—In Civil Revision Nos. 219 of 2001, 192 of 2002, 245 of 2002 and 420 of 2002, the orders impugned are the rejection of applications under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of pleadings, whereas in Civil Revision No. 448 by the order impugned, the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint was allowed. Similarly, in Civil Revision No. 263 of 2002 by the impugned order the application under Order 18 Rule 2 CPC was allowed and defendants No. 2 and 3 were permitted to adduce evidence to controvert the evidence of defendant No. 1 and in Civil Revision No. 335 of 2002 the order under challenge is the dismissal of application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC for framing of additional issues. 2. In all these revision petitions preliminary objection of maintainability has been raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents. 3. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents that firstly the impugned orders are not the orders which fall within the zone of case decided as envisaged under sub-section (1) of Section 115 and secondly in view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115, the impugned orders are not liable to be varied or reversed as had these orders been made in favour of the petitioners who have applied for revision, the suit or the proceedings would not have been finally disposed of. According to the learned Counsel, the word "proceedings" used in proviso does not pertain to the proceedings in the suit. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have argued that the civil revisions are maintainable as these are against the impugned orders whereby some legally enforceable claim or right of the party aggrieved, has been decided and these orders must fall within the realm of "case decided". They have also submitted that in the proviso the word proceedings denotes the proceedings in the suit and not independent of the suit. 4. Since the words "case decided" is no longer res Integra, this Court would refer to the case law interpreting these words. It is also to be examined whether the words "other proceedings" used in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 mean the proceedings in the suit or the proceedings otherwise than suit or the proceedings before other Tribunals. 4. Since the words "case decided" is no longer res Integra, this Court would refer to the case law interpreting these words. It is also to be examined whether the words "other proceedings" used in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 mean the proceedings in the suit or the proceedings otherwise than suit or the proceedings before other Tribunals. Section 115 is as under: "Revision.—[(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears— (a) to-have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where the order, if it had been, made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.] (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation.—In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding." 5. This section as originally enacted empowered the High Courts with revisional jurisdiction over subordinate Courts in case of failure to exercise jurisdiction, exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law as well as exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The original Section 115 was only the present sub-section (1) and by the amendment of 1976 it was re-numbered as sub-section (1) and proviso was added and subsection (2) and explanation were inserted. The original Section 115 was only the present sub-section (1) and by the amendment of 1976 it was re-numbered as sub-section (1) and proviso was added and subsection (2) and explanation were inserted. The Proviso was as under: "Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding any issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where— (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." 6. By the amendment of 1999, proviso (a) has been retained: whereas proviso (b) has been omitted and before explanation, sub-section (3) has been added. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment of 1999, it has been stated that: "Section 115 of the Code provides for revision by the High Court of an order or decision of any court subordinate to such High Court. The Malimath Committee noticed that often the records of the lower Courts are sent to the High Court in the revisional proceedings. It is imperative that records of the proceedings pending in the subordinate court should not be sent unless High Court so desires and revision should not operate as stay of proceedings before the trial Court. The Committee while agreeing in principle that scope of interference against interlocutory orders should be restricted, felt that the object can be achieved more effectively without demanding the High Court of the power of revision. Clause 12 seeks to achieve the above object by suitable amendments to Section 115." 7. So far sub-section (1) is concerned, it shows that revision petition is maintainable before the High Court if it is against the decision of a case by a Court subordinate to it and no appeal lies against the said decision and further if it appeals to the High Court that the subordinate court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it or it has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, it may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. If the Court intends to vary or reverse the order impugned, it must further examine that had that order been made in favour of the party applying for the revision, it would have finally disposed of the suit or the proceedings in which it was made. This restriction has been provided by way of proviso to sub-section (1). The explanation makes it clear that the expression, "any case which has been decided" includes "any order made in the course of a suit or other proceedings." 8. So far the word, "case decided" used in sub-section (1) is concerned, it fell for consideration in number of decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. In Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigadier F.J. Dhillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, considering the expression case liberally, Shah, J..(as he then was) observed that term case is not restricted to litigation in the nature of a suit in the Civil Court. It includes proceedings in the Civil Court in which jurisdiction of the Court is invoked for determination of some claim or right legally enforceable. It is observed in para 11 : "The expression "case" is a word of comprehensive import: it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a Civil Court. To interpret the expression "case" as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice.” Also in paragraphs 12 and 13: ".....The expression "case" includes a suit, but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, there would be no warrant for equating it with a suit alone. 13. That is not to say that the High Court is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate Court and the conditions in Clause (a), (b), or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary the High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied. 13. That is not to say that the High Court is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate Court and the conditions in Clause (a), (b), or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary the High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied. The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal, from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction." 9. In Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406, the Supreme Court observed that it was not decided in Major S.S. Khanna (supra) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided.*It was stated : "a case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 10. Therefore, by now it is settled that the word "case" includes a suit but it does not mean a concluded suit nor each and every order in the suit. If the expression case is interpreted as concluded suit, appeal or other proceedings, it imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of power of superintendence of the High Court. On the other hand, the connotation cannot be interpreted so widely as to include each and every order passed in the suit, appeal or other proceeding. It will depend upon the nature of the order and circumstances of the case in which it was made to hold whether it is a case decided or not. On the other hand, the connotation cannot be interpreted so widely as to include each and every order passed in the suit, appeal or other proceeding. It will depend upon the nature of the order and circumstances of the case in which it was made to hold whether it is a case decided or not. In a recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sailo Ram v. Kuldip Chand, Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) (DB) 84, the case law of the Supreme Court and this Court has been referred to, to hold that the revision is maintainable against the orders passed on applications under Order 41 Rule 27 and under Order 18 Rule 17-A CPC, these orders being case decided. 11. Whereas sub-section (1) empowers the High Court to entertain revision petitions against all orders adjudicating right or obligations of the parties which amount to "case decided" and lays down three conditions in the light of which the order impugned is to. be tested. If one of the conditions is fulfilled in a case before reversing or varying the order impugned, the Court will further examine whether the order impugned falls within the exception carved out by the proviso to sub-section (1). 12. By deleting proviso (b), by the amendment of 1999, it cannot be inferred that the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115(1) is enlarged. Rather the scope is narrowed down as now even failure of justice or irreparable injury to the petitioner is not a ground to vary or reverse the order impugned, 13. Further, the maintainability of revision petition and justifiability thereof are two different, distinct and separate things. If an order impugned is not case decided, the revision petition is not competent and it has to be dismissed at the threshold without considering it on merits. On the other hand, if the revision petition is competent, the High Court will consider it on merits in the light of three conditions provided in sub-section (1) and may refuse to vary or reverse the order impugned if the case does not fall in the exception carved out of the proviso to sub-section (1). Therefore, the proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115(1), but curtails it. Therefore, the proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115(1), but curtails it. Further, the explanation that "any case which has been decided" includes "any order made, or any order deciding any issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding" has to be read with the proviso. A conjoint reading of explanation and proviso makes it clear that only those orders may be reversed, varied or modified in revision which fall within the limitation prescribed by the proviso. 14. Another point arises whether proceedings referred to in the proviso are the original proceedings and not proceedings in the suit. Learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Madhvi Sirothia v. Narendra Nath Sirothia, 1988 All. L.J. 551, held that revision petition is not maintainable against the order passed in the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that it is the order in the original petition for divorce and not in an original proceedings as envisaged in the proviso. The learned Judge had interpreted that proceedings used in the proviso are original proceedings and cannot mean proceedings in a suit as the word proceedings occurs along with the word suit. But this view was not followed in a subsequent judgment of the learned Single Judge of the same Court in Ram Krishan v. Narbada, 1999 Allahabad Law Journal 1001, wherein it was held that an order under Section 24 of the Act finally adjudicates the rights of the parties with regard to maintenance pendente lite, thus, it is case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. It was decided that the expression "any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding" should be read disjunctively and disjointly and "the proceedings" were held to be in a suit and not independent of the suit. In the opinion of this Court, the view in Ram Krishan v. Narbada (supra) lays down the correct law on the point. Moreover, the explanation is to be read in the context of principle expression case which has been defined in it. 15. In view of above discussion, this Court reiterates that for holding a civil revision maintainable against an order, it is to be examined whether by the said order any right or obligation of the parties to the suit has been decided. 15. In view of above discussion, this Court reiterates that for holding a civil revision maintainable against an order, it is to be examined whether by the said order any right or obligation of the parties to the suit has been decided. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Bakshi and others v. Dharam Dev and others, (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 2, the learned Judges while interpreting Section 115 have observed as under: "5. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 puts a restriction on the powers of the High Court inasmuch as the High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in course of a suit or other proceedings except where (i) the order made would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or (ii) the said order would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made. Under clause (a), the High Court would be justified in interfering with an order of a subordinate court if the said order finally disposes of the suit or other proceeding. By way of illustration we may say that if a trial Court holds by an interlocutory order that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case or that suit is barred by limitation, it would amount to finally deciding the case and such order would be revisable. The order in question by which the amendment was allowed could not be said to have finally disposed of the case and, therefore, it would not come under clause (a). 6. Now the question is whether the order in question has caused failure of justice or irreparable injury to respondent 1. It is almost inconceivable how mere amendments of pleadings could possibly cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to any party. Perhaps the converse is possible, i.e., refusal to permit the amendment sought for could in certain situations result in miscarriage of justice. After all, amendments of the pleadings would not amount to decisions on the issue involved. They only would serve advance notice to the other side as to the plea, which a party might take up. Perhaps the converse is possible, i.e., refusal to permit the amendment sought for could in certain situations result in miscarriage of justice. After all, amendments of the pleadings would not amount to decisions on the issue involved. They only would serve advance notice to the other side as to the plea, which a party might take up. Hence we cannot envisage a situation where amendment of pleadings, whatever be the nature of such amendment, would even remotely cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to any party." 16. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Prem Bakshi and others v. Dharam Dev and others (supra), revision petition is not maintainable against an order allowing the amendment of the pleadings. It is correct that in this judgment the emphasis was on proviso (ii) which stands deleted by the amendment of 1999, still the order allowing the amendment of the pleadings does not come within the parameters of case decided as by such an order any right or obligation of the parties to a suit is not decided. 17. In the result, the Civil Revision No. 448 of 2002 wherein by the impugned order the application for amendment was allowed, is not maintainable and it is disposed of as such. In Civil Revision No. 263 of 2002, by the impugned order the application under Order 18 Rule 2 CPC was allowed and defendants No. 2 and 3 were permitted to adduce evidence to controvert the evidence of defendant No. 1. Similarly, by the order impugned in Civil Revision No. 335 of 2002, the application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC for additional issues was dismissed. These orders in both these revision petitions do not fall in the category of case decided as no right or obligation of the parties to their respective suits is decided. Therefore, these revision petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. 18. So far Civil Revision Nos. 219 of 2001, 192 of 2002, 245 of 2002 and 420 of 2002 wherein by the impugned orders the applications for amendment of the pleadings were dismissed are concerned, these are maintainable as these fall under the category of "case decided" as these finally adjudicated upon the rights of the parties to take a plea or defence by way of amendment. But such an order will only be interfered with if any of the three conditions prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 115 are fulfilled and further the order falls within the exception carved out by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115. Therefore, this Court holds that these revision petitions are maintainable and will be heard on merits. Order accordingly.