S. R. BANNURMATH, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the contesting respondents 3 to 7 and the learned High Court Government pleader for respondents 1 and 2. ( 2 ) IN this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order passed by the District Magistrate (Annexure F) refusing to renew the license of the petitioners to run the cinema theatre as well as the affirmative order passed by the Divisional Commissioner (Annexure G ). ( 3 ) THE facts according to the petitioners leading to the present proceedings are as follows : premises bearing No. 43, Residency Road, Bangalore, originally a vacant site belonging to one M. A. Bhakhi, predecessor-in-title of respondents 3 to 7 herein was leased to petitioner-1 under a registered lease deed dated 2-2-1966 for a period of 35 years from the date of execution of the lease deed, i. e. , the lease would come to an end on 2-2-2001. Copy of the lease deed is produced as Annexure A to the writ petition. As per the terms of the lease, after certain initial payments, petitioner 1 was required to build a cinema theatre and to run the same. One of the conditions, viz. , Condition No. 9, was an option given to petitioner 1 to continue the lease for a further period of 15 years on such terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon. But, the option to continue the lease for the period of 15 years should be exercised by petitioner 1-lessee with six months' notice before the expiry of the lease period of 35 years. Condition No. 10 prescribes that, if the aforesaid option is exercised by the lessee, there shall be a separate lease deed registered and the lessee on the expiry of the further period of 15 years shall deliver possession of the property. According to the petitioners, as in the year 1969 some dispute arose between the parties and as per the agreement the dispute was referred to an arbitrator. It is the case of the petitioners that after the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator, on 28-8-1969 the arbitrator passed the Award (vide Annexure B to the writ petition) extending the lease for a period of one year from 2-2-2001 to 1-2-2002. It is the case of the petitioners that after the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator, on 28-8-1969 the arbitrator passed the Award (vide Annexure B to the writ petition) extending the lease for a period of one year from 2-2-2001 to 1-2-2002. It is contended that, though the Award was not made rule of the Court, both the parties have acted upon it as per the letter of acknowledgment dated 29-6-1970 written by Bhakhi, the lessor and predecessor-in-title of respondents 3 to 7, with acceptance of additional rent (vide Annexure C to the writ petition ). It is submitted that before the expiry of the period as per the extended time as held by the arbitrator, on 2-8-2000 as per the letter at Annexure D the petitioners exercised the option, but the respondents refused to renew the lease. Hence, petitioner-1 was forced to file a suit in O. S. No. 833 of 2002 in the Civil Court for specific performance and it is stated to be still pending adjudication. ( 4 ) AS this was the state of affairs, when the license period of petitioner-1 to run the cinema was coming to an end, he filed an application before the District Magistrate for renewal of the license and the District Magistrate considering the case of the petitioners by an order dated 2-7-2001 (vide Annexure E to the writ petition) renewed the license of respondent/petitioner-1 herein till 31-10-2001. Aggrieved by the same, respondents 3 to 7 preferred an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner. Questioning the maintainability of the appeal filed by respondents 3 to 7, petitioner 1 approached this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 43004 of 2001 and it is stated that this Court had stayed further proceedings in the appeal. According to the petitioners, during the pendency of the writ petition, the period of license came to an end and on the application filed by petitioner-1 the District Magistrate granted a temporary permit under Rule 86 of the Cinema Rules. This was again challenged by respondents 3 to 7 in Writ Petition No. 44977 of 2001. According to the learned counsel, this Court by the order dated 18-1-2002 dismissed both the writ petitions, viz. , Writ Petitions Nos. 43004 and 44977 of 2001, on the ground that the same have become infructuous. This was again challenged by respondents 3 to 7 in Writ Petition No. 44977 of 2001. According to the learned counsel, this Court by the order dated 18-1-2002 dismissed both the writ petitions, viz. , Writ Petitions Nos. 43004 and 44977 of 2001, on the ground that the same have become infructuous. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, during the pendency of the writ petitions, by an order dated 1-1-2002, as the District Magistrate suspended the license, petitioner-1 had challenged the same in Writ Petition No. 305 of 2002 and this Court considering the contentions by the order dated 21-1-2002 quashed the order of suspension and remanded the case for fresh consideration. ( 5 ) THE grievance of the petitioners is that, though on an earlier occasion the District Magistrate had rejected the objections of respondents 3 to 7, after the remand he has entertained the same and by the impugned order dated 2-7-2001 rejected the prayer of petitioner-1 for renewal (vide Annexure H ). It is submitted that, though the petitioner has approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 9233 of 2002, this Court refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal. As such, immediately thereafter petitioner No. 1 preferred an appeal and the Divisional Commissioner/appellate authority on reconsideration by the order dated 7-5-2002 rejected the appeal thereby affirmed the order of the District Judge refusing to renew the license. Hence the writ petition. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners contended that the finding arrived at by both the authorities regarding the possession of the petitioners as unlawful and hence the license cannot be renewed or granted was illegal and unsustainable; that even if the lease has expired in view of the exemption provided under the Rent Control Act, in spite of the expiry of the lease, the status of petitioner-1 continues to be that of statutory tenant as long as he is not evicted under due process of law and as such his possession cannot be termed as unlawful one and hence the District Magistrate could not have rejected the application for renewal of the license. It is further contended that in so far as the expiry of the lease is concerned, even before the expiry of lease period of 35 years, since in the arbitration proceedings, as mutually agreed to between the parties, the time was extended by one year and before the expiry of that one year period, as petitioner-1 has exercised the option for continuation of the lease for additional period of 15 years, the possession of petitioner-1 ought to have been held as lawful. It is also contended that even though the award is not made rule of Court, since respondents 3 to 7 by their own conduct have accepted and acted upon the award, the same is binding on them and as such they could not raise the objection regarding possession whether lawful or not before the authorities. It is also contended that respondents 3 to 7 have no locus standi to object the renewal of the license. It is further contended that the lease and possession of the petitioners is protected under the old Rent Control Act and since the new Rent Control Act is not applicable and even otherwise as the criteria fixed under the Rent Control Act are only for the purpose of eviction proceedings, the same cannot be made applicable as has been done by the authorities in respect of the grant or renewal of the license. Alternatively, it is contended that even assuming that the lease has come to an end on the expiry of the lease period of 35 years, the possession cannot be termed as unlawful unless the tenancy is terminated under due process of law and as such the possession of petitioner-1 has to be held as lawful possession. It is further contended that the No Objection Certificate has been earlier granted, there is no requirement or necessity of asking for NOC every time when the question of renewal of licence is raised. During the reply it is contended that the order of the District Magistrate at Annexure H is hit by the principles of res judicata. It is further contended that the No Objection Certificate has been earlier granted, there is no requirement or necessity of asking for NOC every time when the question of renewal of licence is raised. During the reply it is contended that the order of the District Magistrate at Annexure H is hit by the principles of res judicata. Highlighting the same, it is contended that as the objections of the respondents now raised before the authorities have all been considered and rejected by the District Magistrate in the earlier proceedings, vide Annexure E to the writ petition, especially in respect of the finding of the unlawful possession and as the same are binding on the parties, the order at Annexure H is hit by the principles of res judicata. It is further contended that since all the contentions raised by respondents 3 to 7 have been rejected earlier, he too cannot raise the same objections as per the doctrine of estoppel, especially when the earlier order at Annexure E is not challenged or set aside by the competent authority and has become final and the findings given therein are having binding nature on the parties. Lastly, it is contended that even assuming that the findings of the authorities are proper, the principle of equity should weigh much in favour of the petitioner. It is also submitted that as the renewal is rejected, even though respondents 3 to 7 cannot take possession of the premises without lawfully evicting the petitioners, petitioner-1 cannot run the business by himself or make use of the premises and on the other hand till such eviction orders are passed, if the petitioners are allowed to continue, ends of justice would be met. On these among other grounds, it is contended that the impugned orders are passed by the District Magistrate and the Appellate Authority/divisional Commissioner, be quashed. ( 7 ) IN support of the contentions learned counsel has relied upon the following pronouncements. 1. ILR (1986) 1 Kant 1024 2. ILR 1984 Kant 1115 3. ILR 2002 Kant 565 : (2002 AIR Kant HCR 1335) 4. AIR 2002 Kant 26 : (2001 AIR - Kant HCR 2357) 5. AIR 1961 SC 1077 6. AIR 1990 SC 53 7. AIR 1973 Mysore 17 8. 1980 (1) KLJ 439 (sic) 9. 1993 (3) KLR 3561 (sic) 10. (1999) 5 Kant LJ 30 : (AIR 2000 Kant 25) 11. AIR 2002 Kant 26 : (2001 AIR - Kant HCR 2357) 5. AIR 1961 SC 1077 6. AIR 1990 SC 53 7. AIR 1973 Mysore 17 8. 1980 (1) KLJ 439 (sic) 9. 1993 (3) KLR 3561 (sic) 10. (1999) 5 Kant LJ 30 : (AIR 2000 Kant 25) 11. AIR 1984 SC 1030 . ( 8 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the contesting respondents argued in support of the impugned orders. Basically his objection regarding the arbitrator's award is that this document (award) is a created document and no reliance can be placed upon the same to state that as the original lease of 35 years has been extended by one more year and before the expiry of the added one year. As petitioner-1 has exercised his option, his option is within time. In this regard, learned counsel has produced the affidavit filed by the arbitrator himself wherein the arbitrator has admitted that this award has been passed only at the instance of petitioner-1. It is also contended that, even if this award is accepted for a moment, the same again cannot be relied upon since in an unequivocal terms it is noted that petitioner-1 has given up the contention regarding this award and hence the same cannot be raised once again before this Court by way of writ petition. As a further argument it is also contended that assuming that there is an award, it is practically without any value since the same has not been subjected to rule of Court and as it is an unregistered document no right can be claimed to be created under it. In so far as the ground of res judicata is concerned, it is contended that, though the parties to Annexures E and F are the same and issues raised are also the same, since the first order (Annexure E) has not attained finality because of efflux of time and having become infructuous the principles of res judicata are not attracted. The appeal has been dismissed again infructu-ous does not create any right. On these among other grounds, it is contended that the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. In respect of his argument, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has relied upon the following pronouncements. 1. (1995) 5 SCC 698 : ( AIR 1996 SC 140 ) 2. On these among other grounds, it is contended that the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. In respect of his argument, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has relied upon the following pronouncements. 1. (1995) 5 SCC 698 : ( AIR 1996 SC 140 ) 2. (1998) 4 Kant LJ 610 : (1998 AIHC 993) 3. (1998) 4 Kant LJ 353 : (AIR 1998 Kant 328) 4. AIR 1985 Kant 112 (sic) 5. AIR 1967 SC 948 6. (1976) 1 Kant LJ 438 : (AIR 1978 Kant 125) 7. AIR 1989 SC 1923 8. AIR 1970 SC 833 . ( 9 ) LEARNED High Court Government pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 also argued in support of the finding of the authorities inter alia contending that under R. 85 of the Karnataka Cinema Regulation, every application for regrant of license is to be practically considered as if it is afresh license and as such, both the authorities have rightly looked into the requirements under the prescribed rules themselves and have arrived at the right conclusion based on finding of facts. It is contended that since the authorities have after giving due opportunity to the petitioners and after considering all the contentions raised by both sides have arrived at the finding of facts, the same should not be interfered with especially when they are concurrent findings of fact by this Court while exercising writ jurisdiction. ( 10 ) ON the basis of the arguments advanced by both the sides the following questions arise for consideration:1) Whether the possession of the petitioner is lawful or unlawful? 2) Whether the respondents have locus standi to challenge or object to the grant of license to the petitioner? 3) Whether the respondents are estoppel from questioning the renewal of licence of the petitioner or barred by principles of res judicata? ( 11 ) MUCH argument has been advanced in respect of the possession of petitioner-1. It was contended that as per the lease deed petitioner-1 was given on lease a vacant site and as such after construction of building on the said land, his possession is protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1969, as under the Act he becomes statutory tenant and even after the expiry of the lease he continues to be in lawful possession till he is evicted under due process of law. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case K. E. Goverdhan v. N. Krishna Rao, reported in ILR (1986) 1 Kant 1024. That was a case of eviction considered under the Rent Control Act. But, so far as possession of tenant for the purpose of Cinema Regulation Act is concerned, the law is well settled by the later pronouncements of Division Bench of this Court as well as the pronouncement of the Apex Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case Vinoda Talkies, Tiptur v. District Magistrate, Tumkur District, Tumkur, reported in (1999) 5 Kant LJ 30 : (AIR 2000 Kant 25), has held that where lease has expired and the renewal of lease is refused, tenant cannot be held to be in lawful possession and hence not entitled to renewal of cinema licence in view of R. 6 of the Karnataka Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1971. Similar is the view of a Division Bench of this Court in the case M/s. Bhagyashree Combines, Bellary v. District Magistrate, Bellary District, Bellary, reported in (1998) 4 Kant LJ 353 : (AIR 1998 Kant 328) wherein it is held that lease of cinema theatre on expiry, possession of lessee subsequent to the expiry of lease cannot be considered as lawful and, therefore, the authority can refuse to grant licence under R. 6. ( 12 ) EVEN the Apex Court in the case of M. C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam, reported in AIR 1974 SC 104 has held that on expiry of the lease, the lessee cannot be stated to be in lawful possession of the leased property. Similar is the view in the later pronouncement in the case reported in (1995) 5 SCC 698 : ( AIR 1996 SC 140 ) wherein it is held that even if a site is taken on lease by a licensee, continuance in possession even after expiry of the lease period cannot be termed as lawful possession and as such he is not entitled for the renewal of license. It is further held almost in the similar circumstances that when a site is taken on lease by licensee, continuance of possession by him even after expiry of the lease period in contravention of the terms of the lease and in the absence of acquiescence such possession cannot be a lawful possession, it being as a tenant at sufferance and there being no landlord tenant relationship which is an essential character of a lawful possession. ( 13 ) ON going through these pronouncements there can be no doubt as to the position of law. And as such it has to be held that once lease period has expired, possession of the lessee is not lawful one but only a litigious possession. It is to be noted at this stage itself the alternative argument of the petitioners. It is contended that even if the lease has expired, exception from the provisions of the Rent Control Act is only for the purpose of eviction and are not for any other the purpose and as such the tenant continues to be a statutory tenant and hence until he is evicted under due process of law his possession cannot be termed as unlawful. I am afraid to accept this contention in view of the aforesaid clear law laid down. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Patil Exhibitors (P) Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, reported in ILR 1985 Kant 3700 : (AIR 1986 Kant 194) has held that lessee contending in possession continues to be so as a quondam lessee, who continues in possession without there being a bilateral consensual act of holding over and as such is not in lawful possession but is merely juridical possession. ( 14 ) IT is nextly contended that as the initial lease was for 35 years, even before the expiry of the said period, mutual arbitration proceedings were initiated and in the same an award has been passed by the arbitrator extending the lease period by one year that is up to 2-2-2000. It is also contended that as per the original agreement, notice of option has been already given well within the time prescribed, the award is binding on the respondents. It is to be noted that this arbitration award has been disputed by the respondents inter alia contending that it is a created document. It is also contended that as per the original agreement, notice of option has been already given well within the time prescribed, the award is binding on the respondents. It is to be noted that this arbitration award has been disputed by the respondents inter alia contending that it is a created document. In this regard, the respondents have produced an affidavit of the arbitrator himself along with the Statement of Objections. On a perusal of the same, it is to be noted that the arbitrator has clearly admitted that the award was passed only at the instance of the petitioners herein even though there was no arbitration clause in the lease deed and in spite of the original landlord Shri M. A. Bakhi did not agree for the same. This admission or statement on oath by the arbitrator himself clearly goes against the contentions of the petitioners especially when the same is not disputed by the other side. Even otherwise it is to be noted that before the Divisional Commissioner this point of arbitrator's award and its effect has been given up by petitioner-1 himself as is noted in the order at Annexure G to the writ petition and hence it is not open to the petitioners to canvass the same. In this regard the pronouncements in the case the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board, Trivandrum v. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, reported in AIR 1985 Ker 112 (sic) and in the case Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. Workmen, reported in AIR 1967 SC 948 and the decision of this Court in the case Thayarammal v. Peoples Charity Fund, reported in (1978) 1 Kant LJ 438 : (AIR 1978 Kant 125) are to the effect that contentions not pressed before the lower authority cannot be raised once again in the writ petition, are clearly applicable to the present case and hence I have to hold that the same is not available to the petitioners. Even otherwise, it is to be noted that since the award of the arbitrator has not been made Rule of Court the same cannot be considered at this stage. As such the findings arrived at by both the authorities regarding unlawful possession of the petitioner in my view are just and proper and as such on this count alone petitioner- 1 is not entitled for the renewal of the licence. As such the findings arrived at by both the authorities regarding unlawful possession of the petitioner in my view are just and proper and as such on this count alone petitioner- 1 is not entitled for the renewal of the licence. ( 15 ) IN so far as the locus standi of the respondents/owners is concerned this Court in the case Syed Gafar v. Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore Division, Bangalore, reported in (1998) 4 Kant LJ 610 : (1998 AIHC 993) has held that where licence is granted to a tenant to exhibit cinema in the leased premises, the landlord who is objecting to grant of licence is a person aggrieved and has locus standi to challenge or object to the proceedings. In my view both the authorities have rightly held that the respondents have locus standi to challenge or interfere in the licence renewal proceedings. ( 16 ) THE next point to be considered is regarding res judicata or estoppel. In this regard it is contended that in the earlier proceedings for renewal of licence in the year 2001 before the District Magistrate all the objections now raised were considered and negatived by him as per Annexure F to the writ petition especially in respect of the question of lawful possession and hence it is contended that the same acts as res judicata or its acts as an estoppel. At the outset it is to be noted that in that proceeding the District Magistrate held the petitioners as in lawful possession mainly placing reliance and on the assumption of valid arbitration award, which now has been established as a collusively created award and also without making the same Rule of Court. Hence, I am of the view that Annexure F to the writ petition does not act as res judicata. Moreover, it is to be seen that since the District Magistrate is a quasi-judicial licence issuing authority and not a Court, principles of res judicata are not attracted. ( 17 ) ON considering in detail all the arguments of both sides on the impugned orders, I am of the view that there is no illegality in rejecting the prayer of the petitioners for renewal of the licence and as such in my view the writ petition is devoid of merits and hence liable to be dismissed. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, this writ petition is dismissed. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, this writ petition is dismissed. ( 19 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .