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2003 DIGILAW 79 (MAD)

Valsarajan v. Saraswathy

2003-01-23

N.KRISHNAN NAIR

body2003
ORDER: This revision is directed against the order dated 5th August, 1999 of the Judge, Family Court, Kozhikode in C.C. No. 373 of 1998. The respondent herein filed a petition for maintenance against the petitioner under Sec. 125 of the Crl.P.C. before the Family Court, Kozhikode. Though the petition was stoutly opposed by the petitioner, the lower Court by the impugned order allowed the petition directing the petitioner to pay maintenance to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 350 per month. The said order is seriously challenged in this revision. 2. The petitioner married the respondent on 22nd April, 1987 and a child was born in the wedlock. Their marriage was dissolved by a decree passed by the lower Court on 18th October, 1997 in O.P. No. 219 of 1993. An earlier application for maintenance filed by the respondent was dismissed on the ground that she was living in adultery. After the dissolution of the marriage, the respondent filed the application for maintenance alleging that the petitioner is bound to maintain her as she is unable to maintain herself. The petitioner resisted the application contending that since an earlier application filed by the respondent was dismissed, the second application is not maintainable. It was also contended by the petitioner that since the respondent is living in adultery, she is disentitled to get maintenance in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 125(4) of the Crl.P.C. The Court below rejected both the contentions and allowed the application. 3. The first question arising for consideration in this case is whether the dismissal of the earlier application for maintenance filed by the wife under Sec. 125 of the Crl.P.C. is a bar to the consideration of the second application filed by her after she suffered a decree for divorce. It is settled position that when an application for maintenance filed by the wife is dismissed on merits, a second application for maintenance on the same facts cannot be entertained. In this case, admittedly, the respondent had filed M.C. No. 223 of 1993 against the petitioner for maintenance and the same was dismissed by the lower Court on the ground that she was leading an adulterous life. After the dismissal of the first application, the respondent suffered a decree for divorce. The second application for maintenance was filed by her as a divorced wife. After the dismissal of the first application, the respondent suffered a decree for divorce. The second application for maintenance was filed by her as a divorced wife. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh v. Smt.Ramendri and others J.T. (2000)2 S.C. 553, a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance. As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in Sec. 125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a divorced woman, she is entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife. In this case the earlier application was on one state of facts and the second application was based on a different state of facts. The respondent filed the first application as the wife of the petitioner but the second application was filed by her as his divorced wife. Therefore, the lower Court was fully justified in finding that the second application is maintainable. 4. The next question for consideration is whether the respondent is disentitled to get maintenance in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 125(4) of the Crl.P.C. As per Sec. 125(4), no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband or if they are living separately by mutual consent. In this case, it is true that the Court below dismissed the earlier application filed by the respondent on the ground that she was living in adultery. As stated earlier, the present application for maintenance was filed by the respondent as a divorced wife. A divorced wife can never live in adultery. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider an identical situation in Vanamala v. Ranganatha Bhatta (1995)2 K.L.T. 397. In that case, a petition for maintenance filed by a divorced wife under Sec. 125(4) was resisted on the ground that the divorce was by mutual consent and therefore the divorced woman was not entitled to get maintenance. The Supreme Court held that on a plain reading of Sec. 125(4), it is clear that the expression ‘wife’ in the sub-section does not have the extended meaning of including a woman who has been divorced. The Supreme Court held that on a plain reading of Sec. 125(4), it is clear that the expression ‘wife’ in the sub-section does not have the extended meaning of including a woman who has been divorced. According to the Supreme Court, unless there is a relationship of husband and wife, there can be no question of a divorced woman living in adultery or without sufficient reason refusing to live with her husband. In this connection, it is also relevant to note the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh v. Smt.Ramendri J.T. (2000)2 S.C. 553. In that case, the husband obtained a decree for divorce against the wife on the ground of desertion. An application for maintenance filed by the wife was resisted on the ground that a decree for divorce having been passed on the ground by desertion of the wife, she is not entitled to get maintenance on account of Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 125 of the Crl.P.C. The Supreme Court held that Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 125 would be applicable where the marriage between the parties subsists and not where it has come to an end. The Supreme Court further observed the claim for maintenance under the first part of Sec. 125 of the Crl.P.C. is based on the subsistence of marriage while claim for maintenance of a divorced wife is based on the foundation provided by Explanation (b) to Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 125 of the Crl.P.C. 5. In this case even if it is assumed that the respondent is living in adultery, she is entitled to get maintenance from the petitioner since Sec. 125(4) is not attracted in this case. I see no infirmity in the order of the lower Court. 6. This revision is groundless and is dismissed. V.K.-----Petition dismissed.