Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This is defendants appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below. It has been concurrently found that the plaintiff-respondents are the co-owners of the suit land as has been mentioned in the jamabandis Exs.Pl, P2 and the statement made by DW2 admitting the ownership of plaintiff-respondents 2. Even otherwise, the defendant-appellants did not specifically deny the ownership and proprietorship of the plaintiff-respondents. It has further been found that the land in dispute is dohli and no sale, mortgage, lease for 99 years in respect of such a land is permissible and the same has to be held as void ab initio. The lease deed dated 20.8.1994 for a period of 99 years in respect of Dohli land has been held to be void ab inito as it amounted to permanent alienation. The law does not confer any rights on the lessee like the defendant-appellants and reliance has been placed on the judgments of this Court and other courts in the case of Sewa Ram v. Udegir, A.I.R. 1922 Lahore 126, Tirkha and Ors. v. Dewarka Par shad and Anr., 1972 P.L.J. 614; and Sittal Doss and Anr. v. Financial Commissioner Haryana and Ors., 1989 P.L.J. 148. The owners have been held to be competent to file a suit and there was no reference with regard to production of Wajib-ul-arz. The Dohli tenure came to an end because the Dohlidars did not carry out the religious purpose of the Dohli. The claim of the Dohli-dar is that his right to occupy and continue as Dohlidar cannot be disputed but they did not produce any condition or restriction to show that Dohlidar was not competent to lease out the land for 99 years. It is appropriate to mention that Dohli is a rent-free grant of a small plot of land by village community for the benefit of a temple, mosque or shrine, or to a person for religious purpose. Such land cannot be alienated by sale or mortgage because the status of Dohlidar is that of a trustee. In the instant case, the lease for 99 years at a fixed amount of Rs. 1,10,000/- with possession to Dohli was given to the lessee vide lease deed dated 20.8.1993. Such land cannot be alienated by sale or mortgage because the status of Dohlidar is that of a trustee. In the instant case, the lease for 99 years at a fixed amount of Rs. 1,10,000/- with possession to Dohli was given to the lessee vide lease deed dated 20.8.1993. Accordingly, the lessee could not be evicted from the Dohli before the expiry of full term of 99 years and possession could not be taken from the lessee, even though Dohildar has been rendering no service. It has been held by the Courts below that it is settled law that Dohli is not for a permanent tenure; and Dohli rights are extinguished and the property reverts back to the original proprietors. It is in these circumstances that the lease deed in favour of the defendant-appellants was held to be void conferring no right. 2. Brief facts of the case which have led to the filing of the instant appeal are that plaintiff-respondents Surat Singh and others filed Civil Suit No. 317 of 2000 dated 8.2.1994 seeking declaration and injunction alleging that the suit land as per entry made in the jamabandi was owned and possessed by the owners whose name figure in Khewat Nos. 50, 51. 52, 54 and 55. The land was given on Dohli to defendant-respondents 8 to 14 several years go who were in possession as Dohlidars. Similarly, another piece of land owned by Shamlat deh measuring 6 kanals 1 marla was given on Dohli to defendant-respondents 8 to 14. Plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 further alleged that defendant-respondents 8 to 14, without any legal right permanently alienated the suit land in favour of defendant-appellants and defendant-respondent 7 for a period of 99 years for a consideration of Rs. 3,10,000/- vide registered lease deed dated 20.8.1993. Seeking a declaration, the-plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 asserted that the lease deed amounted to permanent alienation and the same was liable to be declared null and void. It was further prayed that plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 and proforma defendant-respondents 17 to 32 were the co-sharers/co-owners of the same. 3. The Civil Judge held that Dohlidars were not entitled to lease out the land for a period of 99 years and declared the lease deed dated 20.8.1993 as null and void. The view taken by the Civil Judge was challenged before the learned Additional District Judge who also affirmed the findings. 3. The Civil Judge held that Dohlidars were not entitled to lease out the land for a period of 99 years and declared the lease deed dated 20.8.1993 as null and void. The view taken by the Civil Judge was challenged before the learned Additional District Judge who also affirmed the findings. The argument raised that the lists of properties comprised in Khewat No. 51, 54 and 55 were not filed and the proprietors of those properties were not served under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code, was considered by the learned Additional District Judge and it was held that non-service would not vitiate the decree as the proprietors of Khewat Nos. 51, 52, 54 and 55 are the beneficiaries of the decree passed by the Civil Judge. The observations of the learned Additional District Judge are as under:- ".....But the question is whether failure of procedure prescribed under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC vitiates the proceedings in the case in hand. The proforma respondents as well as the proprietors of khewat Nos. 51, 52, 54 and 55 are the beneficiaries under the decree in hand. The plaintiffs had filed the suit seeking relief for themselves as well as for other proprietors of the khewats. They did not claim any relief against those proprietors. Thus, in my considered view non-compliance of Order 1, Rule 8 CPC in the case in hand cannot be construed as vitiating all the proceedings. In the absence of compliance of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, the suit can well be treated to have been filed by the plaintiffs in their individual capacity and not under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and hence in such circumstances there would be no need to remanded the case back. Reference in this respect may be made to Single Bench authority of our own Honble High Court cited as "Suhlar etc. v. Ram Singh, 1987 Recent Revenue Reports 366." 4. However, the learned Additional District Judge modified the decree by treating the suit filed by plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 in respect of their land measuring 8 kanals 19 marlas in their individual capacity and not in a representatives capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code. As a result, the lease dated 20.8.1993 was declared null and void only to that extent. As a result, the lease dated 20.8.1993 was declared null and void only to that extent. In other words, the land measuring 6 kanals 1 marla belonging to Shamlat deh was not held to be subject matter of the suit. 5. I have heard Mr. G.S. Gandhi, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants who are the lessee from the Dohlidars. The learned counsel has resurrected the same argument, namely, list of the properties notsupplied and no permission to pursue the suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code was taken. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jai Narain and Ors. v. Chandgi Ram and Ors., 1977 P.L.J. 527; Mar Kishan and Ors. v. Durga and Ors., (1996-1)112 P.L.R. 787; Kundan Singh and Ors. v. Gurnam Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1986 Punjab and Haryana 51; and Smt. Munni Devi and Ors. v. Satgur Dayal Tandon and Ors., A.I.R. 1973 Allahabad 281. The learned counsel has also submitted that Sher Singh has already expired and no decree could have been passed against a dead person. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme court in Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar and Anr. (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 810 and Babu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 204. 6. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the defendant-appellants and regret my inability to accept the same. It is well settled principle of law that Dohlidars cannot alienate the property by way of sale, mortgage or a permanent lease nor such a lease confers any right on the lessee as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Sital Dasss case (supra) which has also been relied upon by the Courts below. This Court following various other judgments including the Division Bench judgments in the cases of Baba Badri Dass v. Shri Dharma and Ors., 1981 P.L.J. 447 and Dharma v. Smt. Harbai," 1976 P.L.J. 617 in Sittal Dasss case (supra) held as under:- "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on consideration of the matter, we are of the view that Sewa Rams case (supra) is correctly decided. The principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment were followed in another Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Dharma v. Smt. Harbai, 1976 P.L.J. 617. This division Bench had followed the observations made by the learned Single Judge in Tirkha v, Dwarka Parshad, 1972 P.L.J. 614, who in turn had followed Sewa Rams case (supra). We are of the opinion that all these three cases are correctly decided and lay down unequivocally that the sale, mortgage or any other alienation of Dohli tenure is void ab initio...." 7. It will be appropriate to make a reference to the observations of the Division Bench in Dharmas case (supra) which states the principles more explicitly. The observations of the Division Bench read as under:- "This brings me to the real point in controversy on which elaborate arguments were advanced, i.e. whether the present lease deed for 99 years amounts to permanent alienation or not. Again in my view, the answer has to be in the affirmative. The lease deed Exhibit D2 is for 99 years on an annual rent of Rs. 480/-. On the expiry of the term of lease the possession is to revert to the lessor and in case of non-payment of rent, the lessor is entitled to take legal action for its realisation. This shows that the lessee could not be evicted from the land before the expiry of full term on 99 years and thus it is a lease from generation to generation and the proprietors could not take possession from the lessee even though the Dholidar failed to render the services as required under the Sharat Wajib-ul-arz. It is settled law that a person cannot pass title which he himself does not hold. The Dholi is not a permanent tenure and the moment the Dholidar fails to render the requisite services for which the Dholi was created, the dholi rights are extinguished and property reverts to the original proprietors. In view, the terms and conditions of the lease deed in question clearly lead to one irresistible conclusion that it was a case of a permanent alienation. It do not agree with Mr. Kapoor that the Dohiliar has a right to create a lease and the same could not be successfully challenged. In view, the terms and conditions of the lease deed in question clearly lead to one irresistible conclusion that it was a case of a permanent alienation. It do not agree with Mr. Kapoor that the Dohiliar has a right to create a lease and the same could not be successfully challenged. The Dholidar, according to the specific condition in Sharat Wajib-ul-arz is debarred from making a sale or mortgage of the Dholi tenure and the present transaction being a pennanent alienation has to be held to be void ab-initio. On this aspect of the matter, the following observations of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Tirkha and Ors. v. Dwarka Parshad and Anr., 1972 P.L.J. 614, may be read with advantage:- "There is a world of difference between a void and voidable transaction. A void transaction is non est whereas a voidable transaction is good so long as it stands, but becomes void when it is impeached by the person who has a right to get the transaction declared void. The observations of the learned Chief Justice are clear on the point that the alienation of Dholi tenure is void ab initio. If it is void, it is non est. On the other hand if it is voidable the alienor could no challenge it. Whereas according to the learned Chief Justice a Dholidar can impeach the very alienation he has made. Thus the alienation is void and not voidable." 8 The argument that list of the properties of Khewat Nos. 51, 52, 54 and 55 were not filed nor there was effective service on all the proprietors would not require any serious consideration because the learned Additional District Judge has already modified the judgment by restricting the claim of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 to their individual rights. The suit has not been considered as one under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code in a representative capacity and the decree passed by the Civil Judge has accordingly been modified. Therefore, there is no substance in these arguments. 9. The other submissions that Sher Singh defendant-respondent 7 had died and no j decree could have been passed against him, would also not require any serious consideration because no such argument was raised before the Courts below. Even in the present proceedings, nothing has been pointed out as to when Sher Singh died. 9. The other submissions that Sher Singh defendant-respondent 7 had died and no j decree could have been passed against him, would also not require any serious consideration because no such argument was raised before the Courts below. Even in the present proceedings, nothing has been pointed out as to when Sher Singh died. Therefore, such an argument cannot be permitted at the stage of second appeal. 10. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on a judgment delivered by District Judge, Gurgaon showing that Wajib-ul-arj has been followed for the purposes of concluding grant of compensation to a Dohilidar. According to the learned counsel, the Dholiar has been accepted to be the owner of the property and compensation treating him as owner has been awarded. A true copy of that judgment has been placed on record as Mark A. I am afraid, even this submission of the learned counsel cannot be entertained at this stage because such like documents are required to be produced as evidence and the witnesses producing such documents have to be subjected to cross-examination. It is only then that such a custom/Wajib-ul-arj could be recognized. Moreover, the land situated in the judgment Mark A is in village Manesar, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, whereas the land in the present case is situated at village Bhotwas Ahirs, Tehsil and District Rewari. Therefore, it would not ipso facto govern the customs attached to the land in village Bhotwas Ahirs. The argument is wholly misconceived and cannot be accepted. For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.