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2003 DIGILAW 80 (PNJ)

Ajaib Singh v. Sohan Singh

2003-01-17

HEMANT GUPTA

body2003
Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. This is defendants appeal wherein the estate left by deceased Smt. Taro daughter of Kharak Singh of village Mucchal is in dispute. 2. Briefly the facts are that Smt. Taro was married to one Jit Singh @ Chet Singh. She has 1/5th of share in the land measuring 60 kanals situated in village Mucchal i.e. the village of her parents i.e. from her fathers brother. She had some land in the village Bhalojala i.e. village of her husband. She died on 4.1.1971 without leaving behind any child. Her husband has pre-deceased her. The revenue authorities sanctioned mutation of her estate of village Mucchal i.e. her parents village in the name of her real sister Smt. Dhano whereas mutation in respect of village situated in Bhalojala i.e. husbands village was sanctioned in favour of husbands brothers son Santa Singh. Smt. Dhano sold the property situated at village, Mucchal in favour of defendant-appellant and Santa Singh sold the said property situated in village Mucchal in favour of present plaintiff. Santa Singh also relied upon a will dated 13.11.1970 in respect of land situated at Mucchal. 3. Both the courts have returned a concurrent finding of fact that Smt. Taro has not executed a will dated 13.11.1970. Thus, the only question which arises is whether husbands brother son i.e. Santa Singh will succeed to the property of Smt. Taro situated at village Mucchal or her sister Dhano. The learned trial Court decreed the suit relying upon Section 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 holding that Santa Singh is a preferential heir of Smt. Taro to her sister Dhano. The appellate Court affirmed such finding. 4. I have heard counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case. 5. The substantial question of law which arises in the present appeal is whether the source from which Smt. Taro inherited the property is relevant to determine the succession of Smt. Taro in terms of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 15 of the said Act reads as under; "15. 5. The substantial question of law which arises in the present appeal is whether the source from which Smt. Taro inherited the property is relevant to determine the succession of Smt. Taro in terms of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 15 of the said Act reads as under; "15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.- (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16- (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband: (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband: (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father: (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father: (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1).- (a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in Sub-section (1) in the order specified therein but upon the heirs of the father: and (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in Sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband". 6. The learned trial Court relied upon Joginder Singh v. Rulda Singh and Ors., (1964)66 P.L.R. 150 to hold that Santa Singh is preferential heir in terms of Section 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act. In the said case, the female Smt. Aso succeeded to her son Mohan Singh. The source from which Smt. Aso has succeeded the property is relatable to the property of her husband. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute to law laid down in the judgment. 7. Counsel for the appellant relied upon Bhagat Ram (D) v. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 2002 Supreme Court 1 to contend that the source from which the female inherits the property is important and that would govern the succession. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute to law laid down in the judgment. 7. Counsel for the appellant relied upon Bhagat Ram (D) v. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 2002 Supreme Court 1 to contend that the source from which the female inherits the property is important and that would govern the succession. As a matter of fact, the Honble Supreme Court in the said judgment has discussed the recommendation of the joint committee of the two Houses of the Parliament wherein provisions corresponding to Section 2 of Section 15 were recommended. It will be relevant to reproduce para 12 and 13 of the judgment. "12. We do not think that the law laid down by the learned single judge in the above said decision is correct. Even if the female Hindu who is having a limited ownership becomes full owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the rules of succession given under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 can be applied. In fact, the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 as originally introduced in the Rajya Sabha did not contain any clause corresponding to Sub-section (2) of Section 15. It came to be incorporated on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament. The reason given by the Joint Committee is found in Clause 17 of the Bill, which reads as follows:- "While revising the order of succession among the heirs to a Hindu female, the Joint Committee have provided that, properties inherited by her from her father reverts to the family of the father in the absence of issue and similarly property inherited from her husband or father-in-law reverts to the heirs of the husband in the absence of issue. In the opinion of the Joint Committee such a provision would prevent properties passing into the hands of persons to whom justice would demand they should not pass." 13. The source from which she inherits the property is always important and that would govern the situation. Otherwise persons who are not even remotely related to the person who originally held the property would acquire rights to inherit that property. That would defeat the intent and purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 15, which gives a special pattern of succession." 8. Thus in view of the said judgment the source from which Smt. Taro has inherited the property is important and would govern the situation. That would defeat the intent and purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 15, which gives a special pattern of succession." 8. Thus in view of the said judgment the source from which Smt. Taro has inherited the property is important and would govern the situation. Since the property in village Mucchal has been inherited by her being niece of Bela Singh i.e. her fathers brother. She has got the property which on account of her relationship with Bela Singh i.e. through her father. 9. Faced with the situation, the counsel for the respondent has relied upon Balasaheb Anandrao Ghatge v. Jaimala Sahaji Raje Angre and Ors., A.I.R. 1978 Bombay 44 and Jayantilal Mansukhlal and Anr. v. Mehta Chhana Lal, A.I.R. 1968 Gujrat 212. In view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, the intention of the legislature as found by the Bombay High Court is not sustainable. In Jayantilai Mansukhlals case (supra) the question which has been decided is whether Section 15(1) would be applicable in respect of property inherited under a Will. However, the said judgment is clearly distinguishable. 10. It has been categorically held by the Honble Supreme Court that the source from which the female inherits the property is important and would govern the situation. In view of the said Supreme Court judgment, the judgment and decree of both the Courts below is clearly not sustainable. Consequently, I allow the petition, set aside the judgment and decree and dismiss the suit. No costs.