JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE R.G., J.:-This matter is listed for hearing on the point of Stay in view of the reply/reply affidavit filed by the respondent-M.S.E.B, on 26-9-2001. From the dockets of the case, it is clear that this matter was heard for admission on 2nd July, 2001. Thus Court issued Rule on that date and also Rule on interim relief in terms of prayer Clause (c), which was made returnable within three weeks. However, it appears that thereafter no interim relief was granted. On March 31, 2003, while passing the order, as is clear from the docket, it was mentioned. "Order of interim relief granted by this Court is hereby confirmed". In fact, as observed earlier, there was no interim stay granted and Rule on interim relief does not mean that the interim relief is granted. It only means why the interim relief should not be granted. 2. Inspite of there being no interim relief, surprisingly parties appear to be under impression that there is interim relief granted and, therefore, the respondent/Board filed its reply affidavit, titling it as "Affidavit in reply to Rule on interim relief issued by this Court." When the matter was called out for hearing, it was specifically put to both the parties as to whether was there any interim relief granted by this Court in this matter any time? Both the parties, after having verified the record, agreed that there was no interim relief granted. 3. However, since Rule on interim relief was already issued long back, and reply has also been filed under the impression that there was interim relief wherein it has specifically prayed by the respondent that interim relief granted on 28-5-2001 be vacated, with the consent of the parties, this matter now is heard only on the point of grant of interim relief/Stay as is expressed by both the parties. This Court, therefore, has taken up this matter to decide as to whether is it a fit case wherein any interim relief is required to be granted or not. The matter is also hotly contested on the point of stay also. Taking into consideration the importance of the point involved in the matter, this Court heard the matter on that point alone, though at length. 4. The matter is also hotly contested on the point of stay also. Taking into consideration the importance of the point involved in the matter, this Court heard the matter on that point alone, though at length. 4. Just and necessary facts, for the decision on the point of stay/interim relief, are as under: The petitioner/mandal is a registered union representing Class-III and Class-IV employees of the respondent-Maharashtra State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board" for the purposes of brevity). Undisputed position is that the respondent/Board has not framed Standing Orders, nor are there any Standing Orders, certified under section 2-A of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It is also not disputed that any Standing Orders under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 are there. The Board has already framed the Service Regulations in accordance with the provisions of section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The conditions of service of the employees working in the respondent/Board are being governed by these Regulations framed under the Act of 1948. However, it is also to be seen that these Regulations appear to have not been notified under section 12-B of the Standing Orders Act, 1946. Generally when there are no Standing Orders framed or duly certified or notified, the industries can be said to have been governed by Model Standing Orders. The question that needs consideration for the purposes of the present decision, is as to whether any industry, where no certified Standing Orders are there or notified Standing Orders are there, will the Regulations prevail or Model Standing Order will prevail? 5. The respondent/Board on May 23, 2001 issued a circular which is said to be a confidential, regarding the guidelines in the cases of transfer. This circular appears to have been issued in accordance with the powers vested in the Board under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. What prompted the Board to issue this Circular is abundantly made clear in the said Circular itself. Therefore, the Board took a decision to effect the transfers in certain cases including that of inter-cadre transfers. However, while affection such transfers what things are to be observed and what procedure as to be followed, is given in paragraph 3 thereof in detail. These are the guidelines to be observed while effecting the transfers. Therefore, the Board took a decision to effect the transfers in certain cases including that of inter-cadre transfers. However, while affection such transfers what things are to be observed and what procedure as to be followed, is given in paragraph 3 thereof in detail. These are the guidelines to be observed while effecting the transfers. This Circular dated 23rd May, 2001 is at Annexure-B on page 24 of the petition. 6. The above said circular appeared to have hurt the union and its members which prompted the petitioner-union to challenge the said circular by filing a complaint under section 28 read with Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act 1 of 1972). Alongwith the complaint, an application under section 30(2) of the of the Act was also moved by the petitioner-union. Initially, interim relief was granted by the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, staying the effect and operation of the Circular, however, after having reply from the respondent-Board and after having heard the matter again, interim relief granted earlier was vacated and application filed under section 30(2) of the Act by the petitioner- union came to be rejected by the order dated June, 13, 2001. It is this order which is under challenge in the present writ petition at the instance of the petitioner-union. 7. As pointed out earlier, Rule is already issued in this matter and Rule on interim relief was issued and hence the matter is now heard on the point of stay. Shri B.M. Khan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-union contended that issuance of the circular by the respondent/Board, governing the acts of misconducts and transfer; making provision for effecting transfers ex-cadres also, was beyond the competence of the respondent Board, particularly in view of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. According to Shri Khan, issuance of the Circular in question is in contravention of the provisions of the Act of 1946, as also Schedule I of Model Standing Orders under that Act. According to Shri Khan, issuance of the Circular in question is in contravention of the provisions of the Act of 1946, as also Schedule I of Model Standing Orders under that Act. Shri Khan contends that if at all such a change is required to be made, and provisions are to be made as regards transfer of the employees, it was incumbent on the part of the Board to have first issued a notice of change under section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No such notice of change is issued and, therefore, no provision of transfer of the present employees can be made. Shri Khan further stressed that the contents of the circular indicate that the officers concerned are informed about the acts of misconducts, which the employees may commit and which would call for the transfer even ex-cadre of such employees. Shri Khan argued that ex-cadre transfer, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be permissible particularly when there is no provision to that effect, made even in Model Standing Orders. Shri Khan further contended that in view of the provisions of the Standing Orders Act, 1946, Service Regulations framed by the respondent/Board cannot be said to be operative in the field where the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 apply. He further contended that since there are no provisions either in the Model Standing Orders or in any other law for effecting ex-cadre transfers, that too as a measure of punishment because of the acts of misconducts mentioned in the Circular introduction of the subject of transfer and that too ex-cadre, by circular cannot be permitted unless Model Standing Orders are framed by the board, and further they are duly certified by the Competent Authority or notified in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Shri Khan, therefore, assailed the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, contending that the authority below failed to see that there could not be two sets of service conditions for Class III and Class IV employees, when the service conditions as regards these employees are already covered in the Model Standing Orders. 8. Shri Khan, therefore, assailed the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, contending that the authority below failed to see that there could not be two sets of service conditions for Class III and Class IV employees, when the service conditions as regards these employees are already covered in the Model Standing Orders. 8. Shri Khan further contended that since Model Standing Orders govern the present industry, the Service Regulations framed by the Board, could be said to be operative even in respect of the matters, which are not either covered or provided for the Schedule to the Act of 1946, as also under the Rules of 1959. According to Shri Khan, the learned Member of the Industrial Court lost the sight of this important aspect and reached to the erroneous conclusion of vacating the stay. 9. Shri Khan pointed out that even under the Service Regulations framed by the Board, no provision is made for ex-cadre transfers for the acts of the alleged misconducts mentioned in the Circular dated 23-5-2001. He, therefore, argued that effecting such transfers would be in contravention of section 9-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Shri Khan expressed apprehension that under the guise of these powers of transfer, the Board may pick and choose the employees, even with ulterior motive and may transfer them under the protection of the alleged circular. In view of this, Shri Khan contended that it is a fit case wherein there should be stay to the effect and operation of the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, so as to prevent the respondent-Board from mis-utilising these powers. According to him, if these powers are allowed to be exercised, it is likely to be used in vengeance in a given case. Shri Khan, therefore, earnestly prays for grant of stay to the effect and operation of the circular and the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court. 10. Shri K.H. Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-Board, alongwith Shri Bandarkar, Advocate, vehemently contended that the apprehension entertained by the petitioner is totally unfounded. He contended that the Employees Service Regulations of the Board are framed strictly in accordance with the powers conferred on the Board by section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. Shri K.H. Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-Board, alongwith Shri Bandarkar, Advocate, vehemently contended that the apprehension entertained by the petitioner is totally unfounded. He contended that the Employees Service Regulations of the Board are framed strictly in accordance with the powers conferred on the Board by section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. According to Shri Deshpande, section 79 of the Act of 1948 confers power on the Board to make the Regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder for providing for all or any of the matters referred to in section 79. Clause (c) of section 79 deals with the duties of (officers and other employees) the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. Heavily relying on this provision, it is contended that statute confers powers on the Board to make Regulations and these Regulations having been framed under those powers do definitely have a legal force. Regulation No. 15 gives power to the Board to transfer the employees of the Board from one post to any other post within or outside the sphere of duty or place of employment or to any place in India as the exigency in administration may require. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent-Board, the contents of the circular are self-explanatory to suggest as to what prompted the respondent-Board to issue this circular. However, this Court, at this stage does not find it appropriate to deal with it on merits as the subject matter is already pending decision before the Competent Industrial Court at Nagpur. The only thing, which this Court has to see is, whether could such a circular be issued or not by the respondent- Board in accordance with the powers derived by it under Clause 15 of the Regulations? Which itself derives powers under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. 11. The point is : Was it permissible for the respondent/Board to have issued a circular pertaining to the subject of transfer inspite of the fact that no such provision for transfer is either made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 or in the Schedule under section 2-A thereof ? 11. The point is : Was it permissible for the respondent/Board to have issued a circular pertaining to the subject of transfer inspite of the fact that no such provision for transfer is either made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 or in the Schedule under section 2-A thereof ? Shri Deshpande, learned Advocate for the respondent/Board contended that the present respondent Board cannot be said to be governed by the provisions of the Standing Orders Act of 1946 or even by the Model Standing Orders, particularly when the Service Regulations are already framed by the Board that too in accordance with the statutory provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 under section 79(c) thereof. Shri Deshpande, further contended the section 2-A of the Standing Orders Act, 1946 makes it clear that said Act of 1946 applies to an industrial establishment, where the Model Standing Orders for every matter set out in the Schedule applicable to such establishment shall apply to such establishment from such date (as the State Government may, by a notification in the Official Gazette appoint in this behalf). Proviso added thereto further makes the position clear that nothing in that section shall be deemed to affect any Standing Orders which are finally certified under the said Act and have come into operation under the said Act in respect of any Industrial Establishment before the date of coming into force of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1957. Relying on this provision, Shri Deshpande, contended that schedule under section 2-A of the Act of 1946 deal with the matters to be provided in Standing Orders (Model Standing Orders and Amendments) under this Act. This Schedule under section 2-A of the Act deals with eleven subjects, about which, a provision has to be made in the Standing Orders to be framed under the Act. However, it is clear from the contents thereof that no reference, whatsoever, is made to the subject of "transfer" therein. In short, subject of transfer is left untouched by the provisions of the Act of 1946 itself, nor is there any reference to it either in the Schedule under section 2-A of the Act or even under Schedule 1 of Model Standing Orders. 12. In short, subject of transfer is left untouched by the provisions of the Act of 1946 itself, nor is there any reference to it either in the Schedule under section 2-A of the Act or even under Schedule 1 of Model Standing Orders. 12. Shri Khan, the learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that respondent Industry is, no doubt, governed by the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and, therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the respondent-Board to have framed Standing Orders, and if the respondent-Board wanted to introduce the subject of transfer, it was incumbent on the part of the respondent-Board to have got those Model Standing Orders with amended provisions, duly certified by the Competent Authority in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Standing Orders Act of 1946. Shri Khan contended that failure on the part of the respondent/Board to frame such Standing Orders and further to get the same either certified or duly notified by the Governor, definitely prevents the respondent-Board from introducing the subject of transfer under the guise of the powers being exercised in accordance with the Service Regulations framed under section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Shri Khan contended that the respondent-Board has no escape from the operation of the Standing Orders Act of 1946 and hence it was not open for the Board to have introduced that subject in question by way of a circular, which otherwise is neither provided for under the Act of 1946 nor under the Model Standing Orders. The arguments of Shri Khan, per se, appear to be appealing but the depth of the same will have to be gauged. There cannot be any second opinion as regards the present respondent/industry being governed by the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. However, if the industry has no Standing Orders framed at all and when Model Standing Orders do not refer to the subject of "transfer" in any of its items, then the question is, if the Regulations framed under section 79(c) make a provision for a subject not touched to by the Act of 1946, or Model Standing Orders, whether could it be given effect or not. 13. 13. Shri Deshpande, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent/Board contended that assuming the Act of 1946 is applicable, but it will be only with regard to the subject mentioned in Schedule framed under section 2-A of the Act. If any subject to which a reference is not there either under the Act or the Schedule thereof, then in that respect tot that extent, it is open for the respondent-Board to have acted in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations framed by the Board, which also has a legal sanctity as the same are framed in accordance with the statutory power conferred on the Board under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Shri Deshpande, therefore, contended that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to say that the subject, to which there is no reference either under the Act of 1946 or the Schedule thereof, cannot be touched at all by the employer except in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Act of 1946. Prima facie, we see the Act of 1946 or the Schedule thereof is silent about the subject of transfer, Model Standing Orders are also silent on the subject of transfer. However, transfers are perishable under the Service Regulations of the Board framed under section 79(c) of the Act of 1946. The question is, which one is to govern the subject of transfer. 14. Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, is a general Act, whereas the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, is a special Act. Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 deals with the duties of the officers and servants of the respondent-Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. This is no more than the ordinary general power, with which the employer is invested in the first instance to regulate the conditions of service of his employees. This Act, however, does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of the State Electricity Board. In fact, it is an Act to regulate the co-ordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a special Act, with regard to the subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments. In fact, it is an Act to regulate the co-ordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a special Act, with regard to the subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments. In such circumstances, though section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 generally provides for making of the regulations, providing for the conditions of service of employees of the respondent-Board, it can only be regarded as a general provision, which must yield to the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, in respect of the matters covered by the latter Act. The principle "generalis specialised non derogant," is to be definitely invoked in such matters, i.e. the general provision to yield to a specific provisions. 15. The learned Advocates in support of their contentions pressed into operation various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Shri Deshpande, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent heavily relied on the decision of the Division Beach of this Court reported in 1993(II) C.L.R. 200 in the matter of (All India Handloom Fabrics Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Unions others)1. This matter related to provision of Regulation 70 of the petitioner co-operative society in that petition. The question was when there was a reference to power of transfer the employees in accordance with the Regulations framed in the year 1959, whether power to transfer did survive in view of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959. The Division Bench of this Court, referring to the provisions of section 2-A of the Act of 1946, reached to the conclusion that section 2-A of the Act makes it clear that what section 2-A determines is; every standing order must cover the matters, set out in the Schedule, but the Act nowhere provides that the Standing Orders, which were in existence which covered the area not covered by the Items Nos. 1 to 10, automatically come to an end. 1 to 10, automatically come to an end. The Division Bench, therefore, held that the appellant had a right to transfer the employees under the Staff Regulations, Shri Deshpande, learned Advocate further contended that since the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, as also Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1959 are totally silent about the subject of transfer and further that when transfer is a subject which is already introduced in Service Regulations of the Board, it was very much well within the competence of the Board to have issued the said circular pertaining to the transfer which is the subject-matter of challenge before the Court below in the original proceedings. Shri Deshpande, further argued that having realized that it was very much necessary to make such transfers, taking into consideration the alleged interest developed by the concerned employees, since they were not transferred, it has become necessary to transfer such employees and, therefore, it is policy decision taken by the respondent-Board. 16. Shri Khan learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1471 in the matter of (Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Company Ltd. others v. State of Uttar Pradesh others)2. Relying on this judgment, Shri Khan contended that as in the case cited supra, in the present case also it could be very conveniently said that there is no conflict between the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It is to be been that these two cases definitely purport to secure to Industrial employees clear and unambiguous condition of their employment. The obvious object of the Act could be said to be to avoid any confusion in the minds of the employers or the employees in respect of their rights and obligations, consisting the terms and conditions of employment and thereby avoid unnecessary industrial disputes. The obvious object of the Act could be said to be to avoid any confusion in the minds of the employers or the employees in respect of their rights and obligations, consisting the terms and conditions of employment and thereby avoid unnecessary industrial disputes. Shri Khan further relying on this judgment, contended that the whole idea behind the certified Standing Orders is to make the parties sure and clear about the terms and conditions of their employment and in such a case when a problem arises as regards some industrial dispute or apprehended disputes, the same will have to be sorted out in pursuance of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which is a special Act, Shri Khan therefore, contended that the present respondent-Board cannot be said to have any escape from the provision of the industrial Employment Standing Orders Act and as already observed by me earlier the principle "generalis specialibus non derogant," has to be definitely invoked in the present matter. 17. Shri Khan then invited my attention to a decision of the Orrisa High Court reported in 1975 Lab.I.C. 1233, in the matter of (Workmen, Orrisa State Commercial Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Orrisa State Commercial Transport Corporation Ltd. another)3. The point for decision in that case was the Transport Corporation, a Government of Orrisa undertaking, submitted their Draft Standing Orders for certification by the Certifiably Officer in accordance with section 3 of the Act of 1946, which was objected to by the petitioner-union. The Certifying Officer, after certification moves in the Draft Standing Orders, forwarded the same to the parties, duly authenticated. The employee- union, therefore, preferred an appeal under section 6 of the Act before the Labour Court, challenging certain provisions thereof. The Appellate Authority, after certain alterations in the Draft Standing Order, finalised the same and precisely the Standing Orders 7, 14, 18 19 and some Clauses of Items 20 and 23 (1) (g), which appeared to be the subject matter of challenge before the High Court. While dealing with the subject, the learned Judges of the High Court of Orrisa, observed that: "... While dealing with the subject, the learned Judges of the High Court of Orrisa, observed that: "... in the case of Draft Standing Orders, the items which were not included in Schedule I of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, could not have been introduced in the certified Standing Orders." Shri Khan also invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1978 (4) S.C.C. 16 , in the matter of (U.P. State Electricity Board another v. Hari Shankar Jain others)4. This is the judgment, on which, Shri Khan placed heavy reliance. In the opinion of this Court, in All India Handloom Fabrics Marketing Co-operative Society case (cited supra), the decision of the Supreme Court, in the matter of U.P. State Electricity Board v. Sari Shankar Jain others, was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court. With the help of the learned Advocates, I have read both the judgments in extenso and it is seen that the judgment of the Supreme Court was not cited before the Division Bench. This judgment of the Supreme Court specifically observes that Regulations framed under section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, in respect of the conditions of service of the employees, will be subservient to the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which is a special Act in respect of such matters. The Supreme Court, therefore, while deciding this matter, invoked the maxim "generalis specialised non derogant," and held it to be applicable in the matter before it. It is held in the judgment of the Supreme Court that Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the Schedule and the Regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are to no effect unless such Regulations are either notified by the Government under section 13-B or certified by the Certifying Officer under section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. In regard to the matters, in respect of which regulations made by the Board, having been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, shall continue to apply. In regard to the matters, in respect of which regulations made by the Board, having been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, shall continue to apply. Relying on this decision, Shri Khan contended that there is hardly any scope for the respondent to contend that since Schedule under the Act, does not include the subject of transfer, it was open for the respondent/Board to have introduced the same by way of circular on the basis of the alleged powers conferred on it under section 79 (c), which empower the Board to frame Service Regulations. 18. Shri Khan, invited my attention to yet another decision report in 1990 L.L.J. 96 (Madras) in the matter of (S. Alamelu Superintending Engineer South Arcot Electricity System (S), Villupuram)5. In this matter, surprisingly, a provision was made in the Regulation No. 25 (2) framed by the Electricity Board, putting an embargo on a woman employee, contracting a marriage with any person, who has a wife living; without obtaining the permission of the Board. The Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, having got formulated and certified but not providing for such misconduct, the Regulation was held not to prevail and was held not to be invoked to take a disciplinary action. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court, therefore, observed that it was a result of the sanctity annexed to the Act and the Rules and the Standing Orders under them and was having overriding effect on other Service Rules and Regulations. Shri Khan, placing reliance on this judgment, contended that once it is admitted that the present respondent is also governed by the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, then in that case, it will prevail over the Rules and Regulations framed even under section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 19. Shri Khan relying on the judgment in the matter of (Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Employees Association v. State of Karnataka others)6, reported in 1987 (11) L.L.J. 62, contended that Service Regulation unilaterally framed, cannot be enforced on workmen and framing of Standing Orders are obligatory. Service Rules are not, therefore, binding on the workmen and Model Standing Orders only will prevail. Service Rules are not, therefore, binding on the workmen and Model Standing Orders only will prevail. He invited my attention to a decision of the Single Judge of this Court, reported in 1998(4) Bom.C.R. (A.B.)786, in the matter of (kadam Rupsing Bhivji v. Returning Officer, Municipal Council, Ahmednagar others)7. Shri Khan placed reliance on this judgment for contending that in the instant matter, if at all anything additional subject was to be introduced by the employer as regard conditions of service, that too in the Regulation framed by the Board, it was not open for the Board to do it unilaterally much less by issuing straight way the circular, which also appears to have been marked as "Confidential". In the case of Kadam Rupsing Bhivji (cited supra), it is observed by this Court "Regulations can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be law enacted by the legislature of the State". 20. In the opinion of this Court, correct reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Electricity Board (cited supra) will govern the decision in the instant matter. I have already observed that this decision appeared to have not been brought to the notice of Their Lordship of the Division Bench of this Court, who decided the matter in the case of All India Handloom Marketing Co-operative Society. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision have invoked the Rule "generalis specialibus non derogant" which means that general provision should yield to a specific provision is based upon the reason that in passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a general Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from the Parliament. Since the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, is a special Act, dealing with a specific subject, viz. conditions of service enumerated in the Schedule of workmen, in an industrial establishment, it is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of that Act, embodying as they do hard-won and the precious rights of the workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure including a quasi judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity (Supply) Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by section 79 (c) of the Electricity supply Act. The provisions of the Standing Orders Act must, therefore, prevail over section 79 (c) of the Electricity Supply Act in regard to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies. 21. In view of these observations of the Supreme Court, though it could be said that the Regulations made under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act are statutory in nature, however that could not mean that the same would stand on a high pedestal so as to override the Standing Orders made under the Standing Orders Act. No doubt, the Statutory bodies are authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the employees of these bodies have a statutory status, it is also no doubt true that the Regulations made under the statutes creating these bodies have force of law, however, that by itself would not be sufficient to hold that the regulations framed under section 79(c) have to gather more importance than that of the provisions made under the Standing Orders Act which is a special law. Relying on this decision, Shri Khan argued merely because the items at Serial Nos. 1 to 10 in Schedule under the Act, do not include the subject of transfer, does not mean that it was permissible for the board to take that decision of transfer. 22. Shri Khan further argued that under the guise of a policy decision, it is not permissible for the respondent Board to circumvent the provisions of the Standing Orders Act by which it is undisputed governed. In the instant matter admittedly the respondent-Board is an industrial establishment, to which Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applies. However, the Board has neither made nor got certified any Standing Orders, though it was bound so to do under that Act. 23. Shri Deshpande, for the respondent contended that as per the Regulation 15, employees of the Board could be transferred from one post to any other, within or outside the sphere of duty or place of employment or to any place in India as the exigency of the administration may require. 23. Shri Deshpande, for the respondent contended that as per the Regulation 15, employees of the Board could be transferred from one post to any other, within or outside the sphere of duty or place of employment or to any place in India as the exigency of the administration may require. Relying on this provision, Shri Deshpande contended that introduction of the transfer policy by the circular date 23rd May, 2001, cannot be said to offend any of the provision of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Shri Deshpande contended that since Regulation 15 of the Employees Service Regulations, framed under section 73(c) or Regulation 21(B) of the Seniority Regulations do definitely permit such transfers and therefore he contended that there does not arise any question of conflict between the provisions of the Act of 1946 and the provisions contained in the Service Regulation and Seniority Regulations framed by the Board. Shri Deshpande, therefore, contended that even assuming that Model Standing Orders are applicable, still there being no conflict, the provisions of Service and Seniority Regulation framed by the Board would operate. Shri Deshpande made this argument getting the same guarded by a further statement that, the same was being made without prejudice to the rights of the Board to contend that the provisions of 1946 Act are not applicable to the employees in the service of the Board. However, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of U.P. State Electricity Board (cited supra), I have no slightest hesitation in observing that Model Standing orders are definitely applicable to the employees in the service of the respondent/Board. Failure on the part of the Board to frame Standing Orders and to get the same certified or duly notified, would not allow the respondent/Board to contend that provisions in respect of subject to which reference is made in the Schedule under section 2-A of the Act of 1946, would not apply. In this view of the matter and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, I come to the conclusion that the provisions of the Special Act will prevail in the matter and, therefore, the Board has to comply with the provisions of the Act of 1946. However, the matter does not rest here only. 24. In this view of the matter and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, I come to the conclusion that the provisions of the Special Act will prevail in the matter and, therefore, the Board has to comply with the provisions of the Act of 1946. However, the matter does not rest here only. 24. We have to again revert back to the conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court in the U.P. State Electricity Board's case and particularly to the observation in para 18 thereof. It is held in that judgment that : " the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the Schedule and the Regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under section 13-B or certified by the Certifying officer under section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act." This clearly points towards the importance of the words "enumerated in the Schedule". This clearly means it is a special Act only with regard to the subject referred to in the Schedule under section 2-A of the Act or if any other item is included therein subsequently. If any Industry has to make any provisions about any of the subjects in the Standing Orders, if the Standing Orders are framed or if it is to be tampered with in any manner, what is required is, those regulations are to be got notified either in accordance with section 13-B if the industry is a Government undertaking or it has to be got duly certified by certifying Officer under section 5 of 1946 Act. But, when the subject about which a regulation is already framed by the Board or when that particular subject does not form part or is not included in any of the Items given in Schedule under section 2-A of the Act then in the opinion of this Court, why it should not be permissible for the Board to issue certain guidelines in respect of the subject which is already included in the Regulation is a question. Restriction is only with regard to the subjects which are included in the Schedule and not the subjects which are outside the Schedule. Restriction is only with regard to the subjects which are included in the Schedule and not the subjects which are outside the Schedule. In the matter in hand, according to me, the matters which are enumerated in the Standing Orders in respect of those matters only the Act of 1946 will have to be treated as a special Act but the matters not enumerated therein in the cases of those matters, the Regulations framed by the Board under section 79 (c) will have to prevail. It is also worth to keep it in mind that the impugned circular is not introducing the subject of transfer as a new subject. What is being done by the circular is certain guidelines are being issued while exercising the powers of transfer and suggesting under what circumstances and situation the transfer would be effected. If any particular employee is thereby hurt, he has his every remedy open to challenge the same on any special grounds such as mala fide etc. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that by issuing the present circular the respondent/Board is in any manner tampering with the items enumerated in the Schedule under section 2-A of 1946 Act. 25. This Court, therefore, can safely rely on the decision of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the matter of All India Handloom Fabric Marketing Co-operative Society Limited (cited supra). I do not see any justifiable reason to deviate from the decision of the Division Bench. This Court, therefore, finds it appropriate to uphold the order passed by the learned Judge of the Industrial Court which has rightly rejected the interim relief application which was moved by the present petitioners/employees. Since the petition is already admitted and there is no stay up till now and since this Court has heard the matter as it is made clear in the opening part of this order, it is not a fit case wherein there should be stay as prayed for by the petitioners. Order accordingly. Order accordingly. -----