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2003 DIGILAW 802 (MP)

Suryanarayan v. Shyam Lal Vyas

2003-07-01

UMA NATH SINGH

body2003
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS civil revision, filed under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as act) against the order dated 18-11-2002, passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior in Case No. 22/99-2000x90/7, calls in question the impugned order, mainly on the ground that "the bona fide requirement" as defined under Section 23-A (a) in respect of "member of family" as defined under Section 2 (e) of the Act, does not include grand children and further, in Para 8 of the impugned order the reasons given by the Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as "authority") are not based on materials on record. It is also contended that the applicant was not afforded a proper opportunity to defend his case. It is also urged that even the map of the premises was not considered in right perspective. ( 2. ) ON the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the non-applicant/landlord that the order does not suffer from any infirmity, and the bona fide requirement of the non- applicant and his family was taken into account and then it was found that the accommodation available to the non-applicant was insufficient to meet the requirement of a large family consisting of 19 members. A judgment of this Court Kailash Chandra v. Vinod and Ors. , reported in 1994 JLU Volume 43 page 277, was sought to be relied upon to contend that bona fide requirement also includes requirement of a growing family. It is further contended that the accommodation vacated by tenant Kirpal Das is non-residential in nature and therefore, could not have met the requirement. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment Gurucharan Singh v. Premabai Shrivastava, reported in 2001 (3) M. P. H. T. 87 (CG) = 2001 (II) MPJR Chhattisgarh 73, to contend that an accommodation of non-residential nature can not be counted for a requirement of residential accommodation. It is also contended that another accommodation of one room having been vacated by another tenant Bhagwan Das during pendency of revision being very small in size is only used for kitchen, of a son of the non-applicant. Further cross-examination of Suryanarayan (D. W. 1), the applicant herein, reveals that he did not visit the second floor of the accommodation belonging to the landlord, said to be situated at Daulatganj. ( 3. Further cross-examination of Suryanarayan (D. W. 1), the applicant herein, reveals that he did not visit the second floor of the accommodation belonging to the landlord, said to be situated at Daulatganj. ( 3. ) THIS revision has been preferred under Section 23-E of the Act which on reproduction reads like :- "revision by High Court.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 31 or Section 32, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter. (2) The High Court may, at any time suo motu or on the application of any person aggrieved, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Rent Controlling Authority, call for and examine the record of the case pending before or disposed of by such authority and may pass such order in revision in reference thereto as it thinks fit and save as otherwise provided by this section in disposal of any revision under this section, the High Court shall, as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it does for disposal of a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if any such proceeding of the Rent Controlling Authority is of a Court subordinate to such High Court : Provided that no powers of revision at the instance of person aggrieved shall be exercised unless any application is presented within ninety days of the date of the order sought to be revised. " ( 4. ) A judgment of this Court B. Johnson v. C. S. Naidu, reported in AIR 1986 MP 72 , in Para 26, has interpreted Section 23-E of the Act as under:-"it appears to us that the only manner in which the other part of Sub-section (2) can be given a meaning and it can also be reconciled with sub-section (1), which expressly provides that no appeal lies, is to construe Sub-section (2) as providing for the power of revision to correct any defect in the order of the Rent Controlling Authority, which taints it with such unreasonableness that it results in miscarriage of justice, and this has to be done keeping within the limits prescribed by Section 115, CPC as far as may be. In other words, the power of revision is not restricted to the narrow limits of Section 115, CPC, but it is not as wide as that of an appeal and the indication is that an attempt should be made to keep as near as possible to the limits of the power of revision under Section 115 of CPC, exceeding the same only to the extent necessary for preventing miscarriage of justice. Use of the expressions save as otherwise provided by this section and as far as may be to connect the two parts of Sub-section (2), supports this conclusion. " Thus, a revision under the Act is not as narrow as the ambit of Section 115, CPC, but at the same time, it is also not as wide as that of an appeal. In any case, while exercising revisional powers under Sections 23-E, the Court is to keep in mind that this provision is only meant to prevent miscarriage of justice. Honble the Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (1998) 8 SCC 119 ] has articulated the extent of interference by High Court, in a revision against an order of RCA as under:- The proviso to Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Act indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is "according to the law". In other words, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such finding on the materials available. Although, the word "revision" is not employed in the proviso to Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Act, it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance, distinction between appellate and rcvisional jurisdiction is well understood. Although, the word "revision" is not employed in the proviso to Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Act, it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance, distinction between appellate and rcvisional jurisdiction is well understood. Revisional power is ordinarily a power olsupervision keeping subordinate Tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. While exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact finding Court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of the impugned order shows that the High Court has overstepped the limit of its power as a Revisional Court. The order impugned on that score is hence vitiated by jurisdictional deficiency. " ( 5. ) HAVING considered the rival submissions and from careful scrutiny of the records, I do not find any infirmity leading to miscarriage of justice which calls for interference in revision. I would further say that bona fide requirement in respect of family members of a landlord also extends to grand children. I would also say that a contention of the applicant that he was not given sufficient opportunity to plead his case appears to be unfounded as the applicant moved the Court for leave to defend on 8-4-2001 but prayed for time after a gap of one year and five months on 13-9-2002, which was rightly refused. Had the applicant been aggrieved by denial of opportunity to plead his case, he would have preferred a revision also against that order. Besides that, looking to the large size of the family of the landlord/non-applicant the space available with him including the one subsequently vacated, was grossly inadequate and therefore, the eviction order has been correctly passed. ( 6. ) AS the impugned order does not appear to suffer from any illegality or material irregularity, the civil revision being devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed.