Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) is directed against the order dated 16.4.2003 passed by the Addl, District .Judge, Forozepur allowing the application filed under Section 149 of the Code seeking permission to deposit the deficient Court fee of Rs. 337.10. The Learned Additional District Judge has recorded a finding that it was an inadvertent mistake and deficient amount of court fee was affixed. For his view, the learned Additional District Judge has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Amrik v. Union of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1974 Pb. 444. 2. Brief fact of the case are that predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondents i.e. Subhash Chander Narang filed a civil suit for declaration against the defendant-petitioner to the effect that he is tenant of defendant-respondent No. 4 i.e. Municipal Council, Abohar in the shop bearing No. 77 MCA. A further relief of possession of the aforementioned shop was also claimed against the defendant-petitioner. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed. When the defendant-petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, an application under Section 149 of the Code was filed by the plaintiff-respondent seeking permission to deposit the court fee of Rs. 337.10. The application was contested by the defendant-petitioner on the plea that there was no sufficient reason disclosed in the application by the plaintiff-respondent explaining the delay in depositing the court fee before the trial Court at the appropriate time. The application has been allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and feeling aggrieved, the defendant-petitioner has approached this Court by challenging the aforementioned order. 3. After hearing learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner, I do not find any legal infirmity in the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. Section 4 of the Courts Fee Act, 1870 (for brevity, the Act) makes it mandatory that court fee has to be paid on all the documents specified in First arid Second Schedule of this Act. The method of computation of court fee has been given in Section 7 of the Code. However, Section 149 of the Code mitigates the rigors of Section 4 of the Act by permitting the Court to grant time for making up the deficiency in court fee. Section 4 of the Act and Section 149 of the Code read as under:- "4. However, Section 149 of the Code mitigates the rigors of Section 4 of the Act by permitting the Court to grant time for making up the deficiency in court fee. Section 4 of the Act and Section 149 of the Code read as under:- "4. Fees on documents filed, etc., in High Courts in their extraordinary jurisdiction:- No documents of any of the kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fee, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by any of the said High Courts in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction; or in the exercise of it extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction; in their appellant jurisdiction:- or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the [judgments (other than judgments passed in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court) of one] or more Judges of the said Court, or of a division Court; or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendence; as Courts of reference and revision.- or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a Court of reference or revision; unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document. "149. Power to makeup deficiency of court-fees.- Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as in such fee had been paid in the first instance." The aforementioned provisions came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotka Bibi (dead) by her legal representative and Ors., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1374. Chhotka Bibi (dead) by her legal representative and Ors., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1374. Holding that Section 149 of the Code has to be read as a proviso to Section 4 of the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :- "The above section therefore mitigates the rigour of Section 4 of the Court Fees Act and it is for the Court in its discretion to allow a person who has filed a memorandum of appeal with deficient court-fee to make good the deficiency and making good of such deficiency cures the defect in the memorandum not from the time when it is made but from the time when it was first presented in Court. In our view in considering the question as to the maintainability of an appeal when the Court-fee paid as insufficient to start with but the deficiency is made good later on the provisions of the Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure have to be read together to form a harmonious whole and no effort should be made to give precedence to provisions in one over those of the other unless the express words of a statute clearly over-ride those of the other. Apart from the decision bearing on the point, there can in our opinion, be no doubt that Section 4 of the Court Fees Act is not the last word on the subject and the Court must consider the provisions of both the Act and the Code to harmonise the two sets of provisions which can only be done by reading Section 149 as a proviso to Section 4 of the Court Fees act by allowing the deficiency to be made good within a period of time fixed by it. If the deficiency is made good no possible objection can be raised on the ground of the bar of limitation; the memorandum of appeal must be treated as one filed within the period fixed by the Limitation Act subject to any express provision to the contrary in that Act and the appeal must be treated as one filed within the period fixed by the Limitation Act subject to any express provision to the contrary in that Act and the appeal must be treated as pending from the date when the memorandum of appeal was presented in Court. In our view it must be treated as pending from the date of presentation not only for the purpose of limitation but also for the purpose of sufficiency as to court-fee under Section 149 of the Code. If such a construction be accepted, the bar of Section 3 of the Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals Act of 1962 would not operate in the instant case." Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Mahibulla and Anr. v. Seth Chaman Lal (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1241. 4 The facts of the present case has to be examined in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments. A finding has been recorded by the learned Additional District Judge that on account of an inadvertent mistake on the part of plaintiff-respondents, deficiency in payment of meager sum of Rs. 337.10 as court fee has occurred and the same deserves to be condoned. Once such a discretion has been allowed by the Code under Section 149 of the Code as interpreted by the Supreme Court, I do not feel persuaded to take a view different than the one taken by the learned Additional District Judge. Moreover, the deficiency is very meager and could be caused by virtue of wrong calculations. The revision petition, therefore, is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.