Sainsons Paper Industries Ltd. v. State Of Haryana
2003-05-26
G.S.SINGHVI, N.K.SUD
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. In this petition, the petitioner has made the following substantive prayers : "(i) issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the offending provisions contained under Section 61(1)(d)(i) and Rule 68 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 whereby concessions/exemptions granted under Sections 13-B and 25-A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 and also under Rule 28-A of the Rules framed under the State Act have been withdrawn midway being illegal, arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable, violative of principles of natural justice and hence, liable to be quashed by this honourable Court. (ii) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the exemption certificate dated February 27, 2003 to be valid for a period of nine years from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2006 in view of the declaration of the area of Pehowa to be Industrial Backward Area vide notification dated March 5, 1999 (annexure P2) in terms of the provisions of Rule 28-A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 . (iii) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents not to charge any tax from the petitioner in pursuance to the withdrawal of concession/exemption under the abovesaid offending provisions of the VAT Act during the pendency of the abovenoted Act." 2. The petitioner was incorporated as a private limited company in 1989. After six years, it got a fresh incorporation as public limited company. It is engaged in manufacturing of craft and packing papers in the unit set up at Village Bakhli, Tehsil Pehowa, District Kurukshetra. After the commencement of commercial production, the petitioner applied for exemption under Section 13-A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (for short, "the 1973 Act") read with Rule 28-A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 (for short, "the 1975 Rules"). Additional Director, Industries, Haryana, issued eligibility certificate, annexure P3, under Rule 28-A(1) of the 1975 Rules entitling the petitioner to claim exemption from payment of tax for a period of seven years from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2004 subject to the ceiling of Rs. 11,85,41,000. The grievance of the petitioner is that during the currency of the period of exemption State of Haryana has enacted the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (for short, "the 2003 Act") under which the benefit of exemption has been indirectly withdrawn.
11,85,41,000. The grievance of the petitioner is that during the currency of the period of exemption State of Haryana has enacted the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (for short, "the 2003 Act") under which the benefit of exemption has been indirectly withdrawn. It has challenged the constitutionality of Section 61(1)(d)(i) of the 2003 Act and Rule 68 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 (for short, "the 2003 Rules"). It has further prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to modify the exemption certificate so as to entitle it to claim exemption for a period of nine years commencing from January 1, 1998 on the ground that the area of Pehowa has been declared to be industrially backward area vide notification dated March 5, 1999 issued under Rule 28-A of the 1975 Rules. 3. Shri Narender Hooda argued that even though the impugned enactment is not beyond the legislative competence of the State, the same should be struck down because the provisions contained therein have the effect of depriving the petitioner of its right to continue to avail of the benefit of exemption from payment of tax granted under Rule 28-A of the 1975 Rules. He submitted that the petitioner had spent huge capital in anticipation of getting the benefit of exemption and, therefore, the respondents are estopped from withdrawing the exemption granted vide certificate, annexure P3. He then argued that Section 61(1)(d)(i) of the 2003 Act under which the petitioner has been made eligible to opt for deferment of tax is arbitrary, irrational and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the end, he argued that even if the court is not inclined to strike down Section 61(1)(d)(i) of the 2003 Act, the respondents may be directed to amend the eligibility certificate so as to entitle the petitioner to avail of the benefit of exemption for a period of nine years because the industrial unit set up by it falls in a backward area. He submitted that his client may be allowed to make a representation to the competent authority for grant of exemption for a total period of nine years commencing from January 1, 1998. 4. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel.
He submitted that his client may be allowed to make a representation to the competent authority for grant of exemption for a total period of nine years commencing from January 1, 1998. 4. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel. A legislation can be struck down only on the following grounds : (1) It is beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature. (2) It is ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. 5. The petitioner has not assailed the constitutionality of Section 61(1)(d)(i) of the 2003 Act and Rule 68 of the 2003 Rules on the ground that the Legislature of the State of Haryana was not competent to enact the same. Therefore, we need not examine the vires of the impugned provisions on the ground of lack of legislative competence. 6. The second ground of challenge raised by the petitioner is totally devoid of substance and merits rejection. The petitioner has not placed any material on the record of the writ petition to show that the impugned provisions are discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. We are further of the view that the legislative instrument cannot be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness simpliciter and unless the petitioner is able to show that the impugned legislation violates the particular provisions of the Constitution of India, the court cannot grant a declaration of invalidity qua the same. 8. De hors the aforementioned observations, we are convinced that Section 61(1)(d)(i) instead of adversely affecting the petitioner amply protects its rights by giving it liberty to opt for deferment of the payment of tax. The Legislature could have done away with the exemption in its entirety. However, instead of adopting that course, it has protected the rights of those to whom exemptions were granted under the repealed legislation, i.e., the 1973 Act. Thus, the impugned provision cannot be termed as arbitrary or irrational. The petitioners prayer for directing the respondents to treat exemption certificate dated February 27, 2001 (erroneously typed in the prayer clause as February 27, 2003) is disposed of in terms of the prayer made by Shri Hooda who requested that his client may be allowed to make a representation to the competent authority for grant of exemption for a total period of nine years commencing from January 1, 1998.
It is hoped that the representation, if any, made by the petitioner will be considered by the competent authority and decided at an early date and in any case, latest within a period of three months from the date of its submission. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated above.