T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioner assails the order dated 24-3-1999 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad, in R. C. A. No. 2 of 1996. Revision petitioner is the landlady who filed the petition seeking eviction of the tenant in R. C. No. 17 of 1990. ( 2 ) IT is averred inter alia in the petition that the premises bearing No. 4-8-824/b was originally belonged to the petitioner s mother-in-law who later willed away the said premises in her favour. It was divided into two mulgies by constructing a wall in between. The premises in question was let out to the respondent/tenant on the condition of paying a monthly rent of Rs. 840/ -. The respondent paid the rents at that rate till the end of March, 1993 and thereafter committed wilful default. That apart, the premises is required bona fide for doing wholesale cloth business by her husband along with adjacent premises which too was let out to another tenant. ( 3 ) THE respondent/tenant resisted that petition mentioning inter alia in the counter that he has been running a tailoring shop therein for the last several years and that he never committed any default, much less wilful default. The husband of the petitioner used to collect the rents and sometimes he used to pay the rents by means of money order. When he sent the money orders for the months of April and May, 1992, the petitioner with an ulterior motive evaded the receipt of money orders. She did not specify the bank account into which the rents could be credited. Therefore, he filed R. C. No. 19 of 1992 seeking permission of the Rent Controller to recover the rents. The husband of the petitioner who used to do cloth business in a rented premises situate in Station Road, Nizamabad, sold away the running business and, therefore, that clearly establishes that he does not wish to do cloth business at all. If really the husband of the petitioner intends to do cloth business he can as well utilize the space available over the mulgi and adjacent mulgi for his business without harassing the respondent. ( 4 ) APPRECIATING the evidence, both oral and documentary adduced on either side, the learned Rent Controller was of the view that there had been no default on the part of the tenant. ( 4 ) APPRECIATING the evidence, both oral and documentary adduced on either side, the learned Rent Controller was of the view that there had been no default on the part of the tenant. However, on the ground of bona fide requirement, he directed the tenant to be evicted within two months from the date of the order. Having been aggrieved by the said order, the tenant carried the matter in appeal in R. C. A. No. 2 of 1996. The learned Senior Civil Judge, as aforesaid, under the impugned order, reversed the finding of the Rent Controller which is now being assailed. ( 5 ) THERE has been no gainsaying about the jural relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties inter se. The quantum of rent is also not in dispute. Although the eviction petition has been filed on twin considerations of wilful default and bona fide requirement, the ground of wilful default having not been accepted by both the Courts below, has not been pressed by the petitioner. The only ground upon which the petitioner is seeking eviction of the tenant is bona fide requirement. ( 6 ) IT is clearly emerging out of the record that the husband of the petitioner used to do cloth business in a rented premises situate at Station Road, Nizamabad. Earlier, he was an educated unemployee. The premises in question and the adjacent premises bear one municipal number and earlier it was one premises which was willed in favour of the petitioner by her late mother-in-law. The premises was divided into two by constructing a wall in between and it was let out to the respondent/tenant for carrying out tailoring business and the adjacent premises was let out to the other tenant for carrying on cloth business. Obviously, the premises is situate in a locality where people do wholesale business in cloth. Having regard to the above factual scenario, it has to be seen as to whether the requirement is bona fide or is influenced by any oblique motive. ( 7 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents Sri Shankar Rao Neemkar is two fold. Firstly, since it is clearly emerging from the record that the husband of the petitioner is doing business in shares, he does not require the premises bona fide for doing cloth business. ( 7 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents Sri Shankar Rao Neemkar is two fold. Firstly, since it is clearly emerging from the record that the husband of the petitioner is doing business in shares, he does not require the premises bona fide for doing cloth business. Secondly, since it is averred in the petition that the petitioner s husband desires to do cloth business, he seeks to contend that desire cannot be the intention and it falls short of the requisite intention to do business in the absence of which eviction cannot be ordered. ( 8 ) APROPOS the first contention, PW1 stated in his evidence that at present he had been doing share consultancy business temporarily as he did not get the schedule mulgies . The said admission taken as a whole would clearly show that doing share consultancy business is a stopgap arrangement as he could not get the demised premises. In my considered view, certainly it is not in substitution of the cloth business. Therefore, the contention merits no consideration. ( 9 ) TO buttress the second contention, learned Counsel seeks to place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Sri Kempaiah v. Lingaiah, 2001 (8) Supreme Today 116. The Apex Court held that the word require used in clause (h) of sub-clause (1) of Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (for short, the Act ) implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between "desire" and "require" lies in the insistence of the need and there is an element of "must have" in the case of require which is not present in the case of mere desire. On facts, that was a case where the High Court on evidence found that the petitioner had no bona fide reasonable requirement and that was not a case in which partial eviction could have been ordered and if the eviction is ordered, great hardship would be caused to the tenants who were all proved to be poor people. Having regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to that case, it was held that it was only the case of desire of landlord but not the requirement. Having regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to that case, it was held that it was only the case of desire of landlord but not the requirement. The learned Counsel seeks to place reliance upon another judgment of the Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (6) Supreme Today 330. The Apex Court again considered the meaning of the expression bona fide requirement . It was held thus:". . . the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by requires is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase required bona fide is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. " ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court further held that"the Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself- whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation; must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. " ( 11 ) WHAT is required to be considered, having regard to the above two authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, is whether the need of the landlady is natural, real, sincere and honest or it is a mere pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant. ( 12 ) THE facts obtaining in the above referred cases are different from the facts in the instant case and, as a matter of fact, the facts cannot be identical in each and every case. Here is a case where evidence also shows that after closing down the retail cloth business, the husband of the petitioner has been doing business in shares. Having regard to the said admission on the part of P. W. 2, it is sought to be contended that he has no intention to do cloth business again as otherwise immediately after the sale of the retail business he could have switched over to the wholesale business in cloth. Therefore, it is nothing but a ruse or pretext on the part of the petitioner to see that the tenant is evicted. I am afraid, I cannot accede to the said contention firstly for the reason that although the word desire has been used in the petition, pleadings shall have to be considered as a whole harmoniously. Isolated excerpt or expression used in a paragraph cannot alone be considered. On a reading of the entire pleading, it is clear that it is not a mere desire. Isolated excerpt or expression used in a paragraph cannot alone be considered. On a reading of the entire pleading, it is clear that it is not a mere desire. Secondly, for the reasons hereinabove discussed that merely because he was doing share business after closing down the earlier business of cloth, it cannot be ruled out that he had no intention to do cloth business again particularly when it is said that he was doing it temporarily. Doing business cannot be ruled out in this case. Since he was an educated unemployee he was doing business in cloth in retail earlier. But the present business which he wanted to revert is again the self-same cloth business in which certainly he is not a novice. Having regard to the fact that he was doing business in cloth in retail earlier and he wanted to switch over to that business that too in wholesale, in my considered view, it cannot be considered that it is nothing but a pretext or pretence. What is required under is law that his intention must be genuine, real, honest and sincere. At this stage, from the evidence available on record, there are no compelling circumstances to hold that his intention to do business in cloth in wholesale is nothing but a mere pretext or pretence. ( 13 ) THAT apart, in an application of this sort, what the Court is required to see is whether the requirement is bona fide or not; or whether it is influenced by any oblique motive. Having regard to the finding reached by the learned Rent Controller that the evidence on record falls far short of the required proof to prove the ulterior motive in this case, there are no compelling circumstances emanating from the record to negate the same. The Andhra Pradesh (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is a beneficial welfare legislation. As a matter of fact, Rent Control Statues are welfare legislations, not entirely beneficial enactments for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord (vide Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 ). In the said judgment, the Apex Court relied on its earlier judgment in Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum, (1994) 2 SCC 671 . In Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma (2003) 3 SCC 433 , the Apex Court reiterated the said principle. In the said judgment, the Apex Court relied on its earlier judgment in Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum, (1994) 2 SCC 671 . In Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma (2003) 3 SCC 433 , the Apex Court reiterated the said principle. In Dwarka Prasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCC 549 , it was held thus: "normally, the rent legislations are meant for the benefit of the tenants but the rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the landlord which give him a right to evict the tenant, the most important being to ensure that he gets payment of rent regularly and promptly and that in case the tenanted premises is required by him for his personal need, he is able to get its possession from the tenant. The beneficial provisions contained in these statues must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. " again in Imdad Ali v. Keshav Chand, (2003) 4 SCC 635 , the Apex Court reiterated the said principle. ( 14 ) THE learned Rent Controller considered all these points which are clearly emerging from the record so as to reach the conclusion that petitioner requires the premises bonafide for doing wholesale cloth business by her husband. The only ground upon which the learned Appellate Authority was influenced is that the husband of the petitioner sold away not only the stock-in-trade of his retail cloth business but also the furniture and therefore that was an indicia that he was not inclined to do cloth business, oblivious of the fact that he must do one business or the other even if he sold away the stock-in-trade belonging to the former business and that he is not a novice to do business in cloth. The sole premise upon which the learned Appellate Authority was swayed away, in my considered view, is outweighed, by the clear circumstances which emerge out of the record. That apart, when a finding has been reached by the learned Rent Controller basing on sound reasons which are clearly emerging out of the record, it is not expected of by the Appellate Court to upset the said finding, as has been done in this case, on that sole ground For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the learned Appellate Court is not correct, legal and proper and is liable to be set aside. ( 15 ) IN the result, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 24-3-1999 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad in RCA No. 3 of 1996 is hereby set aside. The tenant is given six month s time to vacate the premises.