JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This is defendants appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code), challenging concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The Learned Civil Judge while decreeing the suit in favour of plaintiff-respondent for separate possession by way of partition to the extent of 1/7th share in the suit property has held that one Ajit Ram was earlier owner in possession of the property in dispute. He died on 10.5.1973 leaving behind the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and defendant-respondents No. 2, 3, 4 & 5 as his sons and defendant-respondents No. 6 and 7 as her daughters. He was also survived by his widow known as Prasani Devi. Even Prasani Devi died on 8.9.1988. The Civil Judge has further found that will dated 15.5.1973 Ex. DA was propounded by the defendant-appellant which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The suspicious circumstances are that the will is recorded on an ordinary paper on 10.5.1973 in favour of Rajiv Kumar, grand son of Ajit Ram. The will did not see the light of the day for over twenty years till 8.1.1994 when the same is claimed to have been handed over by one Amar Chand an old man, who is stated to be a friend of Ajit Ram. The will has never been entered in any record of the Corporation till the date of its production. No explanation has come as to why the will was with-held by him for a long period of 20 years. The will has not been shown to the father of Rajiv Kumar, who was admittedly staying with him and the will is made to the exclusion of natural heirs. It was in these circumstances that the will has been found to be surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the same has been discarded. 2. The learned Appellate court has affirmed the findings of the Civil Judge. It is further pointed out that Ajit Ram died 5 days after the execution of the will. The will is dated 10.5.1973 and Ajit Ram died on 15.5.1973. The learned District Judge dealt with this aspect and observed as under :- "This Ajit Ram is stated to have died on 15.5.1973. Suit for partition was filed by Sushil Kumar on 18.4.1990. Chaman Lal defendant No. 2 had filed written statement on 27.7.93. The will is dated 10.5.1973 and Ajit Ram died on 15.5.1973. The learned District Judge dealt with this aspect and observed as under :- "This Ajit Ram is stated to have died on 15.5.1973. Suit for partition was filed by Sushil Kumar on 18.4.1990. Chaman Lal defendant No. 2 had filed written statement on 27.7.93. He had filed another written statement but he no where pleaded that there was any will in favour of his son Rajiv Kumar. Then Chaman Lal had died and Rajiv Kumar had pleaded this will. Charan Singh only witness of the will who appeared as DW.1 stated that he had handed over the will after signing to Amar Chand and Ajit Ram died on 15.5.1973. Amar Chand was told that he should deliver the will to the grand son when Rajiv Kumar becomes major. It was admitted by Charan Singh that Ajit Ram was not having good health at the time of execution of will. That he was feeling perturbed nervous. At that time, one Hakim was called for treatment. Medicines were administered in his presence. That he (this witness) also did not remain there although Ajit Ram was not feeling well. That he left the place since Ajit Ram was not serious. He admitted that he was not on speaking terms with Ajit Ram. He admitted that during the life time of Ajit Ram, all the children were on speaking terms and were visiting each other. That the will was scribed on a judicial paper. He stated that this will was handed over by Amar Chand to Rajiv Kumar on attaining majority about 1-1/2 years back. He stated that the will was not scribed by a regular Deed writer. Rajiv Kumar had given his age to be 27 years, when he appeared in the Court on 28.1.1999 which means that in 1973 when this will is stated to have been scribed, this Rajiv Kumar may be just 1/2 years of age. Then this will shall be at the instance of Chaman Lal father of Rajiv Kumar but Chaman Lal no where pleaded this will even when this suit was filed on 18.4.1990 and Chaman Lal filed the written statement on 27.7.1993. This will is on a plain paper in Urdu. Then this will shall be at the instance of Chaman Lal father of Rajiv Kumar but Chaman Lal no where pleaded this will even when this suit was filed on 18.4.1990 and Chaman Lal filed the written statement on 27.7.1993. This will is on a plain paper in Urdu. It was executed due to services rendered by Chaman Lal, father of Rajiv Kumar then Chaman Lal must be knowing about the will but it is not a case here. This will is on plain paper unregistered document which saw light of the day only in 1997, even when this litigation had started in 1990. Ajit Ram had even died in 1973 itself. He was admittedly not having good health. There were five sons and two daughters of Ajit Ram. There would be no cause for him to execute the will in favour of one grand son who happened to be son of Chaman Lal. Chaman Lal had even another son. There appears to be no plausible explanation to exclude all the natural heirs i.e. five sons and two daughters and then executing will in favour of one grand son. This Ajit Ram may be having many grand sons in 1973. Even his wife was alive and is stated to have died on 8.9.1988 after 4/5 years of the death of Ajit Ram. From all this, it can safely be said that will Ex. DA is surrounded by all the possible suspicious circumstances. The trial Court had rightly ignored the will and decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff." 3. Mr. Puneet Jindal has vehemently argued that plausible explanation is available if the recitals in the will are read. According to the learned counsel, recitals in the will show that the will is to be handed over to Rajiv Kumar defendant-appellant on his attaining majority. As the will was executed in 1973 and Rajiv Kumar attained majority somewhere in 1994. It was then handed over by the custodian of the will i.e. Amar Chand to Rajiv Kumar. The learned counsel has pointed out that non-production of will for a long period would not by itself constitute a suspicious circumstance. As the will was executed in 1973 and Rajiv Kumar attained majority somewhere in 1994. It was then handed over by the custodian of the will i.e. Amar Chand to Rajiv Kumar. The learned counsel has pointed out that non-production of will for a long period would not by itself constitute a suspicious circumstance. For the afore- mentioned proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Bishnupriya Mohapatra v. Bata Krushna Mohapatra, 1993 Civil Court Cases 651 and another judgment of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shiv Prosad Sadhukhan v. Nemai Chandra Ghosal, 1991 Civil Court Cases 124. 4. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant and regret my inability to accept the same. The onus to prove the will is squarely was on the defendant-appellant, who had propounded the will. It was his duty to dispel the lurking doubts entertained by the courts below. The delay of more than 20 years in producing an important document, like the will coupled with numerous other factors can constitute a basis for concluding that the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and is thus liable to be discarded. In the case of Guro v. Atma Singh and others, 1992(2) SCC 507, the Supreme Court has held that will can be proved by showing testamentary capacity and signature of the testator in addition to satisfying the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. It has further been pointed out that shaky signatures, a feeble mind, unfair and unjust disposal of property etc. would be suspicious circumstances. The observations of their Lordships in this regard read as under :- "With regard to proof of a will the law is well settled that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will, could be accepted as genuine. Such suspicious circumstances may be a shaky signature, a feeble mind and unfair and unjust disposal of property or the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator." The afore-mentioned view of the Supreme Court is based on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev, AIR 1962 SC 567; S. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 and Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, (1977) 1 SCC 369. 5. When the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court are applied to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the defendant-appellant has miserably failed to discharge the heavy burden of dispelling suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. The will is dated 10.5.1973 and the testator Ajit Ram had died 5 days later on 15.5.1973. The will did not see the light of the day for over 20 years and the same is recorded on an ordinary paper. The will is also not registered and has been made to the exclusion of natural heirs. No convincing explanation has been furnished by the propounder of the will to establish that the suspicious circumstances are not well founded. 6. It is well settled that the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below cannot be disturbed by this court while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code unless it is shown that those findings are absolutely perverse and are based on no evidence. 6. It is well settled that the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below cannot be disturbed by this court while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code unless it is shown that those findings are absolutely perverse and are based on no evidence. In a catena of judgments, the Supreme Court has held that in the absence of any material to show that the findings arrived at could not have been reached by taking into consideration the evidence left out or by omitting the evidence which has been taken into consideration, the findings cannot be interfered with by the High Court in a second appeal. The Apex Court has laid down and reiterated this proposition of law in the cases of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331; Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423; Chandrabhagabai v. Ramakrishna and others, (1998) 6 SCC 207; Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar and Bros. and another, (1998) 6 SCC 748; M.G. Hegde and others v. Vasudev, (2000) 2 SCC 213; State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (dead) through L.Rs., (2000) 5 SCC 652; M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244; Baidyanath Bhattacharya v. S. Karmakar, (2000) 9 SCC 505; Manorama Thampuratti v. C.K. Sujatha Thampuratti, (2000) 9 SCC 233; Chandragouda and another v. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar, (2000) 10 SCC 617; Thimmaiah and others v. Ningamma and another, (2000) 7 SCC 409; Mohd. Abdul Muqtedar v. Sk. Fakruddin, (2000) 9 SCC 384; G. Thankamma Amma v. N. Raghava Kurup, (2000) 9 SCC 517; Ananta Kalappa Jaratakhane v. Krishtappa, (2000) 9 SCC 735; Kempaiah v. Doddanaraiah, (2000) 9 SCC 60; Mohd. Hadi Hussain v. Abdul Hamid Choudhary, (2000) 10 SCC 248 and Ajit Chopra v. Sadhu Ram, (2000) 1 SCC 114. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also held that for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 100 of the Code the existence of substantial question of law is a sine qua non. It has further been held that where the findings of fact of the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own finding on re- appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. It has further been held that where the findings of fact of the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own finding on re- appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. Even in the cases concerning title and ownership, the findings of fact as recorded by the courts below are considered by their Lordships to be the final. The same view has been reiterated in the recent judgment rendered in the case reported as Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh, (2001) 4 SCC 262 wherein Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 has been declared ultra vires of Section 100 of the Code. 7. The argument of the learned counsel that long delay in producing the will based on the judgments of Orissa and Calcutta High Courts would not call for any serious consideration because in those cases, delay alone was the basis for discarding the will and same stood sufficiently explained. The will in those cases was also held to be a natural testamentary presents and the trial court as well as the first appellate court have returned those findings. In the present case, numerous suspicious circumstances have been enumerated by both the courts below for recording a conclusion that the same remain unexplained. Therefore, I do not feel impressed with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.