Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal filed under Section 100 of CP. Code by the plaintiff against the judgment/decree, dated 21-2-1984, passed by learned additional District Judge, Barwani, M. P. , in C. A. No. 1-A of 1983, which in turn arises out of Civil Suit No. 48-A of 1980, decided by Civil Judge, Class II, sendhwa, on 12-11-1982. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on following two substantial questions of law for consideration :-" (1) Whether on facts and circumstances of the case the deposit of Rs. 8,000/- made by the defendant without notice to the plaintiff/appellant can be said to be due compliance and performance of the terms of the contract, wherein time was the essence of the contract ? (2) Whether in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, section 14 of the Limitation Act has been correctly interpreted and applied to the facts of this case ?" ( 2. ) FACTS in brief that led to filing of this second appeal need mention in brief to appreciate the controversy involved and urged in appeal. ( 3. ) THE dispute relates to land which formerly had the Khasra no. 60 having an area of 1. 94 acres situated in Village Bhadgaon in Tehsil sendhwa. This land was jointly owned by two brothers- Gobaria and Laxman. These two then partitioned the land resulting in half portion being allotted to gobaria and remaining half to Laxman. There was one Well on this land. The well fell to the share of Gobaria but it was agreed that Well will remain joint. So far as land going in the share of Gobaria was concerned, it was given the khasra No. 60/2 measuring 0. 97 acres whereas the land falling to the share of laxman was concerned, it was allotted Khasra No. 60/1 measuring 0. 97 acres. ( 4. ) THE plaintiff purchased the share of Laxman and became its owners, i. e. , 60/1 whereas defendant purchased the share of Gobaria and became owner of Khasra No. 60/2. However, in the year 1974, dispute arose between the plaintiff and defendant on the use of Well. This dispute led to filing of suit by the plaintiff against the defendant being Civil Suit No. 40-A of 1976 in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Sendhwa for damages amounting to rs. However, in the year 1974, dispute arose between the plaintiff and defendant on the use of Well. This dispute led to filing of suit by the plaintiff against the defendant being Civil Suit No. 40-A of 1976 in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Sendhwa for damages amounting to rs. 4,025/-and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in his possession. This suit eventually resulted in compromise between the parties on 13-1-1977 (Ex. P-6 ). In terms of this compromise, the defendant was to pay a sum of Rs. 8,000/- to the plaintiff on or before 20-6-1977 and get the sale deed executed in his favour of the land belonging to plaintiff. It was further stipulated that in case if defendant fails to pay Rs. 8,000/- on or before 20-6-1977 then plaintiff will pay Rs. 8,000/- to defendant on agreed date and get the sale deed executed in his favour in relation to land belonging to defendant. This compromise was then filed in Court and accordingly, decree in terms of compromise was passed. ( 5. ) THE defendant then on 10-6-1977 deposited a sum of Rs. 8,000/-in Court in terms of compromise decree and then served legal notice (Ex. D-3) calling upon him to execute the sale deed in his favour in terms of the compromise decree. This notice was served on the plaintiff on 21-6-1977 but despite notice having been served, the plaintiff did not execute the sale deed in defendants favour in respect of his land, i. e. , Khasra No. 60/1. It is this inaction on the part of the plaintiff that led to filing of an execution application by the defendant against the plaintiff praying therein for execution/enforcement of the compromise decree against the plaintiff. It was contended in the execution application that since the defendant has complied with the terms of the compromise decree by depositing a sum of Rs. 8,000/-on 10-6-1977, he is and has become entitled to get the sale deed executed in his favour from the plaintiff in respect of his land (Khasra No. 60/10 ). The plaintiff then resisted this execution on several legal and factual grounds contending inter alia that the decree in question is inexecutable and hence, can not be enforced. This objection of inexecutability was upheld by the executing Court and accordingly, by order dated 20-4-1978 the execution application filed by the defendant was rejected. The plaintiff then resisted this execution on several legal and factual grounds contending inter alia that the decree in question is inexecutable and hence, can not be enforced. This objection of inexecutability was upheld by the executing Court and accordingly, by order dated 20-4-1978 the execution application filed by the defendant was rejected. This order was upheld in appeal (10 of 1973) on 7-8-1980. It then became final. ( 6. ) THE plaintiff then filed a suit out of which this second appeal arises against the defendant for specific performance of contract alleging that in terms of the compromise, since the defendant has failed to perform his part of the contract, by not getting the sale consideration (Rs. 8,000) deposited in time (i. e. , 20-6-1977) and hence, plaintiff has become entitled to get the sale deed executed in his favour in respect of land belonging to defendant, i. e. , 60/2 on paying Rs. 8,000/- to the defendant. In substance, therefore, the plaintiff claimed specific performance of contract basing his claim on the strength of compromise decree. The defendant while denying the claim of the plaintiff filed a written statement and in that written statement filed his counter claim against the plaintiff. In his counter claim, the defendant claimed specific performance of contract against the plaintiff basing his case on the same compromise decree and averred that since he has admittedly complied with the terms of the compromise decree by depositing the entire sale consideration in time, he was entitled to get the sale deed executed in his favour in respect of the land belonging to plaintiff. He alleged that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and has in fact performed his part. It is this issue namely, whether plaintiff is entitled to claim specific performance of contract against the defendant or defendant is entitled to claim specific performance against the plaintiff was gone into in the suit. The Trial Court while dismissing the plaintiffs suit decreed defendants counter claim by granting decree for specific performance against the plaintiff. In an appeal filed by the plaintiff, the appeal was dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court giving rise to filing of this second appeal by the plaintiff. As observed supra, the appeal was admitted for final hearing on aforementioned two substantial questions of law. ( 7. In an appeal filed by the plaintiff, the appeal was dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court giving rise to filing of this second appeal by the plaintiff. As observed supra, the appeal was admitted for final hearing on aforementioned two substantial questions of law. ( 7. ) HEARD Smt. S. Waghmare, learned Counsel for the appellant and shri D. S. Kale, learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 8. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, I find no substance in the appeal and hence, it merits dismissal, resulting in upholding of the impugned judgment/decree. ( 9. ) AT the outset, it may be mentioned that the questions of law framed do not arise out of the plaintiffs case but they relate and arise out of the counter claim of defendant decreed by the two Courts against the plaintiff. In other words, so far as case of the plaintiff against the defendant is concerned, the same having been negatived by two Courts, no substantial question of law on his claim is framed and hence, the dismissal of suit has become final. The only questions therefore, that arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether two Courts below were justified in passing a decree of specific performance of contract in defendants favour by allowing his counter claim ? ( 10. ) COMING to the first substantial question of law, in my opinion, it has no substance and hence, it deserves to be answered against the plaintiff. It is a settled view of the Courts including that of Apex Court that in a cases of specific performance of contract relating to immovable property, time is usually not regarded as an essence of contract. Even then, so far as facts of this case are concerned, it is an admitted case that defendant had deposited the entire sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/- in Court on 10-6-1977. In view of this fact, the question of time being the essence of contract losses its significance because the defendant had performed his part of contract in time. Not only that, the defendant had also levied execution to get the sale deed executed in his favour. 8,000/- in Court on 10-6-1977. In view of this fact, the question of time being the essence of contract losses its significance because the defendant had performed his part of contract in time. Not only that, the defendant had also levied execution to get the sale deed executed in his favour. This conduct of defendant also shows that even assuming that the time was the essence of contract, the defendant had taken all possible steps against the plaintiff strictly in terms of the compromise decree for its enforcement. In view of this, it can not be held that defendant had not done anything towards the contract. In my opinion, the deposit of Rs. 8,000/- in Court by the defendant was sufficient compliance of the terms of the agreement (i. e. , compromise decree) and in any event, the filing of an execution application by the defendant immediately after deposit was a notice to the plaintiff that the said amount has been deposited. It can not be urged by the plaintiff that he had no notice or knowledge of the deposit having been made by the defendant in Court because plaintiff did contest the execution application made by the defendant which in clear terms mentioned deposit of Rs. 8,000/- in Court on 10-6-1977 by the defendant. In view of these circumstances, the first question has to be answered against the plaintiff (appellant) and in favour of defendant. Indeed, it was so answered by the two Courts below also and in my view, rightly. ( 11. ) THIS takes me to the second question. The main submission of learned Counsel for the appellant was that counter claim of defendant was barred by time for the purpose of claiming specific performance of contract on the strength of compromise decree because it was filed beyond the period of three years. It was also urged that defendant was not entitled to claim any benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act so far as the earlier execution proceedings were concerned, while calculating the period of filing counter claim is concerned. I do not agree to thi submission as in my view, the submission has no force. ( 12. ) SECTION 14 of the Limitation Act has its application when following conditions are satisfied or present in any case:- " (1) Both prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. I do not agree to thi submission as in my view, the submission has no force. ( 12. ) SECTION 14 of the Limitation Act has its application when following conditions are satisfied or present in any case:- " (1) Both prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. (2) The prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligent and in good faith. (3) The failure of the prior proceedings was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. (4) The earlier proceedings and the later proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue. (5) Both the proceedings are in Court. " ( 13. ) WHEN I examine the facts of this case, it is noticed that the proceedings in question on which the defendant had placed reliance did satisfy the aforementioned conditions enabling him to take benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for saving his counter claim. It can not be disputed that execution proceedings filed by the defendant relates to same subject matter, that they were between the same parties, that they were based on same cause of action, that they were in Court, that they were civil proceedings. Once, these conditions are found to be satisfied, the defendant had every right to rely upon section 14 of the Limitation Act to save his counter claim. It can not be disputed that the counter claim had all the attributes of suit and hence, the court can grant the same relief in counter claim which can be granted in any suit. In view of this, one can easily conclude that defendant was prosecuting his remedy of claiming specific performance bonafidely in execution proceedings pursuant to a compromise decree and on their termination against the defendant, the counter claim was filed no sooner the suit was filed by the plaintiff. ( 14. ) IT may be taken note of that there is no other substantial question framed so far as readiness and willingness of defendant is concerned in execution of contract. It is, therefore, not necessary for this Court to examine all other related questions pertaining to grant of specific performance in favour of defendant. Reliance placed by learned Counsel for the appellant on AIR 1972 SC 730 is of no significance and has no application to the facts of this case. ( 15. It is, therefore, not necessary for this Court to examine all other related questions pertaining to grant of specific performance in favour of defendant. Reliance placed by learned Counsel for the appellant on AIR 1972 SC 730 is of no significance and has no application to the facts of this case. ( 15. ) IN view of aforesaid discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. Second Appeal dismissed.