TARUN CHATTERJEE, C. J. ( 1 ) THE alleged contemnor Mr. T. George Joseph, Principal secretary, Tax Registration, Government of u. P. , Lucknow is the appellant before us. He files this appeal against an order of a learned judge exercising contempt jurisdiction in which the learned Judge after considering the allegations made in the application for contempt has framed a charge which is as follows:-that you failed to follow the directions given by the Division Bench of this court on 7-12-2000 passed in Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 38807 of 2000 and connected writ petitions in preparing the seniority list of Entertainment and Betting Tax Inspector Grade-II and thereby wilfully disobeyed the above order of this court. " after framing the charge the learned contempt Judge also directed the appellant to produce evidence in his defence of the charge by affidavit within three weeks. ( 2 ) A preliminary objection has been raised by the private-respondent saying that no appeal lies against the impugned order in view of the fact that there was no final decision of the matter. According to the learned counsel for the private-respondent, an appeal shall lie against only those order or decisions in which-some point was decided or finding given in the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt. Learned counsel for the private-respondent further submitted that from the impugned order it could not be said that the learned Judge has initiated the proceeding to punish for contempt. In support of his submission learned counsel for the respondent relied on several decisions of the Supreme court, the first of which is reported in Barada kanta Mistra v. Orissa High Court The next decision on which the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on is the decision of the supreme Court in the Case of State of maharashtra v. Mahbood S. Allibhoy and another and also another decision of the supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Dass goel v. Honble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon and others. Relying on these decisions the learned counsel for the private-respondent submitted before us that no appeal lies against the impugned order. ( 3 ) SRI Upadhyay appearing on behalf of the alleged contemnor, refuted the arguments of the learned counsel for the private-respondent. Justice B. S. Dhillon and others. Relying on these decisions the learned counsel for the private-respondent submitted before us that no appeal lies against the impugned order. ( 3 ) SRI Upadhyay appearing on behalf of the alleged contemnor, refuted the arguments of the learned counsel for the private-respondent. According to Sri Upadhyay an appeal is maintainable against the impugned order as from the impugned order it appears that cognizance of the contempt proceeding has been taken and a contempt proceeding has been initiated and finally by the impugned order the learned Contempt Judge has framed a charge against the alleged contemnor and thereby directed the alleged contemnor to produce evidence in support of his defence. Sri Upadhyay has taken us through certain paragraphs of the application for discharge filed by the alleged contemnor and sought to argue that from the impugned order it will be apparent that it was really the initiation of the contempt proceedings to punish for contempt. In support of his contention Sri Upadhyay relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of r. N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others. ( 4 ) AFTER considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and after going through the decisions cited at the Bar we are of the view that this appeal is maintainable in law. Before we decide this question, we may refer to Sections 17 and 19 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). ( 5 ) SECTION 17 of the Act deals with procedure after cognizance. Section 17 (1) says that a notice of every proceeding under section 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise, Sub-section (3) of section 17 provides that the Court may, if it is satisfied that a person charged under Section 15 is likely to abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of the notice, order the attachment of his property of such value or amount as it may deem reasonable. Sub-section (5) of section 17 says that any person charged with contempt under Section 15 may file an affidavit in support of his defence, and the Court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires. ( 6 ) SECTION 19 of the Act provides for an appeal against any order or decision of the high Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, where the order or decision is that of a single judge to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the supreme Court. ( 7 ) NOW the question is whether the impugned order comes within the meaning of any order or decision to punish for contempt. If we hold that it is so then there will be no difficulty in holding that an appeal lies against the aforesaid order. In our view the appeal is maintainable in law. As noted above section 19 of the Act clearly says that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the high Court, to a Division Bench of the High court when a situation arises to punish for contempt. Therefore, let us see whether by the impugned order the learned Contempt judge has exercised his jurisdiction to punish for contempt. ( 8 ) WE have carefully read the judgment under appeal and we find that the learned contempt Judge after considering the entire materials on record has come to a finding that there was intentional violation of the order of the Division Bench of this Court as the alleged contemnor had failed to follow the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court on 7-12-2000 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 38807 of 2000 and connected writ-applications in preparing the seniority list of Entertainment and Betting Tax Inspectors Grade-II and thereby wilfully disobeyed the above order of this Court. From the impugned order it also appears that the learned Contempt Judge has also exercised his jurisdiction by coming to a conclusion that the alleged contemnor had failed to follow the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court. From the impugned order it also appears that the learned Contempt Judge has also exercised his jurisdiction by coming to a conclusion that the alleged contemnor had failed to follow the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court. ( 9 ) IN the case of R. N. Dey and others the supreme Court clearly observed in Paragraph 2 which is important for our purposes as follows:-"2. These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 4-8-1998 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in cr No. 628 of 1998 and CPAN No. 1822 of 1997 in FA No. 232 of 1998. By the impugned order, the Court accepted unqualified apology tendered by the appellants in compliance with the orders of the Court for not paying the balance award money due to the respondents. The Court further directed the appellants to deposit with the Registrar (Appellate Side) the compensation money determined in terms of the order of the learned Land Acquisition judge in respect of the lands acquired by the State as mentioned in the order and decree within two weeks from the date of the order without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in such proceedings. Further, the court did not pass any order on the application filed by the Collector for vacating the rule issued in the contempt proceeding holding that the Collector cannot go behind the award passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. "in Paragraph 12 of the said judgment the supreme Court has also observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. ( 10 ) IN our view, in the present case a dispute had arisen before the learned Contempt judge asking the learned Contempt Judge to drop the proceedings on the ground that there was no wilful violation or disobedience of the order of the Division Bench of this Court as the alleged contemnor had not acted in that fashion and intentionally violated the order of the Division Bench. In the Counter affidavit filed the appellant has clearly stated that after the order of the Division Bench was passed, the matter was sent to the Law Department of the Government and the Law Secretary submitted a report on the basis of which the alleged contemnor had directed the Commissioner concerned to proceed on the basis of the Division Bench decision of this Court. Therefore, so far as the alleged contemnor is concerned, the question of violating any order of the Division Bench could not arise at all. In any view of the matter from the impugned order it appears that the learned Contempt Judge had exercised his jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings mainly on the basis that the alleged contemnor had failed to follow the directions given by the Division Bench. Prima facie he was satisfied that there was no ground to exercise jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceeding in view of the fact that cannot be said to be a wilful disobedience of the order of the division Bench at the instance of the alleged contemnor. ( 11 ) IN the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barada Kanta Misra v. Orissa high Court on which the learned counsel for the private-respondent relied on, it has been clearly stated that an appeal shall lie against those orders or decisions in which some point was decided or finding was given in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt. As we have already noted that in the impugned order the learned Contempt Judge has decided some point and a finding has been arrived at in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt for which a charge has been framed and the alleged contemnor has been directed to produce evidence in support of his defence, we are of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court as relied upon by the learned counsel for the private-respondent does not help him for the purposes of holding that the appeal is not maintainable. ( 12 ) SO far as the other decision on which the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob s. Allibhoy and another (supra ). ( 12 ) SO far as the other decision on which the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob s. Allibhoy and another (supra ). In our view this decision of the Supreme Court is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. In that decision an order dropping the proceedings for contempt or refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt was under appeal before the Division Bench under section 19 of the Act. This is not fact arising in this case. It is neither an appeal from an order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate proceedings for contempt. It is really in the nature of initiating proceeding to punish for contempt. That being the position this decision does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 13 ) THE last decision on which the learned counsel has relied on is a decision of the Supreme court in the case of Purshotam Dass goel v. Honble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon and others (supra ). In our view, this decision does not also help the respondent. On the other hand this decision helps the appellant. In this decision the Supreme Court at page 371 has observed which is as under:-the order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. . . . . " the Supreme Court has also held in the same decision that it is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under Section 19. At page 371 of this decision the Supreme Court has also observed as follows: -. . . . . We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type or order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19. In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged cbntemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19. In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged cbntemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution from an order initiating the proceeding. But that is entirely a different matter. What we are deciding in this case is that the present appeal filed under Section 19 (1) of the Act does not lie and is incompetent. " ( 14 ) FROM the aforesaid observation of the supreme Court it is, therefore, clear that an appeal shall lie against an order under section 19 of the Act even where the orders were passed at some intermediate stage in a proceeding. As we have discussed already that some bone of contention was raised by the appellant before the learned Contempt Judge and, therefore, it cannot be said that no appeal lies against it such order. The view expressed by the Supreme court in the said decision has also taken the help of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barada kanta Misra which has also been discussed by us in the forgoing paragraph of this order. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid we are of the view that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent is devoid of any merit and it should be overruled. Later ( 16 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties on the question whether this appeal should be admitted or not. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, prays for production of the records relating to the writ petition as well as the contempt proceedings and at the same time also prays for production of the records now lying in the Law Department. ( 17 ) AFTER going through the impugned order and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of the view that this appeal should be admitted and, accordingly, we admit the appeal and in view of the nature of the order passed by the learned Contempt judge we stay the operation of the impugned order for a period of three months from this date with liberty to apply for extension, vacation and variation of the interim order in the presence of the other side or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier. ( 18 ) REGARDING the question of production of records we keep it open that at the time of hearing of the appeal if production of the record is found to be necessary, the records shall be called for. ( 19 ) COUNTER affidavit be filed within three weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within one week thereafter. Let the appeal be listed after a month. Preliminary objection overruled. .