V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) AN interesting question of law as to whether it is competent for the land Acquisition Officer/collector to condone the delay in filing application under section 28a (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) as amended by land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 seeking re-determination of the compensation arises for consideration in this Writ petition. ( 2 ) SHAIK Ahmed was owner of land admeasuring Ac. 13. 19 guntas in S. No. 659 of Patancheru Village. In the year 1976 the respondent acquired the land for public purpose to wit for establishment of industrial Development Area, Patancheruvu under Phase-Ill. After following the procedure, the respondent passed Award on 21. 5. 1977 giving compensation of rs. 5,500/- per acre. Shaik Ahmed received the compensation under protest and made application allegedly on 23. 5. 1977 along with two others requesting the respondent to refer the matter under Section 18 (1) of the Act. Award was passed in respect of the lands belong to various persons. Therefore, a number of matters were referred under Section 18 of the Act to the court of District Judge, Sanga Reddy, Medak district. ( 3 ) WHEN the matters being O. P. No. 142 of 1978 and Batch were pending before the Court, Shaik Ahmed died on 26. 12. 1978. His wife, Rabia Bee, second petitioner herein, and his son Mohammed maqdoom Ahmed, first petitioner herein, were brought on record by reason of orders passed by learned District Judge in I. A. No. 331 of 1978. Be that as it is, the learned District judge by order dated 7. 11. 1979 disposed of all the Original Petitions under Section 18 of the Act awarding a sum of Rs. 11,500/- per acre. Nonetheless, O. P. No. 142 of 1978, which was in relation to the land belonging to Shaik Ahmed, was rejected on the ground that there is no reference for that land. The petitioners have not filed any appeal against order of learned District Judge rejecting the reference and the order of the civil Court dated 7. 11. 1979 became final. ( 4 ) IN 1990 the petitioners filed a writ petition being W. P. No. 15781 of 1990 before this Court. They prayed for a direction to the respondent to refer their application dated 23. 5. 11. 1979 became final. ( 4 ) IN 1990 the petitioners filed a writ petition being W. P. No. 15781 of 1990 before this Court. They prayed for a direction to the respondent to refer their application dated 23. 5. 1977 under Section 18 (1) of the act to Civil Court. The Writ Petition was dismissed by order dated 7. 12. 1990 observing that the petitioners may approach the respondent for enhancement of compensation as provided under Section 28a of the Act. The petitioners writ appeal being W. A. No. 787 of 1991 was also dismissed on 17. 7. 1991. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application dated 30. 10. 1991 requesting the respondent to re-determine the compensation. The respondent by the impugned Memo lr. No. C/868/91 dated 26. 7. 1993 informed that the petitioners case under Section 28a of the Act cannot be considered as "there is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act to condone the delay in filing application under section 28a of the Act". Assailing this memo, the petitioners filed the present writ petition seeking a declaration that the impugned memo as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. They also seek a direction to the respondent to decide the application of the petitioners under Section 28a of the Act and pay compensation to them. ( 5 ) THE respondent filed a counter- affidavit opposing the writ petition. It is stated that the petitioners have not made any application within three months from the date of Award of the Court of District Judge dated 7. 11. 1979 and therefore their application cannot be entertained. It is also further stated that the petitioners writ petition being W. P. No. 15781 of 1990 was dismissed and writ appeal being Writ appeal No. 787 of 1991 was also dismissed on 17. 7. 1991. Even according to this, the application under Section 28a ought to have been filed on 18. 10. 1991, but the petitioners filed application on 30. 10. 1991 which is beyond the time as prescribed under section 28a (1) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order is justified. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners, sri N. Vasudeva Reddy, submits that Shaik ahmed along with two others made an application to the Land Acquisition Officer on 23. 5. 1977 seeking reference under section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order is justified. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners, sri N. Vasudeva Reddy, submits that Shaik ahmed along with two others made an application to the Land Acquisition Officer on 23. 5. 1977 seeking reference under section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the learned district Judge erred in holding that Shaik ahmed, predecessor of the petitioners, had not sought for any reference. He also submits that in respect of other co-owners of the land, the Civil Court enhanced the compensation awarding a sum of Rs. 11,500/- per acre and if the amount payable under the Act to the petitioners is not re-determined as per Section 28a of the Act, that would result in injustice to petitioners. He submits that it is competent for the Land Acquisition officer to condone the delay in filing application under Section 28a (1) of the Act having regard to the fact that the petitioners are pursuing the remedy before this Court by filing writ petition and writ appeal. These contentions are refuted by learned Assistant government Reader for Land Acquisition, sri Peddanna. ( 7 ) THE only question that arises for consideration, as noticed in the beginning of the judgment, is whether the Land acquisition Officer can condone the delay in filing application under Section 28a of the Act for re-determination of the compensation ? ( 8 ) SECTION 28a of the Act reads as under: section 28a. ( 7 ) THE only question that arises for consideration, as noticed in the beginning of the judgment, is whether the Land acquisition Officer can condone the delay in filing application under Section 28a of the Act for re-determination of the compensation ? ( 8 ) SECTION 28a of the Act reads as under: section 28a. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court : (1) Wherein an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court: provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18. ( 9 ) A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28a shows that a person interested in the other land covered by same notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, if he had not made an application to the collector under Section 18 of the Act may make application in writing to the Collector requesting to re-determine the amount of compensation on the basis of award of court on a reference made under Section 18 of the Act by other persons covered by the same notification. Such person is required to make an application within three months from the date of the award of the Court on the basis of which re-determination is sought. In Union of India v. Pradip Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736 , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that a person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied. (I) An award has been made by the Court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28a; (II) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference; (III) The person moving the application under Section 28a is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4 (1) to which the said award relates; (IV) The person moving the application did not make an application to the collector under Section 18; (V) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and (VI) Only one application can be moved under Section 28a for re-determination of compensation by an applicant, (emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) IN Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court inter alia considered the questions whether dismissal of application under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts to "not filing application" within the meaning of Section 28a of the Act ? and whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Act is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain application under Section 28a of the Act ? and whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Act is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain application under Section 28a of the Act ? The unanimous Court speaking through Hon ble sri Justice G. B. Pattanaik, (as His Lordship then was), answered the question holding that "dismissal of application seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act on the ground of delay would tantamount to "not filing application" within the meaning of Section 28 A of the Act and that when an application of a landowner under Section 18 of the Act is dismissed on the ground of delay, the said owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28a, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled". It is relevant to excerpt the following observations from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment (reported in SCC ). The expression "did not make an application", as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28a cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer Question 1 (a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28a of the Land acquisition Act, 1894. . . . . We, accordingly answer Question 1 (a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28a of the Land acquisition Act, 1894. . . . . So far as Question l (b) is concerned, this is really the same question as in Question 1 (a) and, therefore, we reiterate that when an application of a landowner under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground of delay, then the said landowner is entitled to make an application under Section 28a, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled, (emphasis supplied) ( 11 ) THE judgments in Pradeep Kumari s case (supra) and Hansoli Devis case (supra) held that application under Section 28a should be filed within three months from the date of award on the basis of which redetermination of amount of compensation is sought and further that the land owner whose application under Section 18 is rejected or the landowner who has made a defective application under Section 18 of the Act is also entitled to make application under Section 28a within three months from the date of award on the basis of which redeterrmnation is sought. ( 12 ) THE reference being O. P. No. 142 of 1978, allegedly at the instance of shaik Ahmed, was not accepted by the court of District Judge on the ground that there is no proper reference. The petitioners did not challenge the same by filing appeal under Section 54 of the Act before this Court. Therefore, the judgment has become final. Even thereafter, the petitioners did not file any application before the Land Acquisition Officer though admittedly they had clinching evidence to the effect that Shaik Ahmed along with two others made joint application on 23. 5. 1977 and that the fault lies with respondent in not making proper reference. The petitioners waited for eleven long years and then approached this Court by filing Writ Petition no. 15781 of 1990. This Court by order dated 712. 1990 categorically held that the relief prayed by petitioners seeking reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act cannot be granted in writ petition as the same was rejected by learned District Judge and petitioners have not filed any appeal against the same. 15781 of 1990. This Court by order dated 712. 1990 categorically held that the relief prayed by petitioners seeking reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act cannot be granted in writ petition as the same was rejected by learned District Judge and petitioners have not filed any appeal against the same. The relevant observations are as under: the relief which the petitioners seek in this writ petition cannot be granted for the reason that the same plea was considered and decided against them by the Land acquisition Court i. e. , the District Judge, medak at Sanga Reddy on 7. 11. 1979 in o. P. Nos. 141 to 143, 176, 236 and 237 of 1978. The claim of the petitioners for enhancement of compensation was rejected for the reason that there was no application for such enhancement or any reference under Section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition act in relation to the share of the first petitioner s father. Counsel submits that, as a matter of fact, their father also had filed an application and the Land Acquisition Court proceeded on a wrong assumption in refusing to grant enhancement of compensation. The petitioners could as well have filed an appeal against that judgment. But they have not chosen to do so, with the result that the order has become final. It is not now possible to direct the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference notwithstanding the above judgment, nor is it possible to direct a review of that judgment. ( 13 ) THIS Court also observed that the petitioners may approach the respondent by filing application under Section 28a of the Act. Though it was observed that application may be made if necessary by seeking condonation of delay, this court did not give any positive direction to condone the delay. Indeed, such a direction could not have been given by this Court. As petitioners did not make any application and admittedly they approached the respondent on 30. 10. 1991, the application was beyond three months from the date of award of Civil Court, i. e. , 7. 11. 1979 and impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. ( 14 ) SECTION 28a of the Act was inserted by Section 19 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 with effect from 24. 9. 1994. When the Civil Court passed award on 7. 11. 11. 1979 and impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. ( 14 ) SECTION 28a of the Act was inserted by Section 19 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 with effect from 24. 9. 1994. When the Civil Court passed award on 7. 11. 1979 there was no provision like Section 28a. It, therefore, becomes clear that in respect of Award in question section 28a is not available to the petitioners in view of admitted position that against judgment of learned District Judge, no appeal was filed before this Court. If any authority is required, a reference may be made to constitution Bench decision of Supreme court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, air 1989 SC 1933 . ( 15 ) WHETHER judgment of this Court in writ Petition No. 15781 of 1990 as confirmed by Division Bench is of any assistance to the petitioners? Admittedly writ appeal was dismissed on 17. 7. 1991 and petitioners filed application under Section 28a of the act on 30. 10. 1991. Even this is beyond three months. In any event, as held by the supreme Court in Hansoli Devi s case (supra) even where application under Section 18 of the Act is rejected on the ground of delay or on the ground of technical defects, the petitioners ought to have made an application within a period of three months from 17. 7. 1991. Having not done so, petitioners cannot be heard to say that their application is in time. Sections 6 (1), 11a, 18 (2), 28a are some of the provisions of the Act, which prescribe time limit for doing certain things. None of these provisions empower the authorities to condone the delay or to ignore the delay in taking action or in entertaining applications. In fact, a perusal of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would show that in view of period of limitation of three months prescribed by section 28a (1), the provisions of the limitation Act, especially Section 5, do not apply to the applications made under section 28a of the Act. ( 16 ) IN Officer On Special Duty (Land acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, (1996) 9 SCC 414 , the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the collector/land Acquisition Officer has power to condone the delay in filing application under Section 18 of the Act seeking reference to Civil Court. ( 16 ) IN Officer On Special Duty (Land acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, (1996) 9 SCC 414 , the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the collector/land Acquisition Officer has power to condone the delay in filing application under Section 18 of the Act seeking reference to Civil Court. The Court ruled that while making reference under Section 18 (1) of the act, Land Acquisition Officer acts as a statutory authority and is not a Court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was also held that Section 29 (2) of the limitation Act cannot be applied to proviso to Section 18 (2) of the Act. The Supreme court observed as under: though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to section 18 (2) of the Act, we are of the considered view that sub-section (2) of section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The collector/lao, therefore, is not a Court when he acts as a statutory authority under section 18 (1 ). Therefore, Section 5 of the limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The High Court, therefore was not right in its finding that the Collector is a Court under Section 5 of the Limitation act. ( 17 ) A Division Bench of this Court in gaisetti Tirupathi v. Land Acquisition officer-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, peddapalli, 2002 (5) ALD 564 (DB), after referring to Shah Manilal Chandulal s case (supra) held as under: thus, it is seen from the above that the Limitation Act has no application to the proceedings before the Collector and, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation act cannot be applied for codonation of delay in making an application under subsection (2) of Section 18 of the Act. The supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal chandulal (supra) held that though subsection (3) of Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act by virtue of local amendments, treated the Collector as a court for the limited purpose of exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure to correct the errors of orders passed by the collector under Section 18 of the Act, he cannot be considered to be a Court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands attracted only when the Land Acquisition officer acts as a Court. ( 18 ) THESE two decisions are binding on me, and I cannot countenance the submission that delay in filing application under Section 28a (1) of the Act can be condoned by Collector. ( 19 ) IN the result, for the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.