P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal, the appellant has called in question the correctness of the order dated 26th november 1999 made in Writ Petition No. 29411 of 1994 by the learned Single Judge of this court, wherein the learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant challenging the correctness of the order dated 27th July 1994 passed by the 1st respondent - State government dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant challenging the correctness of the order dated 3rd January 1994 passed by the 2nd respondent confiscating 499. 40 quintals of paddy and 68 quintals of rice in exercise of the power conferred on him under Section 6a of the Essential commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE facts in brief which are not in serious dispute may be stated as hereunder: the appellant is a rice industry. The premises of the appellant was inspected by the 3rd respondent - Food Inspector attached to the office of the Tahsildar, Sagar Taluk, Shimoga district on 3rd February 1992 and found only 499. 40 quintals of paddy as against 569. 04 quintals and 68 quintals of rice as against 153. 20 quintals required to be stocked in the premises of the appellant. In other words, the 3rd respondent found that there was a shortage of 69. 64 quintals of paddy and 85. 20 quintals of rice. The 3rd respondent also seized the quantity of the paddy and the rice which was stocked in the premises of the appellant. On the report submitted by the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent -Deputy Commissioner after conducting necessary enquiry as prescribed under law made an order dated 3rd January 1994 confiscating the entire stock of paddy and rice which was seized by the 3rd respondent. The said order was affirmed in appeal by the 1st respondent. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has as noticed by us earlier dismissed the Writ Petition. ( 3 ) SRI Chaitanya Hegde, learned Counsel for the appellant challenging the correctness of the impugned order made three submissions. The said order was affirmed in appeal by the 1st respondent. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has as noticed by us earlier dismissed the Writ Petition. ( 3 ) SRI Chaitanya Hegde, learned Counsel for the appellant challenging the correctness of the impugned order made three submissions. Firstly, he submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the orders impugned passed by the 2nd respondent dated 3rd january 1994 and the order dated 3rd February 1992 passed by the respondents -2 and 3 respectively are also liable to be quashed on the ground that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to pass an order confiscating the paddy and rice which was kept in stock in the premises of the appellant. According to the learned Counsel, it is only the foodgrains in respect of which shortage was found by the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent could have proceeded to make an order of confiscation of foodgrains. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of SUBHAS motichand SHETH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1. 1977 (2) Kar. L. J. 272 and also the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of PREM KUMAR KHANDELIA v. STATE OF west BENGAL 1988 (1) Crimes Page 259. Secondly, he submitted that even assuming that the 2nd respondent has the power in law to confiscate the stock seized for contravention of the order made under Section 3 of the Act, the said power is required to be exercised by the 2nd respondent in a fair and reasonable manner and keeping in mind the gravity of the nature of the contravention committed by the appellant. According to the learned Counsel, in the impugned orders both the respondents 1 and 2 have proceeded on the basis that the 2nd respondent is required to confiscate the entire stock seized. It is his submission that the respondents - 1 and 2 have failed to apply their mind with regard to the question as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it was imperative for the 2nd respondent to confiscate the entire food grains. e. paddy and rice seized by the 3rd respondent. It is his submission that the respondents - 1 and 2 have failed to apply their mind with regard to the question as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it was imperative for the 2nd respondent to confiscate the entire food grains. e. paddy and rice seized by the 3rd respondent. It is his submission that since both these contentions being questions of law though the said contentions were not seriously urged before the learned Single Judge, this Court while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India should consider the same in the interest of justice. Thirdly, he submitted that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as the respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant has contravened the order issued under Section 3 of the Act is erroneous in law. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, Smt. Ratna Shivayogimath, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents while supporting the order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the orders impugned passed by respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the orders impugned does not suffer from any error which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate power. She pointed out that Section 6a (a) of the Act empowers the 2nd respondent to confiscate the essential commodity seized under Clause 11 of the Essential Commodities (Maintenance of accounts, Display of Prices and Stocks) Order, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order'), if he is so satisfied that the contravention of the provision of the Order has been committed. According to the learned Government Pleader, the expression "in respect of which referred to in clause (b) of Order 11 must be understood as referring to an essential commodity which is the subject matter of Order under Section 3 of the Act; and it cannot be under stood as to mean only such portion of the essential commodities which has been removed and in respect of which the contravention is alleged to have taken place. In support of this contention, she relied upon the division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of reported in NARENDRA kumar v. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1977 CRL. L. J. 1755. In support of this contention, she relied upon the division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of reported in NARENDRA kumar v. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1977 CRL. L. J. 1755. It is her submission that the decision of this Court in the case of Subhas Motichand Sheth (supra) and also of the Calcutta high Court in the case of Prem Kumar Khandelia (supra) relied upon by Sri Hegde does not lay down the law correctly and therefore, the said decision should not be followed. It is her further submission that once the contravention is held proved, there is no discretion conferred on the 2nd respondent with regard to the quantum of the articles to be confiscated. ( 5 ) HAVING elaborately heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the two questions that would arise for consideration in this appeal are: (i) Whether the 2nd respondent has no power to confiscate the entire stock of articles seized which is not part of the essential commodity removed by the appellant? (ii) Whether there is no discretion conferred on the 2nd respondent in the matter of confiscation of the essential commodities seized ? (iii) Whether the finding recorded by respondents -1 and 2 that the appellant has contravened the order issued under Section 3 of the Act is erroneous in law? Regarding first question: before we proceed to deal with the first question referred to above, we find it is appropriate to extract the relevant portion of Clause (b) of Order 11 of the Order which reads as hereunder: " (b) seize, remove or otherwise the seizure or removal of any stock commodity in respect of which he has reason to believe that contravention of this order has been or is being, or is about to be committed along with the packages, coverings or receiptances in which such stock of commodity is found or the vessels, vehicles or other conveyances and animals used in carrying such stock of commodity and thereafter shall take or authorise the taking of all measures necessary. (i) for securing the production of stocks of commodities so seized before the Deputy commissioner as required by Section 6a of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 or in a Court, and (ii) for securing the production of such packages, coverings, receptacles, vessels, vehicles or other conveyance and animals so seized in a Court and for their safe custody pending such production. " From Clause 11 (b) of the Order extracted above, it is seen that the power is conferred on the enforcement Officer to seize, or otherwise remove any commodity in respect of which he has reason to believe that the contravention of the order has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed. As noticed by us earlier, the 2nd respondent is conferred with the power of confiscation of the essential commodity seized under Clause (b) of Order 11, if he is satisfied that contravention of the order has been committed with reference to the article so seized. The words " in respect of which he has reason to believe that contravention of the order has taken place to our mind, must be understood as to mean the entire stock which the licensee was entitled to keep in stock. Under these circumstances, when the words referred to in Clause 11 (b) of the Order states the power of seizure or removal provides for removal of any stock or commodity in respect of which the Enforcement Officer has reason to believe that the contravention of the order has taken place, the said provision cannot be given a restricted meaning as to mean only the portion of the commodity which has already been removed as contended by Sri Hegde. Once the power of seizure is conferred on the Enforcement Office in respect of which power of confiscation is also conferred on the 2nd respondent, the only way in which the said provision is required to be understood as to mean the said portion of the stock which is available and which has a direct bearing or nexus with that portion of the commodity which has already been removed in contravention of the order. Any other interpretation in our view, will totally frustrate the very object of the order. Any other interpretation in our view, will totally frustrate the very object of the order. When the language of a provision of law is clear and unambiguous, it is not permissible for the Court to give a restricted meaning to the language employed in a legislation and frustrate the very object of the legislation. In our view, we are supported by the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of narendra Kumar (supra ). At paragraph 4 of the judgment the Patna High Court has observed as follows: "4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner in the first instance that confiscation if at all could be ordered only in respect of the 10 quintals of sugar, which was not found entered in the stock register, and as according to the case of the State itself that has already been sold in the black market and not available for seizure, the sugar, which was seized and in respect of which no offence was committed could not be confiscated. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is the offending goods which can be confiscated and no other goods as a matter of penalty. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to quote Section 6a of the Act. The section reads as follows: "where any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto, it may be produced, without any unreasonable delay before the Collector of the district or the Presidency town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order, the Collector if satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, may order confiscation of (a) the essential commodity so seized; (b) any package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found and, (c) any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity. Provided that without prejudice to any action which may be taken under any other provision of this Act, no food grains or edible oilseeds seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto from a producer shall, if the seized foodgrains or edible oilseeds have been produced by him, be confiscated under this Section. Provided that without prejudice to any action which may be taken under any other provision of this Act, no food grains or edible oilseeds seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto from a producer shall, if the seized foodgrains or edible oilseeds have been produced by him, be confiscated under this Section. " A plain reading of the Section does not show that only that part of the essential commodity in respect of which the offence is committed can be confiscated. When any essential commodity is seized and the Collector is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order. e. , the order made under Section 3 in relation to the essential commodity, he may order confiscation of the essential commodity so seized. The expression " in relation thereto", in our opinion, means in relation to the essential commodity which is the subject - matter of the order under Section 3: it does not and cannot mean only that part of the essential commodity in respect to which an offence is committed. If that would have been the intention of the framers of the Act, they would have used the expression "in respect of which an offence is committed" somewhere in the section". (emphasis supplied) in the light of the discussion made above, we are not persuaded to accept the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Subhas Motichand Sheth (supra) and in the case of Prem kumar Khandelia (supra) by the Calcutta High Court relied upon by Sri Hegde. Regarding second question: section 6a of the act no doubt confers power on the 2nd respondent to confiscate the commodities seized. It is useful to extract Clause A of Sub-section (1) of the said section which reads as hereunder: 6a. Regarding second question: section 6a of the act no doubt confers power on the 2nd respondent to confiscate the commodities seized. It is useful to extract Clause A of Sub-section (1) of the said section which reads as hereunder: 6a. Confiscation of food grains, edible oilseeds and edible oils - (1) Where any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto; a report of such seizure, shall without unreasonable delay be made to the Collector of the district or the presidency - town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order, the Collector, may, if he thinks it expedient so to do, direct the essential commodity so seized to be produced for inspection before him and if he is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order may order confiscation of (a) the essential commodity so seized; (b) any package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found; and (c) any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity. Provided that without prejudice to any action which may be taken under any provision of this act, no foodgrains or edible oilseeds seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto from producer shall, if the seized foodgrains or edible oilseeds have been produced by him be confiscated under this section. Provided further that in the case of any animal, vehicle, vessel, or other conveyance used for the carriage of goods or passengers for hire, the owner of such animal, vehicles, vessel or other conveyance shall be given an option to pay in lieu of its confiscation, a fine not exceeding the market price at the date of seizure of the essential commodity sought to be carried by such animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance. " from the reading of the provisions referred to above, it is clear that the 2nd respondent is conferred with the power of seizure and confiscation of the articles seized. The power of seizure and confiscation conferred on the 2nd respondent is in the nature of penalty provided for contravention of the order made under Section 3 of the Act. " from the reading of the provisions referred to above, it is clear that the 2nd respondent is conferred with the power of seizure and confiscation of the articles seized. The power of seizure and confiscation conferred on the 2nd respondent is in the nature of penalty provided for contravention of the order made under Section 3 of the Act. The word "may" used under sub-section (1) of Section 6a in our view must be understood as an enabling provision conferred on the 2nd respondent to pass an order of confiscation in respect of the commodity seized. When the power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner to confiscate the seized commodity as an enabling provision, the said provision also has to be understood as conferring discretion on him on the question whether the commodity seized should be confiscated; and if it is to be confiscated what should be the quantity or quantum of the commodity seized is required to be confiscated. This decision he is required to take having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the gravity and nature of the contravention of the order committed and its serious impact on the public distribution system. Further, the said discretion is required to be exercised reasonably and fairly. If the argument of the learned Government Pleader that there is no discretion conferred on the 2nd respondent is accepted as correct, it would lead to a situation, e. g. , that on inspection of 1000 quintals of paddy if it is found there is a shortage of 25 kgs of paddy, the entire stock may have to be confiscated. That cannot be the object of the legislation. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the submission of the learned Government pleader that there is no discretion conferred on the 2nd respondent with regard to the quantity or quantum of the essential commodity required to be confiscated and he is bound to confiscate the entire quantity in respect of which contravention has taken place. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. NAGENDRA rao AND CO. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. NAGENDRA rao AND CO. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AIR1994 SC 2663 , JT1994 (5 )SC 572 , 1994 (3 ) SCALE977 , (1994 )6 SCC205 , [1994 ]supp3 SCR144 , wherein at paragraph 5 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: ". . . . . . . . This is being mentioned only to demonstrate the nature of power and how it is expected to be exercised. Nothing turns on it so far this appeal is concerned. But what needs to be mentioned is that since the power is very wide as a person violating the control orders is to be visited with serious consequences leading not only to the confiscation of the seized goods, packages or vessel or vehicle in which such essential commodity is found or is conveyed or carried, but is liable to be prosecuted and penalized under Section 7 of the Act, it is inherent in it that those who are entrusted with responsibility to implement it should act with reasonableness, fairness and to promote the purpose and objective of the Act. Further, it should not be lost sight of that the goods seized are liable to be confiscated only if the Collector is satisfied about violation of the control Orders. The language of the section and its setting indicate that every contravention cannot entail confiscation. That is why the section uses the word 'may'. A trader indulging in black-marketing on selling adulterated goods etc, should not, in absence of any violation, be treated as par with technical violations such as failure to put up the price list etc, or even discrepancies in stock. " In the instant case, as pointed out by Sri Hegde there is no application of mind by the 2nd respondent on this aspect of the matter. He proceeds on the assumption that the entire commodity in respect of which contravention is alleged is required to be confiscated. Therefore, the impugned order passed by respondents -1 and 2 are liable to be quashed. This aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the learned Single Judge. May be that this ground was not urged as contended by the learned Government Pleader before the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the impugned order passed by respondents -1 and 2 are liable to be quashed. This aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the learned Single Judge. May be that this ground was not urged as contended by the learned Government Pleader before the learned Single Judge. However, since the contention raised being purely a question of law, we are of the view that it would be in the interest of justice not to deny the relief to the appellant on the ground that the said contention was not urged before the learned Single Judge. ( 6 ) NOW, the only question that remains to be considered is as to whether the finding recorded by respondents -1 and 2 that the appellant has contravened, the order issued under Section 3 of the act is erroneous in law? regarding third question: the respondents -1 and 2 on consideration of the materials on record have found that the appellant has contravened the order issued under Section 3 of the Act. The said finding in our view is purely a question of fact. The learned Single Judge has accepted the said finding recorded by the respondents - 1 and 2. We do not find any error in the said conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge. The findings recorded by respondents - 1 and 2 do not suffer from any error much less and error apparent on the face of the record which calls for interference by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the third contention urged by Sri Hegde is required to be negatived. Accordingly, it is negatived. ( 7 ) IN the light of the discussion made above, we make the following order: (i) The Order-Annexure-G dated 3rd January 1994 passed by the 2nd respondent and the order-Annexure-H dated 27th July 1994 passed by the 1st respondent are hereby quashed. (ii) The order dated 26th November 1999 made in Writ Petition No. 29411/1994 hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the 2nd respondent for fresh consideration in the light of the discussion made above. He shall take fresh decision in the matter after hearing the appellant and in accordance with law. ( 8 ) IN terms stated above, this appeal is allowed.