JUDGMENT 1. All India Council for Technical Education, hereinafter shortly referred to as AICTE in pursuance of a direction issued by a learned Single of this Court in Arun and Others Vs. State Of Karnataka And Others, framed norms/guidelines for effecting change of course of students in the Engineering Colleges in the beginning of 3rd semester B.E. Course and communicated the same by Notification dated 12th September, 2001. The guidelines read as under: 1. Branch change at the college level shall be carried out by the Director/principal of the college. 2. Facility of branch change at the IInd year (IIIrd semester) level shall be available only to meritorious students and shall not be considered as a matter of right. 3. These guidelines shall be applicable to all institutions imparting Engineering education in the country including University, University Departments, RECS, autonomous institutes, aided as well as unaided institutions. 4. Branch change is permitted at IIIrd Semester (IInd year) only. 5. For the purpose of branch change, the prescribed intake shall be the intake prescribed by AICTE for the previous academic session when the students were admitted at 1st semester level. Subsequent variation in intake shall have no bearings on the students eligible for branch change. 6. Branch change is permitted, if the strength in any Branch is not falling below 75% of the prescribed intake. 7. Branch change can be made only against clear vacancy in a particular branch. Vacancy (V) being defined as: v = I (Reg + Rep)Where I = The prescribed Intake for the Branch reg = No. of regular students who become eligible to be promoted to IIIrd semester rep. = No. of students from previous batches who become eligible to join III semester (along with regular students ). Branch change shall not be permitted to any course where (Reg + Rep )> 1. Under no circumstances, there shall be any exception to the above stipulation. 8. Branch change shall be strictly according to the Merit list prepared by the college on the basis of total obtained by a student in 1st year University Examination. Only those students who have passed in all the subjects shall be eligible to apply for change of branch. 9. Change of branch should be completed within 10 days of announcement t of I and II semester (1st year) results. 10. Only those students who have passed in all the subjects shall be eligible to apply for change of branch. 9. Change of branch should be completed within 10 days of announcement t of I and II semester (1st year) results. 10. Consolidated lists showing the branch change as per above guidelines be sent to DTE and to the University. 11. Excess intake in any branch shall disentitle the college to effectuate any branch change in that discipline, until the punitive measures, such as reduction in intake etc., as imposed by AICTE is effective. 12. State/university shall ensure that AICTE is kept informed of any violations in implementing these guidelines or excess admissions made by the college. 13. College/students shall not be entitled to any relief if the guidelines mentioned above for permitting branch change are not strictly adhere to. 2. Writ Petition No. 37139 of 2001 and a batch of other writ petitions were filed in this Court calling in question the validity of Clauses 6 and 8 of the Notification contending that those clauses are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they are arbitrary and unreasonable. The writ petitions were opposed by the AICTE by filing statement of objections. The writ petitions were also opposed by the Principal of the Karnataka Regional Engineering College (KREC), Suratkal, one of the respondents in the writ petitions, by filing separate statement of objections. A learned Single Judge of this Court heard Writ petition No. 37139 of 2001 and connected writ petitions together and disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 19. 10. 2001 holding that Clause-6 is unconstitutional being discriminatory and unreasonable. The learned Single Judge in the operative portion of the order has directed thus: in the result, these petitions are disposed of with the following directions:- (1) The request made by the petitioners for change of branch shall be considered by the colleges concerned subject to the petitioners being found eligible in terms of guidelines no. 8 of the Guidelines issued by the AICTE. (2) While considering the request so made, the college shall not permit a change if such a change takes the strength in any such branch below 75% of the actual admissions made to that branch. 8 of the Guidelines issued by the AICTE. (2) While considering the request so made, the college shall not permit a change if such a change takes the strength in any such branch below 75% of the actual admissions made to that branch. It follows that transfer may be permitted to the extent of 1/4th of the total admissions made in any course subject to the candidates being found eligible and also subject to the availability of clear vacancies in the branch to which such transfers are sought. (3) The university shall approve and recognise all such transfers if the some are made within two weeks from today. Calling in question the correctness of the above order of the learned single Judge dated 19th October, 2001 Writ Appeal Nos. 7390 and 7391 of 2001 are filed by the Director, National Institute of Technology, Karnataka (for short, the Director) and the Principal of KREC, Suratkal, respectively, whereas, Writ Appeal Nos. 834 to 842 of 2002 are by the AICTE. Following the above order dated 19.10.2001 passed in Writ petition No. 37139 of 2001 and batch, the learned single Judge allowed Writ petition Nos. 41816 to 41847 of 2001 by order dated 6th December, 2001 in part. That order is the subject matter of Writ Appeal Nos. 802 to 833 of 2002 filed by the AICTE. Further, another learned single Judge of this Court, following the very same order dated 19th October, 2001 passed in Writ petition No. 37139 of 2001 and batch, allowed Writ petition Nos. 188 of 2002 and 47317 pf 2001 by order dated 11. 01. 2002. That order has been called in question by the AICTE in Writ Appeal Nos. 843 and 844 of 2002. In Writ Appeal Nos. 843 and 844 of 2002, a Division Bench of this Court while admitting the Writ Appeals stayed operation of the order of the learned single Judge, whereas in Writ Appeal Nos. 7390 and 7391 of 2001, the Division Bench stayed operation of the order of the learned single Judge on 12. 04. 2002 and both the interim orders are in operation till date. 3. 7390 and 7391 of 2001, the Division Bench stayed operation of the order of the learned single Judge on 12. 04. 2002 and both the interim orders are in operation till date. 3. It was stated at the Bar that even before the Division Bench stayed the operation of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, in pursuance of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge, changes of courses were effected in the case of many students and they have been prosecuting studies in the changed courses. However, it was stated that after the Division Bench stayed the operation of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the changes of courses were not permitted. In those circumstances, three affected students filed W. P. Nos. 38980 to 38982 of 2002 in this Court on 21. 10. 2002 seeking writ of certiorari for quashing Annexure-B dated 19. 09. 2002, which is an endorsement issued by the Director refusing to permit them to change course of study and seeking mandamus to permit them to change course of study. No interim order is passed in those writ petitions. The decision to be taken by us in the writ appeals would determine the fate of the writ petitions, and therefore, it is appropriate that we should first deal with the validity of the judgment of the learned Single Judge impugned in the writ appeals. 4. Before the learned Single Judge, on behalf of the writ petitioners, it was contended that Clause-6 of the Guidelines insofar as the same prescribes that no change shall be permitted, it students strength in any branch falls below 75% of the prescribed intake is clearly arbitrary, irrational and discriminatory, it was also contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that Clause-8 of the Guidelines insofar as the same stipulates that only those students who have passed in all the 1st and 2nd semesters subjects shall be eligible to apply for change of branch is irrational and arbitrary. On the other hand, on behalf of the AICTE and the KREC, it was contended that the Guidelines are aimed at ensuring a coordinated and planned growth of technical education in the Country. If the choice for a change in a Branch is left to the students alone, the object of establishing the AICTE would be defeated. On the other hand, on behalf of the AICTE and the KREC, it was contended that the Guidelines are aimed at ensuring a coordinated and planned growth of technical education in the Country. If the choice for a change in a Branch is left to the students alone, the object of establishing the AICTE would be defeated. Alternatively, it was contended that any change in a Branch at the volition of the students would not be in consonance with the national interest and requirements of technical personnel in various branches of Engineering. The learned Single Judge did not find any merit in the challenge as regards Clause-8. However, the learned Single Judge has opined that Clause-6 of the Guidelines is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that those students who have joined less popular courses get exposed to discriminatory treatment. We have heard Sri P. S. Rajgopal, learned Counsel for the AICTE and Sri G. K. V. Murthy, learned Counsel for the respondent-students in writ appeals and the petitioner in Writ Petition Nos. 38980 to 38982 of 2002. 5. Sri Rajgopal at the threshold would contend that the learned Single Judge in reading down Clause-6 of Guidelines has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226; the learned Single Judge exercised the jurisdiction as if the power conferred on this Court under Article 226 is an appellate jurisdiction; the learned Single Judge has completely ignored the statements of objections filed on behalf of the AICTE and the KREC; no student having joined a particular course can seek change of course as a matter of right; the Guidelines framed by the AICTE are based on sound rationale and are intended to advance the public interest in general and the interest of technical education in the Country in particular; the impugned guidelines are policy decisions of the AICTE intended to sub-serve the public good. Sri Rajgopal placed reliance on number of judgments in support of his submissions Sri G. K. V. Murthy, learned Counsel for the students, on the other hand, would support the judgment of the learned Single Judge and maintain that simply because the Guidelines are based on a policy decision of the AICTE, it cannot be stated that they fall beyond the pale of judicial review power conferred on this Court under Article 226. Sri Murthy would maintain that the prescription in Clause-6 of the guidelines does not stand to reason and it is totally arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 postulates. 6. Learned single Judge has held that Clause 6 of the Guidelines insofar as the same provides that transfer cannot be allowed if the strength in the branch falls below 75% of the permitted intake is irrational and operates in a discriminatory manner vis-a-viz candidates admitted to courses which have attracted 75% or less of the total intake in take course and read down Clause-6 of the Guidelines on the ground that that Clause as it is, is discriminatory and arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Therefore, it becomes imperative for us to have a second look at the said clause and see whether Clause-6 could be condemned as violative of Article 14 postulates. Before undertaking that exercise, it would be beneficial for us in the decision-making to briefly refer to the role of the AICTE and the duties and functions attached to it and the obligation it is expected to discharge in the field of technical education in the country The AICTE, to begin with, was established in the year 1945 by a resolution of Government of India as a national expert body to advise the Central Government and the State Governments for ensuring the coordinated development of technical education in the country in accordance with the approved standards. During the first three decades the AICTE functioned quite effectively and there was phenomenal development of technical education during that period. However, the growth of large number of private Engineering Colleges and Polytechnics in complete disregard to guidelines laid down by the AICTE and scant regard for maintenance of educational standards shown by a large number of such institutions made the AICTE to conclude at its meeting held in 1981 that a stage had been reached when it would be vested with statutory powers to regulate and maintain standards of technical education in the Country. A national working group was set up in November, 1985 to look into the role of the AICTE. 7. The national working group recommended that in order to enable the AICTE to play its role effectively it shall have to be vested with necessary statutory authority. A national working group was set up in November, 1985 to look into the role of the AICTE. 7. The national working group recommended that in order to enable the AICTE to play its role effectively it shall have to be vested with necessary statutory authority. The National Policy on Education 1986 also stipulated that the AICTE will be vested with statutory authority for planning formulation and the maintenance of norms and standards, accreditation, funding of priority areas, monitoring and evaluation, maintaining parity of certificates and awards and ensuring the coordinated and integrated development of technical and management education. A Bill was introduced in the Parliament, the led to enactment of All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, for short, the Act, seeking to provide statutory powers to the AICTE to ensure: (i) proper planning and coordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country; (ii) promotion of qualitative improvement of technical education in relation of planned quantitative growth; and (iii) regulation of the system and proper maintenance of norms and standards. 8. Section 3 (4) of the Act lays down the composition of the AICTE. The AICTE consists of representatives of Union Government and experts drawn from the fields of Education, Vocational and Technical Education, Industry, Science etc. The functions of the AICTE are enumerated in Section 10 of the Act. The establishment of the AICTE was with a view to provide proper planning and coordinated development of technical education system throughout the country apart from maintenance of standards. The AICTE in discharge of its role also acts as the pivotal agency in implementing the National plans regarding technical education apart from advising Government of India on the need for technical manpower to meet the national plans and objectives on the basis of the planned growth of the economy. While permitting establishment of Engineering Colleges and opening of courses in engineering studies in various branches, the AICTE takes into account the technical manpower needs of the economy in various segments of engineering. For this purpose the AICTE has implemented a scheme called National Technical Manpower Information System (NTMIS) through the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (IAMR) at New Delhi. While permitting establishment of Engineering Colleges and opening of courses in engineering studies in various branches, the AICTE takes into account the technical manpower needs of the economy in various segments of engineering. For this purpose the AICTE has implemented a scheme called National Technical Manpower Information System (NTMIS) through the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (IAMR) at New Delhi. IAMR conducts technical manpower surveys as the National level and the State level from time to time to assess the existing human resources available in various branches of Engineering and projected additional requirement of human resources of various branches of engineering availability of trained manpower in each of the branches etc. It is a continuing study and this serves as the basis data for the AICTE in its decisions to permit opening of new branches of studies in those colleges and in fixing intake. 9. The Supreme Court in State Of Tamilnadu And Another Vs. Adhiyaman Edcuational And Research Institute And Others, after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act in paragraph 17 to 21 summarised the role of AICTE in para 22 of the judgment thus: the aforesaid provisions of the Act including its preamble make it abundantly clear that the Council has been established under the Act for coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system at all levels throughout the country and is enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth. The Council is also required to regulate and ensure proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system. The Council is further to evolve suitable performance appraisal system incorporating such norms and mechanisms in enforcing their accountability. It is also required to provide guidelines for admission of students and has power to withhold or discontinue grants and to de-recognise the institution where norms and standards are laid down by it and directions given by it from time to time are not followed. This duty and responsibility cast on the Council implies that the norms and standards to be set should be such as would prevent a lopsided or an isolated development of technical education in the country. This duty and responsibility cast on the Council implies that the norms and standards to be set should be such as would prevent a lopsided or an isolated development of technical education in the country. For this purpose, the norms and standards to be prescribed for the technical educational system in all parts of the country uniformly; that there will be coordination in the technical education and the education imparted in various parts of the country and will be capable of being integrated in one system, that there will be sufficient number of technically education individuals and that their growth would be in a planned manner; and that all institutions in the country are in a position to properly maintain the norms and standards that may be prescribed by the Council. The norms and standards have, therefore, to be reasonable and ideal and at the same time, adaptable, attainable and maintainable by institution throughout the country to ensure both quantitative and qualitative growth of the technically qualified personnel to meet the needs of the country. Since the standards have to be laid down on a national level, they have necessarily to be uniform throughout the country without which the coordinated and integrated development of the technical education all over the country will not be possible which will defeat one of the main objects of the statute. This country as is well known, consists of regions and population which are at different levels of progress and development or to put it differently, at differing levels of backwardness. This is not on account of any physical or intellectual deficiency but for want of opportunities to develop and contribute to the total good of the country. Unnecessarily high norms or standards, say for admission to the education institutions or to pass the examinations, may not only deprive a cast majority of the people of the benefit of the education and the qualification, but would also result in concentrating technical education in the hands of the affluent and elite few and in depriving the country of a large number of otherwise deserving technical personnel. It is necessary to bear this aspect of the norms and standards to be prescribed in mind, for a major debate before us centred around the right of the States to prescribe standards higher than the one laid by the Council. It is necessary to bear this aspect of the norms and standards to be prescribed in mind, for a major debate before us centred around the right of the States to prescribe standards higher than the one laid by the Council. What is further necessary to remember is that the Council has on it representatives not only of the States but also of the State Universities. They have, therefore, a say in the matter of laying down the norms and standards which may prescribed by the Council for such education from time to time. The Council has further the Regional Committee, at present, atleast in four major geographical zones and the constitution of functions of the Committee are to be prescribed by the regulations to be made by the Council. Since the Council has the representation of the States and the professional bodies on it which have also representation from different States and regions, they have a say in the constitution and functions of these Committees as well. 10. In Jaya Gokul Educaitonal Trust Vs. Commissioner And Secretary To Government, Higher Education Department, Kerala State And Another, in para 11, the Supreme Court has observed: the abovesaid Act was on Act to provide for the establishment of All-India Council for Technical with a view to the proper planning and coordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country, the promotion of qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth and the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system and for matters connected therewith. Under Section 10 of the Act, it is stated that it is the duty of the Council constituted under the Act to take all steps as the said Council might think fit for ensuring coordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards. In the statement of objection filed by KREC in W. P. No. 35441 of 2001, it is stated thus: the demand for various branches by the students depends on the perceptions at the moment of admission and they keep changing without having any relevance to the long term perspective based on scientific data, can be see from the following fact. In the statement of objection filed by KREC in W. P. No. 35441 of 2001, it is stated thus: the demand for various branches by the students depends on the perceptions at the moment of admission and they keep changing without having any relevance to the long term perspective based on scientific data, can be see from the following fact. Due to temporary slide down in software segment of the economy, the preferences of the students to various branches of Engineering saw a sea change as evidenced by the preferences of the top ranking students in the seat allotment process of common entrance test cell. Following tabular column would demonstrate this graphically. Preferences exercised by Toppers in the merit list during the last 4 to 5 years academic year 2000-2001 Subject Preferences of merited students during the year 2001-upto the 2002 1. Information Technology 5 2. Computer Science 2 3. Electronics & Communications 1 4. Mechanical 3 5. Electrical 4 The perception based on temporary and passing ups and down which forms normally the basis of students preferences cannot form the basis of national policies and objectives which the Council has to bear in mind in its technical education management. The Council has to frame its policies in regard to the projected national needs. If the students preference for various branches is taken as the sole criteria, the consequences would be certain branch of Engineering like Civil Engineering, Metallurgy Engineering, Chemical Engineering and Mining Engineering will have to be closed down which would result in a lopsided engineering education which will not be in consonance with national needs, national plan and interests of the national economy. While prescribing a cut off percentage of 75% the Council has sought to balance the national needs and interest which require the production of engineering in every branch of engineering to meet the projected human resource needs as per the in-take fixed with the aspirations of engineering students who want to shift to branches perceived to be having highest employability as per their perceptions. It is now well settled that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to the larger public interest. It is now well settled that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to the larger public interest. While it would have been open to the Council to prohibit any change of branch having regard to various factors like National human resources requirement, optimum utilisation, infrastructure created in establishment of Engineering Colleges and various branches of such colleges, the Council has tried to evolve and has placed in position a policy which would take care of individual aspirations as well. 7. If the branch change is permitted to every one who seeks ignoring the number of students who would remain in a given branch of study, the student resultant position would be total disuse of vast infrastructure created at enormous cost. The Council has worked out the capital cost for establishment of engineering college. Excluding the land cost which varies form place to place, it is the estimate of the Council that the capital cost for establishing an Engineering College is about Rs. 4/- lakhs per student, taking that the capital cost involved will be about Rs. 13.10 crores for establishing an engineering college with a student capacity of 360. In so far as this college is concerned, it has about 9 branches of studies. The recurring cost is about Rs. 8.4 crores per annum towards revenue expenditure and about Rs. 5/- crores per year towards cost of replacements and additions to capital assets. Thus, the college is required to incur an expenditure of about Rs. 1.55 crores per department. If all the applications from students of Civil Engineering Mechanical Engineering Metallurgy Engineering and Chemical Engineering for change of branch have to be considered there will be almost no student left in these branches of studies which would mean enormous waste of scare public funds apart from widening imbalance in number of engineers turn out vis-a-vis the national requirements. All these have been taken into account by the Council in prescribing the impugned guidelines and the power having been exercised in a bona fide manner on relevant considerations in public interest is not open to challenge. Having regard to the fact that fee structure is greatly subsidized the national economic resources in engineering and therefore national needs and public interest alone can be guiding factor in laying down policies for engineering education. 11. Having regard to the fact that fee structure is greatly subsidized the national economic resources in engineering and therefore national needs and public interest alone can be guiding factor in laying down policies for engineering education. 11. Furthermore, the AICTE in its statement of objections dated 15-10-2001 filed in Writ Petition No. 37139 of 2001, in paras 6 and 7 has stated thus: 6. While formulating a scheme for permitting change of branches, AICTE has to keep in mind not only the personal choice (likes and dislikes) of students, but also the interest of the institutions (short term and long term) and the national interest (short term and long term needs of the country). It is necessary to ensure that the strength of the technical institution which are built and nurtured over a long period, is not diminished and their ability to impart technical educations of high quality in all the relevant disciplines is not eroded in the long term, on account of our anxiety to satisfy some short term demands of students. Lopsided development of technical institutions and imbalanced development of technical education system in the country have to be avoided. 7. Provision for the lower limit of 75% is made in clause-6 in order to safeguard the interest of the faculty and their continued employability and also to ensure the optimum utilization of the specialised services of the facility in all the departments of the institutions. Similarly, it is meant to ensure optimum utilization of other infra-structural facilities in all the departments. Needless to say, continued under-utilisation or non-utilisation leads to deterioration in the quality; and maintenance of quality is possible only if there is continued utilization at the optimum level. If unrestricted migration form one branch to another is permitted, it may lead to drastic fall in the student strength of some branches resulting in drastic under-utilisation of the other infra-structural facilities and stunted growth of academic activities including research, in those departments, which is turn will lead to deterioration, in the quality of the faculty and other infra-structural facilities of those departments, in the long run. This trend, if not checked in good time, may even compel or prompt the managements of the institutions to close down some of the branches which become unwanted by the students in the short term. This trend, if not checked in good time, may even compel or prompt the managements of the institutions to close down some of the branches which become unwanted by the students in the short term. It will put a damper on private and public investments to be made on such departments/courses of study which are otherwise extremely useful and necessary for the technological development of the country. In course of time, some important branches of study which lose their popularity in the short term may suffer irretrievable damage on account of continued neglect. 12. The learned single Judge has held that Clause-6 of guidelines insofar as the same provides that transfer cannot be allowed if the strength in a particular branch of Engineering falls below 75% of the permitted intake is irrational and operates in a discriminatory manner vis-a-vis candidates admitted to course which have attracted 75% or less of the total intake in that course. If we read the reasoning of the learned single Judge carefully, it is quite clear that the learned single Judge, in arriving at the above opinion, has treated all students who join different Engineering course/disciplines in an academic year as person belonging to a well defined class for the purpose of Article 14 of the Constitution and so treating, the learned single Judge has opined that if clause06 of the guidelines, as it is, is operated, it will result in discrimination in the case of students who join those courses in Engineering which are not popular. Therefore, the basic question is whether all students joining various Engineering courses during an academic year can be regarded as persons belonging to a well defined class for the purpose of applying equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is true that since the guarantee of equal protection embrace the entire realm of State action, it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also in the matter of granting privileges, exemptions and concessions etc. This position is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. I.A.A.I, Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy (M/S) Vs. State Of J & K, and several other decisions to follow those decisions. This position is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. I.A.A.I, Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy (M/S) Vs. State Of J & K, and several other decisions to follow those decisions. What Article 14 mandates is that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if an regards the subject matter of the Legislation, their position is the same; or, in other words, its action must not be arbitrary, but must be based on some valid principle which itself must not be irrational or discriminatory. The principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. It would be totally inexpedient and undesirable to demand that all laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all people in one go or that the operation of a particular law should result in similar kind of treatment in a technical sense, to all those who could be grouped together as well defined class. It is universally realised and accepted that every classification is, in some degree, likely to produce some inequality and that mere production of inequality is not enough to declare a law or a rule or an instrument as unconstitutional or invalid as held in Ameeroonissa Begaum Vs. Mehboob Begum, Babulal Amthalal Vs. Collector Of Customs, Calcutta, Gopichand Vs Delhi Administration. Differential treatment does not per se constitute violation of Article 14 and it denies equal protection only when there is no reasonable basis for the differentiation. Therefore, even accepting that operation of Clause 6 of guidelines would not result in equal treatment to all students joining various courses in Engineering in an academic year in the matter of seeking change of courses under the guidelines at the end of the II Semester and beginning of III Semester, that circumstances itself would not be a valid ground to invalidate clause-6 or to read down that clause in the way the learned single Judge has done. In reviewing the constitutional validity of a law or rule, the Court cannot apply equality clause with a mathematical precision or the exactitude of a surgeon operating on a patient to locate and remove a microscopic diseased particle in the body. In classifying as well as implementing the beneficial provisions, the State and the instrumentalities of the State should have reasonable latitude and discretion. Any rigidity would lead to impracticability and insistence of rigidity, therefore, would not serve the public good. 13. The AICTE as well as the KREC have clearly set out the circumstances and the factors which have gone into the decision-making for prescribing a cut-off percentage of 75% in their pleadings and according to them, that prescription is necessary for a planned and coordinated development of technical education in the country and any liberal change in courses will not be in the National interest and that would result in waste of available infrastructures in the technical institutions. The learned single Judge did not accept the reasons stated by the AICTE for prescribing cut-off percentage 75% on the ground that the AICTE did not adduce any evidence to show that it has conducted any study at the National level to determine the technical manpower required by the country over a given period of time. With respect, we should state that the learned single Judge is not right. Both the AICTE and KREC in their respective statement of objections have stated that in order to assess the technical manpower needs of the economy in various segments of Engineering, the AICTE has implemented a scheme called the National Technical Manpower Information System (NTMIs) through Institute the Applied Manpower Research (IAMR) and IAMR conducts technical manpower surveys at the National level and State level from to time to assess the existing human resources available in various branches of Engineering and that is the basis for permitting new branches of studies in the existing colleges or fixing intake in various disciplines. The correctness of such a study and results thereof is not at all contested by the writ petitioners. Therefore, there is no justification to doubt the integrity of sworn statement made by the AICTE and and the KREC in their counters. 14. The correctness of such a study and results thereof is not at all contested by the writ petitioners. Therefore, there is no justification to doubt the integrity of sworn statement made by the AICTE and and the KREC in their counters. 14. The writ petitioners having joined a particular course of study in Engineering cannot, as a matter of right of course, insist that they should be permitted to change course of studies. Such a right of the petitioners-students in not traceable with reference to any statute or the Constitution or the common law. As rightly held by the learned single Judge himself that it is permissible for the AICTE not to allow change at all from one discipline to another and, if such a ban is imposed by the AICTE, the validity of such a ban could not be assailed successfully on any permissible grounds of judicial review. If that is so, the validity of partial ban on permission to change the course cannot be challenged on any permissible grounds. If total ban is valid in law, it is trite, partial ban too is valid both by reason and logic. Further, even assuming that if Clause-6 is operated, the students who have joined less popular Engineering courses get exposed to disadvantage in relative terms compared to the students who have joined more popular courses in Engineering as held by the learned single Judge in his Judgment, from that fact itself and without anything further, it cannot be concluded that the AICTE has practiced an invidious discrimination in framing the guideline incorporated in Clause 6. In our considered opinion, there is absolutely no scope to apply equality clause to the facts of this case. Even assuming that in terms of treatment, the students who have joined less popular courses are exposed to a disadvantage, that would not tantamount to an invidious discrimination, because, the students who have joined a particular Engineering course would constitute a different and distinct class and, therefore, it is permissible in law to treat them differently. All students who join various Engineering courses during an academic year cannot and should not be regarded as persons belonging to a well-defined class for the purpose of applying Article 14 postulates. All students who join various Engineering courses during an academic year cannot and should not be regarded as persons belonging to a well-defined class for the purpose of applying Article 14 postulates. Secondly, since the prescription in clause 6 of the guidelines in intended to sub-serve the social and public good, even assuming that certain students who have opted for less popular courses cannot have the same advantages which, the students who have joined more popular courses have, in the matter of change of courses, that circumstances itself would not be valid justification for the Court either to invalidate clause 6 or to read down. It is well settled that individual interest should yield to public interest. In a recent judgment in L. Muthukumar And Another Vs. The State Of Tamil Nadu And Others, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle by observing that the interest of individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to larger public interest. The guidelines including the one incorporated in clause 6 framed by the AICTE are undoubtedly policy decisions taken by it to monitor and integrated the technical education in the country and produce engineering personnel in various disciplines to meet the needs and requirements of the country from time to time and place to place. Policy is a course of action based on some declared expediency or utility. Policy is a system of administration guided more by interest than by principle. When we speak about a policy, we should remember that a policy is only a course of action to deal with a subject matter. An authority, statutory or otherwise, is entitled to choose any course of action which it thinks is advantageous to it unless its discretion to choose is taken away by law. Expediency and utility of a policy is primarily within the domain of the administration and the scope of judicial review in that regard is very much limited and circumscribed. Therefore, in reviewing such policy decisions, the reviewing courts should be slow and show deference to the wisdom of an expert body like the AICTE for the Constitutional Courts repeatedly held the reiterated that they will not normally interfere with the policy decision of the governmental and statutory authorities. The courts must exercise jurisdiction of judicial review with circumspection. Therefore, in reviewing such policy decisions, the reviewing courts should be slow and show deference to the wisdom of an expert body like the AICTE for the Constitutional Courts repeatedly held the reiterated that they will not normally interfere with the policy decision of the governmental and statutory authorities. The courts must exercise jurisdiction of judicial review with circumspection. The wisdom in a policy decision of the Government or statutory authorities, as such, is not justiciable unless such policy decision is capricious, arbitrary, whimsical so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution or any statutory or constitutional provision. The only thing to be seen by the Court when a policy decision is assailed is whether the policy in question is arbitrary or violative of any mandatory provisions of law. A Judge in terms of in-puts which make him and by training cannot assume the role of a Supreme Advisor to the administration on policies governing innumerable activities of the State particularly in the present-day context of ever-expanding horizons of human knowledge, by leaps and bounds. Much harm is done by the myth that, by merely is putting on black robe and taking the oath of office as a Judge, as ordinary man in the Judge turns himself into a man with magic wand and qualifies himself to be an unquestionable authority to advise on policies governing on each and all conceivable human skills and departments of human knowledge. 15. In Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. Vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court has held that unless policy decision is inconsistent with constitution or law, Court must exercise jurisdiction with circumspection, particularly when the issues are intertwined with policy decision and technical issues. In Sitaram Co. vs. Union of India, the Apex Court held that the Court does not possess the expertise required to determine the matter, and the determination has been made by experts appointed by the Government. In Sher Singh Vs. Union Of India, the Court opined that there shall be no judicial review if the policy decision is neither unfair nor mala fide. In A.M.S.A. Karmachari Santh Vs. State, the Court has opined that a policy decision shall not be normally questioned in a Court of law and the Court cannot find fault with discrimination based on policy. 16. Union Of India, the Court opined that there shall be no judicial review if the policy decision is neither unfair nor mala fide. In A.M.S.A. Karmachari Santh Vs. State, the Court has opined that a policy decision shall not be normally questioned in a Court of law and the Court cannot find fault with discrimination based on policy. 16. Further, it is well settled by the judgments of the Apex court in Jawaharlal Nehru University Union Vs. Jawaharlal Nehru, Suman Gupta Vs. State Of J & K and Gupta Vs. Arun, that the courts would not interfere in purely academic matters involving policy or with the evaluation of merit by an expert body like AICTE, except where it is satisfactorily established that the impugned action is ultra vires or malfide. The grounds of ultra vires the Act of malfide are neither pleaded nor proved. We are satisfied that the prescription of 75% cut-off percentage for permitting change of course is undoubtedly intended to sub-serve the public interest in general and the national need for engineering personnel in various disciplines in particular. Frank further, J, of U. S. Supreme Court, in his dissenting opinion in the controversial expatriation case of Trop Vs. Duller, observed thus: all power is, in Madisons phrase, of an encroaching nature. Judicial Power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint. . . Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wide exercise of power between questions of authority and questions of prudence - requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want to wisdom to prevail to disregard ones own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Courts giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Courts giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judge to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do. 17. The Supreme Court in Asif Hameed And Others Vs. State Of Jammu And Kashmir And Others, in para 19, held thus: when a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the constitution and if not, the court must strike-down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers. 18. Lord Justice Lawton in Laker Airways Vs. Department Of Trade, while considering the parameters of judicial review in matters involving policy decision of the Executive, held thus: in the Untied Kingdom aviation policy is determined by ministers within the legal framework set out by Parliament. Judges have nothing to do with either policy-making or the carrying out of policy. Their function is to decide whether a minister has acted within the powers given to him by statute or the common law. If he is declared by a Court, after due process of law, to have acted outside his powers, he must stop doing what he has done until such time as Parliament gives him the powers he wants. In a case such as this I regard myself as a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play. In a case such as this I regard myself as a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play. The Supreme Court in Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. Vs. Delhi Administration And Others, speaking about the restraints to be exercised by the reviewing courts held that the Courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decision of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. There are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the expert bodies like the AICTE for the simple reason that the AICTE consists of experts, whereas the judges are not. Therefore, the courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or place or situation, a policy should have been adopted or not, and whether such policy is expedient or utilitarian. 19. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that Clause-6 of the guidelines is intended to sub-serve the National interest by producing needed Engineering graduates in various disciplines and it cannot be held to be arbitrary and based on no reason whatsoever, but founded on mere ipse dixit of the AICTE. The competence of the AICTE to frame a policy in the form of guidelines permitting change of course is not canvassed before us by the writ petitioners. The policy decision taken by the AICTE cannot be interfered with unless the policy is absolutely capricious and not being informed by any reason whatsoever. Further, we also do not find that the prescription contained in clause 6 violates any of the legal rights of the writ petitioners. 20. In conclusion, with humility and great respect to the learned single Judge, we state, we cannot sustain the impugned judgment. Further, we also do not find that the prescription contained in clause 6 violates any of the legal rights of the writ petitioners. 20. In conclusion, with humility and great respect to the learned single Judge, we state, we cannot sustain the impugned judgment. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we pass the following: Order: (i) We allow all writ appeal filed by the AICTE, the Director, National Institute of Technology, Karnataka and the KREC and set aside the judgments of the learned single Judges and dismiss all those writ petitions out of which the writ appeals arose. (ii) In view of our judgment made in the Writ Appeals, Writ Petition Nos. 38980 to 38982 of 2002 are liable to be dismissed and, accordingly, they are dismissed. (iii) We, however, direct that the changes in the course permitted in pursuance of the judgment of the learned single Judge shall not be altered, interfered with in the light of this judgment, because, we are told that the changes in the courses were effected even before the writ appeals were preferred and the interim orders were passed by this Court and that the students have completed/are continuing their studies in the changes courses.. (iv) In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in the writ appeals as well as in writ petitions.