K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THE State of Andhra Pradesh preferred this appeal against the judgment, dated 20. 9. 1999, on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Chodavaram, whereby the respondents-accused were acquitted of the charge under Section 304-B IPC. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Anakapalle, laid a charge sheet alleging that kalla Bhavani was given in marriage to first accused in 1994. At the time of marriage, parents of Bhavani gave a sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards dowry besides 61/2 tulas of gold towards "sare Samans. When Bhavani visited her parents house in September 1997, she told P. Ws. 2 to 5 that the accused persons were harassing her to get Rs. 10,000/- as additional dowry for purchasing an auto. On 7. 11. 1997, the parents of Bhavani received a message that their daughter committed suicide at her matrimonial house by consuming pesticide. On 8. 11. 1997, the Village Administrative Officer of Vaddadi gave a report to police about the death of the deceased. The case was investigated into and after completion of investigation, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer filed the charge sheet against the accused persons. The accused denied the charge framed against them under Section 304-B IPC. The Prosecution examined P. Ws. 1 to 17 and marked exs. P1 to P17, besides M. O. 1. The Defence marked Ex. D1. On appreciation of the evidence on record, the lower Court came to the conclusion that the Prosecution could not prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the learned judge acquitted the accused by the impugned judgment, against which the State came up with the present appeal. ( 2 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 would clearly go to show that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to harassment to bring additional dowry of Rs. 10,000/-, and unable to bear such harassment the deceased committed suicide, but the lower Court did not properly appreciate the evidence on record, and therefore the impugned judgment should be set aside. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents contended that for the first time, P. Ws. 2 to 5 stated in the Court about the harassment to extract money from the accused, that there was a delay of one day in lodging report with the police, that the accused himself informed the relatives of P. Ws. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents contended that for the first time, P. Ws. 2 to 5 stated in the Court about the harassment to extract money from the accused, that there was a delay of one day in lodging report with the police, that the accused himself informed the relatives of P. Ws. 2 to 4 about the death of the deceased, that they did not lodge any report with the police, and that the deceased committed suicide unable to bear severe headache she used to suffer during post and pre-menstrual period, and therefore there are no grounds to interfere with the order under appeal. ( 3 ) THERE cannot be any dispute that the Prosecution has to prove the following three ingredients so as to bring an offence under Section 304-B IPC. They are - (1) the death of the woman is caused by burns or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, (2) the death must have taken place within seven years of her marriage, and (3) soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry. This initial burden on the Prosecution never shifts. Once the Prosecution establishes these ingredients, then the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. ( 4 ) P. W. 14 conducted inquest in the presence of P. Ws. 11 and 16. Ex. P7 is the inquest report which shows that the Panchayatdars opined that the deceased might have committed suicide by consuming pesticide. P. W. 13 conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. Ex. P11 is the post-mortem certificate. The doctor stated that the deceased might have died due to periferal vascular failure and cordorespiratory failure due to Endosulfan Poison. The evidence of p. Ws. 14, 11, 16 and 13 and the recitals in Exs. P7 and P11 establish that the death of the deceased was homicidal and so her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Thus the Prosecution established the first ingredient. ( 5 ) COMING to the second ingredient that the marriage of the deceased took place within seven years prior to her death, the unchallenged evidence of P. Ws. P7 and P11 establish that the death of the deceased was homicidal and so her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Thus the Prosecution established the first ingredient. ( 5 ) COMING to the second ingredient that the marriage of the deceased took place within seven years prior to her death, the unchallenged evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 in this respect clinchingly proves that aspect which has also not been disputed by the learned counsel for the accused. ( 6 ) THE last but the most important ingredient is whether the deceased was subjected to harassment soon before her death for dowry by the accused. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are parents and P. W. 5 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 4 is the younger brother of P. W. 2. The evidence of these witnesses would clearly go to show that the deceased visited her parents house during Dassarah festival. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that Dassarah normally comes in the month of October. The deceased died on 7. 11. 1997. Within one month of her visit to her parents house, the deceased committed suicide. During October 1997 the deceased told P. Ws. 2 to 5 that A1 was harassing her to bring additional dowry for purchasing an auto. P. Ws. 2 to 5 may be closely related to the deceased, but relationship itself is not a ground to disbelieve their evidence. Their evidence has to be appreciated as that of any other witnesses. If their evidence is reliable and trustworthy, it can be accepted. ( 7 ) AS regards the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that P. Ws. 3 to 5 did not give report immediately after the arrived at the matrimonial house of the deceased and they implicated the accused only to extract money from A1, A1 is admittedly not an affluent person to extract money from him. There may be a variety of reasons for P. Ws. 2 to 5 not giving report immediately. They were under enormous grief as the deceased died under unnatural circumstances. Therefore, even if they did not themselves lodge report, it cannot be a circumstance against the Prosecution. On 8. 11. 1997, when P. W. 13 conducted inquest, P. Ws. 3 to 5 categorically stated that A1 was demanding dowry. 2 to 5 not giving report immediately. They were under enormous grief as the deceased died under unnatural circumstances. Therefore, even if they did not themselves lodge report, it cannot be a circumstance against the Prosecution. On 8. 11. 1997, when P. W. 13 conducted inquest, P. Ws. 3 to 5 categorically stated that A1 was demanding dowry. It maybe that the evidence on record shows that the deceased informed P. Ws. 2 to 5 only once about the demand made by A1, but the fact remains that they deposed that A1 did demand additional dowry. ( 8 ) THE other contention of the learned counsel for the accused is that P. Ws. 6 to 8-neighbourers of the accused-did not support the Prosecution case and on the other hand they stated that the deceased used to suffer from fits and A1 and the deceased were on cordial terms. These witnesses are residents of the same village of the accused and are their neighbours and so naturally they did not support the Prosecution and supported the accused. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of these witnesses. ( 9 ) P. W. 9 is a Private Medical Practitioner. He stated that A1 used to bring the deceased to his clinic for the treatment of Fits and Migraine. Learned counsel for the accused contended that the evidence of this witness shows that the deceased was suffering from severe headache and also fits and unable to bear the same she committed suicide. Though P. W. 9 stated that A1 used to bring the deceased to his clinic for treatment, there is absolutely no evidence to show that he ever gave any treatment to the deceased. For the first time he deposed in the Court that A1 used to bring the deceased for treatment. He baldly stated that before more than six months prior to his examination in the Court on 10. 6. 1999, one day A1 brought the deceased on his cycle to his clinic and told him that she was suffering from fits. When he was about to give first aid to the deceased she was found dead. P. Ws. 2 and 4 stated that when they reached the house of the accused and enquired with A1 about the death of the deceased, a1 told them that the deceased consumed poison. When he was about to give first aid to the deceased she was found dead. P. Ws. 2 and 4 stated that when they reached the house of the accused and enquired with A1 about the death of the deceased, a1 told them that the deceased consumed poison. Being a Doctor P. W. 9 could have easily and clearly found out the difference in symptoms that would be present when a person suffers fit and when the person consumes pesticide. Furthermore, P. Ws. 6 and 7, who turned hostile, stated in their chief-examination that when they noticed the deceased lying in her house, she was taken immediately to a Government Hospital. P. W. 9 stated that he was a private Medical Practitioner running a clinic in the name and style of Sree kanakamahalaxmi Clinic. Therefore, it is obvious that P. W. 9 was speaking false, probably at the instance of the accused being his family Doctor. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, this witness cannot be believed. ( 11 ) THE learned Sessions Judge opined that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 5 is in the nature of interestedness. Simply because they are close relatives of the deceased, that does not mean their evidence has to be disbelieved. There appears no reason for them to speak false. During the course of inquest conducted on 8. 11. 1997 they spoke about the harassment. The learned Sessions judge observed that with regard to the harassment, the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 is not consistent and corroborative even during their chief-examination. This observation is not correct and without any basis. These witnesses categorically stated that the accused was demanding additional dowry of Rs. 10,000/- for the purpose of purchasing auto. P. W. 3, though did not state the amount demanded, deposed that the accused was demanding additional dowry for purchasing auto. Their evidence was so consistent that there was not a single inconsistent statement with regard to the demand of dowry and the purpose for which the dowry was demanded. ( 12 ) THE lower Court also observed that none of P. Ws. 2 to 5 raised any Panchayat or asked the accused when he came to their village during Dassarah Festival to take his wife to his house. ( 12 ) THE lower Court also observed that none of P. Ws. 2 to 5 raised any Panchayat or asked the accused when he came to their village during Dassarah Festival to take his wife to his house. In a matrimonial matter when there is harassment of the wife by her husband or his relatives, intervention by the parents or relatives of the wife may some times ruin further the already strained relationship between the parties. The issue is very sensitive and has to be dealt with sensitively and thoughtfully. For this reason, none of P. Ws. 2 to 5 might not have questioned A1 for his acts and on that ground their evidence cannot be disbelieved. ( 13 ) THE trial Court also observed that neighbours of the accused were not examined. It is not correct. P. Ws. 6 to 8 were the neighbours. But they did not support the prosecution. The observation of the learned Sessions Judge that independent witnesses belonging to the native village of the deceased were not examined. This is a meaningless observation, because when there was no evidence on record to show that some persons belonging to the village of the deceased were living in the village where A1 and the deceased were living, how was it expected that the villagers of the same village of the deceased ought to have been examined. The learned Sessions Judge held that the essential ingredients of Section 304-B ipc were not attracted as seen from Ex. P1-report. It appears that the learned sessions Judge did not peruse Ex. P1. Ex. P1 was lodged by the Village administrative Officer. He is not a relative of the deceased. On coming to know about the death of the deceased, he lodged the report. He had nothing to do with the family affairs of the accused and the deceased. Therefore, there was no necessity that Ex. P1 should contain the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC. The learned Sessions Judge held that since Ex. P1 did not contain all the details of harassment etc. , the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 5 was an improvement. This observation is also wrong, as none of these witnesses lodged Ex. P1. Ex. P1 can be used to corroborate the evidence of VAO-P. W. 1 alone. ( 14 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. P1 did not contain all the details of harassment etc. , the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 5 was an improvement. This observation is also wrong, as none of these witnesses lodged Ex. P1. Ex. P1 can be used to corroborate the evidence of VAO-P. W. 1 alone. ( 14 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 5 clearly shows that the deceased informed them that the accused was harassing her to bring additional dowry of Rs. 10,000/- for purchasing auto. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the evidence of these witnesses. Their evidence is convincing and trustworthy. Nothing has been elicited in their cross-examination to discredit their evidence. The entire evidence is against A1 only. There is no evidence against A2. Therefore, after perusing the entire evidence on record, this Court is of the opinion that the reasons assigned by the learned Sessions Judge for acquitting A1 are totally wrong. Soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty. The prosecution is able to establish the offence under Section 304-B IPC. Hence, the A1 is liable to be convicted. ( 15 ) IN the result, the order of acquittal against A2 is confirmed and against A1 is set aside. A1 is convicted under Section 304-B IPC. Since this Court proposes the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 304-B IPC, there is no need to hear the accused on the sentence. A1 is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. He shall surrender himself forthwith to serve the sentence. The remand period, if any undergone by him, shall be given set off. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.