JUDGMENT 1. - In these writ petitions the petitioners have challenged one and the same Notifications issued by the respondents State of Rajasthan. The first Notification is dated 19.7.1984 issued under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 and the Second Notification is dated 12.11.1987 issued under Section 17(4) & (6) of the aforesaid Act. The petitioners have also challenged the validity of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 (for short, 'the Act, 1987') and thus, all these writ petition are taken up for hearing together and are being decided by this common order. 2. Facts leading to filing of these writ petitions are taken up from Writ Petition No. 181/88. The petitioners are the recorded 'khatedar tenants' and in cultivatory possession of the agricultural land bearing khasra no. 96 (present no.184) measuring an area of five bighas and seven biswas situated in Gangapurcity. It is stated that dense abadi around some khasra numbers of land proposed to be acquired is there. Adjacent to khasra no. 98 there is a 'kabristan land'. In khasra no. 97 also there is a 'kabristan', though it is not so recorded in the revenue record. Khasra no. 89 is a public way which goes to the side of khasra no. 96 belonging to the petitioners. This way goes upto khasras nos. 86 and 87. 3. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Gangapurcity (for short, 'the respondent Samiti') is stated to be in existence in the Gangapurcity for a long period. A mandi yard consisted about 125 shops in the center of Gangapurcity is there. A space for the mandi yard which is there in existence is sufficient. It is alleged that the grain mandi is well planned and all the facilities are available to the farmers who used to bring their agriculture produces there for sale and for the purchasers also. The petitioners submitted that still the respondent samiti has instructed to construct a new mandi yard. The planning of construction of new mandi yard is as old as of 1966 but it has not been implemented. It is averred that in the year 1981, 85 bighas of land was acquired for construction of the mandi yard for the respondent samiti near the agriculture land of the petitioners. The planning of construction of new mandi yard is as old as of 1966 but it has not been implemented. It is averred that in the year 1981, 85 bighas of land was acquired for construction of the mandi yard for the respondent samiti near the agriculture land of the petitioners. The respondent samiti has constructed a mandi yard there consisting of 120 shops provided all other facilities required but still the mandi has not been shifted to this mandi yard. It appears that the respondent samiti required a piece of land for further extension of the new mandi yard and for that purpose the acquisition proceedings of the land were started by the Government of Rajasthan for 67 bighas and 10 biswas of land. The Government of Rajasthan iss led a Notification dated 19.7.1984 under Section 4(1) of the Act. In this notification the petitioners agriculture land measuring five bighas and seven biswas comprising in khasra no. 96 (present Khasra No. 184) has been included. Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapurcity was appointed as a Land Acquisition Officer by the State Government under that Notification. The petitioners have come up with the case that the Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapurcity issued a notice under Section 5(1) of the Act, 1953 in the name of Vali Prasad son of Shri Madan Lal and Ramesh Chand son of Shri Madan Lai vide Letter dated 15.3.1989. Shri Vali Prasad stated to have died much before 15.3.1985. Thus Ramesh Chand son of Shri Madan Lal received that notice. It is stated that the legal heirs of Vali Prasad were not served any notices under Section 5(1) of the Act, 1953 by the Land Acquisition Officer, Gangapurcity. The petitioners submitted the reply to the notice aforestated. Therein the following objections were taken; (1) The purpose for which the land is being sought to acquire, is not a genuine and the public purpose. (2) Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapurcity is not competent to issue notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 and to hear the objections and decide the same. He cannot be the Land Acquisition Officer because he is the Administrator of the respondent samiti for which the land is required. 4. (2) Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapurcity is not competent to issue notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 and to hear the objections and decide the same. He cannot be the Land Acquisition Officer because he is the Administrator of the respondent samiti for which the land is required. 4. The Sub Divisional Officer (Land Acquisition Officer), Gangapurcity passed two orders deciding the objections raised by the petitioners under Section 4(5) of the Act Against these orders the objections raised by the petitioner are that the Sub Divisional Officer has not recorded any reason as to who he is of the opinion that the acquisition of the land is proper. He has also not recorded any reason in support of the order rejecting the objections of the 'petitioners. Reasons have also not been given by the Land Acquisition Officer to leave out the land of khasra no. 19, measuring four bighas and 11 biswas. The petitioners submitted that as per the Secretary of the respondent samiti, the Assistant Engineer, Gangapurcity and the Sr. Town Planner only 25 bighas of land was required for further extension of the mandi yard but the State Government has acquired 67 bighas and 10 biswas of the land without any reason. Though the land is sought to be acquired for the respondent samiti while the samiti wants only 25 bighas of land. It is stated to be a case of adamancy of the State Government, otherwise genuine requirement is only of 25 bighas of land. In this letter the Secretary of the respondent samiti has also mentioned that the respondent samiti is not in a position to pay the compensation of 67 bighas and 10 biswas of land proposed to be acquired, meaning thereby it is suggested that the financial position of the respondent samiti is weak one and it is not in a position to pay compensation even for 25 bighas of the land. The petitioners urged that till 28.9.1987 nothing was done by the State Government. Neither declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published nor any further proceedings were drawn. It was only on 29.9.1987 a Gazette Notification was issued by the Government of Rajasthan under the Act though the said Act was not in existence as the State Government has already adopted the Central Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. It was only on 29.9.1987 a Gazette Notification was issued by the Government of Rajasthan under the Act though the said Act was not in existence as the State Government has already adopted the Central Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. This Notification was issued under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act, 1953 i.e. after three years of the issuance of the notice under Section 4 of the Act, 1953. In pursuance of the Gazette Notification dated 29.9.1987 the Land Acquisition Officer, Gangapurcity issued a notice dated 15.12.1987 under Section 9 of the Act, 1953 in the name of Vail Prasad son of Madan Lal and Ramesh Chand son of Madan Lai in respect of khasra no. 96 (min.). The petitioners filed objections and claimed for compensation requesting that whole acquisition proceedings are illegal and under protest it was so prayed that even if the land is acquired they may be paid compensation at the rate of rupees five Iakhs per bigha. The validity of these Notifications has been challenged on various counts and grounds. 5. The writ petition is contested both by the respondent samiti and the State of Rajasthan. They filed detailed replies to the writ petition. On the direction of the Court additional affidavits on behalf of the respondent no. 3 have also been filed. 6. Shri S.C. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 137/88 and 181/88 contended that the acquisition of the land is bad as the notice has been issued in the name of the dead person. The second contention raised in that the urgency clause invoked in this case is wholly arbitrary and unjustified. In the facts of this case there was no urgency and Section 17(4) of the Act could not have been invoked. Next it is contended that the notification published under Section 6 of the Act is barred by limitation. Lastly it is contended that Section 56(4) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1982 is constitutional. Shri Gupta lastly contended that notifications under Section 17(4) and Section 0 of the Act were issued under the repealed Act and thus they are bad in law. 7. Lastly it is contended that Section 56(4) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1982 is constitutional. Shri Gupta lastly contended that notifications under Section 17(4) and Section 0 of the Act were issued under the repealed Act and thus they are bad in law. 7. Shri R.P. Garg, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 14/88, 95/88 and 674/88, contended that in one of his case '(Writ Petition No. 14/88) also the notices Linder Section 4 & 6 of the Act were given to the dead person. Rest, he adopted the contentions advanced by Shri S.C. Gupta. 8. Shri K.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 13/88, contended that though the petitioners purchased the land much before the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act but notice was not given to the petitioner. Notice under Section 9 of the Act was also not given to the petitioner. The petitioner purchased the land in question from one Smt. Gulabi on 7.7.1977. The land has also been recorded in the name of the petitioner on 24.10.1977 in revenue record. Thus the notice given in the name of Smt. Gulabi is no notice in the eyes of law. Despite taking all these objections the respondent did not take notice of the same and continued to show Smt. Gulabi as khatedar of the land and, thus. Shri Sharma contended that the respondents have not applied their mind in the instant case and proceeded to acquire the land mechanically. 9. The second contention raised is that the notices under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are extremely vague. Mentioning of the land acquired for a public purpose for construction of mandi yard for the respondent samiti does not disclose the public purpose. The construction of mandi yard cannot be said to be a public purpose. The whole acquisition of the land is politically motivated. In the case in hand adoption of urgency clause where the respondent samiti has written that it does not require more than 25 bighas of land is illegal. There is total non application of mind. 10. It is next contended that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 is not saved by the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1987 as there is no valid Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953. There is total non application of mind. 10. It is next contended that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 is not saved by the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1987 as there is no valid Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953. The Notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1953 is barred by limitation. Lastly it is contended that the Act, 1987 ultra wires of the constitution. 11. Shri K.N. Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondent samiti, and Shri Inderjeet Singh for Shri S.C. Purohit, Dy. Government Advocate, for the State of Rajasthan, strongly opposed these writ petitions. It is contended that the objections raised that the Notices under Section 4 and other provisions have been given to dead person or to a person who transferred the land, are not tenable as those petitioners have filed the objections. The purpose is to have the notice of the proposed acquisition of land and that has been served. As regards to the other contentions it is submitted that the financial condition of the respondent samiti is very strong. The land is acquired for the public purpose. It is contended that the letters of which reference is made, written by the Secretary of the respondent samiti, do not indicate the decision of the respondent samiti. Acquisition of the land for construction of the mandi yard at the instance of the respondent samiti is a public purpose. The Notifications under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act are saved under the Act, 1987. The urgency clause is rightly put in service in these cases. 12. So far as to the contention that the notification under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act are barred by limitation, it is urged same is not correct. These notifications were published within the limitation prescribed not under the Act, 1987. 13. As regards to the contention that the Act, 1987 is ultra vires, it is submitted that the petitioners could not successfully made out the case. Prayer is made for dismissal of the writ petitions. 14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and meticulously gone through the entire record of the writ petitions.POINT NO. 1:D.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION 137/88, 15. Prayer is made for dismissal of the writ petitions. 14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and meticulously gone through the entire record of the writ petitions.POINT NO. 1:D.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION 137/88, 15. The grievance has been made by the petitioner that his name is Gajadhar but in the notification dated 19.7.1984 under Section 4(1) of the Act he has been described as Gangadhar and, thus, the notice aforestated vitiates only on this ground. We do not find any substance in this contention. In the writ petition the petitioner has named himself as Gangadhar @ Gajadhar. Thus, the petitioner is known as also Gangadhar. So far as to his father's name is concerned it is not in dispute it is correctly mentioned in the notification aforestated. That apart we find from para no. 5 of the writ petition that the notice under sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act has been received by the petitioner from the Land Acquisition Officer and he has also filed his objections. Thus, even if there was some mistake in the notification regarding the name of the petitioner: it has not caused any prejudice to him as he has not only correctly understood his name but taken it to be correct and filed his objection.D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 181/1988, 16. In para no. 5 of the writ petition the grievance is made by the petitioner that the Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice under sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act. 1953 in the name of Vali Prasad son of Shri Madan Lal and Ramesh Chand son of Shri Madan Lal vide letter dated 15.3.1985, though Vali Prasad had died much before 15.3.1985. Ramesh Chand son of Madan Lal received the notice. The legal heirs of Vali Prasad were not served with any notice under Section 4(5) of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thus, the notice issued in the name of a dead person is not valid. The writ petition has been filed by the four persons and petitioner no. 4 is Smt. Vimla widow of late Vali Prasad. Reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondent Samiti and the State of Rajasthan and we find therefrom that in the 'jamaabandi' of Samvat year 2043 Vali Prasad and Ramesh Chand were recorded khatedar tenants. The writ petition has been filed by the four persons and petitioner no. 4 is Smt. Vimla widow of late Vali Prasad. Reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondent Samiti and the State of Rajasthan and we find therefrom that in the 'jamaabandi' of Samvat year 2043 Vali Prasad and Ramesh Chand were recorded khatedar tenants. From document Annexure-1 filed by the petitioners, the mutation entry, we find that the corrections in the revenue record have been made on 6.3.1986. In view of these undisputed facts the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is not bad. The names therein have been shown as khatedar tenants as per the revenue record. Subsequent corrections made therein will not render it invalid, That apart admittedly the petitioners, which includes Smt. Vimla widow of Vali Prasad in response to the notification under Section 4(5) of the Act filed their objections against the proposed acquisition of the land before the Land Acquisition Officer. The legal heirs of late Vali Prasad has a notice of this acquisition and right of filing objection has been availed of. It is not the case where otherwise also by mentioning the name of dead person Vali Prasad in the notification prejudice has been cause to his heir and legal representative.D.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 14/1988 17. In this writ petition the facts stated are that the land in dispute was in the khatedari of the father of the petitioner, late Shri Goriya. The father of the petitioner Shri Goriya died in the year 1975. The land in dispute, as per the case of the petitioner, was transferred in his name and the mutation was made in his favour on 7.8.1982. Old khasra numbers were also changed in new khasra numbers. The petitioner filed additional affidavit on 11.3.1996 and . enclosed to it two documents Annexure-6 and Annexure-7 Annexure-6 is mutation order and Annexure-7 is "Kshetraphal tulnatmak path". The document Annexure-6 is the order of mutation that has been done on 15.2.1983. The petitioner has not produced on record 'jamabandi' of the concerned year. The details are being taken from the 'jamaabandi'. Documents Annexure-1 is the order of the Land Settlement Officer. The document Annexure-6 is the order of mutation that has been done on 15.2.1983. The petitioner has not produced on record 'jamabandi' of the concerned year. The details are being taken from the 'jamaabandi'. Documents Annexure-1 is the order of the Land Settlement Officer. In the reply to the writ petition a specific objection has been taken that the petitioner has not produced the copy of the 'jamaabandi' or khasra girdawari or even entry of the mutation register and the petitioner felt contented and satisfied to produce only document Annexure-1. The two documents which were important material evidence in the matter have been concealed. For non production of these two documents reasonably an inference can be drawn that in case the same would have been produced those would have gone adverse to him. For non production of the document, the 'jamaabandi' it is a case where we can go with the assumption and presumption that in the relevant 'jamaabandi' late Goriya's name is there as a khatedar Tenant. Now we consider it to be appropriate to make reference to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bishambhar Dayal & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others, 1991 (1) WLC (Raj.) 686 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Division Bench of this Court in that case held that a notice issued in the name of dead person and not to the owner and persons interested is a noncompliance to the statutory provisions and the entire proceedings are rendered invalid. The court has also made reference to the decision of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1349/72, Indrapuri Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 4.5.1983 , therein it is held, "It is obvious that the Notification has been issued in the name of a dead person which was declared to be dead by earlier judgment of this court in 1971 and the respondents even after this notice has not amended the Notification by issuing fresh Notification. The person who are interested and who are concerned have not been issued notice because of this mistake and therefore, the entire proceedings of the land acquisition are void." 18. The person who are interested and who are concerned have not been issued notice because of this mistake and therefore, the entire proceedings of the land acquisition are void." 18. Before the Division Bench, in the aforesaid case, it was not placed for consideration that in case where prejudice is not caused to the interested person or the owner of the land due to the fact in the notification, under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1953, name of dead person is there merely on this omission the entire acquisition proceedings may not vitiate. The purpose of issuing the notice is to inform to the owner/interested person of proposed acquisition of the land so that he may file his/her objections. 19. Section 5-A of the Act, 1953 makes a mention that any person interested in any land, in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, 1953 that the said land is proposed to be acquired for a public purpose, may, within 30 days of service of the public notice, in the manner provided under the Act, object to acquisition of the land or any land in the locality, as the case may be. As regards to the other petitions, when in the revenue record the corrections are not made, the petitioners could not have made this grievance. It is a matter of the acquisition of land for public purpose, a land owner or a person interested therein will make all the attempt or efforts and proceedings to frustrate the same. It is an era of doing substantial justice to the litigants. The court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercises extra ordinary equitable jurisdiction. Mere technical breach of statutory provision may not sufficient to render the action of the other side invalid or illegal. In case where the grievance made by the petitioner that in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1953 name of the dead person is mentioned or notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 has been given to a dead person, unless he has established to the satisfaction of the court that as a result of these omissions on the part of the respondent a prejudice has been caused to him, ordinarily interference in the matter may not be only made on this ground. Leaving apart that in the writ petitions except in one, the petitioners have filed their objections in response to the notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, there is no question of causing any prejudice to them and thus merely on this technical plea of the violation of the statutory provision no fault can be found in the action of the respondent. The objections filed by these owners/interested persons are not dismissed on the ground of limitation. In other petitions the petitioners have also failed to show as to what prejudice has been caused to them. Unscrupulous litigants in the court makes all attempt to frustrate the cause of the public interest and thus the courts are to be very cautious and careful and not to invalidate the action of the respondents merely on asking or on a technical violation of the provision of the Act. This grievance may have some force and acceptability where noncompliance of the statutory provisions results in causing prejudice to the litigant concerned. Merely on alleged noncompliance of the statutory provision the inference can not be drawn that prejudice has been caused. Where the owner/interested persons came to know of these proceedings from some other source and he availed of his right to file the objection, no question does arise of causing any prejudice to him. It is the burden on the petitioners to establish to the satisfaction of the court that non compliance of the provisions of the Act resulted in causing a serious, prejudice to any of his right, which they failed to discharge.D.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 13/1988 20. The grievance made by the petitioner is that the land in dispute was purchased by him from the khatedar tenant thereof Smt. Gulabi widow of Gordhan by registered sale deed executed on 17.7.1977. This land has been mutated in his name on 24.10.1977. 'Jamabandi' of Samvat year 2034 has been produced. It is contended that the notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 were not served upon the petitioner. Reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondents. There is a document on he record, Annexure-3, at page nos. 45 to 49 of the writ petition. This is the reply to the notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 dated 15.3.1985. Reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondents. There is a document on he record, Annexure-3, at page nos. 45 to 49 of the writ petition. This is the reply to the notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 dated 15.3.1985. The petitioner submitted the objections which he has against this proposed acquisition of land in dispute.The petitioners right of filing the objection against this proposed acquisition has not been jeopardized. Notice has been given though in the name of the erstwhile khatedar but nevertheless he received it and filed his detailed objections running in 5 pages. Thus by this omission in the notification or notice no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. He has availed of his right of filing the objection and this pleas raised in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not bonafide and thus it is not sustainable. From the objections filed there is possibility that the petitioner would have transferred this land to Hanif Khan. Hanif Khan filed these objections as a power of attorney holder of the petitioner. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner through his power of attorney holder The petitioner in these facts, thus, does not seem. to be interested person. The interested person in he land appears to be Hanif Khan who has filed the objections and this writ petition. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in these petitions is devoid of any merit and substance. 21. Shri K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, contended that the provisions of sub-section 5 of Section 4 of the Act is mandatory and personal notice of the proposed acquisition of the land is to be served on the owner/interested persons. in support of his contention he has placed reliance on the following decisions, 1. AIR 1976 Rajasthan 108, Kalulal v. Shri Mannalal 2. AIR 1985 SC 1622 , Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram 22. In pare no. 3 of the Writ Petition no. 13/88, it is stated that the petitioner carne to know in the month of May, 1985 that his piece of land was being acquired and he filed the objections before the Land Acquisition Officer on 3.5.1985. The petitioner very conveniently, purposely and deliberately did not disclose the source of his knowledge. In pare no. 3 of the Writ Petition no. 13/88, it is stated that the petitioner carne to know in the month of May, 1985 that his piece of land was being acquired and he filed the objections before the Land Acquisition Officer on 3.5.1985. The petitioner very conveniently, purposely and deliberately did not disclose the source of his knowledge. For non disclosure of this source of knowledge re this material and important fact reasonably it can be inferred that he came to know about this acquisition from the publication of notices and personal service as provided under sub-section (5), of Section 4 of the Act, 1953 or placing of the notices at convenient place or near the land of the petitioner. 23. Leaving apart this factual aspect this matter has been considered in the case of State of Gujarat v. Pancho Devi, AIR 1986 SC 803 wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that giving of the personal notice to each and every interested person is not the requirement of Section 4 and in absence of such a notice the proceedings of the acquisition will not be invalidated. The purpose of giving a notice by the Collector by notifying it at the convenient place of the locality appears to intimate the persons affected by the acquisition Sub-section (5) of Section 4 as substituted by the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act no. 22) published in the Gazette on 22.11.1966, provides a notice in the prescribed form of proposed acquisition. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 are to be referred here. Rule 3-A provides that a notice under clause (i) of sub-section (5) of Section 4 shall be in form IA. The petitioner admitted the notification about the and likely to be acquired and he filed the objections before the Land Acquisition Officer on 3.5.1985. It is not the case of the petitioner that notice under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953 was not issued to Sint. Gulabi. From the averments made in the writ petition we are satisfied that the petitioner nowhere disputed this position that the notice under Section CS) of the Act, 1953 was issued in the name of Smt. Gulabi. His grievance is that this notice was not served on the petitioner. In para no. Gulabi. From the averments made in the writ petition we are satisfied that the petitioner nowhere disputed this position that the notice under Section CS) of the Act, 1953 was issued in the name of Smt. Gulabi. His grievance is that this notice was not served on the petitioner. In para no. 14 of the reply to the writ petition the respondent Samiti made a categorical statement "on the one hand the petitioner says that despite of the fact that notice under Section 4(1) or 4(5) was issued in the name of the previous khatedar it came to the knowledge of the petitioner and consequently he filed objections under Section 4(5) of the Act, 1953. On the other hand he denies the plea of service not being affected on him. Playing this double role cannot be allowed." 24. The petitioner has the notice of these proceedings and filed these objections, thus, no prejudice has been caused and this contention raised that the personal notice under Section 4(5) of the Act has not been served on him, is not of any help to him In this case in hand though even if it is taken that the petitioner was entitled to individual notice but since he has actual knowledge of the intended acquisition and filed the objections and, as such, failure to give individual notice by the respondent, to him does not invalidate the acquisition proceedings. As regards to the case law cited by Shri K.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is suffice to say that we have decided this point on the basis of the facts of this case, same are not of any help to him.POINT NO. 2.THE PURPOSE FOR THE LAND AS SOUGHT TO BE ACQUIRED IS NOT A GENUINE AND ALSO NOT FOR THE PUBLIC PURPOSE. 25. The acquisition of the land for establishment of market yard is certainly a public purpose. In the notification under Section 4(1) as well as under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act, it is clearly mentioned that the land is required for public purpose i.e. for construction of new Mandi Yard, Gangapurcity by the respondent Samiti. 25. The acquisition of the land for establishment of market yard is certainly a public purpose. In the notification under Section 4(1) as well as under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act, it is clearly mentioned that the land is required for public purpose i.e. for construction of new Mandi Yard, Gangapurcity by the respondent Samiti. The Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 received the assent of the President on the 3rd of November, 1961 and the preamble of the Act is: "An act to provide for the better regulation of buying & selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of a market for agriculture produce in the State of Rajasthan." 26. Thus, if we go by the provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 the land acquired for construction of regulated market is a public purpose. There is a definite public purpose behind the Act viz. the establishment or regulated market for purchase or sale of agricultural produce, to protect the agriculturists from being exploited by the middlemen and profiteer to enable them to secure a fair return for their produce by establishment of regulated market. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioners in these matters have failed to cite any authority in support of their contention that the acquisition of land for construction of market yard is not a public purpose. Earlier also for the construction of the market yard, which is not in dispute, the land was acquired but it was inadequate and insufficient and, as such, this land in dispute was proposed to be acquired. 28. The petitioners alleged that the Secretary of the respondent Samiti, the Assistant Engineer and the Senior Town Planner opined that only 25 bighas of land was required for further extension of mandi yard. It is stated that 67 bighas and 10 biswas of land sought to acquire is not genuine where the requirement is only of 25 bighas of land. The respondent Samiti further informed to the Government that it is not in a position to pay compensation for 67 bighas and 10 biswas of land sought to be acquired meaning thereby the financial position of the respondent Samiti is weak one. The respondent Samiti further informed to the Government that it is not in a position to pay compensation for 67 bighas and 10 biswas of land sought to be acquired meaning thereby the financial position of the respondent Samiti is weak one. The reference has been made to a document Annexure-9 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 181/1988, which is the letter written by the Secretary of the respondent Samiti to the Secretary, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Jaipur. The reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondent Samiti and therein it is stated that in the document Annexure-9 aforestated whatever views have been expressed therein were the personal view of the Secretary which cannot supersede, vary or modify the resolution of the respondent Samiti, Annexure R-4 which has been sent to the Secretary, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Jaipur vide Annexure R-5 dated 30.6.1981. 29. Having gone through the contents of Annexure R-4 we find that the land measuring 47 bighas and 16 biswas previously acquired of Halka Naamner, Tehsil Gangapurcity is not sufficient. The Chief Town Planner, Rajasthan and the Secretary, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing` Board, Jaipur opined that the extra land is needed for mandi yard which is to be acquired from Halka Naamner and Gangapurcity. The proposal has been made for acquisition of 81 bighas and 11 biswas of land. In Annexure R-5 it is also made clear by the then Secretary of the respondent Samiti that 47 bighas and 16 biswas of land acquired is not sufficient for the construction of the mandi yard. We find further from the reply to the writ petition filed by the respondent Samiti that prior to issue of the notification under Section 6 and Section 17(4) of the Act a resolution has been passed by the respondent Samiti about the urgency and expediency of this notification. This is of 24.9.1986 which has been sent to the Deputy Secretary, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Jaipur. These documents are Annexure R-6 and Annexure R-7 on the record of the writ petition. It has been given out that as a result of the availability of the water for irrigation from Panchna Dam, the irrigated area shall be increased which would result in increasing of the agriculture produces. The respondent Samiti has reiterated the necessity and requirement of this land proposed to be acquired under this resolution dated 24.9.1986. It has been given out that as a result of the availability of the water for irrigation from Panchna Dam, the irrigated area shall be increased which would result in increasing of the agriculture produces. The respondent Samiti has reiterated the necessity and requirement of this land proposed to be acquired under this resolution dated 24.9.1986. Not only this under this resolution it has also been recommended for resorting to the urgency provision under Section 17(4) of the Act. The reference may also have to the survey report of the Secretary, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Jaipur and the Senior Town Planner of the Board. These are the documents on record as Annexure R-8 and Annexure R-9. This joint survey was made as desired by the then Hon'ble Minister for Agriculture. In the joint survey report the desirability of taking action to acquire the area under khasras no. 19 to 22 of village Naamner and khasras no. 79 to 94 of village Gangapurcity, which is adjoining to the area earlier acquired. It was further indicated that this land would be useful for the respondent Samiti. From this joint survey report we have noticed that delay in finalisation of the land acquisition resulted in coming up of the illegal constructions and as a result thereof the very purpose and object of the scheme is frustrated. The reference may have to the affidavit of Shri Dayanand Singh, the Secretary of the respondent Samiti dated 7.8.2002. He made reference to the letter of Shri Nandiwal, the Architecture and Market Planner and the site plan of the land in dispute dated 22.12.1980. Shri Nandiwal stated that the land in dispute shall be required in addition to the land under acquisition. This document is there on the record of the writ petition no. 13/88. The deponent in para no. 13 of the affidavit stated that on the land acquired in the first phase 136 shops-cum-godowns have been constructed. The reference has also been made to the dispute over the constructed sundry shops. A Writ Petition No. 7789, Vyapaar Mandal Samiti, Gangapurcity v. State of Rajasthan & Others, filed which has been decided on 28.7.1989 . As per the direction of this court, upto 14.8.1989, 206 applications were received and as per the merit list prepared the allotment of the shops has been made. In the writ petition no. A Writ Petition No. 7789, Vyapaar Mandal Samiti, Gangapurcity v. State of Rajasthan & Others, filed which has been decided on 28.7.1989 . As per the direction of this court, upto 14.8.1989, 206 applications were received and as per the merit list prepared the allotment of the shops has been made. In the writ petition no. 181/88 we find another affidavit of Dayanand Singh son Harphool, Secretary of the respondent Samiti dated 5.12.2002. In para no. 2 of this affidavit it is stated that the financial position of the respondent Samiti is sound. The bank balance of the respondent Samiti as on 30.11.2002 is Rs. 1,76,45,010. These affidavits filed by the Secretary of the respondent Samiti have not been replied by the petitioners. The petitioners have also not filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondent Samiti and the State Government so the averments made in these affidavits and the replies stand uncontroverted. 30. During the course of arguments at one stage it is also given out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that on the land under acquisition the construction has been put. To ascertain the correctness of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners this court on 17.10.2002 directed the State of Rajasthan to file an affidavit of an Officer not below the Rank of Sub Divisional Officer to state whether what stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners is correct or not. In compliance of the order of the Court, Shri Sanjay Jain, R.A.S. the Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapurcity, filed his affidavit sworn in on 28.10.2002. He also submitted and enclosed to the affidavit a chart prepared by him showing the latest position of the land under acquisition made of 67 bighas and 10 biswas. From the documentary evidence, the reply to the writ petition and the additional affidavits filed by the respondent Samiti we are satisfied that it is a genuine requirement of the respondent Samiti for the land in dispute. The Secretary of the respondent Samiti for the reasons best known to him, has stated that only 25 bighas of land is required and the financial condition of the respondent Samiti is not sound to pay compensation of the land proposed to be acquired. The Secretary of the respondent Samiti for the reasons best known to him, has stated that only 25 bighas of land is required and the financial condition of the respondent Samiti is not sound to pay compensation of the land proposed to be acquired. There is possibility that the Secretary would have stated so to please the petitioners for consideration or without consideration, that is not the matter for consideration of this Court. However, what the Secretary has stated is contrary to the decision taken by the respondent Samiti. On the basis of this letter of the Secretary it cannot be accepted that the acquisition of the land is not genuine. This contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is also devoid of any merit and substance.POINT NO. 3:- RECOURSE TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 17(4) IN THIS CASE IS BAD IN LAW. 31. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the notification dated 29th of September, 1987 published in the Gazette on 12th of November, 1987, the State Government has not mentioned the urgency which prompted it to resort to this provision of the Act. It has next been contended that there was no urgency to acquire the land so as to invoke the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. The provision could have been invoked where the land is urgently required and taking of immediate possession of land in the matter is necessary. It is urged that from the record it is clear that in fact there was no urgency for invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. Thus Section 17(4) of the Act has been invoked in a casual or cavalier manner. The urgency clause has been resorted to when the objection under Section 5-A of the Act has already been decided. It is also contended that the notification dated 29th of September, 1987 does not mention that the land proposed to be acquired is waste or arable. 32. Lastly it is contended that there is total non application of mind of the State Government in resorting to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. There was no material with the State Government to form an opinion that the immediate possession of he proposed land to be acquired is necessary. 32. Lastly it is contended that there is total non application of mind of the State Government in resorting to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. There was no material with the State Government to form an opinion that the immediate possession of he proposed land to be acquired is necessary. In support of their contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 1. Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1594 2. Om Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1998 SC 2504 33. Shri K.N. Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondent Samiti submitted that the urgency clause in this case has rightly been invoked by the State Government after full application of mind. The material before the State Government was there to form an opinion that taking of immediate possession of the land in dispute is urgently necessary. The learned counsel for the respondent Samiti further submitted that it is the subjective satisfaction of the State Government and there vested urgency or not is left to the discretion of the State Government. It is not a mala fide action on the part of the State Government. 34. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent Samiti placed reliance on the following decision, 1. Deepak Pahwa etc. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others, U.J. (SC 1985, 237 . 2. Hari Singh & Others v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1984 SC 1020 . 3. Bhagat Singh etc. v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1999 SC 436 4. First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, AIR 2002 SC 1314 . 35. In the notification dated 29th of September, 1987, in the opening part thereof, it is mentioned that the land notified therein is required for public purpose that is for construction of market yard for Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Gangapurcity immediately. It is further mentioned therein that the immediate acquisition of the land notified in the notification under Section 4 is most urgent. The words used in the notification are "Chunki Uprokt Bhoomi Tatkaal Aavapt Kiya Jana Ati Aavasyaka Hai." The words "Ati Aavasyaka"is in Hindi and its English word is "urgency". It is further mentioned therein that the immediate acquisition of the land notified in the notification under Section 4 is most urgent. The words used in the notification are "Chunki Uprokt Bhoomi Tatkaal Aavapt Kiya Jana Ati Aavasyaka Hai." The words "Ati Aavasyaka"is in Hindi and its English word is "urgency". It is not the case where the State Government has not mentioned in the notification that the possession of the land proposed to be acquired is urgently required. Urgency is disclosed clearly and distinguishably in the notification and this criticism and contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notification lacking in material particulars and averments is wholly untenable. Otherwise also the substance of the matter is to be considered and looked into. The court is not sitting here to find fault with every action of the State Government more so when on reading of the notification we are satisfied that therein it is mentioned that immediate acquisition of the land in dispute is most urgent. The petitioners are the persons who to frustrate or render this exercise of the State Government ineffective and nugatory, are raising all these objections. The court may not to go by this technical approach of the petitioners and rather it is expected to concentrate, consider and look into the substance of the matter. Our this approach and view find support from the judgment of this Court in the case of Gopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Others, AIR 1964 Raj. 270 . The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab & Others (supra) is of little help to the petitioners in this case. There in the notification issued under Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the right of the landowners to file the objections, it was not mentioned that the land proposed to be acquired was waste or arable nor was it stated that there was any urgency to take recourse to Section 17 of the Act. There was only direction to the Collector therein to take action on the ground of urgency. In that case their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case the notification under Section 17(4) of the Act does not mention that the land is waste or arable, it is not legal and complete fulfilment of the requirement of the law. 36. In that case their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case the notification under Section 17(4) of the Act does not mention that the land is waste or arable, it is not legal and complete fulfilment of the requirement of the law. 36. A particular piece of land is arable or not, is a question of fact. Using the word "arable" in the notification issued under Sections 17(4) and 6 of the Act is not of much consequence. It is not alone sufficient to decide the controversy either way. Even if such words are used in the notification and in fact the land is not waste or arable, the notification will have to be quashed but, on the contrary, if the nature of the land remains to be waste or arable there non-mentioning of such words in the notification will not render the same to be illegal. Thus, the court will have to examine the real substance of the matter. 37. In all these writ petitions the petitioners claimed themselves to be. khatedar tenant of the land in dispute and in support of their this right, title and interest they have produced on record the 'jamaabandi' and khasra 'girdaawaris'. From the documents produced on record by the petitioners themselves the land proposed to be acquired is arable. 38. In the objections filed by the petitioner in the Writ Petition no. 13/88, in para no. 2 thereof, he admitted that he is regularly paying the land revenue. He made the land cultivable and he is a cultivator. It is a clear admission of the petitioner that the land is arable. Admission of a party is the best evidence and the opposite party can well rely upon it and is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved to be erroneous, which is not the case here. The reference here may have to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Company & Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 and of this Court in the case of Narain & another v. State of Rajasthan & Others, 1984 RLR 26 . What It is admitted by the party must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. Admission in the pleadings stand on a higher footing. Even a part of admission can be relied upon. What It is admitted by the party must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. Admission in the pleadings stand on a higher footing. Even a part of admission can be relied upon. In the notification under Section 4 and Section 17(4) read with Section 6 of the Act, the khasra numbers of the land its measurement and the name of the khatedar tenants have been mentioned. The cumulative effect of the admissions made by the petitioners in the writ petitions, non rebuttable of the entries made in the revenue record and the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act by themselves is sufficient to hold that the Government has formed opinion regarding the land under acquisition being arable on the relevant evidence and it cannot be said that this opinion is based on irrelevant ground. 39. It is not the case that there was no material before the State Government to form the opinion to resort to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act in the present case. The reference may have to the resolution of the respondent Samiti which has been passed way back in the year 1981. In this resolution Annexure R-1 on the record of the Writ Petition no. 13/88 it is mentioned that the land in addition to land already acquired, is required. 47 bighas and 16 biswas of land of Halka Naamner, Tehsil Gangapurcity, has been acquired and the proposal has been made for the acquisition of the land mentioned therein. Annexure R-2 is another document where in it is clearly mentioned that the land which has already been acquired is not sufficient for the construction of mandi yard and for the additional land the resolution is passed and sent for consideration. Prior to this the plans were prepared of the additional land required to the land under acquisition at that time. The reference may have to the Annexure R-3. The reference may have to another document Annexure R-6, dated 29th of November, 1980. On the desire of the then Hon'ble Minister for Agriculture the site in question was is inspected by the then Secretary of the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Jaipur and the Senior Town Planner of the Board. A joint survey report was submitted indicating therein the desirability to take action to acquire the area under khasra nos. 19 to 22 of village Naamner and khasra nos. A joint survey report was submitted indicating therein the desirability to take action to acquire the area under khasra nos. 19 to 22 of village Naamner and khasra nos. 79 to 94 of village Gangapurcity. 40. We find from the notification that this area proposed to be acquired is adjoining to the area already notified for acquisition and subsequently acquired. The details of necessity of acquiring additional land has been given in the report which it enclosed to the aforesaid document. After joint survey report aforestated the State Government has agreed in principle to delete the land of khasra no. 13 from acquisition on the conditions. This is clearly borne out from the document Annexure R-7. The respondent Samiti on 24th of September, 1986 has passed a resolution and recommended to the State Government to resort to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. This document is there on the record as Annexure-4 The urgency clause was prayed for to be resorted by the respondent Samiti as sufficient water for irrigation shall be available in the area from Paanchna' Dam and as a result of which there shall be increase in he irrigated area and the production of the agriculture products. From the contents of the additional affidavit, which stand uncontroverted, of Dayanand Singh, the Secretary of the respondent Samiti, we find that in the first phase on the land acquired 86 shops were constructed. The applications received for allotment are more in number than the number of constructed shops. The State Government has sufficient material before it to form the opinion that the 67 bighas and 10 biswa land is urgently required for construction of new mandi yard. It is not the case as what it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, of non application of mind. The State Government has considered each and every aspect of the matter and then has formed an opinion that the immediate possession of land proposed to be acquired is necessary for construction of new mandi yard and resorted to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The State Government has considered each and every aspect of the matter and then has formed an opinion that the immediate possession of land proposed to be acquired is necessary for construction of new mandi yard and resorted to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In the case of Om Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court found that the relevant material was not before the State authorities to record its subjective satisfaction to invoke the powers under Section 17(4) of the Act for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In that case also ultimately the court has declined to set aside the acquisition proceedings. 41. In the case of Hari Singh & Others v. State of U.P. (supra) their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, "8. On behalf of the appellants reliance is, however, placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 1 SCR 1071 : AIR 1980 SC 319 . In that decision the main point made out was that the acquisition made out was that the acquisition proceedings had been engineered mala fide by a State Minister. We do not have any such allegation in the present case. In the circumstances of this case we do not find that there is any ground to hold that the order made under Section 17(4) of the Act exempting the operation of Section 5-A of the Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative delay in commencing the construction of the Market Yard. Some photographs of the land produced before us, however, show that the work of construction has already been commenced." 42. In the case of Deepak Pahwa etc. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others , (supra) their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, "The other ground of attack is that if regard is had to the considerable length of time spent on inter- departmental discussion before the notification under section 4(1) was published, it would be apparent that there was no justification for invoking the urgency clause under section 17(4) and dispensing with the enquiry under section 5A. We are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. We are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. This is bound 'to result in a multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. It is therefore, not possible to agree with the submission that mere prenotification delay would render the invocation of the urgency provisions void. We however wish to say nothing about post-notification delay. In Jaga Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 this court pointed out the fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued. There was urgency or not." In Kasi Reddy Papaiah v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 AP 269 , it was held, "Delay on the part of the tardy officials to take further action in the matter of acquisition is not sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of the issue of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. In the result both the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are rejected and the special leave petitions are dismissed." 43. In the case of Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. (supra), their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under, "9. On the question of urgency, the following facts and contentions emerge from the counter affidavits. The establishment of a Market Yard is not merely one of mere urgency but one which makes it necessary to dispense with inquiry under section 5-A the existing market yard is situated in a very congested locality having no scope for expansion and the place where the market is now located is not sufficient to cater to the growing needs of its constituents. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of trucks/bullock carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for those who come to the market. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of trucks/bullock carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for those who come to the market. The existing market is also devoid of any amenities necessary for hundreds of people who visit the market every day or for the bullocks which are being used to draw the carts. During rainy season it becomes well-nigh impossible to find out suitable shelters for the farmers and producers of vegetables. It has become necessary to provide amenities and also construct reads in a planned manner. 10 In our view, the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the existing market We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government. There also enough precedents in connection with acquisition of land for markets where section 5-A has been dispensed with and such action was upheld. 17. It was then urged for the appellant that there was a delay of full one year between the section 4(1) notification and section 6 declaration and this showed the lethargy of the Government and this would reveal that Government would not have lost anything if only a hearing under section 5-A was given to the owners so that they could place their grievances before the Government. In this connection, we may state that the respondents have explained the delay as having been caused inasmuch as of various steps were required to be taken to finalise the proceedings. It was necessary to issue newspaper publications and also make local publication of the substance of the section 4(1) notification. There was also delay on account of following other administrative procedures. In view of the above explanation we are not prepared to hold that the latter delay between section 4(1) notification and section 6 declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at when orders dispensing with the section 5-A inquiry were passed earlier." 44. There was also delay on account of following other administrative procedures. In view of the above explanation we are not prepared to hold that the latter delay between section 4(1) notification and section 6 declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at when orders dispensing with the section 5-A inquiry were passed earlier." 44. In the case of First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli , (supra), their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where existence of the urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power of invocation of urgency clause dispensing with hearing under section 5A cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. When the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under section 17(4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. Their Lordships further observed that of an order invoking power under S. 17(4) of the Act assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant, materials before it or whether the order has been passed in without application of mind. Any post-notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act by invoking powers under Section 17(4) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself especially when no mala fide on the part of the State Government. It is subject to judicial review by the court if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide. Whether there exists urgency or not is a matter in the discretion of the State Government. It is subject to judicial review by the court if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide. Whether there exists urgency or not is a matter in the discretion of the State Government. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed though this satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a court of law except for the grounds indicated but the said satisfaction must be of the appropriate Government and that satisfaction must be as per the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even though cannot be conclusive, but, is entitled to great weight. 45. As said earlier and is to be stated at the cost of repetition that the invocation of urgency clause and dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is not challenged by the petitioners on the ground of mala fide. It is not the case that there was no material before the State Government and the State Government has not applied its mind on the point of invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act in the case in hand. Thus, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on this point are devoid of any merit'and substance.POINT NO. 4:- THE DECLARATION UNDER SECTION 6 WAS NOT MADE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD UNDER THE ACT, 1894 AS AMENDED BY THE LAND ACQUISITION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1984. 46. It is contended that the declaration under Section 6 was not made within the prescribed period under the Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Thus, the whole of the proceedings of the acquisition of land in dispute vitiate. Similarly. the award under Section 11-A of the Act has also not been made within the stipulated period and thus it is also fatal to the acquisition proceedings. Thus, the whole of the proceedings of the acquisition of land in dispute vitiate. Similarly. the award under Section 11-A of the Act has also not been made within the stipulated period and thus it is also fatal to the acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 10.7.1984 i.e. before commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and as per the proviso to Section 6 of the Act, 1894 substituted by the Act No. 68 of 1984 with effect from 24th of September, 1984, the declaration in respect of the land in dispute could have been made within three years of the date of publication of the notification. That has not been published within the stipulated period and thus these acquisition proceedings lapsed. It is next contended that as per the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act, 1894 as inserted by the Act No. 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.9.1984 the Collector has to make the award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings of acquisition of land shall lapse. In this case the declaration itself has not been made within the prescribed limitation and thus the award is also not made within the stipulated period thus the entire proceedings of the acquisition of land in dispute lapsed. 47. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relying on the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) 'Act, 1987 contended that the declaration is made within the limitation and as regards to award it could not be made so far as in the writ petition the stay has been granted by the Court. 48. In the rejoinder Shri K.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that these notifications are not saved by the Act on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents. 49. We have given our thoughtful considerations to the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties on this point. 50. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is dated 19.7.1984 which has been published in the Rajasthan Raj Patra dated 19.7.1984. 49. We have given our thoughtful considerations to the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties on this point. 50. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is dated 19.7.1984 which has been published in the Rajasthan Raj Patra dated 19.7.1984. The notification under Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act is dated 29.9.1987 published in the Rajasthan Raj Patra dated 12.1.1987. Thus if we go by the dates of the notification or the date of publication thereof in the Rajasthan Gazette it is factually correct that the declaration under Section 6 has been made after three years of the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Thus as per the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act, 1894 as substituted by the Act No. 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.9.1984 this declaration is beyond the prescribed period of limitation. But we find sufficient merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that this declaration has been made within the specified period as prescribed under Section 56(4) of the Act, 1984 as added by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. 51. The statement of objects and reasons of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 are to be referred here. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was amended by, the Parliament extensively. This Central Act was at the same time extended to some such of the States including the Rajasthan which were earlier not covered by it. Consequently, the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 stood repealed and certain transitory and special provisions had to be made for disposal of proceedings pending under the said Act and for payment of compensation, interest etc. in accordance with the Central Act. Since Rajasthan Legislative Assembly was not in Session and the circumstances existed which rendered it necessary to take immediate action the Governor of the State of Rajasthan, after obtaining instructions from the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Ordinances, 1986 (Ordinance No. 3/87) on the 30th day of December, 1986 which was published in the Official Gazette on 3rd January, 1987. This Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. The Act, 1987 came into force on 3rd of January, 1987. Thus Section 56 added to the Central Act came into force with effect from 3.1.1987. This Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. The Act, 1987 came into force on 3rd of January, 1987. Thus Section 56 added to the Central Act came into force with effect from 3.1.1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 provides that consequent on this Act having been extended to the State of Rajasthan on 24th day of September, 1984 the date of extension, the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 stood repealed on the date of the extension. Sub-section (2) of Section 56 is saving clause which provides where in any proceeding under the State Act pending on the date of extension, the State Government, the Collector or the Court has, on or after the said date and before commencement of the Act, 1987, done anything taken any action or made any order which is at variance with that as it provided in this Act, such thing action or order shall, subject to other provisions of this section be deemed to have been done, taken or made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and such proceedings shall not be reopened or reviewed or liable to be challenged on the ground of not being in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 56 provides that where any proceeding pending under the State Act on the date of extension or institution after the said date, a declaration under Section 6 or any award under Section 11 has been made after any of the respective periods as specified in Section 6 or Section 11-A, as the case may be, has expired, the said period or periods as the case may be shall be deemed to have been extended up to the date of such declaration or award. In a proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Act, 1987, such period or periods shall be deemed to have been extended upto, and declaration or award, as the case may be, shall be made within, one year and 2 years respectively after such commencement. The Act,, 1987 came into force on 3.1.1987 and 24.9.1984 is the date of extension of the Act to the State of Rajasthan and the State Act stood repealed on the date of extension i.e. 24.9.1984. The Act,, 1987 came into force on 3.1.1987 and 24.9.1984 is the date of extension of the Act to the State of Rajasthan and the State Act stood repealed on the date of extension i.e. 24.9.1984. Sub-section (2) of Section 56 saved anything done and action taken or any order made which is at variance with Central Act subject to the other provisions of Section 56, they will be deemed to have been done or taken or made under and in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act and such proceedings are not to be reopened or reviewed and the same shall not liable to be challenged on the ground of not in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act. There were no time bound provisions in the State Act similar in nature as they are there in the Central Act so certain transitory and special provisions were considered necessary to be made for the disposal of the proceedings pending under the State Act and for payment of compensation and interest etc. in accordance with the Central Act. It is with this object in view that the provisions consequent to the extension of the Central Act have been made by the Act, 1987, whereby Section 56 has been added in the Central Act. Where the declaration under Section 6 is not made within one year or the award was not been made within 2 years in the land acquisition proceedings pending on the date of extension of the Central Act, provisions are made for the pending proceedings in sub-section (4) of Section 56. Provision has also been made in respect of the proceedings pending under the State Act on the date of extension or institute after the said date and the period prescribed under Section 6 or Section 11-A has been expired then such period shall be deemed to have been extended upto the date of declaration or award. In the cases where proceedings are pending even on the date of commencement of the Act, 1987 the declaration or award has to be made within a period of one year and two years respectively after such commencement. In the cases where proceedings are pending even on the date of commencement of the Act, 1987 the declaration or award has to be made within a period of one year and two years respectively after such commencement. On perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 56 we are satisfied that it has been enacted with the object and purpose of prescribing time limit for declaration and award in the pending proceedings not only on the date of extension of the Central Act but also on the date of commencement of the Act, 1987. From the scheme of sub-section (4) of Section 56 as added we are of the considered opinion that if the declaration or award has been made after commencement of the Act, 1987 within prescribed time the declaration or award would be valid in view' of the deeming provision in the, earlier part of sub-section (4) of Section 56. The word "pending" has its own meaning. It is well settled law of interpretation that the Parliament or Legislature is not using word in the enactment which has no concerned or meaning. Superficial words are not being used in the enactments. The pending proceedings would mean the proceedings which have not been disposed of having regard to the object of the Act, 1987. From reading of sub-section (4) as a whole it cannot be conceived that the legislature ever contemplated, for the pending proceedings no provision is to be made. Sub-section (4) of Section 56 is a provision made for undisposed proceedings on 31.1.1987 and limitation has been fixed as one year or two years after the date of commencement of the Act, 1987 for making a declaration or award respectively. Our this approach find support from the.decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chain Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 (2) RLR 725 . Therein the Division Bench of this Court held that sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act, 1987 shall apply to all pending proceedings not only on the date of extension of the Central Act i.e. 24.9.1984, also the date of commencement of the Act, 1987 i.e. 3.1.1987. The acquisition proceedings initiated in the present case before 24.9.1984 thus are not lapsed. The declaration is made within the extended period under sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act. 52. The matter may be examined from another aspect. The acquisition proceedings initiated in the present case before 24.9.1984 thus are not lapsed. The declaration is made within the extended period under sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act. 52. The matter may be examined from another aspect. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force on 24.9.1984 and the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 kept alive for limited purpose i.e. for completing the pending proceedings. The proceedings initiated in this case on 10.7.1984, the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, has not come to an end. They were very much alive and pending both on the date of extension of the Central Act to Rajasthan State i.e. 24.9.1984 and the date of commencement of the Act, 1987 i.e. 3.1.1987. The time to issue and make the declaration shall deem to have been extended by one year after such commencement i.e. from 3.1.1987. The declaration in the present case under Section 6 could have legally been made upto 2.1.1988 and the award upto 2.1.1989. Thus the declaration made under Section 6 vide notification dated 29.9.1987 was within the specified period. Re the land acquisition proceedings which were pending on 24.9.1984 and/or 3.1.1987 Section 56 of the Act, 1984 added vide the Act, 1987 covers the entire proceedings. The Act, 1987 was enacted by the Rajasthan State Legislative Assembly under its own power with regard to the matters mentioned in the concurrent list of the Constitution of India. 53. As a result of the aforesaid discussion we are satisfied that this contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any substance and merits. 54. Shri K.K. Sharma and Shri S.C. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, raised two other incidental arguments which we would like to consider and deal with here. 55. It is contended that the declaration under Section 6 has been made under the Act which stood repealed on 24.9.1984 or even after 3.1.1987 and thus it is not a valid declaration. The contention that the declaration made under a repealed Act has no merits. On perusal of the declaration under Section 6 vide notification dated 29.3.1987 we find there is a reference of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. It is a clerical error/mistake committed which does not render the declaration invalid. The contention that the declaration made under a repealed Act has no merits. On perusal of the declaration under Section 6 vide notification dated 29.3.1987 we find there is a reference of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. It is a clerical error/mistake committed which does not render the declaration invalid. It is unfortunate that the Officers at the Secretariat are not careful, vigilant and mindful of their duties which they owe to the general public and their master. Had they been careful, vigilant and mindful of their duties, this mistake or error would not have been crept in. It is correctly said by the peoples that there is a 'babu raaj'. The 'babus' in the secretariat prepare the note sheets and the Officers go on ditto the same Nobody bothers to look into the files. In case little care would have been taken by the Officers, this mistake committed in mentioning the name of the repealed Act would not have been there. This error or mistake appears to have been crept in as Section 4 notification was issued under the Act, 1953, though later on that Act has been repealed. However, it does not affect the notification. Mentioning wrong provisions in the notification will not render it invalid. There cannot be two views, under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 this notification certainly could have been issued. Otherwise also we feel to see by mentioning of this repealed Act in the notification how any prejudice has been caused to the petitioners. 56. Another point raised by Shri K.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the declaration made under Section 6 is taken to be under the Central Act it is still of no help to the respondent as the same is not made in accordance with the provisions of this Section. In clause (ii) of sub-para (h) of para no. 17 of the writ petition no. 13/88, with regard to this contention, the pleadings made by the petitioner are as under: "(ii) That even if the notification dated 29th September, 1987 published on 12.11.1987 in the gazette, can be considered to be a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, then also, the aforesaid notification is illegal, inasmuch as the aforesaid declaration has not been published in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 6(2) provides that every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situated, of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of such declaration to be given on convenient places in the said locality. The aforesaid declaration has not been published, to the petitioner's knowledge, in any newspaper nor has the Collector caused public notice of the substance of the declaration to be given at the convenient places in the locality. Thus, non compliance of Section 6 of the Act of 1894 clearly vitiates the declaration and the same is illegal and ultra vires." 57. The deponent was verified the contents of this para no. 17(h) of the writ petition. In his affidavit they are stated believed to be true and correct on the basis of the legal advice tendered to him by the counsel. It is not a pure legal question. It is in fact and substance a question of fact i.e. whether the declaration has been published in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality where the land is situated, out of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of such declaration to be given on convenient places in the said locality. The petitioner stated that the aforesaid declaration has not been published, to his knowledge in any newspaper nor has the Collector caused public notice of the substance of the declaration to be given at the convenient places in the locality. Thus, on the basis of these pleadings it is difficult to accept that the factual foundation is there for this contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is a presumption that the official acts are performed in the manner it is required to be performed under the concerned statute. The Advocate has not filed his' own affidavit to state on his personal knowledge that the compliance of the provisions of Section 6 has not been made in the present case. There is total lack of factual foundation in support of this plea and thus it cannot be accepted. The Advocate has not filed his' own affidavit to state on his personal knowledge that the compliance of the provisions of Section 6 has not been made in the present case. There is total lack of factual foundation in support of this plea and thus it cannot be accepted. As this point has been decided on the basis of the facts of this case, we do not consider it necessary to make reference and discuss the case law cited on this point by Shri K.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioners. 58. Now we may advert to the last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, re the validity of sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act, 1987. In their submissions the whole acquisition proceedings stood lapsed as declaration has not been made within the time limit prescribed in Section 6 of the Act, 1894 as amended in the year, 1984. By this State Amendment an attempt has been made to take the accrued vested rights of the petitioner under the Act, 1894 as amended in the year 1984. 59. The Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 was enacted by the State Legislature under its own powers with regard to the matters mentioned in the concurrent list of the Constitution of India. The president of India gave his assent to the State enactment. Thus, this law shall prevail in the State. The reference here may have to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India which reads, "(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State which respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State. Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." 60. Thus, this piece of legislation Is perfectly valid. it is not an accrued vested right. Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." 60. Thus, this piece of legislation Is perfectly valid. it is not an accrued vested right. The Central Act though has been amended and limitation has been prescribed for making declaration, award etc. but in view of the provision of Section 254(2) the State is fully competent to enact the law in respect of the entries in the concurrent list. The only condition for its validity is that it has received the assent of the President of India. After receiving the assent of the President, the law made by the State Legislature in respect of an entry in Concurrent List shall prevail in the State, meaning thereby the Central Law will riot have any application. 61. Matter can be examined from another aspect. Whatever provisions may be there in the Central Act, they stood not applicable in the State of Rajasthan from the date of the commencement of the Act enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State in respect of an entry in Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. State Legislature has all r the power to enact the law as per the entries in the Concurrent List and it will prevail o r the Central Act. Thus, the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 is a valid piece of legislation and not ultra vires of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 62. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, all these writ petitions fail an the same are dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, the parties ape left to bear their own costs.All Writ Petitions Dismissed. *******