G. BIKSHAPATHY, J. ( 1 ) THE L. P. A. is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge in A. S. No. 2061 of 1989 reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, amalapuram in O. S. No. 50 of 1983, dated 13-9-1989. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF is the Appellant. He filed a suit in O. S. No. 50 of 1983 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 18-1- 1983 or in the alternative for recovery of the amount paid as advance and for damages. ( 3 ) THE averments in the plaint are as follows :defendants No. 1 to 5 agreed the sell the plaint schedule house to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 46,000. 00. Accordingly, an agreement of sale dated : 18-1-1983 Ex. A-1 was executed by defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and a sum of Rs. 1,000. 00 was paid and the balance sum of Rs. 45,000. 00 was agreed to be paid within six months and the registered sale deed was to be executed in favour of the plaintiff. Even though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of obligation, defendants No. 1 to 5 failed to register the Sale Deed and deliver the plaint schedule property. Therefore, plaintiff got issued a notice Ex. A-2. In the meanwhile, plaintiff came to know that defendants No. 1 to 5 and the 6th defendant colluded together and played fraud on the plaintiff by executing a Sale Deed dated : 18-1-1983 in favour of 6th defendant subject to agreement ex. A-1. Therefore, the plaintiff got issued a notice calling upon the defendants No. 1 to 5 to execute the Sale Deed and also alleging that the Sale Deed executed in favour of defendant No. 6 dated : 9-2-1983 was fictitious and fabricated document. As there was no response to the notice, the suit was filed by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS No. 1 to 5 filed written statement stating that the plaint schedule property was absolute property of late bulusu Suryanarayana, husband of defendant No. 1 and the father of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and maternal grand father of defendants No. 4 and. 5. The said Bulusu suryanarayana executed a registered Will deed dated : 8-8-1973 bequeathing the plaint schedule property with life estate to his wife, thereafter in favour of defendants no. 2 and 3 and maternal grand father of defendants No. 4 and. 5. The said Bulusu suryanarayana executed a registered Will deed dated : 8-8-1973 bequeathing the plaint schedule property with life estate to his wife, thereafter in favour of defendants no. 2 and 3 till life and vested reminder to the male issues of defendants No. 2 and 3 and in the absence of male issues to the female issues of defendants No. 2 and 3. However, Bulusu Suryanarayana died on 1980. It is also stated that during the life time of bulusu Suryanarayana, he borrowed a sum of Rs. 1. 400. 00 from Malladi Venkatalakshmi under pronote dated : 3-1-1975 and he died without discharging the debt. The plaint schedule property was left out to the defendant No. 6/01/1981 for Rs. 150. 00. When Malladi Venkatalakshmi pressed for the payment of pronote amount, they could not discharge the same and therefore, to avoid unnecessary litigation, in October, 1982 defendants No. 1 and 2 decided to sell the plaint schedule property. They informed the 6th defendant who was the tenant and also others intending to purchase the schedule property. Later in January, 1983, 6th defendant approached the defendants No. 1 to 3 and offered to purchase the same for a sum of Rs. 40,000. 00. However, after bargain, the sale price was fixed at Rs. 45,000. 00. 6th defendant obtained Agreement of Sale dated 4-1-1983 from the defendants No. 1 to 5 and paid a sum of Rs. 5,500. 00 as advance to enable the defendants No. 1 to 5 to clear the debts to Malladi Venkatalakshmi and sundry debts. It was also agreed that the 6th defendant shall pay the interest @ 12% on the remaining sale consideration and to obtain the Sale Deed at his cost. It is stated that out of the advance amount received, the debt due to Malladi Venkatalakshmi was discharged. On 18-1-1983, the plaintiff along with one Gunda Narasimhamurthy approached the defendants No. 1 to 5 herein and offered to purchase the plaint schedule property for a sum of Rs. 46,000. 00. It is the case of the defendants that they informed the plaintiff that they had already entered into an agreement of Sale with defendant no. 6 on 4-1-1983. On 18-1-1983, the plaintiff along with one Gunda Narasimhamurthy approached the defendants No. 1 to 5 herein and offered to purchase the plaint schedule property for a sum of Rs. 46,000. 00. It is the case of the defendants that they informed the plaintiff that they had already entered into an agreement of Sale with defendant no. 6 on 4-1-1983. But, however, the plaintiff assured that he would settle and manage with defendant No. 6 and settle the affair and obtained agreement to sell in his favour on 18-1-1983. The 6th defendant on coming to know the Agreement of Sale in favour of the plaintiff threatened the defendants No. 1 to 5 with criminal prosecution. Therefore, defendants had executed a registered sale deed on 9-2-1983. It is stated that the plaintiff was informed on 25-1-1983 when he came to Rajahmundry that the defendant No. 6 was not agreeable for cancellation of the agreement and therefore, the sale Deed was executed in his favour. ( 5 ) DEFENDANT No. 6 filed a written statement in tune with the defendants No. 1 to 5. He further stated that he was a tenant of the plaint schedule property on monthly rent of Rs. 150. 00. On a representation made by the defendants No. 1 to 5, he entered into an agreement with the defendants No. 1 to 5 for the purchase of the house for a consideration of Rs. 45,000. 00 and an agreement was entered on 4-1-1983 in his favour. It is his case that on 23-1-1983, the plaintiff approached the defendant No. 6 and informed that he obtained Agreement of Sale dated : 18-1-1983 from the defendants No. 1 to 5 and paid a sum of Rs. 1,000. 00 and requested him to cancel the agreement and offered additional sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 apart from retaining the advance amount paid by the 6th defendant. However, the 6th defendant did not accept. Alternative proposal was also not accepted by the defendant No. 6. At the pain of criminal case, the sale deed was executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 on 9-2-1983. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the suit. Basing on the respective averments, the trial court framed the following issues :1. However, the 6th defendant did not accept. Alternative proposal was also not accepted by the defendant No. 6. At the pain of criminal case, the sale deed was executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 on 9-2-1983. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the suit. Basing on the respective averments, the trial court framed the following issues :1. Whether the suit sale agreement dated 18-1-1983 has been executed in the circumstances stated in the written statement of defendants No. 1 to 5 and subject to agreement to cancel the sale agreement dated : 4-1-83 executed in favour of the 6th defendant?2. Whether the plaintiff is aware of and acquired about the sale agreement dated : 4-1-83 in favour of the 6th defendant in respect of the suit building?3. Whether the plaintiff is only entitled to refund of Rs. l,000. 00 together with interest of 12% per annum?4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages; if so for Rs. l,000. 00 or for which amount?5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the suit sale agreement?6. To what relief?in support the case of the plaintiff, three witnesses were examined and Ex. A-1 to A- 5 were marked. for defence five witnesses were examined and Ex. B-l to B-5 were marked. ( 6 ) THE learned trial Court after considering the evidence available on record held that the agreement of sale executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of the defendant No. 6 on 4-1-1983 was not genuine and it was false and fabricated document. The lower court also held that the sale deed was also not valid document as no consideration was passed on. On the other hand, it is brought out in the evidence that Ex. A-1 was executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of the plaintiff on 18-1-1983. In fact, the defendants No. 1 to 5 have categorically accepted that they executed Agreement of Sale and received Rs. 1,000. 00 towards the advance. Disbelieving the evidence of the defence witnesses and also Ex. B-1 and B-2 and holding that the plaintiff had made out a case for execution of the Sale Deed, decreed the suit by a judgment and decree dated 13-9-1989. ( 7 ) AGAINST the said judgment and decree, the defendant No. 6 carried the matter in A. S. No. 2061 of 1989. B-1 and B-2 and holding that the plaintiff had made out a case for execution of the Sale Deed, decreed the suit by a judgment and decree dated 13-9-1989. ( 7 ) AGAINST the said judgment and decree, the defendant No. 6 carried the matter in A. S. No. 2061 of 1989. The learned single judge of this Court by a judgment and decree dated 2-2-1996 reversed the judgment of the trial Court and held that the plaintiff was not entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated : 18-1-1983. Accordingly, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present l. P. A. has been preferred by the plaintiff. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant mr. K. Raghuveer Reddy submits that the judgment of the learned single Judge reversing the judgment of the trial Court is illegal and contrary to law. He submits that the learned single Judge has not properly construed the evidence available on record. There are any amount of inconsistencies in the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants and that the documents pressed into service by the defendant did not inspire any confidence at all. He takes us through the judgment and also the evidence adduced by the parties concerned and submits that the judgment of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel respondents/defendants submits that the judgment of the learned single Judge is quite legal and valid and the approach of the learned single Judge is quite appropriate and that findings of the learned single Judge that ex. B-l and B-2 are genuine and dependable documents and therefore, he submits that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. ( 10 ) IN the instant case, it is not in dispute that the defendants themselves accepted that they had executed Agreement of sale Ex. A-1 in favour of the plaintiff. They have also accepted that they executed Ex. B-l Agreement of Sale dated : 4-1-1983 Ex. B-l in favour of defendant No. 6 and quondam registered sale deed dated 9-2-1983 Ex. B-2 in favour of defendant No. 6. Therefore, albeit proving the documents would not arise, yet, the genuineness of transaction is under serious dispute. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, Ex. B-l Agreement of Sale dated : 4-1-1983 Ex. B-l in favour of defendant No. 6 and quondam registered sale deed dated 9-2-1983 Ex. B-2 in favour of defendant No. 6. Therefore, albeit proving the documents would not arise, yet, the genuineness of transaction is under serious dispute. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, Ex. A-l agreement of sale dated : 18-1-1983 in favour of plaintiff is sought to be scuttled down by Ex. B-l Agreement of Sale in favour of defendant No. 6 dated 4-1-1983. Therefore, the only issue that arises for consideration is whether the Ex. B-l is a genuine and bona fide transaction and whether it was brought out for the purpose of non-suiting the plaintiff. If it is held that Ex. B-l is valid document, nothing survives for consideration and that the plaintiff would not be entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale. ( 12 ) IT is also to be noted in this regard that it is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 6 on 23-1-1981 went to his house and requested him to permit him to purchase half of the portion of the house, which was refused by the plaintiff and when defendant no. 6 came to his house, one Mr. Vadrevu narasimha Rao-P. W. 2 was present. To this extent P. W. 2 categorically stated that when he went to the house of plaintiff-P. W. 1, 6th defendant was there in the house and requesting P. W. 1 to allow him to share the suit house in two portions, which he did not accept. He also stated that P. W. 1 showed the Agreement of Sale Ex. A-1 in his favour. While, it is the case of 6th defendant that ex. B-l was executed on 4-1-1983 by defendant s No. 1 to 5 and an advance amount of Rs. 5. 500. 00 was paid to enable them to clear the debts due to one Malladi venkatalakshmi under Ex. B-3 and 4 and that the interest amount was paid on 4-2-1983 for a sum of Rs. 98. 00 and another sum of Rs. 16. 00 on 9-2-1983. the final payment was made on 8-2-1983. However, in the evidence of defendant No. 6 as D. W. 1 had categorically stated that an agreement of sale was executed on 4-1 -1983. B-3 and 4 and that the interest amount was paid on 4-2-1983 for a sum of Rs. 98. 00 and another sum of Rs. 16. 00 on 9-2-1983. the final payment was made on 8-2-1983. However, in the evidence of defendant No. 6 as D. W. 1 had categorically stated that an agreement of sale was executed on 4-1 -1983. That the defendants No. 1 to 5 offered the same for sale and he purchased the same for Rs. 45,000. 00. The entire execution of Ex. B-1 took place at the house of defendant No. 1 at Rajahmundry. On 23-1-1983, the plaintiff approached defendant No. 6 and informed him that he purchased the suit house on 18-1-1983 and that p. W. 1 told him that he would pay the further sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 besides return of the advance and to give up the claim. On the next day, he went to Rajahmundry and demanded execution of the sale deed on the threat of criminal prosecution. Accordingly, on 9-2-1983, a registered sale deed was executed. As far as the documentary evidence is concerned, Ex. A-l, Ex. B-l and B-2, they are admitted by the parties. However, the genuineness of the transactions are under judicial scrutiny. Only defendant No. 2, who is the daughter of defendant No. 1 entered into the witness box and categorically stated that the entire transaction was dealt with by her mother defendant No. 1. It is not understood as to why defendant No. 2 did not depose about the incidents which took place from time to time. It is also worth noting that story tried to explained by the defendant No. 6 that plaintiff came to his house and requested for half share in the plaint schedule property was not established, in as much as except the sole testimony of defendant No. 6 (D. W. 1), no other corroborative evidence is available on record. On the other hand, it is clearly established that defendant No. 6 himself went to the house. of the plaintiff and asked for sharing of the plaint schedule property at 50% each. At that time, defendant no. 6 came to know that there was already one agreement. If really, defendant No. 6 was having an agreement dated : 4-1-1983, there was no necessity for him to go to the house of the plaintiff and request him for 50% of share. At that time, defendant no. 6 came to know that there was already one agreement. If really, defendant No. 6 was having an agreement dated : 4-1-1983, there was no necessity for him to go to the house of the plaintiff and request him for 50% of share. Other attending circumstances are that Ex. B-1 was executed at Rajahmundry and the evidence given by D. W. 1 and other attesting witnesses are contradictory to each other. While, it is the case of the defendant no. 6 that defendants Nos. 1 to 5 themselves offered the house about 3 to 4 months earlier to Ex. B-1. This is not spoken to by defendant No. 6. On the other hand, Ex. B-l was executed on 4-1-1983 and on that day only the talks took place and it is incomprehensible that the persons from Amalapuram went to Rajahmundry to draft and to execute ex. B-1. Defendant No. 6 also did not clearly state the address where defendant Nos. 1 to 5 were residing. When defendant No. 6 is the tenant, he could not clearly explain where the agreement was concluded. Further, when the property was sought to be sold for Rs. 45,000. 00 the question of bargaining again on 4-1-1983 would not arise and it is in the evidence that the scribe and the attestor were asked to stay outside the house. Yet, another circumstances which goes against the defendants is that the defendants intended to sell the property only to pay the debts due to malladi Venkatalakshmi. As can be seen from ex. B-3 and B-4 that on 20-10-1973 Bulusu suryanarayana borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,400. 00 from Malladi Venkatalakshmi for construction of the house and another sum of Rs. 1,200. 00 on 3-1-1975 for repairs of the house. As far as the payments are concerned, the interest was being paid from time to time. On 13-2-1982, a sum of Rs. 196. 00 was paid towards the interest upto 20-6-1982 and on 4-2-1983 a sum of Rs. 98. 00 was paid towards the interest in respect of the Ex. B-4, on 9-12-1983 a sum of Rs. 716. 00 was paid towards the interest and part payment of the principal amount. On 9-9-1982, a sum of Rs. 70. 00 was paid towards the interest. On 9-1-1983, a sum of Rs. 16. 98. 00 was paid towards the interest in respect of the Ex. B-4, on 9-12-1983 a sum of Rs. 716. 00 was paid towards the interest and part payment of the principal amount. On 9-9-1982, a sum of Rs. 70. 00 was paid towards the interest. On 9-1-1983, a sum of Rs. 16. 00 was paid towards the interest, on 18-1-1983, the balance amount of Rs. 800. 00 was paid. Thus, it is seen that the payments were made only on 8-2-1983 for a sum of Rs. 2. 300. 00in all. It is incomprehensible that the defendants have decided to sell the property for a sum of Rs. 45,000. 00 to discharge the paltry debt of Rs. 2,300. 00. The normal course of human conduct would not allow to sell such a huge property for discharge of such a small and insignificant sum of Rs. 2,300/ -. Further it is in evidence that defendant No. 6 and defendant No. 2 are relations. Added to this full amount was not paid at the time of the registration of the Sale Deed on 9-2-1983. It was only stated in Ex. B-2 Sale Deed that pronote was executed for the balance sum of Rs. 39,500. 00, but that pronote was not filed in the Court. D. W. 2 has further stated that except the sale deed, they did not execute any other document. While in the examination in chief she had stated that Ex. B-l was executed. Thus, the evidence of defendant no. 2 and defendant No. 6 can lack credibility and reliability. Mere execution of documents ipso facto does not lead to automatic conclusion that the transactions are genuine, bona fide and reliable. It is trite to say that the burden lies on the plaintiff to establish his case dehors deficiencies or weaknesses on the part of defence. But, when the 6th defendant tried to project earlier document to claim primary and priority over the later document, the burden shifts on to 6th defendant to establish the genuineness of document Ex. B-1. It is also settled proposition that among two contemporaneous documents, one which is earlier in point of time has to be preferred provided the transaction is bona fide and beyond the pale of suspicion. In civil matters, the degree of proof that is required is measured the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. B-1. It is also settled proposition that among two contemporaneous documents, one which is earlier in point of time has to be preferred provided the transaction is bona fide and beyond the pale of suspicion. In civil matters, the degree of proof that is required is measured the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. While weighing probabilities, the Court would lean on the side where preponderance of probabilities are more. Thus, we are of the considered view that the learned single Judge has failed to evaluate the evidence in proper perspective and committed an error in relying on the sole and unsupported evidence of D. W. 2. The preponderance of probabilities are working out heavily against the Ex. B-l. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the findings of the learned single Judge are wholly unsustainable in law and accordingly they are set aside. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant raises yet another legal issue taking shelter under Section 19{b) of the Specific relief Act. The learned counsel would submit that the 6th defendant is a subsequent transferee, but he cannot be said to be a transferee for value, who has paid the full amount in good faith and without notice of prior contract between the plaintiff and the defendants No. 1 to 5 and therefore, defendant No. 6 cannot seek the protection under section 19 (b ). The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant No. 6 submits that this Section 19 (b) has no application to the facts of this case and on the other hand, it would go to the aid of the defendant No. 6 rather than assisting the Appellant-plaintiff. The learned counsel for the parties rely on the following decisions : bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand mahton, AIR 1934 PC 68; Balaprasad Asaram charkha v. Asmabi, AIR 1954 Nagpur 328; jagati Timmaraju v. Immani Hanumantha rao, (1972) 1 APLJ 1 ; Dr. Govinddas v. Smt. Shantibal, AIR 1972 SC 1520 ; S. Hussain v. Shah Peerchand, 1998 AIHC 3532 : (1998) 2 andh LD 244; Jagan Nath v. Jagdish Rai, air 1998 SC 2028 ). ( 14 ) FOR proper appreciation of the legal issue, it is necessary to extract Section 19 of specific Relief Act, which reads thus :"19. Govinddas v. Smt. Shantibal, AIR 1972 SC 1520 ; S. Hussain v. Shah Peerchand, 1998 AIHC 3532 : (1998) 2 andh LD 244; Jagan Nath v. Jagdish Rai, air 1998 SC 2028 ). ( 14 ) FOR proper appreciation of the legal issue, it is necessary to extract Section 19 of specific Relief Act, which reads thus :"19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title : except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company :provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract. "however, we are only concerned with the interpretation of Section 19 (b) of Specific relief Act. ( 15 ) THE principle underlining the above provision is to protect a transferee for value in good faith and without notice. Lord salborne in Blackwood v. London Chartered bank of Australia (I. 1874 Vol. 5 Law Reports p. C. 92 at page 111) stated :"there is nothing more familiar than the doctrine of equity that a man, who has bona fide paid money without notice of any other title, though at the time of the payment, he, as purchaser, gets nothing but an equitable title may afterwards get in a legal title, if he can, and may hold it; though during the interval between the payment and the getting in the legal title he may have had notice of some prior dealing inconsistent with the good faith of the dealing with himself. " ( 16 ) IT is trite to say that a person is bound to perform his obligation under a contract of sale and agreement holder has a priority in the matter of obtaining the title of the vendor. But, however, equity protects a subsquent purchaser even as against the prior agreement holder, if it is established that the said subsequent purchaser had parted with the entire money under the bona fide with the entire money without knowledge of the prior agreement. Thus, the provision is an exception to ordinary rule. Therefore, it has to be considered under what circumstances, the provision can be pleaded. If there are two agreements for the sale of the property, without subsequent transfer documents namely sale deeds in favour of either of the purchasers, the said provision would not come into operation. Under those circumstances, the respective agreement holders are required to establish the genuineness of the agreements. However, when both the documents are found to be valid and genuine the earliest of such documents has to be preferred. In such a situation, the subsequent agreement holder entering into transaction either bona fide for value and without notice have no relevance. It is only when the sale transaction takes places either preceded by an Agreement of sale or a direct transaction, the subsequent transferee is required to establish that he has purchased bona fide for value and that he had no notice of prior Agreement of Sale. In the instant case, we are faced with a situation, where the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendants No. 1 to 5 on 18-1-1993 and paid certain advance. But, it is also the case of the 6th defendant that he entered into an agreement on 4-1-1983 i. e. earlier to 18-1-1983 followed by a Sale Deed dated : 9-2-1983. Therefore, in such a situation, two issues would arise for consideration. (1) Whether the agreement entered between the 6th defendant and the defendants no. 1 to 5 was bona fide? The 2nd issue that arises for consideration is whether the 6th defendant has paid the full consideration agreed between the parties and whether he had no notice of the earlier agreement alleged to have been executed between the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 5. We have already held that Ex. 1 to 5 was bona fide? The 2nd issue that arises for consideration is whether the 6th defendant has paid the full consideration agreed between the parties and whether he had no notice of the earlier agreement alleged to have been executed between the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 5. We have already held that Ex. B-1 tried to be projected by the 6th defendant as the earlier agreement of sale was not genuine and it cannot be believed. Therefore, there is no earlier agreement of sale in the eye of law, but that cannot be an end of the matter itself. The further issue that arises for consideration is whether even assuming that it is a subsequent purchaser whether he was a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice? It cannot be said that the 6th defendant had no notice at all. It is in evidence that 6th defendant and plaintiff had discussions with regard to the suit schedule property prior to 9-2-1983. ( 17 ) IN Bhup Narain Singh s case, (AIR 1934 PC 68) (cited supra), the Privy Council held that "section 27 lays down a general rule that the original contract may be specifically enforced against subsequent transferee, who allows an exception to the general rule, not to the transferor, but to the transferee and therefore, it is for the transferee to establish the circumstances which will allow him to retain a benefit of transfer which prima facie, he had no right to get. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, the Supreme Court in Jagan nath s case, ( AIR 1998 SC 2028 ) (cited supra), while referring to Bhup Narain singh s case (cited supra) observed as follows :"however, it has to be kept in view that once evidence is led by both the sides the question of initial onus of proof pales into insignificance and the Court will have to decide the question in controversy in the light of the evidence on record. Even this aspect of the matter is well settled by a decision of privy Council in the case of Mohammad aslam Khan v. Feroze Shah, AIR 1932 PC 228 wherein it was observed with reference to the very same question arising under Section 27 (b) of the earlier Specific Relief Act of 1877 that it is not necessary to enter upon a discussion of the question of onus where the whole of the evidence in the case is before the Court and it has no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion in respect thereof. Where a transferee has knowledge of such facts which would put him on inquiry which if prosecuted would have disclosed a previous agreement, such transferee is not a transferee without notice of the original contract within the meaning of the exception in Section 27 (b)" ( 19 ) EVEN assuming that defendant No. 6 was a bona fide purchaser he has to cross further hurdles. ( 20 ) IN Veeramalai v. Thadikara, AIR 1968 madras 383, the Division Bench observed thus :the plain language of the sub-section (b) shows that the subsequent transferee can retain the benefit of his transfer by purchase which, prima facie, he had no right to get, only after satisfying the two conditions concurrently. . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the instant case, admittedly, the full price has not been paid at the time when controversy arose and even at the time when the suit was filed. " ( 21 ) THE Division Bench of this Court in timmaraju s case, ( 1972 (1) APLJ 1 ) (cited supra) after referring to Veeramalai s case, (AIR 1968 Madras 383) (cited supra), himatlal Motilal v. Vasudev Ganesh, (1912) ilr 36 Bom 446 Bhup Narain Singh s case, (AIR 1934 PC 68) (cited supra), and arunachala v. Madappa, AIR 1936 Madras 949 held that the whole of the money should have been paid before the purchaser gets any knowledge of the prior Agreement of Sale. ( 22 ) THE Division Bench of this Court in timmaraju s case (cited supra) further held that Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act laid down an exception to the ordinary rule that a person is bound to perform his obligation under a contract of sale and that agreement-holder has priority in the matter of obtaining the title of the vendor. But equity protects a subsequent purchaser even as against a prior agreement-holder, provided he establishes that he parted with the entire money innocently without knowledge of the prior agreement. It follows, therefore, that unless he paid the entire money or its equivalent before he had any such notice, he will not be entitled to the protection. Where out of the sale consideration, a part is payable in discharge of a debt due to a third party and the same remained unpaid, the subsequent purchaser cannot be said to be a person who has paid the full money before he had notice of the agreement of sale. ( 23 ) ADMITTEDLY, in the instant case, the full amount agreed between the parties was not paid when the Sale Deed was executed in favour of the 6th defendant. Execution of pronote cannot be said to be full payment. what is specified in the provision was that the amount has been actually paid and that is the reason why sub-clause (b) of Section 19 (1) protects the bona fide purchaser, who had parted with his money and without notice of the prior agreement. Otherwise, the provision would allow unscrupulous purchasers to exploit the situation. They could obtain the Sale Deed subsequent to the prior sale agreement, by reciting deferred payments and contemporaneous documents to secure the amount. Therefore, we are of the firm view that for invoking protection under section 19 (b) of Specific Relief Act, the subsequent purchaser should have entered into a transaction bona fide and that he ought to have paid the entire amount and that he had no notice. These ingredients have to be established by the subsequent purchaser and onus lies on him and in the Instant case, these ingredients are totally lacking. Hence the protection of Section 19 (b) is also not available to the appellant-defendant No. 6. ( 24 ) VIEWED from any angle, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment. These ingredients have to be established by the subsequent purchaser and onus lies on him and in the Instant case, these ingredients are totally lacking. Hence the protection of Section 19 (b) is also not available to the appellant-defendant No. 6. ( 24 ) VIEWED from any angle, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment. ( 25 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge is set aside restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court. ( 26 ) IN the result, the L. P. A. is allowed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.