JUDGMENT - BOBDE S.A., J.:-This petition is originally filed by a teacher whose services were terminated, is now sought to be continued by the petitioner No. 1, her husband and her two children. The original petitioner expired on 1st June, 1999. 2. The original petitioner, Smt. Indumati, was employed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 4, hereinafter referred to as the respondents, in the New English High School at Akola. She was confirmed as an assistant teacher in the year 1984. On 28th June, 1985 she made an application to the respondents that she intends to go on leave for a period of about two years from 1st July, 1985 to 30th April, 1987. The respondents replied and rejected her application for leave by letter dated 5th July, 1985. The teacher persisted. Therefore, on 20th July, 1985 the respondents wrote a letter that if she proceeds on leave then her act will be treated as an act of terminated of her services. The teacher, therefore, wrote another letter stating that she cannot resume her duty and quoted Rule 16(3) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service Regulation) Rules, 1981, (hereinafter referred to as "the M.E.P.S. Rules"), which provides that there can be said to be abandonment of service only if the employee remained absent for three years. The respondents, therefore, wrote another letter dated 31st July, 1985, this time starting that if she does not resume her duties within eight days, it will amount to "self surrender" of her services "as already conveyed to you previously". Previously, the communication was that it will be treated as a termination of her service. For reasons, which are not really germane but unacceptable coming from an employee, the teacher remained absent. She resumed her duty on 23rd May, 1987. She was refused permission to resume. She, therefore, filed an appeal on 28th May, 1987 under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether upon the demise of a teacher, her husband and children can continue the present petition. It is fairly conceded that the sons would not benefit in any way except if the Court awards back wages. 3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether upon the demise of a teacher, her husband and children can continue the present petition. It is fairly conceded that the sons would not benefit in any way except if the Court awards back wages. As far as husband is concerned, the submission is that he is entitled to continue the writ petition because he would be entitled to family pension and also his share in the back wages, if awarded. 4. The entitlement to continue proceedings by heirs of the deceased workman is no more res integra. In (Rameshwar Manjhi (deceased) through his son Lakhiram Manjhi v. Management of Sangramgarh Colliery others)1, 1994(1) S.C.C. 292 , the question fell for consideration before the Apex Court. After considering the decisions of various High Courts and the principle underlined section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, Their Lordships held that the heirs of the workman are entitled to continue the proceedings after his demise. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment Their Lordships observed as follows:- "12. The Maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' though part of English common Law has been subjected to criticism even in England. It has been dubbed as unjust maxim, obscure in its origin, inaccurate in its expression and uncertain in its application. It has often caused grave injustice. This Court in a different context, in considering the survival of a claim for rendition of accounts, after the death of the party against whom the claim was made, in (Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury)2, observed as under: "The maxim 'action personalis moritur cum persona' - a personal action dies with the person has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory." 13. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory." 13. It is thus obvious that the applicability of the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' depends upon the 'relief claimed' and the facts of each case. By and large the industrial disputes under section 2-A of the Act relate to the termination of services of the concerned workman. In the event of the death of the workman during pendency of the proceedings, the relief of reinstatement, obviously, cannot be granted. But the final determination of the issues involved in the reference may be relevant for regulation the conditions of service of the other workmen in the industry. Primary object of the Act is to bring industrial peace. The Tribunals and Labour Courts under the Act are the instruments for achieving the same objective. It is, therefore, in conformity with the scheme of the Act that the proceedings in such cases should continue at the instance of the legal heirs/ representatives of the deceased workman. Even otherwise there may be a claim for back wages or for monetary relief in any other from. The death of the workman relief during pendency of the proceedings cannot deprive the heirs or the legal representatives of their right to continue the proceedings and claim the benefits as successors to the deceased workman. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:- "All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceedings existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his death, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory." It is, therefore, clear that the relief of reinstatement would be nugatory but that is not true for the relief in respect of the back wages or family pension. 5. I am of view that as with the workman so with the teacher. 5. I am of view that as with the workman so with the teacher. Therefore, the heirs of deceased teacher must be held entitled to continue the proceedings after the demise of a teacher for the purpose of claiming monetary relief such as back wages and family pension. 6. As regards the family pension, it is not in dispute that the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 have been made application to the full time teaching staff in recognised and aided non-Government Secondary Schools in the State by Government Resolution dated 4th November, 1968. Rule 116 sub-Rule (16) of the said Rules clearly includes a husband of a female Government servant, within the definition of "family". 7. The next question that arise is whether the order of the School Tribunal dismissing the teacher's appeal is vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of record. Mr. Dastane, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, referred to the finding of the School Tribunal that the teacher had abandoned her services and therefore the termination was legal. The learned Counsel referred to Rule 16 sub-rule (3) of the M.P.E.S. Rules, which reads as follows:- "(3) In the case of a permanent employee who, without sufficient cause, fails to apply for leave within 7 days from the date of absence, it shall be treated as breach of discipline and he shall be liable for suitable disciplinary action after due inquiry. A permanent employee who is absent from duty without leave continuously for a period exceeding three years or more, shall be deemed to have voluntarily abandoned his services." It is clear from the perusal of the Rule that the Tribunal has committed an error in rendering a finding that the teacher must be taken to have abandoned her services. Obviously, the teacher has not been absent without leave continuously for a period exceeding three years. She was absent only from 1st July, 1985 to 30th April, 1987. This period is short of three years. But there is a more basic question involved in the present matter and that is whether any question of being absent survive during this period or whether respondents had terminated her services. This also has a bearing on the next submission urged on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that the finding of the School Tribunal that the appeal was barred by limitation is also erroneous. 8. This also has a bearing on the next submission urged on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that the finding of the School Tribunal that the appeal was barred by limitation is also erroneous. 8. I am of view that the School Tribunal is not in error on this point. It is respondents, who had made it clear by their letter dated 20th July, 1985 itself that if she proceeded on leave inspite of the rejection it will be treated as a termination of services. Undoubtedly, the respondents have stated that it would amount to a termination of service at the instance of the teacher. It is clear that the respondents have stated that the teacher's action of proceeding on leave would be treated as termination of her services. This was reiterated by the Management in their letter dated 31st July, 1985, thought they have referred to the termination of service as "self surrender" of her services. Mr. Dastane, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, strongly submitted that the respondents by their conduct treated the contract of services as continuing. The learned Counsel relies on the letter dated 27th March, 1986 in which the respondents asked the teacher to show cause why she should not be treated as having voluntarily abandoned the services and asked for an explanation within seven days. It must be noted, in this letter also, that the respondents started that it has already been made clear to the teacher that if she failed to resume her duty, it would be presumed that the services would be terminated or that she has voluntarily abandoned her services. Mr. Dastane, the learned Counsel further relied on the fact that the respondents had held one sitting of a Departmental Enquiry in respect of the alleged misconduct. It is equally not in dispute that was the only sitting that was held. Apparently, the respondents realised their mistake and did not proceed with the enquiry. In fact they did not even issue another letter of dismissal whether in pursuance of the one so called meeting of the enquiry or otherwise. While it may be said that while the contract of employment continues, an enquiry may be initiated, the opposite may not be true that because an enquiry is initiated it must necessarily follow that the contract of employment continues. It depends on the facts and circumstances of the cases. While it may be said that while the contract of employment continues, an enquiry may be initiated, the opposite may not be true that because an enquiry is initiated it must necessarily follow that the contract of employment continues. It depends on the facts and circumstances of the cases. It is, therefore, clear that the respondents adhered to their stand in the letter dated 20th July, 1985 that if she persisted in proceeding on leave, her services would be taken to be terminated. If this be the correct position and I am view it is, it is clear that the petitioner's appeal is barred by time. The cause of action clearly accrued to the teacher after the respondents disclosed their intention to treat her services as terminated if she proceeded on leave despite rejection of her leave application. The teacher was therefore entitled to approach the School Tribunal within period of thirty days as provided by section 9 of the Act. Not having done so and the teacher in fact having been approached the Tribunal on 28th May, 1987 the appeal must be taken to be barred by time. I must make it clear that I am not taking the view that the letter dated 20th July, 1985 informing the teacher that if she proceeds on leave, her action would amount the termination of services, constitute a valid order of termination or dismissal. I am of view that the termination letter dated 28th July, 1985 furnished a cause of action to the teacher to approach the School Tribunal because the Management clearly expressed their view that if she proceeds on leave it would result in termination of service. 9. In the circumstances, the order of the School Tribunal holding that the petitioners appeal was bared by time is not liable to be interfered with. Rule discharged. The writ petition is therefore dismissed without any order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----