P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) SMT. Vasireddy Rajyalakshmamma the review petitioner, prays for review of the judgment in W. A. No. 1945/99 dated 15-11-2002, on the ground that allowing of writ Appeal stating that the point involved therein is covered by the decision of supreme Court in Government of Andhra pradesh v. J. Sridevi and others though in fact it is not covered and the same is distinguishable on facts, is unsustainable and bad in law. Facts in nutshell; ( 2 ) THE Review petitioner, herein after referred to as "petitioner", filed W. P. No. 12477/98 praying for a Writ of mandamus declaring the action of hyderabad Urban Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as "respondent" in rejecting the application of the petitioner for sanction of layout vide letter No. 7549/mp2/ hud/951, dated 22-9-1997 as illegal and consequently direct the respondents not to interfere with development of land of the petitioner in pursuance of her application. ( 3 ) ON 12-10-1995, the petitioner made an application in prescribed form paying requisite fee requiring permission to develop the land in S. No. 14 of Guttala begumpet. The petitioner also claims that the land is within the exemption granted by g. O. Ms. No. 733 (Revenue) dated 31-10-1988 from the provisions of the Urban Land ceiling Act and an affidavit was filed to that effect. The petitioner also had taken a stand that by virtue of Section 14 (5) of the A. P. Urban Area (Development) Act, 1975, hereinafter referred to as "act" in short for the purpose of convenience, in view of the lapse of the period of 90 days, there is deemed permission in her favour. ( 4 ) A counter-affidavit was filed taking a specific stand that Guttala Begumpet is in core area and the land in question is not in peripheral area and the application is not accompanied by the Clearance Certificate from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority or affidavit that the land is within the ceiling limit and hence such application cannot be said to be one made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and hence there is no question of the petitioner claiming shelter under the deemed provision. ( 5 ) A reply affidavit also was filed by therespondent. ( 6 ) THE Writ Petition was allowed on27-8-1999 and aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed WA. ( 5 ) A reply affidavit also was filed by therespondent. ( 6 ) THE Writ Petition was allowed on27-8-1999 and aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed WA. No. 1945/99, which was allowed along with W. A. No. 44/2000 on 15-11-2002. Pending W. A. No. 1945/99, interim order was granted and the respondent carried the matter to Supreme court in C. A. No. (3995/2002 in S. L. P. (Civil) no. 1341/2001 and the Supreme Court disposed of the Special Leave Petition by the order dated 12-7-2002 with a direction to dispose of the Writ Appeal in the light of the judgment referred (1 supra ). As already referred to supra W. A. No. 1945/99 was allowed and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed the present Review application. ( 7 ) THE respondent filed a counter affidavit in this Review application statingcertain facts not mentioned in the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition by oversight. ( 8 ) SRI Vedula Srinivas, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner made the following submissions. The learned counsel while making elaborate submissions had drawn our attention to the facts in the present case and the facts in the decision referred (1 supra) and had pointed out that though both these cases are distinguishable on facts allowing the Writ appeal on that ground is definitely bad in law and is an error apparent on the face of record which has to be rectified. The learned counsel also would maintain that the petitioner made an application in accordance with law and the authority has either granted nor refused permission and hence such permission shall be deemed to have been granted. The learned Counsel had drawn our attention to Section 14 (1), (2) and (5) of the Act and also G. O. Ms. No. 733 (Revenue), dated 31-10-1988. The learned counsel with all emphasis submitted that the proceeding dated 8-2-1996 was not communicated to the petitioner at all. ( 9 ) PER contra, Sri Niranjan Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel for the hyderabad Urban Development Authority would contend that the facts in /. Sridevi s case referred (1 supra) and the facts in the present case are similar. In /. Sreedevi s case referred (1 supra), the layout application was submitted on 27-3-1997 and there was no rejection within 90 days. Sridevi s case referred (1 supra) and the facts in the present case are similar. In /. Sreedevi s case referred (1 supra), the layout application was submitted on 27-3-1997 and there was no rejection within 90 days. In the present case, the application was submitted on 12-10-1995 and the same was rejected on 22-10-1997. The learned Counsel had pointed out to the letter dated 8-2-1996 and had submitted that the stand taken by the petitioner in this regard is definitely unsustainable. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the different provisions of the Act and also layout Regulations in this regard. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the Additional affidavit and details averred in the counter-affidavit filed in the present Review application. The learned Counsel also would contend that the application itself was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and hence the question of claiming benefit under the deemed provision will not arise at all. Strong reliance was placed on Calcutta municipal Corporation v. Anil Ratan Banerjee. ( 10 ) HEARD both the Counsel at length and also perused the material available on record. ( 11 ) THE petitioner filed an application for grant of layout on 12-10-1995 for an extent of 3. 237 Hectares of land in S. No. 14 of Guttala begumpet village and that the petitioner also filed an affidavit before the authority stating that the land is exempted from the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act as per G. O. Ms. No. 733 referred to supra and the authority insisted for production of the urban Land Ceiling Certificate vide letter no. 7549/mp2/huda/95 dated 8-2-1996 from the competbnt authority and inasmuch as the petitioner had not produced the said certificate, the layout application was rejected by the order dated 22-9-1997. The stand taken by the petitioner is that by virtue of Section 14 (6) of the Act, she is entitled to the layout permission inasmuch as her application was neither rejected nor refused within 90 days. No doubt, the petitioner also "had taken a specific stand that the letter no. 7549/mp2/huda/95 dated 8-2-1996 was not communicated to her at all. ( 12 ) WE have given our careful and anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel. No doubt, the petitioner also "had taken a specific stand that the letter no. 7549/mp2/huda/95 dated 8-2-1996 was not communicated to her at all. ( 12 ) WE have given our careful and anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel. The Division Bench while disposing of w. A. No. 1945/99 and 44/2000 had specifically observed: "however, this order shall not come in the way of the writ petitioners producing the urban land ceiling clearance certificate issued by the competent authority under the regulation Act and seeking sanction of the layout in accordance with law". The main grievance ventilated by the petitioner in the present Review application is that the disposal of the Writ Appeals by the Division Bench is on a wrong premise that the point involved is squarely covered by the Judgment of the Apex Court referred (1 supra), though in fact it is not covered. In the decision referred (1 supra), the Apex court had followed the decision in State of a. P. v. N. Audikesava Reddy and also had observed that the decision in Atia mohammadi Begum v. State of A. P was partly overruled. ( 13 ) IT is no doubt true that on facts the present case is distinguishable to the limited extent that the question of rejection and deemed provision had not fallen for consideration in the decision referred (1 supra ). However, the Apex Court in the said decision had specified that the present case is not one where the High Court should have directed HUDA to pass the layout plans without insisting for a "no Objection certificate" from the Special Officer-cum- competent Authority. Though on facts the said decision is distinguishable, on a careful reading of the Judgment, we are of the opinion that definitely it cannot be said to be one totally unconnected with the present case or an irrelevant decision. The mere fact that a decision referred to in the Judgment is slightly distinguishable on facts by itself cannot be a ground for review, if otherwise, the judgment can be sustained. ( 14 ) IN the present case, the specific standtaken by the respondent is that the very application does not satisfy the statutory requirements and procedural requirements and hence in the case of such an invalid application, the petitioner cannot take shelter under the deemed provision. ( 14 ) IN the present case, the specific standtaken by the respondent is that the very application does not satisfy the statutory requirements and procedural requirements and hence in the case of such an invalid application, the petitioner cannot take shelter under the deemed provision. In other words, the deemed provision is applicable only in the case of applications made as per the Rules and Regulations under the Act. ( 15 ) CHAPTER IV of the Act deals with Development of Lands anis^ction 13 of the act deals with Declaration-of development areas and development of land in those and other areas. Section 14 of the Act deals with application for permission. Section 14 (1) of the Act reads:"every person or body including a department of the Government desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 13 shall make an application in writing to the Authority in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be determined by regulations". i,. Section 14 (2) of the A^t reads: "every application under sub-sec. (1) shall be accompanies by such fee as may be prescribed: provided thai no such fee shall be necessary in the case of an application made by k Department of the government, or any local authority. " section 14 (5),of the Act reads: "if, within ninety days after the receipt of any application made under this section for permission, or of any information or further information required under rules or regulations, the authority has neither granted nor refused its permission, such permission shall be deemed to have been granted; and the applicant may proceed to carry out the development but not so as to contravene any of the provisions of this Act or any rules or regulations made under this Act". On a careful reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 14 of the Act, it is clear that the deemed provision referred to in subsection (5) of Section 14 of the Act can be invoked where an application in writing was made to the authority in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be determined by regulations. Hence, in the light of the specific stand taken by the respondent, inasmuch as a valid application as per regulations had not been presented by the petitioner, the petitioner cannot take shelter under sub-section (5) of Section 14 of the act. In Mohd. Ahmed Ali v. Commissioner, m. C. H. it was held that where an application for sanction of revised layout plan of the petitioner for development of land submitted to the Municipal corporation was referred to HUDA for granting permission and the permission was not rejected within the stipulated time, the permission must be deemed to have been given under Section 14 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that presentation of a valid application is definitely a sine qua non for invoking the benefit of the deemed provision under sub-section (5) of Section 14 of the Act. Evidently, keeping the same in view, the Division Bench while allowing the writ Appeals had observed as already referred to supra. ( 16 ) NO doubt several other additional grounds had been raised in the counter-affidavit filed in the present Review application and in the light of the view expressed by us, we do not think it necessary to advert to all the said grounds and the additional details, suffice for us to state that in the absence of a valid application in accordance with the Rules and Regulations, Section 14 (5) of the Act cannot be invoked. In the decision referred (2 supra), while dealing with the aspect of permission to construct under the Bengal municipal Act (1932), the Apex Court at page 663 had observed:"in the circumstances, it must be held that no construction was made by respondents on the said site up to 24th september 1989. Apart from the above, there is yet another problem in the way of the respondents. Section 319 expressly states that even in case of a deemed permission, the applicant cannot execute the work "so as to contravene any of the provisions of this Act or of schedule VI or any Rule or Bye-law applying thereto". Neither the learned single Judge nor the Division Bench have gone into and/or recorded any finding that having regard to the position of law obtaining on 24th august, 1967 and the width of the road on which the said premises abuts, a permission for twelve storey building could have been granted. Neither the learned. Neither the learned single Judge nor the Division Bench have gone into and/or recorded any finding that having regard to the position of law obtaining on 24th august, 1967 and the width of the road on which the said premises abuts, a permission for twelve storey building could have been granted. Neither the learned. single Judge nor the Division bench have gone into this aspect. They have assumed that such a permission could have been granted. The said assumption is challenged by the ""construction before us. Assuming that permission for a twelve floors buildings could have been granted under the law obtaining in august 1987, the question still remains - not having made any construction on the basis of the said plan before september 24, 1989, can any construction be made thereafter? The answer can only be in the negative. Indeed, even if any construction was commenced before that date, it cannot be continued thereafter according to section 325 of the Bengal Municipal act. It must be remembered that the writ petition itself was field on 28th september, 1989 i. e. , after the expiry of the two years period from August 24, 1987 or from September 24,1987, as the case may be. The new Building Rules issued under the Calcutta Municipal act, 1980 came into force on and from 12th December, 1990. Inasmuch as the respondents had not made the construction within the two years period of any of the three applications aforesaid and also because there was not even an application for renewal of the alleged deemed sanction on the basis of the plan submitted on August 24,1987, no construction could have been carried on by the respondents after September 24,1989, unless they obtained a fresh permission according to law. It is brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the respondents that by an order dated November 29, 1990, a learned single Judge of the high Court had allowed the respondents "to make construction up to the ground floor level in supersession of the notice dated 21st november, 1990 as issued by the district Building Surveyor under section 401 of the Calcutta Municipal corporation Act, 1980" subject to an undertaking that they would demolish the construction, if it is found to have been made in violation of the plan submitted on 24th August, 1987. All this shows again that they only construction that has been made is of the ground floor and that too unde/ the interim orders of the High Court in the present proceedings. In the above circumstances, it must be held that the respondents are not legally entitled to make any construction on the basis of the deemed sanctioned plan (submitted on August 24,1987) on or after September 24,1989 - or for that matter, after the filing of the writ petition. The High Court was, therefore, in error in permitting the respondents (Writ Petitioners) to proceed with the construction of the twelve-storey building on the basis of the plan submitted on August 24,1987 and in giving other allied directions". Regulation 6 of Layout Regulations reads as hereunder:" (A) Scrutiny by the Authority: The layout application shall be scrutinized by Authority with reference to the Master Plan proposals, approach road, site conditions, the proposed locations of the community space, the proposed location of the community sewerage disposal system, the land use break-up percentage of the various areas, and the overall layout pattern etc. (b) Draft Grid Layout approval: After all the above are complied with, a draft layout or "grid Layout" will be approved by the Authority with conditions that the roads, drains, community sewerage disposal system with drainage lines shall be exeuted and completed within a period of one year from the date of sanction. The "grid Layout" will only show the roads pattern, the drainage lines and the location of the community sewerage unit, to facilitate execution of the said works as per the specifications. In case of non-compliance of the above within one year, the Grid Layout approval will lapse and the layout will automatically stand cancelled. The Community Open Spaces reserved for play area and recreation area shall be handed over to the local body before the final layout is released". ( 17 ) THE present application is a Review application filed on the ground that Writ appeals were disposed of on a wrong premises that the point involved in the matter is covered by the decision of the apex Court referred (1 supra ). ( 17 ) THE present application is a Review application filed on the ground that Writ appeals were disposed of on a wrong premises that the point involved in the matter is covered by the decision of the apex Court referred (1 supra ). Though on facts, the said decision is slightly distinguishable, it cannot be said to be totally an irrelevant Judgment and hence the mere reference to such a case by the Division bench while allowing the Writ Appeals, in our opinion, will not alter the situation in any way as far as the result of the matter is concerned, especially in view of the specific observation made by the Division Bench. ( 18 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the present Review application being devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.