Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. Petitioner no. 1 is a Union of Workmen employed by the Bihar State Electricity Board and its claim is that its object is to safeguard the rights and interest of its members. Petitioner no. 2 is its members. In this writ application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, prayer of the petitioners is to quash the notification dated 9.9.1997 whereby the Bihar State Electricity Board (for short the Board) in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 had decided to retire the workmen on completion of 42 years of service under the Board or on attaining the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. 2. It is the stand of the petitioners that the Standing Order of the Board certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 had provided for the age of retirement of the workmen and as such the age of superannuation cannot be altered by a notification issued in exercise of the power under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 . It has been pointed out that Clause 8 of the Standing Order provides for age of retirement of the workman. Same reads as follows : "8. Retirement A workman other than a causal workman will ordinarily retire on attaining the age of 60 years. But the Board may at its sole discretion offer extension of service beyond this age to any workman for a period not exceeding one year at a time until he attains the age of 62 years subject to his being mentally and physically capable of discharging the duties expected of him." 3. Mr. Anand Mohan Verma appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the Standing Order having provided for the age of retirement, the age of retirement prescribed by the Board in exercise of the powers under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) must give way to the provision in the Standing Order. In support of his submission Mr. Verma has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The U. P. State Electricity Board and another V/s. Hari Shankar Jain and others ( AIR 1979 SC 65 ) and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 9 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "9. In support of his submission Mr. Verma has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The U. P. State Electricity Board and another V/s. Hari Shankar Jain and others ( AIR 1979 SC 65 ) and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 9 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "9. The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this : In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a general Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament. Vide London and Blackwall Railway V/s. Limehouse District Board of Works (26 LJ Ch 164 : 69 ER 1048), and Thorpe V/s. Adams (1871) LR 6 CP 125). In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. V/s. State of U.P. ( AIR 1961 SC 1170 : (1961) 3 SCR 185 : (1961) 1 LLJ 540 : (1960-61) 19 FJR 436), this Court observed (at p. 1174) : The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions, one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect." 4. Mr. R. K. Datta however submits that the item of retirement is not one of the items provided under the Schedule and as such the prescription of age by Clause 8 of the Standing Order is beyond the item prescribed under the Act and as such nothing prevents the Board to exercise the power under section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act to prescribe the age of retirement. 5. Having appreciated the rival contention, I find substance in the submission of Mr. Datta. Section 2(g) of the Act interprets the Standing Order to mean rules relating to matter set out in the schedule. 5. Having appreciated the rival contention, I find substance in the submission of Mr. Datta. Section 2(g) of the Act interprets the Standing Order to mean rules relating to matter set out in the schedule. Section 3(2) of the Act provides for submission of the draft Standing Order which is required to contain provisions for every matter set out in the schedule applicable to the industrial establishment. Section 4 of the Act provides for conditions for certification of the Standing Order and Section 5 provides for the manner of certification of the Standing Order. In the schedule of the Act there are eleven items which do not contain the item of age for retirement or superannuation. It is relevant here to state that in the State of Maharashtra by a local amendment age for retirement or superannuation has been added in the schedule of the Act as Item No. 10A, so also in the State of U.P. as item no. 11C. The very fact that the legislature of the two State had to add this item in the Schedule of the Act clearly goes to show that the age of retirement or superannuation is not one of the items, in the schedule of the Act so far as the State of Bihar is concerned. 6. Section 79(c) of the Electric (Supply) Act confers power to make regulation in matter relating to the duties of the officers and other employees of the Board, their salaries and allowances and other conditions of service. It needs no argument to say that age of retirement is a condition of service. True it is that the Act is a special law and the regulation made by the Board in respect of items mentioned in the schedule shall have no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Section 13(b) of the Act or certified by the Certifying Officer under Section 5 of the Act but in my opinion, in a case in which the regulation pertains to a matter which is not an item in the schedule of the Act, the provision made in the regulation shall hold the field. In fact in the case of Hari Shanker Jain (supra) on which Mr. Verma has placed reliance it has been observed so, in paragraph 17 of the Judgment, which reads as follows : "17. In fact in the case of Hari Shanker Jain (supra) on which Mr. Verma has placed reliance it has been observed so, in paragraph 17 of the Judgment, which reads as follows : "17. We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the regulation made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under S. 13-B or certified by the Certifying Officer under S. 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act shall continue to apply. In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age of superannuation having been duly notified by the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact that it is a matter which could be the subject matter of Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of 58 years........(Underlining mine) 7. The view which I have taken also finds support from a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in ihe case of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation V/s. Heeralal and others (1980 Lab. I.C. 160) in which it has been held as follows : ".....As earlier pointed out by us the general power of making regulations as a matter of construction is not intended to prevail over the matters mentioned in the schedule to the Standing Orders Act which in respect of industrial workers are to be regulated by Standing Orders. The regulations will, however, have application even to industrial workers in respect of matters not covered by the Schedule. Further regulations can also be effective on matters in the schedule and can apply to industrial workers on those matters when they are notified under Sec. 2(2) of the Government or certified as Standing Orders under the Act. It has to be noticed that the requirement of notification under Section 2(2), on a proper understanding of that provision, is only in respect of matters mentioned in the schedule which are to be regulated by Standard Standing Orders." (Underlining mine) 8 Mr. It has to be noticed that the requirement of notification under Section 2(2), on a proper understanding of that provision, is only in respect of matters mentioned in the schedule which are to be regulated by Standard Standing Orders." (Underlining mine) 8 Mr. Verma then submits that clause 8 of the Standing Order having provided the age of retirement to be 60 years, the impugned decision to retire the workman on completion of 42 years of service or at the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier, is illegal. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Nagendra Singh V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. [1995 (1) PLJR 183] and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 5 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "5. It is to be noted at this stage that Rule 73 envisages that a person would retire only on attaining the age of 58 years and does not say that a person would retire either on attaining the age of 58 years or on completing 40 years in service. In our opinion, therefore, there can be no justification for retiring the petitioner by arbitrarily pushing back his date of birth and assigning him an imaginary date of birth." 9. I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Verma. In the said case the statutory rule prescribed the age of retirement to be 58 years but on the assumption that the employee must not have been appointed before attaining the age of 18 years, it was assumed that on completion of 40 years of service he shall attain the age of 58 years and thus superannuate from service. No decision to that effect was taken and in the face of the rule the Division Bench held that an employee can not be asked to retire on completing the age of 40 years of service. Here in the present case the regulation framed in exercise of the power under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act had provided for retirement of a person on completion of 42 years of service or 60 years of age, whichever is earlier. Here in the present case the regulation framed in exercise of the power under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act had provided for retirement of a person on completion of 42 years of service or 60 years of age, whichever is earlier. In the face of such a regulation the claim of the petitioner that they shall retire only on attaining the age of 60 years is unsustainable in law and the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. 10. I am further of the opinion that prescribing 42 years of service for retirement is not unreasonable. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of [1993 Supp (2) SCC 592] and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 11 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "11. In K. Nagaraj V/s. State of A.P. (1985) 1 SCC 523 : 1985 SCC (L & S) 280 : AIR 1985 SC 551 ) this Court repelled a challenge to the reduction of retirement age from 58 to 55 on the basis of the policy of the Government, which was found not to be irrational or violating recognised norms of employment plan. It was also noticed that not to provide for an age of retirement at all would be contrary to public interest because the State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its employees to continue in service after they have passed the point of peak and that rules of retirement do not take away the right of a member to his livelihood, the only limit is to the right to hold office till the stated number of years. The provision in the Regulation in hand for maintaining the age of retirement at 58 years as before but in the same breath permitting retirement on the completion of 30 years of service, whichever occurs earlier, is in keeping with the policy of reckoning a stated number of years of office attaining the crest, whereafter inevitably is the descent, justifying retirement. In this context 30 years period of active service is not a small period for gainful employment, or an arbitrary exercise to withhold the right to hold an office beyond thirty years, having not attained 58 years of age." 11. From what has been stated above, it is evident that the grievance of the petitioner is absolutely misconceived. 12. In this context 30 years period of active service is not a small period for gainful employment, or an arbitrary exercise to withhold the right to hold an office beyond thirty years, having not attained 58 years of age." 11. From what has been stated above, it is evident that the grievance of the petitioner is absolutely misconceived. 12. In the result, I do not find any merit in the application and it is dismissed accordingly. No costs.