S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) IN a bodily injury case arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the injured being aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 8. 11. 2000 passed in m. V. C. No. 2834 of 1996 on the file of the m. A. C. T. and Addl. Judge, Court of Small causes, Bangalore City [sch-5], (for short, 'the M. A. C. T. '), has preferred this appeal under section 173 (1) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988, for short 'the Act'. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are as follows: in an accident involving a motor cycle bearing registration No. MEM 3769 owned by the respondent No. 1 and insured by the respondent No. 2, insurance company, the appellant sustained certain injuries. He was an inpatient in Victoria Hospital between 19. 8. 1996 and 23. 8. 1996 (both days inclusive) and even after discharge from the hospital, he had to undergo medical treatment for a period of three months. In the accident the claimant sustained trimal- leolar fracture of the right ankle joint and when he was an inpatient in Victoria Hospital, he underwent surgery and POP cast was applied. The appellant on the date of the accident was aged 47 years and he was a mechanic and according to him, he was earning monthly income of Rs. 3,000. The claimant-appellant alleging that the accident took place solely on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the motor cycle filed claim petition before the m. A. C. T. under section 166 of the Act, claiming compensation of Rs. 4,00,000 under various heads. Although the owner of the motor cycle was served with notice, he remained unrepresented. However, the respondent No. 2 insurance company on service of notice contested the claim petition by filing a written statement, in which all material averments made in the claim petition are denied. On the other hand, it was contended by the insurance company that the claimant himself was responsible for the accident. It is alleged that appellant suddenly entered the road to cross without looking for vehicle or traffic on the road and in the process he sustained injury. On the other hand, it was contended by the insurance company that the claimant himself was responsible for the accident. It is alleged that appellant suddenly entered the road to cross without looking for vehicle or traffic on the road and in the process he sustained injury. ( 3 ) IN premise of the above pleading of the appellant-claimant and the insurance company, the M. A. C. T. has framed the following issues:" (1) Does petitioner prove that he met with road accident and suffered injuries as claimed by him and it is due to rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle bearing No. MEM 3769? (2) If so, to what compensation and from whom he is entitled to? (3) What award or order?" ( 4 ) THE appellant-claimant in support of his claim examined himself as PW 1, and also examined Dr. Ramesh Krishna from victoria Hospital as PW 2, S. Gopala- krishna, who is a medical records technician from Sanjay Gandhi Hospital as PW 3 and marked 16 documents as Exhs. P-l to P-l6. On behalf of respondent none was examined nor any document was adduced. ( 5 ) THE learned Presiding Officer of the m. A. C. T. on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and the issue relating to actionable negligence came to the conclusion that the accident took place mainly due to rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by the driver-cum-owner. At the same time, learned Presiding Officer of the M. A. C. T. also held that the claimant also contributed negligence for causing accident by making attempt to cross the road without noticing any vehicles on the road. In that view of the matter, he apportioned the negligence between the driver of the motor cycle and the appellant in the ratio of 80:20. ( 6 ) THE M. A. C. T. having taken the age of the appellant and income of the appellant as on the date of the accident and kind of treatment he had taken in the hospital as inpatient and outpatient, awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000 towards pain and suffering, rs. 3,000 for medical expenses, Rs. 9,000 towards loss of income during treatment, rs. 3,900 towards loss of future income and Rs. 2,500 towards loss of amenities of life and happiness. 15,000 towards pain and suffering, rs. 3,000 for medical expenses, Rs. 9,000 towards loss of income during treatment, rs. 3,900 towards loss of future income and Rs. 2,500 towards loss of amenities of life and happiness. Out of the above sums determined as compensation, the M. A. C. T. having deducted 20 per cent ultimately awarded a sum of Rs. 26,720 with interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of petition till its realisation. Hence, this appeal by the aggrieved claimant. ( 7 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the finding recorded by the m. A. C. T. attributing contributory negligence on the part of the appellant would contend that that finding could not be sustained firstly because the driver of the motor cycle was not examined nor any document was produced by any of the respondents. The learned counsel would also contend that in the light of the oral testimony of the appellant, the correctness of which is not seriously contested by the respondent in the cross-examination, it is clearly established that the accident took place solely on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the motor cycle. ( 9 ) IT was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that in determining loss of future income the M. A. C. T. has committed an error apparent on its face in not taking into account the permanent disability of the appellant, but also in applying multiplier of 13 to the monthly income of the appellant directly without first multiplying the same by 12 in order to arrive at loss of annual income. The learned counsel would also point out that in the bodily injury cases, injured persons are also entitled to compensation towards attendant charges, transportation charges and special food, etc. , and therefore, the M. A. C. T. ought to have awarded reasonable compensation under those heads. Learned counsel would also maintain that even the compensation awarded under the other heads, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record are on lower side. Learned standing Counsel for the insurance company, on the other hand, would support the impugned award and maintain that the compensation awarded by the M. A. C. T. is just and reasonable. Learned standing Counsel for the insurance company, on the other hand, would support the impugned award and maintain that the compensation awarded by the M. A. C. T. is just and reasonable. ( 10 ) LET us first advert to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the finding recorded by the m. A. C. T. on the issue relating to actionable negligence and apportionment of the blame to an extent of 20 per cent to the appellant-claimant. As already pointed out that although the owner was served with notice, he did not put in appearance and contest the claim. Though the insurance company chose to file the written statement, it did not examine the owner-cum-driver of the motor cycle or adduce any other rebuttal evidence before the M. A. C. T. As it could be seen from the written statement, it is not the case of the respondent No. 2, insurance company, that the accident took place on account of negligence on the part of owner-cum-driver of the motor cycle as well as the appellant. It is true that even in the absence of such plea in the written statement, if the facts established by the evidence could possibly lead to an inference that the claimant also contributed negligence in causing the accident, the m. A. C. T. may be justified in recording a finding of contributory negligence against claimant also. The question is whether the evidence led before the M. A. C. T. would warrant drawing of such inference against the claimant. ( 11 ) HAVING perused the evidence and materials placed before us, we are not persuaded to draw any such inference to attribute contributory negligence on the part of the appellant in causing the accident. In conclusion, we cannot sustain the finding of the M. A. C. T. attributing 20 per cent of the contributory negligence to the appellant in causing the accident. ( 12 ) IT is borne out by the records and evidence led before the M. A. C. T. that the appellant was an inpatient in Victoria Hospital between 19. 8. 1996 and 23. 8. 1996 (both days inclusive) and when he was inpatient he had to undergo a surgery for fracture of the bone and POP cast was applied. ( 12 ) IT is borne out by the records and evidence led before the M. A. C. T. that the appellant was an inpatient in Victoria Hospital between 19. 8. 1996 and 23. 8. 1996 (both days inclusive) and when he was inpatient he had to undergo a surgery for fracture of the bone and POP cast was applied. It has come in evidence that the appellant could not attend to his work at least for a period of three months after the accident. It is also seen from the evidence that on account of the accident there was shortening of right leg of the appellant by 1 1/2 inch. ( 13 ) IN deciding the quantum of damages to be paid to a person for the personal injury suffered by him, the court is bound to ascertain all considerations which will make good to the sufferer of the injuries, as far as money can do, the loss which he has suffered as a natural consequence of the wrong done to him. In Basavaraj v. Shekhar, 1987 ACJ 1022 (Karnataka), a division Bench of this court held that:"if the original position cannot be restored as indeed in personal injury or fatal accident cases it cannot obviously be the law must endeavour to give a fair equivalent in money, so far as money can be an equivalent and so make good the damage. "in other words, the general principle which should govern the assessment of damages in personal injury cases is that the court should award to injured person such a sum of money as will put him in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the injuries. The principle is sometimes referred to as restitutio in inte- grum; but it is manifest and universally realised that no award of money can possibly compensate a man and renew a shattered human frame. Lord Morris of Borth-y- gest in Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), said:"to compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but. . . no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. " ( 14 ) DAMAGES must be full and adequate. Field, J. in Phillips v. South Western Railway co. . . no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. " ( 14 ) DAMAGES must be full and adequate. Field, J. in Phillips v. South Western Railway co. , (1874) 4 QBD 406, held:"you cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. (The plaintiff) can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once and for all. He has done no wrong; he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered. " ( 15 ) THOUGH, undoubtedly there are difficulties and uncertainties in assessing the damages for personal injury case, that fact should not preclude an assessment as best as can, in the circumstances be made. Lord halsbury in Mediana, (1900) AC 113, said:"of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless, it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. But, nevertheless, the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given. " ( 16 ) HAVING regard to the nature of the injuries and the kind and length of the treatment taken by the appellant and the principles governing determination of just compensation in personal injury cases, we think that a sum of Rs. 30,000 would be just compensation towards pain and suffering. The M. A. C. T. has awarded a meagre sum of Rs. 3,000 for medical expenses on the ground that appellant did not produce any evidence to show actual expenditure incurred by him towards medical treatment. 30,000 would be just compensation towards pain and suffering. The M. A. C. T. has awarded a meagre sum of Rs. 3,000 for medical expenses on the ground that appellant did not produce any evidence to show actual expenditure incurred by him towards medical treatment. It is true that the appellant did not produce any evidence before the M. A. C. T. to show the actual cost of treatment. Simply because the appellant did not produce evidence, the duty of the Tribunal does not cease and it is expected to determine the probable cost of medical treatment having regard to the nature of the injuries and kind and length of treatment taken by the appellant as inpatient and outpatient. As repeatedly held by the courts, in such fact situation, an element of guesswork has to play its role. Since the appellant had to take treatment for injuries sustained by him for more than three months both as inpatient and outpatient and since he had to undergo a surgery and POP cast, even in the absence of any concrete evidence led by the appellant before the M. A. C. T. , we think that it is just and reasonable to award at least Rs. 10,000 towards medical expenses and accordingly, we award a sum of Rs. 10,000 towards medical expenses. We, however, do not find any justification to enhance the compensation awarded by the M. A. C. T. towards the loss of income during treatment. It is fairly established that the appellant could not attend to his normal work only for a period of three months and admittedly the monthly salary of the appellant was Rs. 3,000 and, therefore, a sum of Rs. 9,000 awarded by the m. A. C. T. towards loss of income during the treatment is justified and legal. ( 17 ) THIS takes us to the question whether a sum of Rs. 3,900 awarded by the m. A. C. T. towards loss of future income could be regarded as just compensation. In determining the loss of future income the m. A. C. T. has committed an error apparent on its face. The M. A. C. T. when determining total loss of earning capacity has directly applied multiplier of 13 to the monthly income without multiplying the monthly income by 12 in order to arrive at yearly loss of income. In determining the loss of future income the m. A. C. T. has committed an error apparent on its face. The M. A. C. T. when determining total loss of earning capacity has directly applied multiplier of 13 to the monthly income without multiplying the monthly income by 12 in order to arrive at yearly loss of income. We are also of the considered opinion that the M. A. C. T. in the factual situation of this case was not justified in taking the whole body permanent disability at 10 per cent though PW 2 doctor in his evidence assessed the permanent disability between 10 per cent and 15 per cent for the whole body. It needs to be noticed that appellant is a manual worker and, therefore, the physical impairment particularly l inch shortening of the right leg of the appellant should have gone into the decision-making. Therefore, we think that the ends of justice will be met by taking the whole body permanent disability at 20 per cent instead of 10 per cent. Multiplier of 13 applied by the M. A. C. T. is proper. In that view of the matter loss of future income would be Rs. 93,600 (Rs. 3,000 x 12 x 13 = Rs. 4,68,000 and 20 per cent of which comes to Rs. 93,600 ). ( 18 ) THE M. A. C. T. in awarding a petty sum of Rs. 2,500 towards loss of amenities of life and happiness has exhibited conservatism to the core. The compensation to be awarded by the statutory Tribunal, it is trite, should reflect justness and reasonableness in terms of time and space concerned and that feature is totally lacking in the impugned award. Therefore, we think that a sum of Rs. 15,000 towards loss of amenities of life and happiness would be a just compensation. ( 19 ) IT is now well settled that in bodily injury cases the injured person is also entitled for compensation towards attendant charges, transportation charges and special food, etc. No compensation is awarded by the M. A. C. T. under those heads. But, we do not have any concrete evidence to show what exactly the appellant-claimant spent under those heads. In that view of the matter and taking into account the probable expenditure incurred by appellant during three months of the treatment, we award a sum of Rs. No compensation is awarded by the M. A. C. T. under those heads. But, we do not have any concrete evidence to show what exactly the appellant-claimant spent under those heads. In that view of the matter and taking into account the probable expenditure incurred by appellant during three months of the treatment, we award a sum of Rs. 10,000 for attendant charges, transportation charges and special food, etc. ( 20 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal in part with costs and in substitution of the amount awarded, we award total compensation of rs. 1,67,600 with 9 per cent interest from the date of claim petition till its realisation. The advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 1,500. Appeal partly allowed. --- *** --- .