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2003 DIGILAW 872 (AP)

Arjun Pradeepak v. GG. VANI, REP, BY HER GPA G. S. MURTHY, SECUNDERABAD

2003-07-15

DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J.CHELAMESWAR

body2003
DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THE defendants in O. S. No. 74 of 1999 on the file of II Additional District Judge, rangareddy District filed this appeal against judgment and decree dated 19-9-2002. In the course of this judgment the parties will be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. ( 2 ) UNDISPUTED facts for the disposal of this appeal are as follows: Plot No. 176 (A-8) admeasuring 1030. 00 Sq. yards of 866. 93 Sq. mts. in Survey No. 218/1/2 situated at Air force Officers Co-op. Housing society Limited, Vayupuri within the limits of Malkajgiri Municipality is the suit property. Air Force Officers Co-operative housing Society Limited allotted the said plot to Sri C. Satyanarayana, who is the father of second defendant. The first defendant is the son of the second defendant. The said Satyanarayana under a registered gift deed dated 11-3-1985 gifted the suit property to his grandson namely the first defendant. At that time first defendant was a minor. Later the second defendant filed O. P. No. 19 of 1995 on the file of District judge, Rangareddy District and obtained permission of Court to sell the suit property belonging to the minor, first defendant. The district Judge accorded permission by his order dated 28-2-1995. Thereafter, on behalf of first defendant second defendant agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 8,20,000/ -. Under receipt Ex. A-3, he received a part consideration of Rs, 6,00,000/- on 2-7-1996 from plaintiff. Subsequently, first defendant attained majority. The plaintiff and defendants entered into a written agreement of sale dated 12-3-1998. It was registered on 16-3-1998. The original sale agreement was in the custody of defendants. They produced it before the COurt at the fag end of trial. Registration copy of the said sale agreement was marked as Ex. A-2. The original sale agreement was marked as ex. B-4. The terms and conditions of the sale agreement are as follows : (1) That the purchaser shall pay the entire balance of the sale consideration within a week from the date of this agreement and complete the sale transaction. Registration copy of the said sale agreement was marked as Ex. A-2. The original sale agreement was marked as ex. B-4. The terms and conditions of the sale agreement are as follows : (1) That the purchaser shall pay the entire balance of the sale consideration within a week from the date of this agreement and complete the sale transaction. (2) The seller on receipt of the sale consideration in full within the stipulated time, shall deliver to the purchaser the vacant peaceful possession of the schedule property and execute sale deed in his favour or in favour his nominee/s and register the same in accordance with law but, at the expense of the purchaser. (3) The seller shall clear of arrears of taxes, charges, levies and rates etc. if any, that are due and payable in respect of the schedule property up to the date of delivery of possession or registration of transfer deed and shall surrender his title deeds and relevant documents if any, of the schedule property. (4) The seller shall obtain any documents that are necessary for registration of transfer deed. As the sale consideration amount is rs. 8,20,000/-, as per the rules in force at that time, for registering a sale deed, Tax clearance certificate issued by the Income tax department is a pre-requisite. Defendants applied for income-tax clearance certificate on 25-3-1988. The said certificate was granted on 27-4-1998 as per Ex. B-3. On 25-3-1998 itself the plaintiff obtained a demand draft for the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 2,20,000. 00 in favour of second defendant under Ex. A-7. It was revalidated for a further period of six months with effect from 23-9-1998 as evident from Ex. A-8. Subsequently plaintiff got the said amount invested in a Bank fixed Deposit Receipt, on 27-1-1999 second defendant addressed a letter Ex. A-9 to the plaintiff terminating the agreement of sale. To that notice plaintiff issued a reply ex. a-10 expressing her readiness and willingness to pay the balance of sale consideration amount and obtain a registered sale deed. On 25-2-1999 she purchased necessary non-judicial stamps and typed the sale deed on those non- judicial stamps, which is marked as ex. A-21. Subsequently, as the defendants did not affix their signatures on Ex. A-21 draft sale deed, she made an application on 13-4-1999, Ex. On 25-2-1999 she purchased necessary non-judicial stamps and typed the sale deed on those non- judicial stamps, which is marked as ex. A-21. Subsequently, as the defendants did not affix their signatures on Ex. A-21 draft sale deed, she made an application on 13-4-1999, Ex. A-22, seeking refund of the value of stamp papers and refund was ordered on 4-6-1999 by Ex. A-23, by Asst. Inspector General of Stamps, On 26-4-1999 plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance to direct the defendants to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of suit property or alternatively the court may execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and direction to the defendants to put plaintiff in possession of the suit property. The defendants contested the suit. Their main contention was that as per first condition in the sale agreement, Ex. B-4 balance of the sale consideration amount is to be paid within a week from the date of sale agreement, the time is essence of contract and as the balance amount was not paid by 19-3-1998 plaintiff is not entitled for relief of specific performance. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the trial Court. On a consideration of evidence on record, the learned Additional District judge, by his Judgment dated 19-9-2002 held that time is not the essence of contract and decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff. Aggrieved by that judgment and decree, defendants preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) IT is seriously contended by the learned counsel for the appellants before this Court that first condition in the sale agreement is not controlled in any manner by fourth condition, it is an independent term and as per first condition the plaintiff is bound to pay the balance of sale consideration by 19-3-1999 irrespective of the fact whether the defendants obtained income tax clearance certificate by 19-3-1998 or not. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that time is not the essence of contract and judgment and decree of the trial Court are not liable to be interfered with in the present appeal. ( 4 ) THE point for determination in the present appeal is: whether time is the essence of contract ex. B-4 and if so the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance is liable to be dismissed? 5. ( 4 ) THE point for determination in the present appeal is: whether time is the essence of contract ex. B-4 and if so the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance is liable to be dismissed? 5. The Supreme Court of India in a decision reported in Chanda Rani v. Kamal rani categorically held as follows:"it is well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity, which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language. "keeping in view the above principle of law we will consider the evidence on record to find out whether time is essence of the contract Ex. B-4. As per rules prevalent on the date of Ex. B-4 income-tax clearance certificate is essential for registering a regular sale deed in pursuance of sale agreement Ex. B-4. Long before Ex. B-4 plaintiff paid a substantial portion of sale consideration. She was not inducted into possession of the suit property either on the date of Ex. A-3 receipt or on the date of sale agreement Ex. B-4. Undisputedly defendants continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. In normal circumstances by the date of receipt of entire sale consideration amount, the vendor shall be ready and willing to deliver possession of the property sold and also convey valid title to the purchaser by executing a regular and proper registered sale deed. By 19-3-1998, the date on which according to the defendants the plaintiff has to pay balance of sale consideration amount, the defendants are not in a position to execute a registered regular sale deed in favour of plaintiff. By 19-3-1998, the date on which according to the defendants the plaintiff has to pay balance of sale consideration amount, the defendants are not in a position to execute a registered regular sale deed in favour of plaintiff. In fact the defendants did not take any step by 19-3-1998 to obtain income tax clearance certificate. The second defendant applied for income tax clearance certificate on 25-3-1998. This circumstance clearly indicates that the parties to the sale agreement Ex. B-4 did not consider the time as essence of sale agreement. If really the defendants construed first condition in ex. B-4 as a major condition for determining the fate of sale agreement Ex. B-4, immediately after 19-3-1998 they should have issued a notice terminating the sale agreement, Ex. B-4. They did not issue any such notice. On the other hand, after the expiry of the said crucial date, the second defendant made an application in Ex. B-3 on 25-3-1998 to the income-tax authorities seeking income tax clearance certificate from the department. This conduct of the second defendant is a clear indication of the crucial fact that defendants did not treat the time as essence of the contract. ( 5 ) SECOND defendant gave evidence as d. W. 1. The first defendant, who is the owner of the suit property, did not give evidence. A close reading of evidence of d. W. 2 makes it clear that the time is not essence of contract. P. W. 2 is the husband of plaintiff, P. W. 1. He was looking after the affairs of his wife, In his cross-examination d. W. 1 deposed as follows:"immediately, after expiry of the said period of one week, I did not address any letter or issue any notice either to p. W. 1 or to P. W. 2 demanding them to pay the balance of sale consideration but I orally asked P. W. 1 and then she asked me to wait for few days. Again says P. W. 2 asked me to wait for few days. At first P. W. 2 asked me to give 24 hours time to him as the money was in a Bank outside the City, and i accepted for it. Again says P. W. 2 asked me to wait for few days. At first P. W. 2 asked me to give 24 hours time to him as the money was in a Bank outside the City, and i accepted for it. P. W. 2 did not pay the balance amount by 24 hours as promised by him and so I telephoned to P. W. 2 and as usual P. W. 2 asked him to give few days time. I told him that he was delaying and procrasting and asked him to settle before end of march, 1998. P. W. 2 told me that he would settle before March, 1998. On 28-3-19981 telephoned to P. W. 2 and he replied that he was not in a position to settle before 31st March, 1998". He further deposed as follows:"though P. W. 2 did not pay the balance of sale consideration amount within 10 days from Ex. A-3, he asked some time to pay the balance of sale consideration amount. I did not give him specific time before which he should pay the balance of sale consideration amount. "the above evidence of second defendant shows that even after 19-3-1998 he was prepared to give some time to plaintiff to pay the balance of sale consideration amount. According to second defendant himself asking for time by plaintiff or second defendant granting time to plaintiff till the end of March, 1998 to pay the balance happened during the end of March, 1998. As already noticed by 25-3-1998 itself the plaintiff obtained a bank demand draft for the entire balance of sale consideration amount in the name of second defendant and kept it ready. Therefore, there is no question of plaintiff not having money or capacity to pay the balance of sale consideration amount and requesting the defendants to extend time for payment of balance sale consideration amount. The above evidence of second defendant is referred to only for the purpose of pointing out that even defendants did not consider the time as essence of contract Ex. B-4 further it is not the plea or evidence of defendants that subsequent to Ex. B-4 sale agreement there is substantial increase in the market value of suit property and thereby defendants sustained any monetary loss due to alleged delay on the part of plaintiff in paying the balance of sale consideration amount. B-4 further it is not the plea or evidence of defendants that subsequent to Ex. B-4 sale agreement there is substantial increase in the market value of suit property and thereby defendants sustained any monetary loss due to alleged delay on the part of plaintiff in paying the balance of sale consideration amount. The evidence on record clinchingly points out that from the date of Ex. B-4 the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. The defendants even after obtaining income-tax clearance certificate Ex. B-4, did not bring it to the notice of plaintiff and demand her to pay balance amount and obtain a regular sale deed in her favour. There are latches on the part of the defendants and not on the part of plaintiff. The relief of grant of decree for specific performance is a discretionary relief. In the circumstances of the present appeal we are satisfied that the trial Court exercised its discretion judicially keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the suit. There are no reasons to interfere with the said judgment and decree of the trial Court. We do not find any merits in the present appeal. ( 6 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The defendants are granted two months time from today to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in pursuance of judgment and decree of the trial Court failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to obtain a regular sale deed and get it registered through process of Court.