Judgment S.N.JHA, J. 1. This writ petition arises from a proceeding under Sec. 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 1961 (in short, the Act). The petitioners are purchasers of the disputed land. By the impugned order the respondents claim of pre-emption has been allowed and the petitioners have been directed to re-convey the disputed land to them. The facts giving rise to the case are as follows. 2. On 24-11-79, 0.44 Acre land out of 4.30 Acres of Plot No. 2456 Khata No. 332 at Rajgir in the district of Nalanda was sold by respondent Nos. 7 to 16 to petitioner No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 28.000.00 . The sale was registered on 10-12-79. On 8-3-80 respondent Nos. 5 and 6 filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Act before the Deputy Collector, Incharge Land Reforms (DCLR), Biharsharif for re-conveyance of the transferred land in their favour. The application was registered as L.C. Case No. 1 of 1980-81. On 15-4-80 possession of the land was delivered to the applicants i.e. respondents 5 and 6 in terms of Clause (ii) of Sec. 16 (3). The petitioners objected to the prayer for re-conveyance on grounds that the disputed land is situate within Rajgir Notified Area Committee. The land had been purchased for charitable purpose, namely, construction of building in memory of Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel, the first Deputy Prime Minister of the country, to be named as Patel Sewa Sadan. After purchase of the land the petitioners had constructed a room for use as office of Patel Sewa Sadan which was standing on the disputed land. It is not agricultural or horticultural land and therefore provisions of Sec. 16(3) of the Act are not applicable. The purchasers are not land holders or raiyats within the meaning of the Act and thus even if the land were to be treated as homestead it could not be said to be homestead of landholder. The land had been recorded in the cadestral survey record of rights as Parti Kadim. There were a number of residential houses in the vicinity. In support of the contention about the non-agricultural/horticultural nature of land the petitioners described the vicinity as having a bus stand, market etc. 3. The land had been recorded in the cadestral survey record of rights as Parti Kadim. There were a number of residential houses in the vicinity. In support of the contention about the non-agricultural/horticultural nature of land the petitioners described the vicinity as having a bus stand, market etc. 3. The parties submitted documents in support of their respective claim as detailed in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the writ petition respectively. Upon consideration of the documents, by order dated 26-3-91 the DCLR allowed the application and directed the petitioners to execute the sale deed on the same terms and conditions as contained in the sale deed within a period of one month failing which legal action would be taken, that is, the sale deed would be executed by the Court in the manner laid down under Order 21, Rule 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, as envisaged in Clause (iii) of Section 16 (3) of the Act. The petitioners preferred appeal before the Additional Collector, Nalanda at Biharsharif. The Additional Collector directed an enquiry by the Anchal Adhikari. On 6-5-82 the Anchal Adhikari submitted his report. The appeal was eventually dismissed on 6-10-82. The petitioners preferred revision under Sec. 32 of the Act before the Board of Revenue. By order dated 28-2-84 the Additional Member, Board of Revenue remanded the case to the Collector, Nalanda with a direction to personally enquire into the matter. The Collector, Nalanda came to the same conclusion as the Additional Collector and dismissed the appeal on 13-3-85. The petitioners again moved the Board of Revenue, the same Additional Member who had earlier remanded the case dismissed the revision on 15-2-86 rejecting the contention of the petitioners that the Collectors order was not in accordance with the remand order. The petitioners moved this Court in CWJC No. 2144/85 which was dismissed on 18-7-86. The petitioners thereafter went to Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 12960 of 1986 giving rise to Civil Appeal 581 of 1987. By order dated 4-3-87 the case was remitted back to the Collector for fresh disposal. I will refer to the order of the Supreme Court later at the appropriate place in this Judgment. After detailed hearing on a number of dates the Collector finally dismissed the appeal on 12- 4-90. The petitioners yet again moved the Board of Revenue in revision. By order dated 28-8-91 the revision was dismissed. I will refer to the order of the Supreme Court later at the appropriate place in this Judgment. After detailed hearing on a number of dates the Collector finally dismissed the appeal on 12- 4-90. The petitioners yet again moved the Board of Revenue in revision. By order dated 28-8-91 the revision was dismissed. The petitioners have come to this Court challenging the aforesaid orders. 4. It would thus appear that the case has a chequered history and except for two remand orders one by the Board of Revenue on 28-2-84 and the other by the Supreme Court on 4-3-87, they lost at all stages. The dispute, it would appear, is concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the authorities below the DCLR, the Additional Collector, the Collector and the Board of Revenue recorded by different officers at different stages. As a matter of fact, the petitioners attempt to get the orders (before remand by the Supreme Court) set aside by this Court failed when the writ petition, CWJC 2144/86, was dismissed on 18-7-86. A submission seems to have been made in the Supreme Court to the effect that the materials on record were not adequate to decide the dispute and therefore an opportunity should be given to the parties to lead further evidence. The plea apparently found favour and the case was remitted back for fresh disposal. It would be useful at this stage to quote the order dated 4-3-87 in extenso as under : "Special leave granted. Heard both sides. Having taken into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case we find that the material on record is not adequate and the parties should be given opportunity to lead further evidence. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and the Board of Revenue and remit the matter back to the Collector, Land Reforms, District Nalanda for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order asto costs. 5. We find no difficulty in accepting submission of the Counsel for the respondents that the earlier writ petition, CWJC 2144/ 86, having been dismissed by this Court on merit, in the normal course this writ petition would have been barred by principles of res judicata but for the order of the Supreme Court. 5. We find no difficulty in accepting submission of the Counsel for the respondents that the earlier writ petition, CWJC 2144/ 86, having been dismissed by this Court on merit, in the normal course this writ petition would have been barred by principles of res judicata but for the order of the Supreme Court. However, the remand was to enable the parties specially the petitioners to lead further evidence, and in the circumstances the point at issue has to be decided with particular reference to additional evidence, if any, filed by the parties. In view of the dismissal of earlier writ petition not much reliance can be placed on materials on record from before, for, that may amount to reviewing the previous order. In the circumstances we wanted to know as to whether the petitioners had led further evidence. It may be mentioned here that under Sec. 33 of the Act the authorities have the power as vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure trying a suit of (a) admitting evidence by affidavits, (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and (c) compelling production of documents. It is admitted position that neither any affidavit was filed by the petitioners nor any witness was summoned/ examined on oath nor any person was compelled to produce documents. The petitioners merely filed a voter list (referred to at page 89 of the paper book), certain sale deeds showing the increase in the value of the contiguous lands, and a certificate dated 24-6-89 to the effect that the sale deed in question had been burnt (referred to at Pages 98-101 of the paper book). 6. Sri Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the aforementioned certificate dated 24-6- 89 and contended that the transfer of land did not materialise and as the transfer was not complete, the application for preemption under Sec. 16 (3) was not maintainable. The plea of the counsel is totally misconceived and cannot be accepted. 7. Sub-sec. Sri Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the aforementioned certificate dated 24-6- 89 and contended that the transfer of land did not materialise and as the transfer was not complete, the application for preemption under Sec. 16 (3) was not maintainable. The plea of the counsel is totally misconceived and cannot be accepted. 7. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 16 of the Act provides that when any transfer of land is made to any person other than a co-sharer or raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer or transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the deed. The provisions relating to registration of deeds and documents are contained in the Registration Act 1908. It is not necessaiy to refer to the provisions in details. Suffice it to say that after a document is presented for registration and the execution thereof is admitted by or on behalf of the executant and the formalities required under Secs. 34, 35, 58, 59 and 60 are observed, endorsement and certificate referred to in Secs. 59 & 60 are copied in the Register Book, and the registration of the document thereupon is deemed to be complete under Sec. 61 (2) of the Act. The document is thereafter returned to the person who presented the same for registration, or to such other person (if any) nominated by him in writing in that behalf. Where the document (other than wills) remains unclaimed in the Registration Office for a period exceeding two years it may be destroyed under Sec. 85 of the Act. This is the only import of the aforementioned certificate dated 24-6-89. 8. The destruction of a document, delivery of which is not taken by the vendor/ vendee or any person on his behalf, can by no stretch of logic be interpreted as rendering the transfer of property or registration of the document incomplete. As seen above, registration is deemed to be complete under Sec. 61 (2) of the Registration Act after the contents of the documents, the endorsement thereon and certificate are copied in the relevant book. As seen above, registration is deemed to be complete under Sec. 61 (2) of the Registration Act after the contents of the documents, the endorsement thereon and certificate are copied in the relevant book. Under Sec. 47 of the Registration Act the transfer relates back to the date of execution. As rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents, an application for pre-emption is to be filed within three months of the date of "registration" of the document and therefore the Court has only to see whether the document was registered or not, since upon registration of the document property stands transferred from the date of execution itself. 9. Another aspect of the case is that the omission to take back the document from the Registration Office within the period of two years as envisaged in Sec. 85 of the Act, and the consequences thereof, if any, cannot bind a third party. The claim of preemption, though a weak right as held by Courts, is nevertheless a statutory right and thus where a transfer of land takes place to a person who is neither a co-sharer nor adjoining raiyat, any co-sharer or adjoining raiyat of the transferred land acquires the right to claim re-conveyance on the same terms and conditions. 10. Shri Rajendra Prasad submitted with vehemence that the document remained unclaimed as full consideration money was not paid to the vendors. As would appear from the sale deed, 21,000 rupees only had been paid to the vendors, the balance 7,000 rupees was to be paid at the time of exchange of equivalent (chirkut). The chirkut was not handed over to the purchasers and the balance amount was therefore not paid. The transfer thus being not complete the claim for pre-emption was not maintainable. Counsel submitted that a valid transfer is a pre-condition of the claim for re-conveyance/pre-emption under Sec. 16 (3) of the Act. Reliance was placed on Amarendra Kumar Sinha V/s. The Additional Member Board of Revenue Bihar, 1998 (3) PLJR 192, Gujan Yadav V/s. Sitaram Choudhary, 1973 BBCJ 260 , AIR 1974 Patna 124 and Most. Savitri Devi V/s. State of Bihar, 1989 PLJR 772 : AIR 1989 Patna 327. 11. The plea that the balance of the consideration money i.e. Rs. 7000.00 was not paid to the vendors appears to be a ploy to resist the claim of pre-emption. Savitri Devi V/s. State of Bihar, 1989 PLJR 772 : AIR 1989 Patna 327. 11. The plea that the balance of the consideration money i.e. Rs. 7000.00 was not paid to the vendors appears to be a ploy to resist the claim of pre-emption. If it were so it should have been stated right at the first instance in the show cause filed by the petitioners before the DCLR. Counsel was not able to take a firm stand that the plea had been taken by the petitioners in the show cause. From the order of the DCLR dated 26-3-81 it does not appear that any such plea had been taken in the show cause or even argued before him. On behalf of the respondents copy of the grounds of appeal (L.C. Appeal No. 1/1981-82 by the petitioners) was produced from which it definitely appears that such a plea had not been taken even before the Additional Collector in appeal. It it were a fact that the petitioners had not paid the balance amount and were thus treating the transfer as incomplete and the transaction as closed, this should have been their the first and foremost plea. Coming as it did at a very late stage it appears to be an after thought, to defeat the rights of the preemptors respondents. 12. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the question as to whether title passes on execution and registration of the deed or on payment of consideration money, depends upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from the deed, (see the cases of Panchoo Sahu v. Janki Mandar, AIR 1952 Patna 263, and Nagar Khan V/s. Gopi Ram Agarwala, AIR 1976 Patna 2. Payment of consideration money need not necessarily be in praesenti. Payment could be deferred but title could still pass. From perusal of the impugned sale deed in the instant case it would appear that the parties intended that the title would pass on execution of the deed notwithstanding deferred payment of part thereof. 13. It is significant to mention that the vendors respondent Nos. 7 to 16 herein never appeared at any stage in the proceeding including this Court in the present case, to support the plea of the petitioners. A plea of this kind is normally taken by the vendor. 13. It is significant to mention that the vendors respondent Nos. 7 to 16 herein never appeared at any stage in the proceeding including this Court in the present case, to support the plea of the petitioners. A plea of this kind is normally taken by the vendor. He may contend that as the full consideration money was not paid the sale was not complete and therefore there being no valid transfer of the dispute land claim for pre-emption was not maintainable. Silence of the vendors in the instant case goes in favour of the respondents rather the petitioners. 14. The case of Amarendra Kumar Singh (supra) was a case of vendor disowning the sale deed and on that ground resisting the claim of pre-emption. The plea further was that he had never parted with possession of the land in favour of the vendee. Similarly in the case of Gujan Yadav (supra), it was the vendor who contested the claim of the preemptor on the ground that the intention to transfer of the land was on payment of consideration money and since the consideration money was not paid, the land did not get transferred and they were still owner of the land. Again, in the case of Mostt. Savitri Devi (supra) the plea of non-payment of the consideration money came from the vendor. As a matter of fact, on the ground that consideration money was not, paid by the vendee, the vendor had executed registered deeds of cancellation cancelling the earlier deeds. The decisions are therefore of no help to the petitioners. 15. We wanted to know from the Counsel as to whether any action was brought by the vendors to realise the money, if it were true that the balance consideration money was not paid to them. Counsel was again not able to take a definite stand. Apparently the vendors have all along been satisfied. It is to be kept in mind that according to the petitioners they constructed one room for use as office of Patel Sewa Sadan which prima facie shows that according to them, the possession was delivered to them a fact stated in the sale deed itself. Apparently the vendors have all along been satisfied. It is to be kept in mind that according to the petitioners they constructed one room for use as office of Patel Sewa Sadan which prima facie shows that according to them, the possession was delivered to them a fact stated in the sale deed itself. If the petitioners were put in possession of the disputed land on or about 24-11 -79 i.e. the date of execution of the sale deed, (before delivery of possession in favour of the purchasers by interim order dated 15-4-80), the vendors would not have sat idle after receiving only part of the consideration money. The plea of the petitioners about the sale not being complete in the facts and circumstances thus must be rejected. 16. Shri Rajendra Prasad finally concentrated on the original case of the petitioner that having regard to the nature of the land, its situation, and status of the purchasers themselves, the disputed land does not qualify as "land" under Sec. 2 (f) of the Act wherein the term has been defined to mean as land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture, or an orchard, kharhur, or pasturage or forest land or even land perennially submerged under water or homestead of a land holder. According to the Counsel the land is situate in a Bazar area at Rajgir, it is neither agricultural nor horticultural land etc.. It is also not homestead of a landholder i.e. a raiyat or under-raiyat etc. as defined in Sec. 2 (g) read with 2(k) of the Act. 17. It may be stated here that this is the original case of the petitioners which was rejected by the authorities under the Act at different stages and also by this Court. The Supreme Court gave opportunity to the petitioners to lead further evidence on the point but no such evidence has been led. It was open to the petitioners to examine witnesses in terms of Sec. 33 (b) of the Act or even file affidavits in terms of Sec. 33(a). What they did after the remand was to file similar sale deeds rise in price of the land in the vicinity, but sale deeds with respect to the lands of the vicinity had earlier been filed too in order to indicate the nature of the land. What they did after the remand was to file similar sale deeds rise in price of the land in the vicinity, but sale deeds with respect to the lands of the vicinity had earlier been filed too in order to indicate the nature of the land. After considering the documents and the argument the petitioners case was consistently rejected by all the authorities. I wonder, if the petitioners can be allowed to agitate the same point again. 18. In fairness to the parties, however, it may be stated that document not less than the impugned sale deed Itself describes the land as agricultural a recital which must bind the petitioners, being party to the deed, It may also be stated that more than once local inspection was held by the statutory authorities, and the findings were eventually recorded upon consideration of their reports and map of the vicinity, As submit ted on behalf of the respondents, some constructions have been made in the vicinity in disregard of the provisions of Ancient Monuments and Archaelogical Sites and Remains Act, 1958, but, then, being totally unauthor= ised, they cannot be determinative of the real character of the land. 19. With respect to the argument that only homestead of a land holder (besides agricultural/ horticultural etc, lands) are amenable to provisions of Sec. 16 (3) of the Act, It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that it is not the case of the petitioners that the vendors are not agriculturists. What is required is that the vendor should be a landholder i.e. raiyat and not that the purchaser should be a landholder i.e. raiyat. It was pointed out that from the enquiry report it would appear that the authorities found existence of pyne, standing crops on the disputed land suggesting the agricultural character of the disputed land. Even if it were homestead, the vendors being ralyats within the meaning of Sec. 2 (k) of the Act a fact stated in the recital of the sale deed itself, the land would certainly fall within the ambit of Sec. 2 (f) and, therefore, Sec. 16 (3) of the Act. I find substance in the submissions of the Counsel for respondents. Accordingly, the plea of the petitioners as to non-agricultural/horticultural or homestead character of the land is rejected. 20. I find substance in the submissions of the Counsel for respondents. Accordingly, the plea of the petitioners as to non-agricultural/horticultural or homestead character of the land is rejected. 20. Lastly Sri Rajendra Prasad submitted that the application under Sec. 16 (3) was not in the prescribed form and therefore it should have been summarily rejected. In this regard he placed reliance on Ram Chandra Singh V/s. Sub-divisional Officer, Hajipur, 1989 PLJR 103 : AIR 1989 Patna 50 and Sona Devi V/s. Paras Nath Singh, 1989 PLJR 301. In the former case Rule 19 of the Ceiling Rules (which lays down the procedure of filing application under Sec. 16 (3) of the Act) was held to be mandatory in the context of absence of notice of the proposed application to the transferrer as required under Rule 19 (3) of the Rules, In the latter case, the preemptor had failed to furnish full description of the disputed land in Form LC 13, While considering the requirements of the application under Sec. 16 (3) of the Act read with Rule 19 and Form LC 13 of the Rules the Supreme Court observed in the case of Hiralal Agrawal v, Rampadarath Singh, AIR 1969 SC 244 , that omission to comply with the requirements would not be fatal to the application as those provisions are directory In nature and it would be sufficient compliance of the directory provisions so long as it furnishes the necessary Information to the Collector to proceed with the application, No doubt, strictly speaking, application under Section 16 (3) should be filed in prescribed format i.e. in LC Form 13, but if all relevant facts have been stated In the application and the procedure laid down in Rule 19 has otherwise been followed, the application cannot be rejected on the ground that it was not filed in the prescribed form. Nothing in particular was pointed out which was missing in the application filed by the respondents In the instant case. It is well settled that what is Important is the substance and not the form. In any view, after 24 years of litigation, it would not be at all proper to entertain such a technical plea when the parties have contested each others claim on merits at different stages. 21. It is well settled that what is Important is the substance and not the form. In any view, after 24 years of litigation, it would not be at all proper to entertain such a technical plea when the parties have contested each others claim on merits at different stages. 21. Before I close the discussion I must notice the submission of the Counsel for the respondents that if the petitioners are treating the transfer as incomplete by reason of non payment of the balance consideration money, or otherwise, it is not understandable as to why they are pursuing the litigation. In that case they may conveniently ignore the order of the Collector under the Act i.e. DCLR to execute the sale deed in favour of preemptors failing which the deed will be executed by the DCLR in the manner provided in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, vide Sec. 16(3) (iii) of the Act. If such sale deed is executed by the DCLR on the petitioners refusal to do so, the person aggrieved would be the vendors and the petitioners have nothing to loose. The vendors however by not appearing at any stage of proceeding, apparently are least bothered about the outcome of litigation. I find substance in the contention and in the facts and circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the plea of the petitioners la not bona fide and the same has been taken only to defeat the respondents claim of preemption 22. In the result, for reasons stated above, I find no merit In this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed with cost which is quantified at five thousand rupees, payable to respondent Nos, 5 and 6, B.N.P.SINGH, J. : 23. I agree, Petition dismissed.