JUDGMENT - KHARCHE S.T., J.:-By this Second Appeal, the appellants/defendants challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Joint District Judge, Akola on 18-11-1987 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1984, directing them to pay an amount of Rs. 8000/- along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of suit till the realisation of the amount. The Appellate Court had allowed the appeal and set aside the decree and judgment dated 23-9-1985, passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 46 of 1984, dismissing the suit for refund of consideration. 2. Brief facts are as under : The defendants are real brothers. They own land Survey No. 61, admeasuring 5 acres at Soyata. On 29-1-1981 they had agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff Balkrishna Chuturbhuj Charkha, for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- on receiving advance amount of Rs. 8000/-. The remaining amount of Rs. 2000/- was to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. The possession was to be delivered after the registration of the sale deed. The execution of the sale deed was postponed as on the date the Ceiling scheme was made applicable to that village, and there was restrictions on alienation. The deceased plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance of consideration, but the defendant avoided to execute the sale deed, and therefore, the deceased plaintiff had instituted a suit claiming specific performance of the contract or in the alternative refund of Rs. 8000/- + Rs. 4000/- towards interest on the said amount. 3. The defendants combated the claim by their written statement, and contended that the deceased plaintiff was carrying on the business of money lending. They had executed the agreement of sale (issarchitthi) as security for loan amount of Rs. 3000/- advanced to them, though in the agreement of sale it has been mentioned that amount of Rs. 8000/- was advanced to them. It is contended that they were in need of money, and hence approached the deceased plaintiff, who agreed to advance the loan at interest at the rate of Rs. 5% per month, after executing the agreement of sale by way of security. 8000/- was advanced to them. It is contended that they were in need of money, and hence approached the deceased plaintiff, who agreed to advance the loan at interest at the rate of Rs. 5% per month, after executing the agreement of sale by way of security. It is contended that the deceased plaintiff is in the habit of advancing loans to the defendants from last 15 years, and had also advanced loan to one Shivram, prior to 15 days of the present transaction dated 29-1-1981. 4. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, dismissed the suit with costs. The appeal was carried by the then plaintiff to the District Court. The Appellate Court set aside the dismissal of the suit and allowed the appeal, and directed the defendants to pay the amount of Rs. 8000/- to the plaintiff with interest @ 6% p.a., on the said amount from the date of the suit till realisation of the amount. It is this judgment and decree which has been challenged in this appeal. 5. The substantial question of law formulated by this Court while admitting this appeal on 6-7-1988 was-whether the transaction in question was a money lending transaction inviting dismissal of suit under section 10 of the Money Lending Act, 1946 (hereinafter called as 'M.L. Act' for short), and whether the deceased plaintiff was doing the business of money lending. 6. Mr. S.R. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the defendants contended that the finding of the Appellate Court is contrary to the provisions of the law and there is a apparent error of law in the judgment. He contended that the trial Judge has recorded finding while answering issue No. 7 that, it is suffice to say that under the guise of the Isarchitthi, the deceased plaintiff Balkrishna has indulged in money lending transaction. He does not hold any licence, and therefore issue No. 7 has been answered by the trial Court in the affirmative and held that the deceased plaintiff is the money lender, carrying on the business of money lending without licence. 7. Mr. Deshpande, further contended that there was no reason for the Appellate Court to disturb the said finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. 7. Mr. Deshpande, further contended that there was no reason for the Appellate Court to disturb the said finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. He contended that as per section 10 of the M.L. Act, the trial Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the suit and on consideration of the evidence adduced by the defendants, it would appear that the plaintiff was carrying on the business of money lending and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court is not sustainable in law. 8. Mrs. K.V. Sirpurkar, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff contended that the Appellate Court was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence to hold that the plaintiff is a money lender. Something more is required to be proved by the defendants to establish that the plaintiff is a money lender. To have a loan transactions with one or two persons cannot be the basis for branding that person as a money lender. She further contended that on the basis of this finding, the Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit, and directing the defendants to refund the amount of Rs. 8000/- with interest as mentioned above. In support of this submission, Mrs. Sirpurkar, relied on the decision of Single Bench of this Court in (Ganesh Madhavrao Hawaldar v. Mithalal Keshaolal Dave)1, 1999(1) Bom.C.R. (N.B.)868, another decision of the Single Bench of this Court in (Nandram Kaniram v. N.B. Rahetkar)2, 1994(1) Bom.C.R. 28 , and also on the Single Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (K. Sudersanam v. S. Venkatrao)3, A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 442. 9. I have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel it is necessary to reproduce sub-section (2) of section 2, which defines the business of money lending and "business of money lending" means the business of advancing loans (whether in cash or kind and) whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business'. 10. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel it is necessary to reproduce sub-section (2) of section 2, which defines the business of money lending and "business of money lending" means the business of advancing loans (whether in cash or kind and) whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business'. 10. Sub-section (9) of section 2 defines Loan, and loan means an advance at interest (whether of money or in kind but does not include --(a) a deposit of money or other property in a Government Post Office, bank or in any other bank or in a company or with a Co-operative Society; (b) a loan to, or by, or a deposit with any society or association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other enactment relating to a public, religious or charitable object; (c) a loan advanced by a Government or by any Local authority authorized by Government; and (d) loan advanced by a Co-operative Society. 11. It is not disputed that the plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance of contract, and in the alternative for refund of consideration. The trial Court refused to grant the decree for the relief of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff, and the finding of the trial Court so far as this relief, is concerned has been confirmed by the Appellate Court, and this decree has not been challenged by deceased plaintiff and it has become final. 12. This Court in Ganesh Madhaorao Hawaldar's case (supra) in para No. 4 has observed that,---"It is then submitted by Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the plaintiff is a money lender and the suit was hit by section 10 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 by reason of the plaintiff not having the money lending licence. On considering the entire evidence on record, I find substance, in the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The plaintiff in emphatic term says that he has never adopted money lending business. The burden of proof was, therefore, on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has adopted the money lending business as a profession. In this respect, the defendant had led evidence to show that the plaintiff had advanced a loan to him as well as to his son. The burden of proof was, therefore, on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has adopted the money lending business as a profession. In this respect, the defendant had led evidence to show that the plaintiff had advanced a loan to him as well as to his son. He was however, unable to show that besides him and his son, other persons have also borrowed money from the plaintiff. It is well settled that mere one or two the casual transactions of money lending do not make a person as a professional money lender. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mrs. K. Sundersanam v. S. Venkartao, A.I.R. 1963, A.P. 442. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had adopted money lending business as a profession. In my view, the lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff not being a money lender was not required to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders' Act. No fault can be found with the said findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant". 13. In Nandram Kaniram (supra), this Court took the view that the isolated transaction of advancing loan cannot be held to be a money lending transaction. 14. The Appellate Court in para No. 12 of the judgment observed as under: "It is true that the evidence on the record reveals that the defendants and Shioram had taken loans from the plaintiff. It further reveals that they had executed documents of agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff. The defendants claims that they are having loan transaction with the plaintiff since last 10 years. In my view, this much evidence is not sufficient to hold that the plaintiff is a money leader. Something more is required to be proved by the defendants to establish that the plaintiff is a money lender. To have a loan transactions with one or two persons cannot be the basis for branding that person as a money lender. As such the learned Civil Judge has erred in holding that the plaintiff is a money lender and he is not possessing a valid money lending licence, his suit for refund of consideration is also liable to be dismissed." 15. As such the learned Civil Judge has erred in holding that the plaintiff is a money lender and he is not possessing a valid money lending licence, his suit for refund of consideration is also liable to be dismissed." 15. It is obvious that the finding of the Appellate Court that the defendants have failed to establish that the deceased plaintiff was carrying on the business of money lending is based on proper appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in support of their contentions. Hence simply because the deceased plaintiff had advanced loan to the defendants and one Shioram, one cannot jump to the conclusion that he was carrying on the business of money lending. Something more is required to be proved by the defendants to establish that he is a money lender. 16. Sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, contemplates that -- "no Court shall pass a decree in favour of a moneylender in any suit to which this Act applies including such suit pending in the Court before the commencement of the Bombay Moneylenders (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Maharashtra LXXVI of 1975), unless the Court is satisfied that at the time when the loan or any part thereof, to which the suit relates was advanced, the moneylender held a valid licence and if the Court is satisfied that the moneylender did not hold a valid licence, it shall dismiss the suit." 17. But, then before pressing this sub-section into service, the defendants have to establish that the plaintiff was carrying on the business of money lending. In this context I may usefully refer the decision of Supreme Court in (Gajanan and others v. Seth Brindawan)4, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2007, it has been observed in para No. 10 that "Money Lender" as defined in section 2(v) of the Act means a person who, in the regular course of business advances a loan as defined in this Act and it includes, subject to the provisions of section 3, the legal representatives and successors-in-interest of the person who advanced the loan; and the expression 'moneylending" is also to be construed accordingly. By virtue of section 2(ix) "Sub-Registrars" appointed under the Indian Registration Act are to function under the present Act. Section 11-A enjoins every Sub-Registrar to maintain a register of moneylenders in the prescribed form. By virtue of section 2(ix) "Sub-Registrars" appointed under the Indian Registration Act are to function under the present Act. Section 11-A enjoins every Sub-Registrar to maintain a register of moneylenders in the prescribed form. Section 11-B renders it obligatory for every person who carries on or intends to catty on the business of moneylending to get himself registered by an application to the Sub-Registrar of the sub-district in which he carries on or intends to carry on such business. The application is required inter alia to specify the district or districts in which the applicant carries on or intends to carry on business of moneylending. Section 11-D provides that the registration certificate granted under section 11-D shall not entitle the holder thereof to carry on the business of money lending in other districts. Section 11-F which bars persons from carrying on business of money lending without registration certificate also provides a penalty for the contravention of this provision. Section 11-C provides for composition of offences covered by section 11-F(i). According to section 11-H no suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a moneylender is to proceed in a Civil Court until the Court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not required to have such certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of moneylending. From the scheme of these provisions it is evident that for a person to be a moneylender he must in the regular course of business advance a loan. There is a long catena of authorities on the statutes regulating the controlling moneylenders in which the expression "moneylender" has been so construed as to exclude isolated transaction or transactions of moneylending. Vivian Bose, J., while dealing with the Act which concerns us, in (Sitaram Shrawan v. Bajya Parnya)5, A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 177, said : "The word 'regular' shows that the plaintiff must have been in the habit of advancing loans to persons as a matter of regular business. If only on isolated act of moneylending is shown to the Court it is impossible to state constitutes a regular course of business. It is an act of business but not necessarily an act done in the regular course of business." 18. The aforesaid ratio laid down by the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is an act of business but not necessarily an act done in the regular course of business." 18. The aforesaid ratio laid down by the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Though the defendants tried to establish that there were in all two transactions of money lending by the deceased plaintiff, one with the defendants and another with Shioram, and that the transactions were being done from the last 10 years. There is absolutely no material to substantiate the contentions of the defendants. Had it been the fact, the defendants would not have failed to make a complaint about the same to the Registrar, especially when it is the case of the defendants that the deceased plaintiff used to charge exorbitant interest. The defendants have gone to the extent of saying that he infact had advanced the loan of Rs. 3000/- and got the execution of the agreement of sale in his favour as a security, but by mentioning therein that he had paid the balance consideration of Rs. 8000/-. In such circumstances, it is quite obvious that it is not at all possible to hold on the basis of the evidence led, that the deceased plaintiff was carrying on the business of money lending and the suit is liable to be dismissed as per section 10 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. The Appellate Court was perfectly justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court dismissing the suit in its entity and no patent error of law has been shown in the judgment of the Appellate Court. Thus I have come to the conclusion that there is no merits in the appeal, and the same stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances, parties are left to bear their own cost. Appeal dismissed. -----