TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) MADE the following: in these appeals filed against the order of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior division), Mangalore, in proceedings under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act, the respondent-landowner has raised a two-fold preliminary objection; one touching the maintainability of the appeal and the other, the liability of the appellant to pay Court fee. Mr. R. Vijaya Kumar, Counsel appearing for the landowner strenuously argued that the appellar did not have an unqualified right to file an appeal against the judgment of the reference Court and that even if any such right is conceded in his favour, the same could be exercised only after obtaining the leave of this Court. Alternatively, he argued that in an appeal preferred by the beneficiary of an acquisition also, Court fee was payable on the amount representing the difference between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and that awarded by the Reference Court. The appellant had not, it was contended by Mr. Kurnar, paid the requisite Court fee on the differential amount which it was legally liable to pay. ( 2 ) MR. Padubidri Raghavendra Rao, Counsel appearing for the appellant on the other hand, argued that the question whether a right of appeal vested in the beneficiary of an acquisition was no longer res Integra in the light of the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in U. P. Awas Evam vikas Parishad v Gyan Devi (dead) by L. Rs and Another. He urged that all that the beneficiary was required to do was to seek the leave of the Appellate court to prefer an appeal. An application for the grant of such a leave having been filed in the instant cases, this Court could and ought to grant the requisite permission especially when the enhancement granted by the Reference Court was manifold of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. On the question of payment of Court fee, Mr. Rao submitted that a plain reading of section 48 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, left no manner of doubt that Court fee was payable only in cases where the appellant was the owner of the land and was seeking award of a further amount before the Appellate Court. The appellant in the instant cases was not according to mr. The appellant in the instant cases was not according to mr. Rao claim ing any amount nor could any such claim be maintainable since it was not the owner of the land. On a true and correct interpretation of section 48, the liability to pay Court fee could according to Mr. Rao arise only in cases where the appeals were preferred by the landowners against the orders made by the Reference Court. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a Division Bench of this Court in Executive Engineer, karnataka Housing Board Division, Belgaum v Babu Krishna Waskar and others. ( 3 ) THE question whether an appeal can be maintained by the beneficiary of an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act is indeed concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in U. P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad's case, supra. The majority opinion in the said case declared:"in case, the amount of compensation has been enhanced by the court and no appeal is filed by the Government, the local authority if adversely affected by such enhancement may file an appeal with the leave of the Court. This right of the local authority does not depend on its being impleaded as a party in the proceedings before the Reference court. Even if the local authority is not impleaded as a party before the reference Court it can file an appeal against the award of the reference Court in the High Court after obtaining leave if it is prejudicially affected by the award. In case the Government files an appeal against the enhancement of the award the local authority is entitled to support the said appeal and get itself impleaded as a party. When the person having an interest in the land files an appeal in the high Court against the award of the Reference Court and seeks enhancement of the amount of compensation the local authority should be impleaded as a party in the said appeal and it is entitled to be served the notice of the said appeal so that it can defend the award of the reference Court and oppose enhancement of the amount of compensation before the High Court. The same will be the situation in case of an appeal to this Court from the decision of the High Court". . The same will be the situation in case of an appeal to this Court from the decision of the High Court". . ( 4 ) IN the light of the above pronouncement, it is no longer open for the respondents to argue that the beneficiary even when aggrieved of the order of enhancement made by the Reference Court is not entitled to maintain an appeal against the same. The observations made by the Apex Court are in fact suggestive of such a right of appeal being available to a local authority even when it has not been impleaded as party before the Reference Court. The appellant in the instant cases was irnpleaded as a party before the Reference court where it had appeared to contest the claim for enhancement of compensation. The verdict of the Reference Court having gone against it, the beneficiary could legitimately seek redress before an Appellate Court in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the paragraph extracted above. All that was required as a condition precedent for the exercise of that right was an application seeking permission of the Appellate court to maintain an appeal. The appellant has accordingly made a specific application seeking the permission of this Court to maintain these present appeals. Objections to the said application have been no doubt filed by the respondent-landowner which inter alia assert that the right of appeal itself is doubtful but the said contention as noticed above cannot hold water in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court. The Land acquisition Officer had in the present case awarded compensation to the landowner at the rate of Rs, 1,50,000/- per acre for dry lands and Rs. 1 lakh for wetlands which amount has been enhanced by the Reference Court to Rs. 4,50,000/- per acre in the case of dry lands and Rs. 3,50,000/- per acre in the case of wetlands. The enhancement granted is thus nearly 200% over and above what has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The grievance of the appellant-beneficiary cannot in the light of the said enhancement be said to be farfetched or academic so as to justify refusal or permission in its favour to maintain the present appeals. The enhancement granted is thus nearly 200% over and above what has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The grievance of the appellant-beneficiary cannot in the light of the said enhancement be said to be farfetched or academic so as to justify refusal or permission in its favour to maintain the present appeals. We accordingly hold that the appellant-beneficiary of the acquisition is entitled to maintain the present appeals for which we hereby grant the requisite permission prayed for by it in the application filed before us. The objections to the maintainability of the appeal raised by the respondent accordingly stand overruled. ( 5 ) THAT brings us to the question whether the appellant is also required to pay Court fee on the amount representing the difference between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and that awarded by the Reference court. Section 48 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, deals with payment of Court fee on a memorandum of appeal against decision, award or order relating to compensation. It runs as follows:"48. Fee on memorandum of appeal against decision, award or order relating to compensation. The fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against a decision or an award or order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purpose shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant". ( 6 ) A plain reading of the above provision would no doubt prima facie create an impression that the liability to pay Court fee on the memorandum of appeal will arise only if the appellant before the Appellate Court makes a claim for payment of compensation over and above the amount awarded in his favour by the Land Acquisition Officer. A beneficiary of an acquisition cannot however make any claim for payment of any amount in his favour either before the Reference Court or before the Appellate Court competent to hear the appeals. It on the other hand can challenge the correctness of the order passed by the Reference Court granting enhancement in the compensation awardable to the owner. Strictly speaking therefore Mr. Rao's contention that the liability to pay Court fee does not arise in case of appeals preferred by the beneficiaries of acquisitions could not be lightly brushed aside. It on the other hand can challenge the correctness of the order passed by the Reference Court granting enhancement in the compensation awardable to the owner. Strictly speaking therefore Mr. Rao's contention that the liability to pay Court fee does not arise in case of appeals preferred by the beneficiaries of acquisitions could not be lightly brushed aside. To the same effect indeed was the Division Bench decision of this court in Babu Krishna Waskar's case, supra, relied upon by Mr. Rao. That case dealt with Section 48 of the Act before its amendment and held that the word 'applicant' appearing at the end of the said section clearly implied that the liability to pay Court fee will arise only it the appeal is by the claimant-owner seeking payment of compensation. The legal position has however undergone a change since the said pronouncement. The issue was examined by the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v Tarak singh and Others. The question there was whether the Indore Development authority who happened to be the beneficiary of the acquisition was liable to pay Court fee on the memo of appeal filed by it having regard to Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Court Fees Act. Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Court fees Act is in pari materia with Section 48 of the Karnataka Court Fees and suits Valuation Act. The contention before the Apex Court was that the language employed in Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Court Fees Act did not envisage payment of Court fees on an appeal filed by a beneficiary as the beneficiary does not make any claim for payment of any compensation. Repelling the contention, the Supreme Court observed:"it is true that the appellant is not the claimant. But, when the appellant seeks to avoid the decree, which is made by the Reference court, it must be construed that the appellant is seeking to avoid the amount of higher compensation determined by the Reference Court, as claimed by the landowners. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation awarded by the reference Court under the Central Act. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation awarded by the reference Court under the Central Act. When its legality is challenged by filing the appeal under Section 54, the difference of the amount for which appeal is filed, ad valorem Court fee under Section 8 is required to be paid. Article 11 of Scheduled II has no application, since it is expressly covered by Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Court Fees act". ( 7 ) THE only difference between Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Court fees Act and Section 48 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, lay in the use of word 'applicant' in the Karnataka Act instead of the word 'appellant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act. The Karnataka Act was however amended by Act 15 of 1998 by which the word 'applicant' appearing at the end of Section 48 was substituted by the word 'appellant'. The result then is that the provisions of Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh court Fees Act which fell for interpretation of the Supreme Court in Indore development Authority's case, and those of Section 48 of the Karnataka Act are made word by word similar. That being so, the declaration of law by the supreme Court as regards the liability of the beneficiary to pay Court fees on an appeal preferred by it will apply not only in regard to the appeals relatable to Madhya Pradesh Act but also those referable to Section 48 of the karnataka Act. We have in the light of the said pronouncements of the supreme Court, no hesitation in holding that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Babu Krishna Waskar's case, supra, is no longer an authority for the proposition that appeals filed by the beneficiaries under the Karnataka enactments are not required to pay Court fee. The correct position after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court is that even on appeals preferred by the beneficiaries against orders made by the Reference Courts, Court fee is payable on the amount that represents the disputed differential between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and that awarded by the reference Court. The correct position after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court is that even on appeals preferred by the beneficiaries against orders made by the Reference Courts, Court fee is payable on the amount that represents the disputed differential between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and that awarded by the reference Court. In that view, therefore, the office shall determine the amount payable towards Court fees on the said differential amount having regard to the pronouncement of the Division Bench of this Court in Special land Acquisition Officer v S. M. Gajendran alias S. M Gajendra Babu'. The appellant shall upon determination of the said amount arrange to pay the requisite Court fee within a period of 4 weeks. --- *** --- .