ORDER Rajesh Tandon, J. 1. Sri Rajendra Dobhal for the revisionist and Sri N. C. Gupta, Standing Counsel for the respondent. 2. This revision arises out of the order passed by the District Judge, Uttarkashi dated 22-4-1986 passed in Original Suit No. 9 of 1985, Bachan Lal v. State of U. P. 3. The brief facts giving rise to this revision are that a suit was filed by Sri Bachan Lal Thalwan in the Court of District Judge. Uttarkashi praying for the following reliefs : (a) A decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession, occupation and enjoyment of two muthi land granted to him forming part of plot No, 2112 in village Barahat, District Uttarkashi by the Deputy Commissioner in charge, Uttarkashi. (b) Costs of the suit, and any other relief which the learned court may deem fit in the interest of justice or to which the plaintiff is found entitled. According to the plaint averment the plaintiff applied for two muthi of land out of plot No. 2112 of village Barahat, District Uttarkashi in the month of November, 1974, under Government Grants Act, for construction of house for residential purpose. The land according to the plaintiff lies within the limits of Nagar Palika, Uttarkashi. According to the plaintiff S. D. M. Bhatwari after necessary scrutiny submitted papers to the Deputy Commissioner with the recommendation that grant of the land may be made to the petitioner. After completing all the formalities, the Acting Deputy Commissioner sanctioned, grant on 2-4-1975 to the plaintiff and immediately thereafter lease deed was also executed. 4. During the proceedings of the case the plaintiff has applied for amendment in the plaint. The trial Court has rejected the application vide order dated 22-4-1986. The revisionist has challenged the order by filing the present revision under Section 115, C. P. C. 5. Heard Sri Rajendra Dobhal for the revisionist and Sri N. C. Gupta, standing counsel for the respondent at great length and have perused the pleadings of both the parties, copy of the plaint, written statement and other material on record. 6. The revisionist has challenged the order by filing the present revision under Section 115, C. P. C. 5. Heard Sri Rajendra Dobhal for the revisionist and Sri N. C. Gupta, standing counsel for the respondent at great length and have perused the pleadings of both the parties, copy of the plaint, written statement and other material on record. 6. In paragraph 11 of the plaint it has been stated that a notice dated 19-8-1983 from the office of District Magistrate, Uttarkashi was served alleging that the grant made in his favour by S. D. M. Bhatwari was not in accordance with taw and was liable to be cancelled and as such show cause notice was issued as to how the grant should not be cancelled. In paragraph 27 the plaintiff claimed the following relief : "That, it is in the fitness of things that the order dated 16-7-84, passed by the District Magistrate/Collector, Uttarkashi in case No. 7 of 82-83 by quashed." 7. Cause of action according to the plaintiff arose when the grant of the land in question was made in his favour by the incharge Deputy Commissioner, Uttarkashi and thereafter lease deed was executed and got signed by the plaintiff and further -that the Collector, Uttarkashi cancelled the grant without any authority of law illegally, arbitrarily and inconsistently. 8. As will appear from the aforesaid paragraph as well as cause of action which according to the plaintiff was to the effect that the order dated 16-7-1984 passed by the District Magistrate, Uttarkashi in case No. 7 of 1982-83 be quashed and in cause of action also the plaintiff has pleaded that the District Magistrate has cancelled the grant without any authority of law, illegally, arbitrarily and Inconsistently. The pleading with regard to cancellation of patta is already there in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the suit. 9. It appears that the relief which was sought by the plaintiff was Only with regard to the decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the possession, occupation and enjoyment of two muthi land granted to the plaintiff. Along with the plaint an application for temporary injunction was also filed. 10. 9. It appears that the relief which was sought by the plaintiff was Only with regard to the decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the possession, occupation and enjoyment of two muthi land granted to the plaintiff. Along with the plaint an application for temporary injunction was also filed. 10. During pendency of the suit an application was filed by the plaintiff in the year 1986 under Order VI, Rule 17, C. P. C. stating therein that in paragraph 27 of the plaint he has already pleaded for quashing "of the order dated 16-7-1984 and as such the same may be deleted and in its place the following words may be inserted : 1. "Deserved to be declared void and in case the said order is allowed to remain in force then the defendant can cause injuries to the rights of the plaintiff would adversely effected, therefore, it is necessary to declare the said order be void." Similarly at the end of paragraph 28 of the plaint the following amendment was sought: 2. "And thereafter threatening the plaintiff to vacate the land and there is apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff that defendant may dispossess the plaintiff from suit land." In paragraph 31 of the plaint amendment t the following effect was sought : 11. That after the word 'jurisdiction' and before the Court-fee the following words may kindly be inserted : "for the relief of perpetual injunction and for declaration the suit valued at Rupees 5.000/-. And after the words 'for injunction' and before is being the word "may" kindly be inserted being the consequential relief of declaration. 12. From the perusal of the amendment which are sought to be incorporated, it appears that the plaintiff has already taken the plea that order dated 16-7-1984 passed by the District Magistrate/Collector, Uttarkashi be quashed, in other words since the quashing in not possible by the Civil Court and the suit can be brought only under the provisions of Specific belief Act, therefore, the plaintiff has sought amendment for declaring the same to be void. In other words the plaintiff was already conscious of the fact that the order dated 16-7-84 is null and void and only due to defective pleadings 'quash' was mentioned instead of declaring to be void. 13. According to Sri Rajendra Dobhal. In other words the plaintiff was already conscious of the fact that the order dated 16-7-84 is null and void and only due to defective pleadings 'quash' was mentioned instead of declaring to be void. 13. According to Sri Rajendra Dobhal. learned counsel for the revisionist the amendments which are being sought to be incorporated will not change the nature of the suit Inasmuch as the initial order by which the grant was cancelled is already there and as such only change of relief under the provisions of Specific Relief Act cannot be denied to the plaintiff inasmuch as once the pleadings were already there, it will not change the nature of the suit. 14. Order VI, Rule 17, C. P. C. relates to the amendment of pleadings. Rule 17 has further been amended and substituted by the C. P. C. (Amendment) Act 2002 with effect from 1-7-2002. The original Rule 17 was as under : The Court, may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Thereafter by way of amendment the following has been substituted w.e.f. 1-7-2002. 15. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties : Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. I my opinion the proviso is not applicable under the present case inasmuch as the suit was filed in the year 1985 and soon thereafter amendment application was filed in March 1986. 16. Sri N. C. Gupta, Standing Counsel however, has argued that the amendment will change the nature of the proceedings inasmuch as notice under Section 80, C. P. C. was not in respect of amended pleadings and further the amended pleading is barred by the provisions of Order 2. 16. Sri N. C. Gupta, Standing Counsel however, has argued that the amendment will change the nature of the proceedings inasmuch as notice under Section 80, C. P. C. was not in respect of amended pleadings and further the amended pleading is barred by the provisions of Order 2. Rule 2, C. P. C. 17. It is a settled law that at the time of allowing of amendment, the Court has only to look as to whether the ingredients of Order VI, Rule 17 are satisfied or not. Rule 17 is very much clear it provides that amendment can be allowed at any stage of proceedings on such terms as may be just, there is no quarrel with the proposition that the amendment-was sought at the trial stage and that too without changing the nature of the suit. 18. Order 6, Rule 17 has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions and the Apex Court has given guidelines for the law courts that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical view. Aforesaid guidelines have been given by the Apex Court in B. K. Narayan Pillai v. Parameshwaran Filial (2000) 1 SCC 712 : (AIR 2000 SC 614). It has also been emphasised in the aforesaid decision that technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Court in administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled multiplicities of litigation. 19. Admittedly in the present case cause of action which the plaintiff has pleaded is cancellation of patta in his favour, either in the original pleadings or in the amended pleadings he is not changing the cause of action. The cause of action still is the same i.e. cancellation of patta and he wants to get it declared null and void, Therefore, it is a fit case where the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Court in administration of justice and further that in order to avoid uncalled multiplicity of litigation the amendment has to be allowed. 20. The intention behind the amendment is two fold; one to avoid multiplicity of litigation and another to minimise litigation. 20. The intention behind the amendment is two fold; one to avoid multiplicity of litigation and another to minimise litigation. In the case, Raghu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan (2001) 2 SCC 472 : (AIR 2001 SC 699) the Apex Court has held as under : "If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case, as is evident from the perusal of averment made in paras 8(a) to 8(f) of the plaint which were sought to be incorporated by way of amendment. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for." The expression 'cause of action' has also been interpreted in the case of, B. K. Narayan Pillai (AIR 2000 SC 614) (supra) where the Apex Court after referring the judgment of Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107 has held that the expression "cause of action" in the present context does not mean 'every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed'. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under : The expression 'cause of action in the present context does not mean "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke v. Gill in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could every be amended or added and, of course no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. The expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corpn. Ltd. and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would made the rule futile. The words 'new case' have been understood to mean 'new set of ideas' Dornan v. J. W. Ellis and Co. Ltd., his also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. Ltd. and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would made the rule futile. The words 'new case' have been understood to mean 'new set of ideas' Dornan v. J. W. Ellis and Co. Ltd., his also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any light acquired by any party by lapse of time." Thus in my opinion order to do substantial justice between the parties as well as for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties the amendment sought by the plaintiff in paragraphs 1,2,3 and 4 of application deserves to be allowed. 21. The revision is, therefore, allowed. Order dated 22-5-1986 passed by the District Judge, Uttarkashi is quashed. Amendment shall be incorporated by the plaintiff in the plaint within one month after receipt of certified copy of the order. The District Judge is directed to decide the suit as far as possible within two months. The plaintiff will pay a costs of Rs. 2.000/- which shall be deposited in State Legal Service Authority, Uttaranchal and shall be utilised for the benefit of poor litigants.