JUDGMENT Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Heard the parties. The opposite party filed Title (Eviction) .Suit No. 16 of 1998 against the defendant-petitioner for his eviction from the suit shop detailed in Schedule A to the plaint under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) on the grounds of personal necessity and expiry of lease. The defendant petitioner claimed that she was inducted as tenant in the suit shop directly by the owner of Sen Mansion at Hirapur, Dhanbad, measuring 5 x 7, being a portion of Holding No. 2 (old) in Ward No. 4 (old) of Dhanbad Municipality and the plaintiff had no locus standi to claim himself to be the landlord of the suit shop within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act. She was never a tenant under the plaintiff and she was paying rent to the owner regularly. There was no question of any fixed term of tenancy. However, in the alternative personal necessity was also denied. 2. During pendency of the suit, the trial Court passed an order under Section 15 of the Act which was not complied with and, therefore, the defendants defence against ejectment was struck off by order dated 17.2.2001. 3. However, the suit proceeded treating the plaintiff to be the landlord of the suit shop, whereas admittedly as stated in paragraph 1 of the plaint, the plaintiff was inducted as tenant in the suit shop by the owner of the building Sen Mansion and as such his capacity in respect of the suit shop was that of a tenant only. In course of hearing of the suit, the plaintiff brought on record the unregistered agreement dated 28.6.1996 between him and the defendant inducting her as a qua-tenant in the suit shop for eleven months. The said document was marked as Exhibit 1. 4. A perusal of the said agreement reveals that the plaintiff had inducted the defendant as tenant in shop No. 8 at monthly rental of Rs. 600/- payable by her to the plaintiff. She had also deposited a sum of Rs. 5000/- by way of security with the plaintiff, which was to be returned after expiry of eleven months period of the agreement.
600/- payable by her to the plaintiff. She had also deposited a sum of Rs. 5000/- by way of security with the plaintiff, which was to be returned after expiry of eleven months period of the agreement. It was also mentioned therein that every month the rental of the shop in question shall be paid by the plaintiff to the owner of Sen Mansion without any break and if the rental for more than two months fell due, both the plaintiff and the defendant shall be jointly responsible to vacate the shop. 5. In this revision application filed under Section 14 (8) of the Act by the defendant without going into the pleadings, evidence and findings recorded in the impugned judgment regarding the alleged claim of personal necessity of the plaintiff as well as the question of partial eviction, if any, in my view, the first thing to be considered and decided herein is whether the plaintiff was the landlord of the suit shop, within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act and was entitled to file and maintain a suit under Section 14 of the Act for eviction of the defendant from the suit shop. 6. It is not in dispute that the owners of Sen Mension, the suit shop being part whereof, hand inducted the plaintiff as tenant therein. Further, in the year "1996 on the basis of the aforesaid registered agreement the plaintiff appears to have inducted the defendant as sub-tenant therein and on the said document one of a witness. In the said document, there was no agreement that the newly inducted sub-tenant shall pay any rent directly to the shop No. 8 was to receive monthly rent from the defendant. Further by the said document no direct relationship of landlord and tenant was created between the owners of the suit shop and the defendant and as such even if the period of eleven months expired and/ or the plaintiff required the shop for his personal use, as tenant of the said shop, in my opinion, he had no locus standi to file a suit for defendants eviction under Section 14 of the Act. At any rate the plaintiff did not come under the definition of landlord within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act.
At any rate the plaintiff did not come under the definition of landlord within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. As tenant of the premises he was not authorized to file and maintain a suit for eviction under the Act. 7. In my view, in case a tenant inducts a sub-tenant in a rented premises either of his own or with consent of the owner/ landlord thereof, for eviction of the said sub-tenant, he is not authorized to file a suit for eviction under the Act is given only to a landlord against a tenant. The tenant, on the other hand, cannot claim this prerogative under the Act in respect of a sub-tenant. I, therefore, hold that the Title (Eviction) Suit No. 16 of 1998 filed by the plaintiff-opposite party herein under Section 13 of the Act for eviction of the defendant-petitioner was not maintainable. Consequently, I need not go into merit of the findings recorded by the trial Court in the impugned judgment regarding personal necessity of the plaintiff as well as partial eviction of the defendant from the suit shop. I, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and eviction decree and dismiss the suit as not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff. 8. In the result, this revision application is allowed, but without costs.