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2003 DIGILAW 885 (PNJ)

State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh Takhar

2003-07-03

S.S.SARON, SWATANTER KUMAR

body2003
ORDER Swatanter Kumar, J. - F.I.R. No. 31 of 1994 was registered against Balraj Singh Takhar accused respondent herein under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474 read with Section 120-B Indian Penal Code under the jurisdiction of P.S. Division No. 5, Jalandhar. 2. According to the prosecution, the case was registered on the basis of an application received from Mrs. Geena Gill addressed to the S.S.P. Jalandhar. The complainant claims to be a permanent resident of U.S.A. and she had appointed the accused, her uncle, as general attorney in order to take care of her moveable properties and bank accounts in India. However, Balraj Singh Takhar allegedly indulged in misappropriation of properties and withdrew large sums from her bank accounts for his personal use. Having come to know of such activities of the accused, the complainant cancelled the general power of attorney in November, 1990, which she had executed in the year 1983. Various documents and even cheque book etc. were not returned by him to the complainant. In fact the accused forged a cheque of Rs. 40 lacs from the cheque book, of account No. SB/38 14990 of Punjab and Sind Bank, Basti Guzan, Jalandhar. This fact came to the notice of the complainant after a registered letter was sent by the advocate on behalf of the respondent in relation to the said cheque and threatening to take proceedings under the Criminal law against the complainant. Placed in these circumstances, the complainant wrote a letter/complaint to the S.S.P., Jalandhar as afore- noticed. A case was registered and a police report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Charge under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 474 Indian Penal Code was framed against the accused. The accused-respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. The prosecution led considerable documentary and oral evidence. However, the complainant did not examine herself in the Court and finally vide judgment dated 13.9.1997, the learned trial Court gave benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted him of the charges framed against him. This judgment of acquittal gave rise to the two above noted cases. 3. The prosecution led considerable documentary and oral evidence. However, the complainant did not examine herself in the Court and finally vide judgment dated 13.9.1997, the learned trial Court gave benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted him of the charges framed against him. This judgment of acquittal gave rise to the two above noted cases. The complainant filed Criminal Revision No. 166 of 1998 titled as Mohinder Kaur Gill v. Balraj Singh Takhar and another, challenging the order of acquittal in favour of the accused, while Criminal Appeal No. 345-DBA of 2000 was filed by the State against the same judgment. 4. The appellant State of Punjab filed Criminal Misc. No. 127-MA of 1998 for grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal, which was listed before a Division Bench of this Court for grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal. Division Bench of this Court declined the leave vide order dated 30.6.1998 passed in Criminal Misc. No. 127-MA of 1998. The Criminal Revision No. 166 of 1998 preferred by the complainant was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 30.6.1998 observing that in view of the fact that appeal to leave in Criminal Misc. No. 127-MA of 1998 had been declined, the revision deserved to be dismissed. 5. Aggrieved from the said order, the State of Punjab had preferred a special leave petition to appeal before the Honble Supreme Court of India, where leave was granted and finally in Criminal Appeal No. 1190 of 1999, State of Punjab v. Balraj S. Takhar, the Honble Supreme Court passed the following order :- "Leave granted. Without expressing any opinion on the merits we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have granted leave to the State to file an appeal and to the complainant to file revision petition. We accordingly set aside the orders of the High Court and direct that the High Court will decide the matter on merits as expeditiously as possible. The appeals are allowed." That is how both Criminal Appeal and Criminal Revision have been placed for disposal before this Court. 6. At the very outset we may notice that after hearing the learned counsel for the parties at some length, we were of the view that the matter may require to be remanded to the trial Court. The appeals are allowed." That is how both Criminal Appeal and Criminal Revision have been placed for disposal before this Court. 6. At the very outset we may notice that after hearing the learned counsel for the parties at some length, we were of the view that the matter may require to be remanded to the trial Court. At that stage, the parties had submitted that they would like to consider the possibility of compromising the entire matter as the dispute was primarily between the real uncle and niece. Vide order dated 21.1.2003 we had granted time to the parties. However, the respondent failed to appear before the Court despite a specific undertaking given on his behalf and directions by the Court in that regard. The complainant had come all the way from U.S.A. and was willing and ready to settle the matter. We are unable to appreciate the attitude of the respondent-accused as adopted in the present case. Vide order dated 4.4.2003, we had passed certain interim directions as well as required the respondent- accused to bear the expenditure of the ticket of the complainant for travelling from U.S.A. to Chandigarh. 7. In light of the above facts, the principal question that falls for consideration before the Court is whether the cheque of Rs. 40 lacs allegedly to have been issued by the complainant is a forged or a genuine cheque ? 8. De hors various controversies raised before us, on facts the necessary answer to this pertinent question shall provide appropriate precept for resolving other incidental issues arising in this case. 9. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case including PW 1 Devinder Singh, Assistant Manager, Punjab and Sind Bank and PW 4 Narinder Singh Shergill who proved the photographs Ex.DH and DG as well as specimen signatures of Mohinder Kaur PW 4/D and PW 4/C. In addition thereto, number of documents were proved on record by the prosecution to establish that the cheque in question was a forged one. We may notice that vide order dated 24.5.1997 the trial Court itself had closed the evidence of the prosecution as it failed to produce all the witnesses and request for adjournment was declined. 10. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code was recorded who denied the allegations and pleaded innocence. We may notice that vide order dated 24.5.1997 the trial Court itself had closed the evidence of the prosecution as it failed to produce all the witnesses and request for adjournment was declined. 10. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code was recorded who denied the allegations and pleaded innocence. The accused also led defence and examined six witnesses in support of his case as well as produce certain documents. The learned trial Court while granting benefit of doubt to the accused, held as under :- "I have perused the report of Forensic Science Lab. at length. The same is Ex.PX on the file. A careful perusal of this report shows that there is not a single word written in this report against accused Balraj Singh. This report only states that the signatures on the disputed cheque are not of Mohinder Kaur and nothing more. Further this report at page No. 5 specifically mentions that it had not been possible to express any definite opinion on the questioned signatures on the cheque in comparison with specimen writing stamped and marked S-14 to S-73. Hence as per the observation of the Asstt. Director, Forensic Science Lab. Punjab as per Ex.PX it has further been opined by it that no express opinion has been given on the signatures of Mohinder (sic. Maninder) Kaur on the disputed cheque with comparison of S-14 to S-73, which are the writings of Balraj Singh accused, when he signed as Mohinder (sic. Maninder) Kaur Gill. Hence the report of Forensic Science Lab. itself, which has been relied upon by the prosecution itself has given no opinion and has not at all compared the questioned signatures with those signatures which were given by accused in the Court. Hence the report in question is not at all helpful to prove the prosecution case, as far as the alleged forgery committed by the accused is concerned. Another important point, which has been argued upon by the ld. defence counsel is that in the present case, the accused has been charge-sheeted and the present case against the accused was registered on written complaint given by Mohinder (sic. Maninder) Kaur Gill, the complainant to SSP, Jalandhar. Ld. counsel for the accused has argued that the complainant herself has not stepped into the witness box to prove all the allegations of the complaint. Maninder) Kaur Gill, the complainant to SSP, Jalandhar. Ld. counsel for the accused has argued that the complainant herself has not stepped into the witness box to prove all the allegations of the complaint. As such when there is no direct evidence coming forward from the side of prosecution to prove even the bare allegations as contained in the complainant, the entire prosecution case fails and the accused is entitled to be acquitted. The perusal of file shows that after the written complaint was received from the complainant, who had opined to register a case against the accused under the Sections under which the accused has been charge sheeted. The allegations in the complaint were that the accused had forged the signatures of Mohinder (sic.-Maninder) Kaur Gill, the complainant on the disputed cheque which came to the knowledge of the complainant, when she received notice from the Advocate of accused in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which was filed by the present accused against the complainant. The perusal of file further makes it evident that by way of examination of defence witnesses, it has been proved by accused Balraj Singh that he had presented the cheque of Rs. 40 lacs for encashment before the concerned bank and the same was dishonoured with the remarks "insufficient funds". Consequently, a notice as required under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was served by Shri Ranjan Lakhan Pal, Advocate, on behalf of the accused Balraj Singh to the complainant Mohinder (sic.- Maninder) Kaur Gill. It is further proved on the file that Mohinder (six.- Maninder) Kaur Gill neither paid the said amount, nor appeared in that very complaint case, which is still pending. Hence, when under these circumstances, the only presumption is that the present case was registered by the prosecution at the instance of the complainant, who only wanted to wriggled out of the liability which she had under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Instead of appearing in that very complaint case, the complainant had given a written complaint to the police authorities, as counter-blast and after that she never turned upon in the Court to depose her earlier version. The perusal of file shows that many times, the summons were sent to her, but she never turned (up) and further never any date was requested for her examination. The perusal of file shows that many times, the summons were sent to her, but she never turned (up) and further never any date was requested for her examination. As such when the complainant herself has not stepped into the witness box and has not stated the contents and the allegations of the complaint, there is no direct evidence coming forward from the side of the prosecution proving the allegations of the prosecution case." 11. The challenge by the learned Senior Deputy Advocate General for the appellant State of Punjab as well as for the revision-petitioner to the judgment of acquittal and particularly the above recorded findings, is inter alia on the following grounds : i) The learned trial Court has erred in law and more particularly in the facts and circumstances of the case, in closing the evidence of the prosecution vide order dated 24.5.1997. It is contended that no proper opportunity was given to the prosecution to prove its case. ii) The report of the Forensic Expert was admissible in evidence under the provisions of Section 293(4)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and in the event of the Court choosing to disbelieve the said report, an opportunity ought to have been granted to the complainant for proving the said report to the satisfaction of the Court. This has seriously prejudiced the case of the prosecution. iii) The circumstances of the case clearly establish on record that parties had a joint account, the power of attorney had been cancelled prior to the issuance of the cheque and the accused being the sole beneficiary of the cheque showed beyond doubt that accused had committed the offence which he was charged with. As such the judgment of the trial Court is erroneous and based upon misappreciation of evidence. iv) It was also contended that the accused was also liable to be punished under Section 471 Indian Penal Code as that offence in any case stood established beyond any reasonable doubt. 12. The learned Senior Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State and learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner also contended that accused was the sole beneficiary of the cheque and he used the same with complete knowledge. He also contended that the learned trial Court as per settled practice could have asked for more time for conclusion of the trial rather than closing the evidence of the prosecution. 13. He also contended that the learned trial Court as per settled practice could have asked for more time for conclusion of the trial rather than closing the evidence of the prosecution. 13. While meeting these arguments, learned counsel for the accused vehemently contended that the prosecution had failed to prove its case and the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in a judgment of acquittal is very limited. He also contended that it has not been proved on record that the accused had ever forged the signatures of the complainant on the cheque in question. 14. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and with their assistance gone through the records of the case. 15. After considering the documents and material on record, we are of the view that the cases requires to be remanded. In fact, a tentative view in this regard we have expressed at the outset. There are certain infirmities committed by the learned Trial Court, which require a fresh look. 16. The report of the Forensic Expert has not been correctly relied upon by the learned trial Court. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused, however, relied upon judgment of a Honble Single Bench of this Court in the case of Nirmal v. State of Punjab, 2001(4) RCR(Criminal) 622. Before adverting to the same, we may notice that the Assistant Director (Documents), Forensic Science Laboratory, Punjab, Chandigarh, has examined the documents, i.e. the cheque, admitted signatures of Mohinder Kaur on account opening form as well as signatures of Mohinder Kaur taken on a sheet Ex. PW.4/C on 21.6.1994 marked as Section 1 to Section 13. He submitted his report Ex.PX before the Court in which it was opined as under :- "The person who wrote the red enclosed specimen signatures stamped and marked A1 to A4 and S1 to S13 did not write the questioned signature on the cheque bearing No. SB/38-14990 dated March 9, 1994 for Rs. 40,00,000 (Rs. forty lakhs)." 17. This opinion of the Expert was based upon various reasons and observations given in detail in Ex.PX. However, the learned trial Court stated that there was no definite finding recorded in Ex.PX that the signatures on the cheque here forged by the accused. In fact, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are, to some extent, at variance with the contents of Ex.PX. However, the learned trial Court stated that there was no definite finding recorded in Ex.PX that the signatures on the cheque here forged by the accused. In fact, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are, to some extent, at variance with the contents of Ex.PX. The learned counsel for the respondent-accused emphatically submitted that as the Examiner was not produced in Court and report Ex.PX was not proved in accordance with law, the accused was entitled to confirmation of order of acquittal. 18. First and foremost, we must discuss the main plank of submission raised on behalf of the respondent-accused that the report of the handwriting expert exhibit PX could not be looked into must less relied upon by the learned trial court in consonance with the principle enunciated in the case of Nirmal (supra). In the case of Nirmal (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court had made reference and relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Damu and others, 2000(2) Recent Criminal Reports 781. In the said case, Honble Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions of section 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code), held as under - "Exh. 64 is only the opinion of the Asstt. State Examiner of Documents. From that description alone, it cannot be gathered whether his office would fall within the purview of Section 293 of the Code. Hence without examining the expert as a witness in Court, no reliance can be placed on Exh. 64 alone." 19. A bare reading of the above conclusion of the Honble Apex Court clearly shows that the office of the Assistant State Examiner of Documents was not an office specified under the provisions of Section 293 of the Code and as such did not fall within the purview of the said section so as to make the report to be per se admissible in evidence. In these circumstances, their Lordships observed that no reliance could be placed on Exhibit 64 alone. In these circumstances, their Lordships observed that no reliance could be placed on Exhibit 64 alone. While specifically relying upon the above conclusion of the Honble Apex Court, the learned Single Judge held as under :- ".....From a perusal of the above it would be clear that Section 293 Criminal Procedure Code applies only to certain experts like Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to the Government, Chief Inspector of Explosives, Director of the Finger Print Bureau, Director, Deputy Director, or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory and the Serologist to the Government, besides Director of Haffkeine Institute, Bombay. The report of the handwriting expert, even if it has been given by the expert working in the Forensic Science Laboratory, would not be per se admissible under Section 293 Criminal Procedure Code unless the maker of the said report is summoned and examined as a witness and the other side is given opportunity to cross-examine the witness. In my opinion, there was absolutely no occasion for the learned Sessions Judge to have observed that the report of the handwriting expert was admissible under Section 293 Criminal Procedure Code and could be allowed to be tendered into evidence without summoning the author of the report." 20. With respect, but regretfully, we are unable to adopt the view expressed by the learned Single Judge, in the case of Nirmal (supra), as a proposition of law. Various Clauses of sub-section (4) of Section 293 of the Code illustratively state which of the reports are admissible in evidence by their mere tender and it may not be necessary or obligatory on the part of any of the authorities to summon the author of the report it Court. Unambiguously purpose behind the provisions of Section 293 of the Code is to avoid appearance of the experts before the Court, provided they hold designated office in terms of section 293 of the Code. The view expressed in Nirmals case (supra) appears to be somewhat in contradiction to the terms of provisions of Section 293 of the Code. The provisions provide that any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government Scientific expert to whom this section applies, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or Court proceedings. The view expressed in Nirmals case (supra) appears to be somewhat in contradiction to the terms of provisions of Section 293 of the Code. The provisions provide that any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government Scientific expert to whom this section applies, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or Court proceedings. The report of such Government Scientific Expert is per se admissible in evidence, provided the Government Scientific Expert, who is author of the report and should be specifically designated as Government Scientific Expert as enumerated under sub-section (4) of Section 293 of the Code. Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory is one of such designated experts whose report and analysis are admissible in evidence. In our opinion, it would not be necessary to summon the expert even to prove the said report. However, the power of the Court to summon and examine the expert, if the Court thinks it proper under sub-section (2) of the Section 293 of the Code cannot be restricted. The discretion of the Court would have to be exercised in consonance with the settled principles of law and keeping in view the facts and circumstances and subject matter of the report by the Court. The purpose of provision of Section 293 of the Code appears to liberalise encumbersome procedure and strict submission and proof of the report submitted by the Government Scientific Expert, as defined under the provisions of Section 293 of the Code. In our view, it may not be in consonance with the scheme of the amended provisions of Section 293 of the Code to require the report to be proved by production of the expert in Court, which would otherwise be covered under the provisions of the said sections. The view expressed in Nirmals case (supra) appears to be neither in consonance with the provisions of section 293 of the Code nor in conformity with the law enunciated by the Honble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra case (supra), upon correct application of the principle of ratio decidendi. The judgment of the Honble Apex Court in State of Maharasthra v. Damus case (supra) would not be a precedent in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The judgment of the Honble Apex Court in State of Maharasthra v. Damus case (supra) would not be a precedent in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The view expressed in Nirmals case imposes limitations or renders certain reports inadmissible which are not so spelt out in the section, in our humble view. This obviously would have the effect of rendering a document inadmissible, which otherwise would be admissible if tendered in accordance with law. What is expressed is the rule and implications are precluded. "Expressum facit cessare tacitum" is a well accepted principle of interpretation of statutes. Having given our serious consideration to the matter in issue, we hold that the view expressed in Nirmals case (supra) to this extent is not a correct exposition of principle of law involved. It is to some extent opposed to the language of Section 293 read with sub-section (4) of the Code and the reliance upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) probably was not quite proper. The view in Nirmals case thus, would be per incurium and therefore, is not a binding precedent. It may be useful to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case Criminal Appeal No. 312-DB of 1997 titled Pardeep etc. v. State of Haryana decided on 28.5.1997, where in somewhat similar circumstances, the Bench held as under :- "....The provisions of Section 389(1) of the Code do not admit any limitation and if legislature has opted not to impose any limitation for grant of such relief, it will be difficult for the Court to hold that such limitation can be read into statute by Judicial pronouncement. Every case must be adjudicated on its own facts, merits and demerits. It is not possible to prescribe jacket (strait-jacket?) formula which will govern all cases and would adequately provide parameters on the basis of which each bail application could be granted or declined. xx xx xx xx xx xx We find it difficult to define the limitation in such cases which could be imposed on the powers exercisable by the Appellate Court as prescription of such limits by judicial intent, we fear, may neither be possible nor permissible keeping in view the statutory provisions governing the subjects. xx xx xx xx xx xx We find it difficult to define the limitation in such cases which could be imposed on the powers exercisable by the Appellate Court as prescription of such limits by judicial intent, we fear, may neither be possible nor permissible keeping in view the statutory provisions governing the subjects. It has been repeatedly held by various Courts that laying down of conditions which would universally apply in granting or refusing a bail application irrespective of other factors, grounds and reasons, may ultimately prove more disadvantageous than furthering the cause of these statutory provisions which give a definite right to an accused or convict. In the famous case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2147, the Honble Supreme Court of India while dealing with the arguments identical to the one advanced on behalf of the State in Subhash Chands case (supra), before the learned Division Bench, was repelled by the Supreme Court while declining the relief and it expressed its view as follows :- "The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Court and in this Court on the basis that once a person had been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but that underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the Court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years." 21. The report Exhibit 64 in State of Maharashtra v. Damus case (supra) was the opinion of Assistant State Examiners of Documents, who obviously is not a designated government Scientific Expert under sub-section (4) of Section 293 of the Code. However, in the present case, the report Exhibit PX was submitted by the Assistant Director, Documents, Forensic Science Laboratory, Punjab. We may also refer to another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of Punjab, 1982 Crl. However, in the present case, the report Exhibit PX was submitted by the Assistant Director, Documents, Forensic Science Laboratory, Punjab. We may also refer to another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of Punjab, 1982 Crl. L.J. 2138, wherein it was held that the report of the Chemical Examiner, as a whole, including the averments with regard to the condition of the sample and the seals thereon and the manner of its receipt was admissible under the provisions of section 293 Criminal Procedure Code Their Lordships of the Division Bench also commented upon the ambit, scope and object of the provisions of section 293 of the Code. Their Lordships held as under :- "In legal terminology, the word "document" under Section 293 is one of larger connotation and what is more, the Section brings within its ambit any such document purporting to be such a report. Thus there is no warrant for any artificial constriction or narrowing down the ambit of the report visualised under Section 293 to only that part thereof which pertains to the opinion of the Chemical Examiner and excluding all the rest, therefrom. Again the significant words in Section 293 seem to be "upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis." The words "duly submitted" include within its ambit the mode and manner of the submission of the sample and its receipt by the Scientific Expert. Consequently, the report with regard to the manner of the submission of the sample for examination and its condition would come squarely within the scope of Section 293 of the Code." 22. In view of the above discussion, we are not in a position to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the trial court should have entirely rejected the report Exhibit PX submitted by Assistant Director, Documents Forensic Science Laboratory. Furthermore, we are also of the considered view that the learned trial court was not justified in partially rejected the report and holding the same as of insignificant consequence in regard to the offence for which the accused was charged. The accused in the present case, was charged under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The report Exhibit PX in definite and unambiguous term suggests that the signatures on the cheque were not that of Maninder Kaur-complainant. The accused in the present case, was charged under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The report Exhibit PX in definite and unambiguous term suggests that the signatures on the cheque were not that of Maninder Kaur-complainant. In other words, the signatures on the cheque of Rs. 40 lacs which the accused had sought to encash in his account did not bear the true and genuine signatures of the account holder. The experts evidence indicated at least prima facie that some one has played the mischief of forging the signatures of the complainant, the benefit of which the accused intended to draw. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani v. State of Gujarat, JT 2001(1) SC 156, to contend that the above evidence is sufficient to convict the accused at least under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Their Lordships in Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani (supra) held as under :- "We have heard the parties. In our view it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant used the duplicate certificate with changes, as a true certificate knowing it to be false in material particulars and thereby got admission. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the conviction. However, keeping to the nature of the offence and the fact that the appellants past and present records has been good and the fact that he has already lost his career and is now married, we reduce the sentence to that already undergone. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 23. Still in another case titled as Bank of India v. Yeturi Maredi Shanker Rao and another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 821, their Lordships held as under :- "......It was clearly established that the accused used the forged document and on the basis of that document obtained money to which he had no claim and thereby caused wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss to complainant. The complainant used to take the assistance of the accused whenever she wanted to have any transaction in the Bank and therefore, it is expected of him to have known the signatures of the complainant. The complainant used to take the assistance of the accused whenever she wanted to have any transaction in the Bank and therefore, it is expected of him to have known the signatures of the complainant. Under these circumstances, it could not be doubted that the accused used the withdrawal form knowing it to be forged or at least believed it to be forged and therefore it could not be said that he could not be convicted for an offence under Section 471. It is no doubt true that so far as the evidence about the forgery of the signature of the complainant on the withdrawal form was concerned there was no evidence except the fact that the signature was forged and the further fact that the withdrawal form was in the possession of accused who presented it in the Bank and obtained money therefrom and pocketed the same. From these facts an inference could safely be drawn that it was the accused who got signatures of the complainant forged on the withdrawal form as it was he who used it to obtain money from the Bank. In this view of the matter therefore, the acquittal of the accused for an offence under Section 467 read with Section 109 also could not be justified." 24. Without entering into the implicates of the merit of the offence and keeping in mind the above enunciated principle of law, we are unable to affirm the approach adopted by the learned trial court in acquitting the accused. The evidence of the expert could not have been brushed aside by the Trial Court, partially referring the same, while giving benefits to the accused. The report of the expert need to be appreciated as afore-noticed and, if necessary, should be granted to the parties to lead evidence. In our view, the learned Trial Court, thus, has failed to exercise the jurisdiction lawfully vested in it. Since we propose to remand the matter, we may not record any further findings in this behalf. 25. Furthermore, the learned trial court has also not appreciated the provisions of section 293 of the Code in their right perspective. If the Court was of the opinion that the report required to be proved and it intended some clarification, it was obligatory upon the Court to summon the expert before rejecting the report wholly or partially. 25. Furthermore, the learned trial court has also not appreciated the provisions of section 293 of the Code in their right perspective. If the Court was of the opinion that the report required to be proved and it intended some clarification, it was obligatory upon the Court to summon the expert before rejecting the report wholly or partially. The findings recorded by the learned trial court are clearly suggestive of the fact that it has declined to fully and substantially rely upon the report, which was ex-facie admissible in evidence. The Court ought to have granted an opportunity to the complainant to produce the expert. 26. It has been vehemently argued before us on behalf of the complainant that the principles of natural justice have been violated as the order closing the prosecution evidence was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not disputed that the complainant is the niece of the accused, who appointed him as attorney to look after his affairs of property and bank etc. in India. The power of attorney was revoked on alleged mis- appropriation by the accused. The cheque is alleged to have been issued after revocation of the power of attorney. It is nowhere is evidence before us as to how and on what account the cheque was issued in favour of the accused by the complainant. 27. The complainant had examined number of witnesses including the fact that she had submitted a report of the Forensic expert to prove her case. The charge was framed on 16th October, 1996 and the matter was fixed for the first time for recording of prosecution evidence on 8.1.1997. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 24th April, 1997 and the matter was fixed even before the District Judge on 13.3.1997, vide order dated 24th February, 1997. A criminal revision preferred by the accused for quashing the charge against him was dismissed by the High Court and direction was issued to the trial court to complete the trial within three months. The matter was listed before the learned District Judge and thereafter last opportunity was granted for 24th May, 1997 on which date the learned trial Court passed the order closing the evidence of the prosecution. 28. The matter was listed before the learned District Judge and thereafter last opportunity was granted for 24th May, 1997 on which date the learned trial Court passed the order closing the evidence of the prosecution. 28. During the course of hearing, it was informed to us that the complainant was not well and she had made a statement before the Court for an adjournment as she planned to come to India and make a statement in support of her complaint. 29. It is true that the learned trial Court is expected to comply with the directions issued by the High Court in its true spirit and substance, but it is equally known that in the interest of justice as and when the learned trial court feels it appropriate do ask for extension of time to comply with the time bound schedule in conclusion of the trial. This practice is well established and in all probability as and when such request is received by the High Court, the same is normally allowed. 30. In the facts and circumstances, the most pertinent factor which the Court should consider while passing the order closing the evidence is that the Court should ensure that there should be no mis-carriage of justice if the evidence was closed. The evidence on record seen in light of the circumstances attended thereto clearly show that the complainant would suffer serious prejudice and there is every likelihood of mis-carriage of justice, if the evidence is closed. We are of the considered opinion that keeping in view the circumstances of the case, the order closing the evidence of the complainant/prosecution was not in the interest of justice. 31. At this stage, we may also make reference to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh, 2001(2) RCR(Criminal) 390, where in the case under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code PW.1 appeared earlier but was not present on the last occasion and the prosecution evidence was closed. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court while setting aside the acquittal held as under :- "We have no doubt that in this case a miscarriage of justice has occasioned due to the failure of the trial Court to comply with the mandatory directions contained in the Code. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court while setting aside the acquittal held as under :- "We have no doubt that in this case a miscarriage of justice has occasioned due to the failure of the trial Court to comply with the mandatory directions contained in the Code. Criminal justice cannot be allowed to be defeated solely on account of inaction or lapses of the Court in adhering to the mandates of law. When the State of U.P. moved the High Court of Allahabad, in this case, seeking leave to appeal, the above aspect should have been considered by the learned Judges and set right the grave miscarriage of justice occasioned on account of louting (flouting?) the directions of law." 32. The order sheet of the trial court shows that on most of the dates of hearing the prosecution evidence was present. The prosecution evidence itself was commenced on 8.1.1997 and could not be concluded because of intervening order of the High Court and the evidence itself was closed within nearly four months i.e. 24.5.1997. We certainly record that expeditious disposal of trial Court deserves appreciation but such conclusion should be in consonance with the basic rule of law and should in no circumstances lead to miscarriage of justice. No person, guilty of serious offence, should be permitted to escape on the ground of some error on the part of the prosecution in concluding its evidence in time. The Court must and is obliged to draw a balance between the dates to be granted for prosecution to conclude evidence and the likelihood of the mis-carriage of justice on the other. 33. We are convinced that the learned trial Court fell in error of law in not granting opportunity to the complainant to summon the expert under section 293(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in closing the evidence. 34. 33. We are convinced that the learned trial Court fell in error of law in not granting opportunity to the complainant to summon the expert under section 293(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in closing the evidence. 34. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused also contended that there are improvements in the statements made to the police and what was stated by PWs in the Court and that the statement of PW.4 was quite contradictory to the statement made by him before the police under section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code These arguments are not of much merits, because firstly, even if there are certain misstatement and contradiction in the statement of the witnesses before the Court unless they were of vital nature and apparently prejudicial to the defence of the accused would the accused get benefit of the same. Such statements have to be appreciated in their correct perspective. No such significant contradiction or improvement has been brought to our notice, which would fall in that category and grant benefit of doubt to the accused. This argument in any case lose their significance in view of the order we propose to pass in the facts and circumstances of the case. 35. In view of our above discussion and particularly keeping in mind the fact that adequate opportunity was not granted to the complainant to lead evidence in support of her case, the report ought to be treated as a report squarely falling under the provisions of Section 293(1) and (4) of the Code and further that the learned trial Court has fallen in error to some extent in acquitting the accused, we set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 13.9.1997. Further we remand the matter with a direction to the learned trial Court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law keeping in view the above observations and decide the same expeditiously. However, nothing stated here shall be taken as an expression on merit of the case and the trial Court would examine the material and evidence on record independently uninfluenced by any factual aspect considered here but at the same time would keep in mind the legal position. 34. Consequently, Criminal Appeal preferred by the State and the revision preferred by the complainant are accepted to the above extent, while leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.