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2003 DIGILAW 887 (AP)

Vurlamka Satyavathi v. State OF A. P. , through Sub-Divisional Officer, Peddapuram, E. G. Dist

2003-07-17

S.R.K.PRASAD

body2003
S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of the judgment rendered in S. C. No. 266 of 1997, dated 1-12-1998 on thefilebf theiii Additional sessions Judge, Kakinada, convicting and sentencing A-2 and A-3 for the offence under section 498-A IPC, and acquitting A-l for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. ( 2 ) THE facts that arise for consideration, and briefly stated as follows: kollu Naga Satyavathi and the appellants herein, being accused, are residents of thetagunta Village. A-l was the husband of the deceased-Kollu Naga Satyavathi, A-2 and A-3 are the married sisters of A-l. They are eking out their livelihood by attending collie work. P. W. 1 being the father of Kollu naga Satyavathi, is a resident of Vontimamidi village. He also used to work as Collie. P. W. 2 is his wife. They performed the marriage of the deceased-Kollu Naga satyavathi with A-l about two years prior to the incident as per the Hindu customs. At the time of the marriage P. W. 1 agreed to give an amount Rs. 10,000. 00as dowry, but could pay only Rs. 4,000. 00 and he could not pay the remaining amount. The deceased-Kollu Naga satyavathi joined A-l at Thetagunta Village soon after the marriage. It is alleged that at the instance of A-2 and A-3, who are the sisters, A-l started demanding the deceased for rest of the dowry and beating her on that ground. Six months prior to the incident, when the deceased was at her parents house, a dispute was raised before the elders P. W. 7 devara Suryarao and P. W. 6 Nukaraju and with the assurance that the balance would be paid away by Jogiraju, the father of the deceased, after receiving the sale proceeds in cashew nuts, A-l took back his wife. However, ill treatment of the deceased continued, that the accused did not even send his wife for Sankranthi festival in spite of invitation by P. W. 1 Jogiraju through lovaraju, who is his son being P. W. 9, the accused refused the invitation on the ground that P. W. 1 failed to pay the balance of the dowry amount. However, ill treatment of the deceased continued, that the accused did not even send his wife for Sankranthi festival in spite of invitation by P. W. 1 Jogiraju through lovaraju, who is his son being P. W. 9, the accused refused the invitation on the ground that P. W. 1 failed to pay the balance of the dowry amount. He did not even send the deceased, it is alleged that on 18-1-1998 the deceased and accused went to Coolie work at cotton field where A-l rebuked his wife and humiliated mentally for the balance of the dowry amount, and unable to bear said harassment and cruelty meted out in the hands of A-l to A-3 she committed suicide on the night of 18-1-1997 by consuming pesticides. P. Ws. 1 and 2, who are the parents of the deceased, came on 19-1-1997 at 6. 00 a. m. , after coming to know about the death of her daughter, and when questioned about the cause of death, the accused could not give any explanation. Thereafter, P. W. 1 went to the Police Station at Tuni and gave a report at 11. 00 a. m. on 19-1-1997 the S. I. of Police registered a Crime No. 10/97 under section 306 and 498-A IPC read with 34 IPC. P. W. 12, who is the M. R. O. , held inquest over the dead body of the deceased. P. W. 11-Doctor, conducted post-mortem examination and thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Police officer, Pedda Puram, laid the charge-sheet for the offence under Section 304-B read with 34 IPC. ( 3 ) ALL the accused pleaded not guilty for the charge under Section 304-B read with 34 ipc. ( 4 ) NOW, 13 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. P. W. 1 is the father of the deceased. P. W. 2 is the mother of the deceased. P. Ws. 4 and 5 are neighbours; p. W. 8 is the photographer, P. W. 3 is Gajji appalaraju, who states that the deceased attended collie work in his cotton field and went away. He was treated as hostile in the cross-examined. P. W. 4 Masarapu umamaheswara Rao, is also treated as hostile. P. W. 5 is also treated as hostile, who states in the evidence that he does not know about the relations of the deceased on one hand and a-l to A-3 on the other hand. He was treated as hostile in the cross-examined. P. W. 4 Masarapu umamaheswara Rao, is also treated as hostile. P. W. 5 is also treated as hostile, who states in the evidence that he does not know about the relations of the deceased on one hand and a-l to A-3 on the other hand. P. W. 6-Easarapu nookaraju, speaks about the agreement entered into by the parties fixing the dowry at Rs. 10,000. 00. He deposed that Rs. 4,000. 00 was given prior to the marriage itself and the balance of Rs. 6,000. 00 was not paid. He also speaks about the mediation made by himself and P. W. 7-Suryarao, and also advising A-l to wait for six months and assured that the balance of dowry amount would be paid. He also deposed about accused taking back his wife. Further, he deposed that even 20 days prior to her death, the deceased again come to her parents house complaining about the harassment by her husband-A-1. P. W. 7- devara Suryarao, also speaks about the mediation and also about ;payment of amount by selling away the cashew nuts, and that himself and P. W. 6 advising A-l to take back his wife. It is also in the evidence of p. W. 7 that he saw the dead body of the deceased in front of the house of the accused. P. W. 8-Dasari Rama Rao speaks about taking photographs. P. W. 9-Easarapu Lovaraju, who is the brother-in-law of A-l, deposes that a-2 and A-3 used to instigate A-l and used to harass the deceased. He also deposed about himself going to the house of the accused now and then, and inviting them for Sankranti festival four days prior to it. P. W. 10, who is the village Assistant Officer, deposed about acting as Panchayatdar and also speaks about inquest held by the MRO. P. W. 11- dr. S. Bhimasankaram, speaks about conducting post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased on 20-1-1997 on the requisition made by the MRO and also issuing ex. P-12-post-mortem certificate. He also issued Ex. P-13-report and gave final opinion ex. P-14 on the date of his examination. P. W. 12-M. Satyanarayana speaks about conduction of inquest over the dead body in the presence of P. W. 10, and preparation of ex. P-11-inquest report, and signing the same. P-12-post-mortem certificate. He also issued Ex. P-13-report and gave final opinion ex. P-14 on the date of his examination. P. W. 12-M. Satyanarayana speaks about conduction of inquest over the dead body in the presence of P. W. 10, and preparation of ex. P-11-inquest report, and signing the same. P. W. 13-K. Suryanarayana, S. I. of Police, speaks about the report Ex. P-1 received on 19-1-1997 at 11. 00 a. m. given by P. W. 1, which is registered as Crime No. 10/97 under sections 306 and 498-A read with 34 IPC, after taking up the investigation on the instructions of D. S. P. , and also speaks about observations of scene made in Ex. P-10- observation report, and seizure of MO-12; arrest of A-l to A-3 on 20-1-1997. He also speaks about the material sent for chemical examination for analysis through court, ex. P-17 and filing of charge-sheet. ( 5 ) AFTER trial, the III Additional Sessions judge, Kakinada, recorded a finding of guilty against A-2 and A-3 for the offence under section 498-A IPC, while acquitting A-l for the offence under Section 304-B. Thereupon, a-2 and A-3 were sentenced to undergo RI for two years and also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00 each, in default, to suffer S. I. for six months. He also ordered M. Os. 5 to 11, being ornaments, to be returned to A-l. Aggrieved by the same, A-2 and A-3 preferred Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1999; whereas the State preferred Criminal Appeal no. 628 of 1999 against the acquittal order passed against A-l. ( 6 ) THE point that arises for consideration is whether the judgment acquitting A-l for the offence under Section 304-B is perverse; and whether it is based on proper appreciation of evidence, and whether the court below has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for charges under Section 304-B as well as under section 498-A IPC. ( 7 ) ACCUSED Nos. 2 and 3 were charged for the offence under Section 304-B. No charge has been framed under Section 498-A IPC. Obviously, Sections 498-A and 304-B are two separate and distinct offences, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Rajest Tandon v. State of Punjab wherein it is observed that though cruelty is involved, it has to be established. No doubt it is a technical defect. Obviously, Sections 498-A and 304-B are two separate and distinct offences, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Rajest Tandon v. State of Punjab wherein it is observed that though cruelty is involved, it has to be established. No doubt it is a technical defect. It amounts to irregularity. Irregularities in framing a charge, does not affect the trial in view of Section 446 Cr. P. C. It is also clearly stated under Section 218 of Cr. P. C. , that for every distinct offence accused has to be charged separately and each and every such charge shall be tried separately. Failure to frame charge under Section 498-A IPC does not affect the trial. It is an irregularity. More over, accused were tried for a major offence under Section 304-B. Section 304-B IPC reads as follows:" (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation:- For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life". ( 8 ) IN Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, the hon ble Supreme Court mentioned the ingredients are necessary for application of section 304-B. The relevant portion reads as undenwhere ingredients are mentioned. (a) "when the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury, or (b) occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. (c) and the aforesaid two facts spring within 7 years of girl s marriage. (d) and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative. (e) This is in connection with demand of dowry. If these conditions exist, it would constitute a dowry death; and the husband and/or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. (d) and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative. (e) This is in connection with demand of dowry. If these conditions exist, it would constitute a dowry death; and the husband and/or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. " ( 9 ) IT is now to be considered whether the prosecution has established the said ingredients by placing clinching and reliable evidence? ( 10 ) THE prosecution has placed the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 13. P. Ws. 1, 2 and 9 speak about the death of the deceased-Kollu naga Satyavathi. It is in their evidence that they went and saw the dead body of the deceased. P. W. 12-M. Satyanarayana, conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased. Ex. P-11 is the inquest report. The body was identified by P. Ws. 1 and 2. The inquest report can be looked into only to know whether it is a suicidal death or homicidal death. It is clear from the inquest report that it is a suicidal death. This is a case where post-mortem examination has been conducted by P. W. 11-Dr. S. Bhimasankaram. He opined that the deceased died about 36 to 48 hours prior to the post-mortem and issued ex. P-12-post-mortem certificate with his preliminary opinion. He reserved his opinion subject to receipt of the report from the chemical examiner. He sent the dead body for analysis to the chemical examiner. Ex. P-17 is the letter of advise given by munsif Magistrate, Tuni, whereunder it has been sent for chemical examiner. The Chemical Examiner gave a report under Ex. P-13. P. W. 11 spoke about it. Unfortunately, doctor started giving his final opinion only when he is in the witness box. The final opinion is marked as Ex. P-14. ( 11 ) THE question that falls for consideration at this stage is whether the court can take the final opinion offered in the witness box. I am of the considered view that opinions offered long after the committal of the case and commencement of the trial, shall not be taken into consideration. Hence, ex. P-14 cannot be looked into, and therefore, it is discarded. There are observations made regarding the body. Insofar as F. S. L. report is concerned, it is clearly stated that it contains monocrotophos, an insecticide poison. Hence, ex. P-14 cannot be looked into, and therefore, it is discarded. There are observations made regarding the body. Insofar as F. S. L. report is concerned, it is clearly stated that it contains monocrotophos, an insecticide poison. Hence, the stomach contains Monocrotophos poison, and in all probability, she died due to consuming poison. The observations made by the Doctor disclose that there were no external injuries. The said evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2 and the evidence of P. W. 11 considered along with Ex. P-12-post-mortem certificate. Ex. P-13-F. S. L. report clearly go to show that the deceased-Kollu Naga satyavathi, died due to consuming poison. Ex. P-11-inquest report, also clearly indicate that she committed suicide by consuming poison. Hence, on the strength of the said evidence as well as the documentary evidence, I find that the death is only a suicidal death due to consuming poison, obviously, they are married about two years prior to the death, as can be seen from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2. ( 12 ) IT is next to be seen whether she has been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband A-l, or relatives, soon after the marriage? ( 13 ) SECTION 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as follows:"presumption as to dowry death:- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)". ( 14 ) IT is clearly stated in the above said section that if the death is occurred soon before her death due to subjecting the said person to cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand of dowry, the court has to presume that person died due to dowry death. ( 14 ) IT is clearly stated in the above said section that if the death is occurred soon before her death due to subjecting the said person to cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand of dowry, the court has to presume that person died due to dowry death. ( 15 ) IN this case, the learned Sessions Judge refused to draw the presumption under section 113-B and gave a finding that the time gap in between the harassment and the consequence of such harassment is too long to doubt as to whether suicide was consequence of such harassment by the accused, since they are living together for the last six months. ( 16 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor contends that non-drawal of the presumption is bad. The death has occurred soon before her death. There was harassment due to demand of dowry. However, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab. Paragraphs 14 to 19 of the said judgment read as under:"para-14: It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death. "soon before" is a relative terms which is required to be considered und er specific circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in Sec. 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be soon before death if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before the alleged such treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough. Para-15: No presumption under section 113-B of the Evidence act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty, and harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not toq stale before the date of death of the woman. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on Sham Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 9 SCC 759 : (1997 AIR SCW 1614: AIR 1997 SC 1873 : 1997 Crl. L. J. 1927) is of no help to them, as in that case the evidence was brought on record to show that attempt had been made to patch up between the two sides for which Panchayat was held in which it was resolved that the deceased would go back to the nupital home pursuant to which she was taken by the husband to his house. Such a Panchayat was shown to have held about 10 to 15 days prior to the occurrence of the case. There was nothing on record to show that the deceased was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand of dowry during the period between her having taken to the nupital home and her tragic end. Such a Panchayat was shown to have held about 10 to 15 days prior to the occurrence of the case. There was nothing on record to show that the deceased was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand of dowry during the period between her having taken to the nupital home and her tragic end. Such is not the position in the instant case as the continuous harassment to the deceased is never shown to have settled or resolved. Para-16: Mr. Lalit, learned Senior counsel has further contended that as the prosecution had failed to prove the cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry, the High court was justified in acquitting the accused persons including Rakesh kumar, respondent No. 2. He also pointed out to some alleged contradictions in the statements of p. Ws. 5 and 6. Having critically examined the statements of witnesses, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has proved the persistent demand of dowry and continuous cruelty and harassment to the deceased by her husband. The contradictions pointed out are no major contradictions which could be made the basis of impeaching the credibility of the witnesses. Reference to different sums of money demanded by Rakesh Kumar in the statements of P. Ws. 5 and 6 cannot, in any way, be termed to be contradictory to each other. At the most some of the amounts referred by one witness and not mentioned by the other can be termed to be an omission which in no case amounts to a major contradiction entitling the respondent No. 2 of any benefit. Ram kishan, P. W. 5 has categorically stated that Rakesh Kumar accused had raised a demand of Rs. 15,000. 00 for scooter and refrigerator immediately after the marriage which was fulfilled by giving him a sum of Rs. 20,000. 00. His demand of a Colour TV was also fulfilled. The continuous harassment connected with the demand of dowry is shown to be in existence till 21/09/1988 when the deceased is reported to have come to her brother s house and met her parents. Thereafter she is not shown to have met anyone and no intervening circumstances showing the resolvement or settlement regarding demands of dowry is brought on record. The continuous harassment connected with the demand of dowry is shown to be in existence till 21/09/1988 when the deceased is reported to have come to her brother s house and met her parents. Thereafter she is not shown to have met anyone and no intervening circumstances showing the resolvement or settlement regarding demands of dowry is brought on record. She ws admitedly found dead on 23/10/1988, Kans Raj, P. W. 6 has stated that a colour TV, clothes and jewellery were given to the accused -husband as dowry. He has deposed that his daughter had told him that the accused wanted her to bring further cash amount. The deceased, on persistent demands of the accused, had withdrawn the total sum of rs. 26,000/- from the accounts which was opened by the father in her name. He was also given a new Colour TV in lieu of the TV set given to him at the time of marriage as the same had allegedly gone out of order. It is contended that as there was no Karva Chauth on 2 3/10/1988, the whole of the statement of P. W. 6 should not be believed because he is alleged to have stated that his son had gone to the house of accused on 2 3/10/1988 which was theday of Karva chauth. The submission is based upon the wrong assumption of fact. It appears that the statement of P. W. 6 has wrongly been translated in English wherein it is mentioned: on 23-10-1988 on the day of Karva chauth my son Ram Kishan went to the house of the accused with customaiy presents. He telephoned me to inform that Sunita Kumari has died in the house of the accused. 1 and my wife went to batala. The police came to the spot and I was (sic) examined inquest proceedings also. My separate statement was also recorded. "we have examined the original record and found that the statement of the witness which were recorded in Punjabi / gurmukhi script states that Ram Kishan had gone to the resident of the accused at the occasion of Karva Chauth (Mauke te) and not on the date of Karva Chauth. Relying upon the evidence in the case the trial Court had rightly concluded:"the sum and substance of the above discussion is that the prosecution has adduced best available evidence to prove the charge against the accused. Relying upon the evidence in the case the trial Court had rightly concluded:"the sum and substance of the above discussion is that the prosecution has adduced best available evidence to prove the charge against the accused. The statement of Kans Raj (P. W. 6) and Ram kishan (P. W. 5) inspire confidence. It is not disputed that Sunita Kumari committed suicide about 31/2 years after the marriage. The accused have not given any satisfactory account of even high probability as to how Sunita Kumari died. There is a presumption under Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act that the suicide has been abetted by the husband or other relative of the husband of the deceased. The accused have not been able to rebut that presumption. It is also proved that sunita Kumari was treated with cruelty on account of dowry. "para-17: It is established that the death of sunita Kumari by suicide had occurred within 7 years of her marriage and such death cannot be stated to have occurred in normal circumstances. The term "normal circumstances" apparently means not the natural death. This court in Sint. Shanti v. State of Han/ana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 : (1990 Crl. L. J. 1713) held that (Para 4):". . . . . . . . . . WHERE the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances with in seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before the death of the woman she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relations for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and the husband or relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a minimum of seven years but which may extent to life imprisonment. "para-18: In other words the expression otherwise than under normal circumstances would mean the death not in usual course but apparently under suspicious circumstances, if not caused by burns or bodily injury. Para-19: The High Court appears to have adopted a casual approach in dealing with a specified heinous crime considered tp be a social crime. Relying upon minor discrepancies and some omissions, the Court has wrongly acquitted the accused-husband, namely, rakesh Kumar. Para-19: The High Court appears to have adopted a casual approach in dealing with a specified heinous crime considered tp be a social crime. Relying upon minor discrepancies and some omissions, the Court has wrongly acquitted the accused-husband, namely, rakesh Kumar. The charges framed against respondent No. 2 had been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and there was no justification for interfering with the conviction recorded and sentence passed against him by the trial Court. " ( 17 ) IT is seen from the observations made by the Supreme Court if the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be soon before death if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before the alleged such treatment and the date of death. The circumstances, under which the presumption need not be drawn under Section 113-B, have also been adumbrated in the aforesaid decision. After the alleged demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty and harassment thereafter. The mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and too stale before the date of death. ( 18 ) THE Court below has recorded a finding that there was an agreement to pay rs. 10,000/- as dowry and only Rs. 4000. 00 was paid, this clear from the evidence. It has also recorded a finding that a balance of rs. 6,000/- is still to be paid, which is clear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 6. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the accused contends that P. Ws. 1 and 2 never spoke about the presence of P. W. 6 regarding payment of dowry. Hence, the evidence of p. W. 6, cannot be believed regarding his presence. In any view of the matter, P. Ws. 1 and 2 categorically stated that the marriage was fixed, promising to pay an amounf of rs. 10,000/-towardsdowry. They havestated in their evidence that they paid a sum of rs. 4,000/- as dowry, and the balance could not be paid. There is no motive for P. Ws. In any view of the matter, P. Ws. 1 and 2 categorically stated that the marriage was fixed, promising to pay an amounf of rs. 10,000/-towardsdowry. They havestated in their evidence that they paid a sum of rs. 4,000/- as dowry, and the balance could not be paid. There is no motive for P. Ws. 1 and 2 to speak falsehood. P. W. 6 is having knowledge about the fixation of dowry. Subsequently, it is the version of P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the matter was taken to P. Ws. 6 and 7 and they were said to have chastised P. W. 1 for non-payment of dowry and that P. W. 1 complained that A-l was beating his wife for the balance of dowry. Both the mediators- p. Ws. 6 and 7 are said to have advised A-l to wait for six months for payment, and that p. W. 1 promised to pay the same after the sale of cashewnuts. There is no motive for them to speak falsehood. They have categorically stated about the tendering advice to A-l and also chastising P. W. 1. Their evidence is reliable and trustworthy. It is clear from the evidence that the deceased joined her husband on the strength of advise of the elders. ( 20 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the accused that P. W. 6 is not an elder and he was only related to P. W. 1, and therefore, he speaks due to relationship. P. W. 7 is an independent person and there is no need for him to speak falsehood. He has categorically stated that himself and P. W. 6 have mediated the matter. P. Ws. 1 and 2 also spoke about the same. There is corroboration and consistency in their version in respect of mediation. Hence, their evidence is believable in so far as acting as mediators in settling the matter due to condonation. Thereafter, the deceased and A-l lived nearly about six months. That is no ground for refusing to draw the presumption, when once the demand of dowry is said to have been proved and the death has occurred within 7 years and soon before her death, there was mediation, due to harassment. The presumption has to be drawn in this case regarding dowry death. ( 21 ) THE question whether the presumption has been rebutted by the accused or not. The presumption has to be drawn in this case regarding dowry death. ( 21 ) THE question whether the presumption has been rebutted by the accused or not. A presumption drawn can always be rebutted by eliciting necessary facts during the evidence, or in the cross-examination or by placing positive evidence. Ex. P-11 is the inquest report. It is clear from the evidence of p. W. 1 that there was no more immediate harassment. The prosecution examined the owner of the land whereunder the deceased worked and the incident took place. The owner categorically stated that no such incident took place in his field though she attended the work as Coolie. That means the alleged incident is not established by the prosecution i. e. , beating by A-l to A-3. P. Ws. 4 and 5, who are neighbours, did not support about the alleged harassment. According to P. W. 4, though he turned hostile, accused used to look after the deceased well, though there was routine abusing of deceased by A-l. Petty quarrels arising on small matters cannot be taken note of as harassment. Another neighbour has also been examined as P. W. 5. He did not also support the version of prosecution regarding harassment, and prosecution has come with a specific case of beating one day prior to the death. The prosecution has to prove it. P. W. 1 has no personal knowledge. The owner whereunder the deceased was working did not support the said version. There is absolutely no reliable evidence to believe the version of beating by A-l to A-3. P. W. 9 who is the brother of the deceased states that A-2 and a-3 used to instigate A-l to beat the deceased as the balance of dowry was not paid. According to his version, he used to go to their house now and then. He also states that he went to their house to invite for Sankranti festival four days earlier to it and they did not send her. It is also his version that A-l refused to come and also to send the deceased for Sankranthi. His evidence discloses that a-2 and A-3 were instigating A-l to beat the deceased. He did not speak about beating by a-2 and A-3. The evidence of P. W. 9 goes contra to the version mentioned in Ex. P-1. P. Ws. It is also his version that A-l refused to come and also to send the deceased for Sankranthi. His evidence discloses that a-2 and A-3 were instigating A-l to beat the deceased. He did not speak about beating by a-2 and A-3. The evidence of P. W. 9 goes contra to the version mentioned in Ex. P-1. P. Ws. 1 and 2 have no personal knowledge about the beating, except the version given by the doctor. It is stated during the evidence that 20 days prior to the incident the deceased came and informed about the alleged harassment and beating. If really there was alleged harassment and beating, the brother is said to have gone to the deceased to bring her to the home and she would not have stayed there and she would have returned back. Even according to P. W. 2, her daughter stated about harassment by A-2 and A-3 and not by A-l. There is no consistency in the version of P. W. 2 and P. W. 6. They gave their own different versions and it goes contra to the version given in Ex. P-1, which was an improbability. Hence, the mother-in-law has not complained about the harassment by a-l. Even according to her, her daughter told about harassment by A-2 and A-3 and not by A-l, which shows that there was no harassment by A-l. The prosecution version, as given out by P. W. 2 and 6, is bridled with all contradictions and there is no consistency in their version. One version is found in ex. P-1. Another version is found in the evidence of P. W. 2 yet another version is found in the version of P. W. 6. In view of the inconsistency, it cannot be said that there is harassment before the death. The said evidence only lead to the one conclusion that the accused is able to rebut the presumption regarding the harassment said to have been made, as the prosecution failed to prove it beyond all reasonable doubt in view of placing inconsistent versions. I also find that each witness has given his own version. Mother gave one version. Father gave another version; and brother has given another version. It is clear that their versions are not believable for lack of cogency, consistency and corroboration. The alleged incident said to have been taken place, is also not proved. I also find that each witness has given his own version. Mother gave one version. Father gave another version; and brother has given another version. It is clear that their versions are not believable for lack of cogency, consistency and corroboration. The alleged incident said to have been taken place, is also not proved. There is only a suspicion in this case and has not culminated into proof. ( 22 ) COMING to Accused Nos. 2 and 3, even according to P. Ws. 1 and 2, A-l and the deceased are living separately. The theory of instigation has been introduced in this case. According to P. W. 9 the brother, A-2 and a-3 used to instigate A-l to beat the deceased, as balance of dowry was not paid, which was also not supported by the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2. P. W. 1 has alleged that the accused bet the deceased at the field. The owner of the land has categorically stated that no such beating took place in his land. Thereby it shows that P. W. 1 has come with a version which is not correct. A-2 and A-3 are living separately and it cannot be said that they harassed the deceased. In view of several versions found in the prosecution theory, it cannot be said that A-2 and A-3 instigated A-l to beat the deceased. There is also no reliable evidence placed before the court to believe the said version. Even neighbours have stated that there are only petty quarrels in between the husband and wife and accused was treating the deceased well. As there is no reliable evidence, I am of the considered view that the harassment by a-2 and A-3 is not proved. It is a case where the husband has been let off and the learned sessions Judge gave a finding of guilt under section 498-A I. P. C. against A-2 and A-3. Ex. P-1 attributes beating by A-2 and A-3. P. W. 2 states that A-2 and A-3 were harassing the deceased. P. W. 9 states that they were instigating A-l. There are as many versions as can be seen in the prosecution. Each person gave his own version. The possibility of beating by A-2 and A-3 does not arise, as they are married and living in separate houses. P. W. 2 states that A-2 and A-3 were harassing the deceased. P. W. 9 states that they were instigating A-l. There are as many versions as can be seen in the prosecution. Each person gave his own version. The possibility of beating by A-2 and A-3 does not arise, as they are married and living in separate houses. The evidence given by those witnesses appears to be unnatural insofar as harassment made. In view of the fact that they are living separately, with their husbands and in view of the fact of different versions have been given by P. Ws. 1,2 and 9, the said version have to be disbelieved, and therefore, benefit of doubt, if any, arises due to the contradictory versions have to go to the accused. The presumption, if any, has been successfully rebutted by the circumstances placed during cross- examination, namely A-2 and A-3, are living with their husbands in the village and the versions given by P. Ws. 1, 2 and 9 are contradictory, and the incident of beating is not proved since the owner of the land whereunder the deceased working has denied about happening of any incident of beating. To sum up on a reappraisal of the entire evidence, I find that proper charges are not framed. I also find that Kollu Naga satyavathi-deceased, died due to taking poison. I also find that the evidence placed by the prosecution do not inspire confidence as it bridled with full of contradictions and different versions given by each of the witnesses. I also find that the presumption drawn has been successfully rebutted by the facts elicited during the cross-examination relating to the fact that A-2 and A-3 are living separately. In view of the contradictory versions given by the witnesses, A-l has been rightly acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. ( 23 ) INSOFAR as A-2 and A-3 are concerned, there is absolutely no reliable and trustworthy evidence to show that they harassed the deceased, which can constitute an offence under Section 498-A. The conviction, if any, given, has to be set aside in this case insofar as A-2 and A-3 are concerned. A-l is liable to be acquitted and A-2 and A-3 are also liable to be acquitted for want of reliable evidence. A-l is liable to be acquitted and A-2 and A-3 are also liable to be acquitted for want of reliable evidence. ( 24 ) IN the result, the acquittal passed against A-l is confirmed and the conviction and sentence awarded against A-2 and A-3 are set aside. The Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1999 preferred by Accused Nos. 2 and 3 is allowed and the Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 1999 preferred by the State is dismissed. The fine amount, if any, paid by the accused is ordered to be refunded.