Judgment :- The above Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1990 rendered in A.S.No.65 of 1989 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam thereby modifying the judgment and decree dated 29.7.1989 rendered in O.S.No.124 of 1986 by the Court of District Munsif, Valangaiman at Kumbakonam. 2. The defendant is the appellant herein. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit before the trial Court for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-temple, their men, servants or anybody claiming through them, from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property as a lessee or from evicting the plaintiff and removing the superstructure in the suit property and for costs. 3. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit before the trial Court for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-temple, their men, servants or anybody claiming through them, from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property as a lessee or from evicting the plaintiff and removing the superstructure in the suit property and for costs. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the lessee of the site bearing R.S.No.79/4 in Theradi Bazaar Street (Keela Salai) Thirubuvanam, measuring an extent of 9 feet East-West and 10 feet South-North, having entered into a Pagudhi agreement with the defendant; that lastly, on 9.3.1985, the plaintiff executed a Manai Pagudhi deed with the defendant agreeing to pay pagudhi of Rs.12/= per annum; that he is in possession of the site from October, 1983 onwards and has constructed a small shop with tiled walls on the Northern side, East and West with cement slabs and the roof was covered with asbestos sheets and running a sweet stall under the name and style of `Senthil Sweet Stall' from the year 1984; that at the time of inception of the pagudhi, there was no deed but subsequently, only on 9.3.1985, pagudhi deed was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant; that the suit property was assessed to tax by the Tirubuvanam Panchayat and the plaintiff was paying the tax; that the plaintiff also obtained a licence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act from the town panchayat and he was also assessed to profession tax by the Panchayat and he is paying the tax; that the plaintiff as a lessee of the site is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the same by running a small sweet stall from the year 1983-84 and he is also paying pagudhi to the defendant temple from the date of inception of the tenancy and thus as a lawful lessee of the site, the plaintiff cannot be evicted from the site except under due process of law and since on 16.3.1986, the Shroff of the temple with large body of men visited the suit property and threatened the plaintiff to remove the superstructure and hand over possession of the site to the temple in spite of the plaintiff agreeing to pay any enhanced pagudhi to the suit property, the plaintiff has filed the suit. 4. 4. The defendant-temple filed a written statement thereby denying all the allegations of the plaint and further submitting that there is no pagudhi agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant as asserted; that there is no manai pagudhi deed dated 9.3.1985 as asserted in the plaint; that the alleged document filed into Court is a spurious document and is not binding on the defendant; that the suit site is called as "Theradi Mandapam" where the temple car is parked and during festival, the car has to be removed and on other days, small petty shop owners have their temporary constructions near the road margin i.e. on the Southern border of the property; that in the suit site temporary construction was made by one S.R.Arjuna Raja and he was having a sweet stall; that after some time, the said superstructure was sold to Kothanda Raja and he was conducting the sweet stall under the name and style of "Sendhil Sweet Stall"; that the plaintiff took the superstructure on lease from him and as a sub-lessee was conducting business and therefore the assertions as though the plaintiff was an independent lessee of the site is preposterously false. 5. The defendant would further submit that one Mr.Ponnuswamy was working as Shroff of the temple and the defendant found that he has misappropriated huge funds and he was dismissed from service on 14.7.1985, besides that a criminal complaint was also lodged against him and he was arrested and is on conditional bail; that some of the persons have taken advantage of the above said position and with the connivance of the said Ponnuswamy are preparing documents to suit their purposes for which the said Ponnuswamy is also getting monetary benefit with which he is meeting out his financial demands; that the plaintiff is a close friend of the Ex-shroff and he is fabricating the documents to meet his requirements; that the assessment of tax by the panchayat and the license for the trade will not clothe the plaintiff with any right as a lessee against the Devasthanam and as he was doing business under the stall holders, he might have paid the tax. 6. 6. The defendant would further submit that the persons in occupation of the stall are not allowed to erect any permanent construction; that the temple car has to be dragged only from the Southern side and the stalls are to be removed at that time; that during festival time, the stall holders are to remove the stalls and can erect the same after the festival and this is the practice from the time immemorial; that the plaintiff is not the owner of the superstructure and the shed is constructed as a temporary shed using asbestos sheets only; that the plaintiff is bound to remove the shed during festival season and he is not entitled to any decree for permanent injunction; that even assuming without conceding that the plaintiff is a lessee, he has to remove the shed so that the temple car can be removed; that if the plaintiff is allowed to have permanent construction and if the defendant is restrained by any decree of injunction, the temple car cannot be removed and the entire car festival has to be suspended. On such averments, the defendant-temple would pray to dismiss the suit with costs. 7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court would frame the following issues for determination: 1.Whether the plaintiff is the lease-holder of the suit property? 2.Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the superstructure constructed in the suit property? 3.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as sought for? 4.Whether the alleged lease deed is true and valid? 5.What relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? Thereafter, the trial Court would conduct the trial wherein the plaintiff besides examining himself as P.W.1 would also examine three more witnesses as P.Ws.2 to 4 for oral evidence and would mark 15 documents for documentary evidence as Exs.A.1 to A.15. Ex.A.1 dated 9.3.1985 is the lease deed, Ex.A.2 dated 14.3.1985 is the receipt issued by the defendant temple for the fasli 1394; Exs.A.3 to A.7 are the profession tax receipts issued by the Panchayat; Ex.A.8 is the receipt issued by the Panchayat for payment of licence fee for the sweet stall; Exs.A.9 to A.13 are the revised miscellaneous receipts issued by the Panchayat and Exs.A.14 and A.15 are the photos with negatives showing the temple car and the plaintiff's sweet stall. 8. 8. On the contrary, on the part of the defendants, they would examine three witnesses for oral evidence as D.Ws.1 to 3 and would mark ten documents as Exs.B.1 to B.10. Ex.B.1 is the office copy of the receipt issued to the plaintiff by the defendant temple for the fasli 1393; Exs.B.2 and B.3 are the photos with negatives; Ex.B.4 is the application submitted by the defendant temple to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam against one Ponnusami and others; Ex.B.5 dated 10.9.1987 is the letter addressed by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch CID, Special Cell, Tiruchy to the defendant temple; Ex.B.6 is the pamphlet printed by Tirumbuvanam Janata Party; Exs.B.7,B.8 and B.10 are the letters addressed by the Commissioner, Tiruvidaimarudur to the defendant temple and Ex.B.9 is the letter addressed to the defendant temple by the Friends Association. 9. In appreciation of the entire evidence placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, the trial Court having believed the Ex.A.1 lease deed decreed the suit. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No.65 of 1989 before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam. The learned Subordinate Judge also after framing point `whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property by the date of filing of the suit' and having appreciated the evidence placed on record, and having disbelieved the lease deed would observe that since the defendant stated that the plaintiff got the property from one Kodandarama Raja, the plaintiff becomes a sub-lessee and hence he cannot be evicted except under due process of law. However, the first appellate Court directed the plaintiff that during festival time, the plaintiff would remove his superstructure in order to enable the temple car being taken out for dragging and thus allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant-temple in part. It is only aggrieved against such conclusions by the first appellate Court, the defendant in the suit has come forward to prefer the above second appeal on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal and this Court admitted the same for determination of the following substantial questions of law: 1.Is the lower Court right in decreeing the suit in spite of the fact it has held that Ex.A.1 dated 9.3.1985 and Ex.A.2 dated 14.3.1985 are concocted documents when especially the suit itself was filed only on the strength of these documents? 2.Is the lower Court right in granting relief to the respondent on the contention raised by the appellant as defendant when it is settled law that no party can have a relief on the strength of the pleadings of other party? 10. The notice issued to the respondent returned unserved with remarks that `no such sweet stall and no such person'. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant filed an affidavit thereby submitting that though the respondent is not presently conducting the shop in the aforesaid shop, it is apprehended that he may claim certain rights if the service is not otherwise completed and prayed to order substituted service and this Court ordered substituted service by publication. In spite of the notice being published in `Maalai Malar' Tamil Daily, dated 13.3.2003, no representation is offered on the part of the respondent, when the above matter was taken up for consideration. Therefore, this Court is left with no option but to hold the service `sufficient' for the respondent and deliver the judgment upon hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and having regard to the materials placed on record. 11. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would only reiterate the facts and circumstances of the case as already pleaded by parties before the trial Court without any new fact or circumstance or law being pleaded and therefore bringing the same on record would only be a repetition of those facts and details already traced in the foregoing paragraphs and therefore suffice it to say that the arguments of the learned counsel laying emphasis on those materials already made available has been heard. 12. Adhering to the valid substantial questions of law framed as aforeseen and on the backdrop of the facts and circumstances made available and extracted supra right from the institution of the suit and having had a careful perusal of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and of course the judgments rendered by both the Courts below, it is evident that the plaintiff has come forward to file the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-temple and its men from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property as a lessee or from evicting him or removing the superstructure in the suit property. 13. 13. The admitted case of the respondent/plaintiff is that the ground belongs to the temple and the superstructure was put up by him and that he is in possession and enjoyment of the same from the year 1984 running a sweet stall under the name and style of 'Senthil Sweet Stall' and a little later, on 9.3.1985, a pagudhi deed is said to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant, which has been marked as Ex.A.1 and a receipt said to have been issued in his favour by the appellant Devasthanam dated 14.3.1985 would be marked as Ex.A.2. The respondent/plaintiff would also mark certain other documents such as professional tax receipts as Exs.A.3 to A.7, the receipts issued by the Panchayat Union as Exs.A.8 to A.13, the photographs with negatives as Exs.A.14 and A.15. 14. Likewise, on the part of the appellant Devasthanam also they have marked certain documents as Exs.B.1 to B.10, the receipt issued in favour of the plaintiff as Ex.B.1, the photos with negatives as Exs.B.2 and B.3, the application filed by the appellant in the criminal Court as Ex.Bs.4, the letter written by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch to the temple as Ex.B.5, the resolution passed by Janatha Party as Ex.B.6, the Panchayat Unions Letters as Exs.B.7 and B.8 and the letters written by the Friends Association as Exs.B.9 and B.10. 15. Besides these, four witnesses would be examined on the part of the plaintiff and three witnesses on the part of the defendants. 15. Besides these, four witnesses would be examined on the part of the plaintiff and three witnesses on the part of the defendants. In appreciation of all these materials placed on record, the trial Court, trusting Exs.A.1 and A.2 documents said to be the pagudhi deed and the pagudhi receipt, has decreed the suit, testifying the validity of which the appellant/Devasthanam has preferred an appeal before the lower appellate Court and the said Court, for valid reasons assigned, would not believe the version of the plaintiff pertaining to the genuineness of Exs.A.1 and A.2 and would arrive at the other conclusion that these two documents as alleged on the part of the appellant/Devasthanam are concocted documents by manipulation of records in connivance with one Ponnusamy who was working as the Shroff of the temple and against whom criminal cases were registered for having indulged in acts prejudicial to the interests of the temple and one such act perpetrated on the part of the respondent was in creating Exs.A.1 and A.2 in favour of the plaintiff and this version, since being strongly founded against the plaintiff, no wonder, the first appellate Court has arrived at the conclusion to set aside the findings of the trial Court in the manner as it has been discussed earlier. However, the lower appellate Court having observed that the plaintiff became a sub-lessee and hence he cannot be evicted except under due process of law, has directed the plaintiff to remove his superstructure during festival time to enable the temple car being taken out for dragging, thus allowing the appeal preferred by the defendant in part. 16. However, even not being satisfied with the said concessions granted in favour of the plaintiff by the first appellate Court, as discussed supra, the defendant/temple has now come forward to prefer the above second appeal before this Court seeking to dismiss the suit filed by the respondent herein on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal and on certain substantial questions of law of which this Court, at the time of admission of the above second appeal, has framed the above two substantial questions of law. 17. 17. Not only in consideration of the oral and documentary evidence but on a overall consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case as projected by parties and in application of the legal norms for appreciation of the documents particularly that of Exs.A.1 and A.2, the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that they have been concocted documents based on which the plaintiff has come forward to file the suit and therefore easy conclusions could be arrived at answering the first substantial question of law in this manner and against the respondent/plaintiff. 18. Coming to the second substantial question of law `whether the lower appellate Court in granting relief to the respondent on the contention raised by the appellant as defendant is correct, when it is settled law that no party can have a relief on the strength of the pleadings of other party', the first appellate Court, for no valid reason assigned, has gone upto the extent of granting certain privileges in favour of the respondent/defendant in a qualified manner which is none of the business of the Court and which is not asked for. Likewise, the temple authorities have also no business to suggest certain privileges in favour of the respondent thereby exposing themselves and they have taken sides with the respondent/plaintiff as against the genuine interest of the temple regarding its properties and the convenience of the general public. 19. At any cost, it must be told that nothing could be done against the basic principle that one should come to the Court seeking the relief with clean hands and against this dictum, since the plaintiff has filed the suit on manipulated and make-believe documents in connivance with those who have misappropriated the wealth of the temple, no genuine reason could be there in the whole frame of the pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit and therefore he becomes disentitled to get any relief much less those prayed for in the suit. 20. For these reasons, the first appellate Court should not have granted any relief in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and therefore this Court has no hesitation in setting aside even the relief granted partly in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by the first appellate Court, thus allowing the above second appeal thus answering the second substantial question of law in favour of the appellant/Devasthanam. In result, (i)the above second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed with costs throughout. (ii)The judgment and decree dated 19.2.1990 rendered in A.S.No.65 of 1989 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam and the judgment and decree dated 29.7.1989 rendered in O.S.No.124 of 1986 by the Court of District Munsif, Valangaiman at Kumbakonam are hereby set aside. (iii) The suit in O.S.No.124 of 1986 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Valangaiman at Kumbakonam stands dismissed.