Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 22.2.2003 passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, South Bihar, Patna in Special Case No. 30 of 2000 whereby it has taken cognizance of the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 109, 116, 119, 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and directed for issuance of summons against the petitioner and other accused persons. 2. One Pramod Singh Chandrawanshi had filed CWJC No. 7146 of 1998 (Parmod Singh vs. Chandrawanshi vs. State of Bihar and others) before this Court inter alia challenging the action of the Magadh University in declaring one Sikha Gupta of having passed the M.A.History examination in Sessions 1993-95 in Ist Class and its action in giving appointment to her as part time lecturer in A. N. College, Gaya. This Court while considering the grant of degree to said Shikha Gupta observed as follows:- "The degree was given to respondent no. 7 evidently by fraudulent means. This is the inevitable conclusion in the light of the material finally coming before this Court; it is another matter that the University produced the relevant documents bit by bit and also, it appeared to this Court, quite grudgingly. From the relevant materials it appears that respondent no. 7 appeared for the examination of Paper I held on 5.9.1996 and her answer sheets along with the answer sheets of all the other examinees of the examination centre (A. N. College Gaya) were sent by the Centre Superintendent to the Examiner of that paper under a single despatch memo. Thereafter, she never appeared at the examination centre for the examination of the remaining seven papers and she was shown absent in the attendance sheets for those examinations. For papers II to VII the answer sheets of examinees present for the examinations were sent by the Centre Superintendent to the examiners of the respective papers under despatch memos on each day those examinations were held but as respondent no.7 was absent in those papers the despatch memos under which the answer sheets did not include her answersheets. It, however, appears that she was clandestinely supplied with the blank answer sheets of the University which were obviously stolen from the University Office and taken out unauthorisedly. It, however, appears that she was clandestinely supplied with the blank answer sheets of the University which were obviously stolen from the University Office and taken out unauthorisedly. On the answer sheets given to her, examinations of papers II to VII were wirtten outside the examination hall (when and where are yet to be disclosed). Then someone sent her answer-sheets for papers II to VII to the respective examiners under separate despatch memos each containing a single answer sheet. According to the Centre Superintendent, A. N. College, Gaya, those despatch memos were not prepared by nim and the signatures thereon were not his. Curiously, every examiner accepted the single answer sheet of respondent no.7 and no one seems to have wondered why a single answer sheet was coming under a separate despatch memo and not as part of the main bundle from any examination centre. Each examiner corrected and marked the answer sheets of respondent no.7 and the mark sheets were sent to the University. The rest was routine. The marks of respondent no.7, like all other examinees, were tabulated and an official marksheet, duly signed by the University authorities was issued to her showing her pass, in Ist Class, in M.A. History examination. The answer sheets of respondent no.7 have been produced before this Court. The printed numbers on those answer sheets are not in any sequence, either ascending or descending but those are at random. From the writings in the answer-sheets for the different papers it cannot be said definitely that all the answer-sheets were written by the same person and there is some ground for the suspicion that the answer-sheets of the different papers were written by different persons. From the way the scheme was worked out, it is plain and clear that respondent no.7 was being actively aided and abetted by persons inside the University or closely associated with the University." This Court then observed as follows:- "As much as the University appears to be unwilling to let the full facts come to light, this Court is determined to get to the bottom of this matter and to see that the wrong doers should face the legal consequences of their deeds." This Court went to the extent of observing as follows:- "The episode of granting the spurir ous degree to the wife of a Police Officer was sufficiently bad. But what is worse and far more distressing to the Court is the recalcitrance show by the University authorities in taking any remedial measure to correct the situation. Metaphorically speaking, the University authorities stand before this Court with their pants down. But they do not show any sign of remorse or shame. Instead of trying to cover their nudity they seem to be trying to cover up those responsible for their nudity." 3 Accordingly this Court directed the Criminal Investigation Department to institute a criminal case and nominated Mr. Manoj Nath, IPS an officer of the rank of the Inspector General to be an overall incharge of the case. 4. In the light of the direction of this Court, C.I.D. Case No. 64 of 2000 dated 17.10.2000 was registered against the petitioner and other accused persons. Police after investigation submitted chargesheet against the petitioner. In the investigation it has been found that accused Sikha Gupta appeared in one paper of the M.A.History examination of the session 1993-95 which was held in the year 1996 but remained absent from the examination centre for the rest seven papers but the documents and answer books were fabricated and ultimately she has been declared to have passed the examination in first division. It has further been said that Sikha Gupta was appointed as part time Lecturer in the law faculty of the A.M.College and paid the salary for 13 months. On receipt of the chargesheet the learned judge had taken cognizance of the offence and directed for issuance of summons. 5. During the relevant time petitioner was the Vice Chancellor of the Magadh University. He assails the order taking cognizance on the ground that he is a public servant and the act alleged to have been done by him is in discharge of official duty and as he is not removable except by order of the State Government, order taking cognizance is bad in law. 6. Mr. P.N.Pandey, Senior Advocate submits that the plea of absence of sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceeding and in support of his submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Wahab Ansari V/s. State of Bihar and another [ (2000)8 S.C.C. 500 ] and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 8 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- "8. In the case of Ashok Sahu V/s. Gokul Saikia [1990 Supp. SCC 41; 1990 SCC (Cri.) 611] this Court had said that want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a prohibition against institution of the proceedings, and the applicability of the section must be judged at the earliest stage of the proceedings and in that case, the Court directed the Magistrate to consider the question of sanction before framing a charge in yet another case, in the case of B.Saha V/s. M.S. Kochar (1979) SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939) a three Judge Bench of this Court had held that the question of sanction under section 196 Cr. P.C. can be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings and further in considering the question whether or not sanction for prosecution was required, it is not necessary for the court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint, and it can take into account all the material on the record at the time when the question is raised and falls for consideration. This being the position, we are of the considered opinion that the decision of this Court in Birendra K. Singh case (2000)8 SCC 498 : JT (2000)8 SC 248) does not lay down the correct law by directing that the objection on the question of sanction can be raised at the stage of framing of charge and not at any prior point of time." 7. There is no difficulty at all in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Pandey that the plea of absence of sanction before taking cognizance can be raised at any stage of the proceeding including immediately after taking of the cognizance and issuance of process. However, in those cases where one has to ascertain as to whether the act alleged is in the discharge of official duty or purported discharge of official duty or not and which cannot be determined without leading evidence then in such cases the bar of sanction cannot be raised immediately after the cognizance is taken and process issued. This submission may not detain me any further as in the ultimate analysis nothing turns it. 8. Mr. This submission may not detain me any further as in the ultimate analysis nothing turns it. 8. Mr. P.N.Pandey submits that the petitioner is a public servant within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act and in this connection he has referred to section 21 of the Indian Penal Code which defines public servant. He has also drawn my attention to section 2(c) (xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short the Act) to drive home his point that petitioner being a Vice Chancellor at the relevant time is a public servant. Section 2(c) (xi) of the Act reads as follows:- "2. Definitions.In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (c) "public servant" means, - xx xx xx (xi) any person who is a Vice Chancellor or member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University and any person whose services have been availed of by a University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting examination." 9. In view of the definition of the expression "public servant" in the aforesaid provision and section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, there is no difficulty in accepting Mr. Pandeys submission that the petitioner is a public servant and in fact Mr. B. P. Pandey, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the prosecution has not disputed this stand of the petitioner. 10. Petitioners contention further is that act done by him is in the discharge of his official duty. Allegation against the petitioner is that in conspiracy with other accused persons he admitted Sikha Gupta in M.A. course and allowed her to appear in the examination in violation of the provisions of the Statute and declared her pass although in the examination she had appeared in one paper only. Further allegation against the petitioner is that in furtherance of the conspiracy hatched by him and other accused persons she was appointed as a part time lecturer in A.M.College, Gaya. Further allegation against the petitioner is that in furtherance of the conspiracy hatched by him and other accused persons she was appointed as a part time lecturer in A.M.College, Gaya. Petitioners stand is that according to the Statute the result requires to be declared by the order of the Vice Chancellor but he comes into picture after the two tabulators have completed the tabulation from the marksheets received from the examiners and further after cross checking the tabulation they finally prepare the marksheets which are signed by each of them and sent to the Controller of Examinations and to the Dean of Faculty. According to him after these officials have signed the documents it is put up before the Vice Chancellor who does append his signature as a matter of routine. In regard to the appointment of Sikha Gupta, petitioners stand is that when the matter was placed before him he directed for continuance of the teaching arrangement made by the Principal. According to the petitioner acts done by him were routine matters in discharge of his official duty. 11. In my opinion, it is over simplifying the matter and I am not inclined to comment any further as the same may prejudice the trial. Here the question is as to whether act alleged can be said to be an act done or purported to have been done in the discharge of official duty. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner declared said Shikha Gupta to have passed in the examination in the discharge of his duty as the Vice Chancellor and had also approved her appointment in the said capacity. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai V/s. State of Kerala and another [ (1996)1 SCC 478 )] and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 7 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- "In the present case, the appellant is charged with having entered into a criminal conspiracy with the co-accused while functioning as a Minister. The criminal conspiracy alleged is that he sold electricity to an industry in the State of Karnataka "without the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act" under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. The criminal conspiracy alleged is that he sold electricity to an industry in the State of Karnataka "without the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act" under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. The allegation is that in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his official position and illegally sold certain units to the private industry in Bangalore (Karnataka) which profited the private industry to the tune of Rs. 19,58,630.40 or more and it is, therefore, obvious that the criminal conspiracy alleged against the appellant is that while functioning as the Minister for Electricity he without the consent of the Government of Kerala supplied certain units of electricity to a private industry in Karnataka. Obviously, he did this in the discharge of his duties as a Minister. The allegation is that it was an illegal act inasmuch as the consent of the Government of Kerala was not obtained before this arrangement was entered into and the supply was effected. For that reason, it is said that he had committed an illegality and hence he was liable to be punished for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B, IPC. It is, therefore, clear from the charge that the act alleged is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty as a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of Section 197(1) of the Act." 12. I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, act alleged against the petitioner is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty as a Vice Chancellor and as such allegation made comes within the domain of discharge of official duty. 13. Mr. P.N. Pandey submits that the petitioner being a public servant and the act said to have been done by him being in discharge of his official duty, protection under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is available to him. Mr. B. P. Pandey however submits that protection under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is not available to the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor is not removable from his office save or with the sanction of the Government. To overcome this difficulty Mr. P.N. Pandey submits that the petitioner cannot be removed except by the State Government. To overcome this difficulty Mr. P.N. Pandey submits that the petitioner cannot be removed except by the State Government. This necessitates the examination of the Bihar State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Universities Act). Section 10 of the Universities Act provides for the qualifications, powers and the manner of appointment. Section 10(2) thereof provides that the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government. Section 11 of the Universities Act provides for removal of the Chancellor. Same reads as follows:- "11. Removal of the Vice-Chancellor. (1) If at any time and after such inquiry as may be considered necessary, it appears to the Chancellor that the Vice-Chancellor- (i) has failed to discharge any duty imposed upon him by or under this Act, the Statutes, the Ordinance, or (ii) has acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the University, or (iii) is incapable in managing the affairs of the University, then the Chancellor may, notwithstanding the fact that the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has not expired, require, the Vice-Chancellor, by an order in writing stating the reason therefor, and after consulting the State Government, to resign his post from the date, as may be specified in the order. (Underlining mine) 14. From a plain reading of section 11(1) (iii) of the Universities Act it is evident that the Chancellor after consulting the State Government may require the Vice Chancellor to resign his post. Mr. P.N. Pandey submits that the power to be exercised by the Chancellor either of appointment or removal is with consultation of the State Government and as such said power shall be deemed to be the power of the State Government. Learned counsel highlights that the expression "consultation" would mean concurrence. To drive home his point he has referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "consultation" in Oxford Advance Learner Dictionary which gives the meaning of the word "consultation" as follows:- "The act of discussing with a group of people before making a decision about it: a formal meeting to discuss." 15. The word "consultation" has been used in many of the statutes and at many places in the Constitution. The meaning of the words has to be understood in the context it has been used and in fact has assumed a meaning on account of various judicial pronouncements. The word "consultation" has been used in many of the statutes and at many places in the Constitution. The meaning of the words has to be understood in the context it has been used and in fact has assumed a meaning on account of various judicial pronouncements. I may not dilate on this question any further in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bimal Kumar Jain V/s. Dr. Ramautar Shukla and others (1981 PLJR 450) where in paragraph 11 of the judgment it has been observed as follows:- "The Chancellor has to consult the State Government while making appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor of any University, but he is not bound by such advice. What is required is only a deliberation between the Chancellor and the State Government. The final decision rests with the Chancellor of the University. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Chandramouleshwar Prasad V/s. The Patna High Court and others ( AIR 1970 SC 370 ) where the Supreme Court had to construe the scope of Article 233 of the Constitution where similar expressions occur. Article 233 is a provision regarding appointment of the District Judges. The Governor has to make the appointments in consultation with the High Court. It was pointed out as follows :- "The underlying idea of the Article is that the Governor should make up his mind after there has been a deliberation with the High Court......This does not mean that the Governor must accept whatever advice is given by the High Court." 16 Again, the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. Sankalchan Himatlal Sheth and another ( AIR 1977 SC 2328 ) while considering the expression "after the consultation with the Chief Justice of India" occurring in Article 222 of the Constitution regarding transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another observed:- "What the Constitution requires is consultation with the Chief Justice, not his concurrence with the proposed transfer." In my view, it is futile to urge that when the Act vests power in the Chancellor to make the appointment in consultation with the State Government, the appointing authority is the State Government, and the person so appointed will be deemed to be under the employment of the State." (underlining mine) 17. In my considered view, petitioner being not removable from office save or by the sanction of the State Government, protection under section 197 of the Code is not available to him. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Md. Hadi Raja V/s. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1998 SC 1945) in which in paragraph 28 of the judgment it has been held as follows:- "Therefore, in our considered opinion, the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the officers of Government Companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the government. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. It is, however, made clear that we have not taken into consideration various other grounds raised in these appeals challenging the maintainability of the criminal proceedings initiated against the concerned officers of the public undertakings or the government companies. It will be open to the concerned accused to challenge the validity of the criminal cases initiated against them on other grounds, if such challenge is available in law. Such questions, if raised, in these appeals are kept open to be considered in accordance with law by the appropriate authority." 18. In reply of Mr. B. R Pandeys contention that petitioner having ceased to be the Vice-Chancellor of the University, protection under Section 19 of the Act is not available to him, Mr. P. IM. Pandey submits that the petitioner continues to be a public servant and as such protection under section 19 of the Act is available to him. Learned counsel points out that in view of section 18(12) of the Universities Act the Senate is to consist of the persons enumerated therein and it includes all Ex- Vice Chancellors of the University. He emphasises that in view of the fact that the petitioner continues to be the member of the Senate he satisfies the requirement of the public servant as defined under section 2(xi) of the Act. It has been pointed out that in view of section 21 of the Universities Act, the Senate is the supreme governing body of the University and exercises control over alt the affairs of the University. It has been pointed out that in view of section 21 of the Universities Act, the Senate is the supreme governing body of the University and exercises control over alt the affairs of the University. Hence the member of the Senate is a public servant. Learned counsel submits that in view of aforesaid, prosecution of the petitioner without sanction is illegal. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State (SPE. Hyderabad) V/s. Air Commodore Kailash Chand ( AIR 1980 SC 522 ) and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 6 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- "6. A perusal of the provisions of these sections would clearly reveal that once the respondent was transferred to the Auxiliary Air Force he retained his character as a public servant because he was required to undergo training and to be called up for service as and when required. It is true that these provisions do not expressly contain the nature of the emoluments that the respondent may receive but the general tenor and setting of the Act clearly show that a member of the Auxiliary Air Force is as much a public servant as an acting member of the Indian Air Force. This is the view which the High Court appears to have taken and we find ourselves in complete agreement with the same. It is not disputed in this case that no sanction was taken from the appointing authority before prosecuting the respondent. For these reasons, therefore, we do not find any error of law in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed." 19. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned counsel and the authority relied on has no bearing in the case. From a plain reading of section 19 of the Code it is evident that previous sanction is necessary in case of such authorities who are removable from the office. So far the fact of continuance of the petitioner as a member of the Senate, being an ex Vice Chancellor of the University as contemplated under section 18(12) of the Universities Act is a membership which will continue till his life and as such petitioner is not removable from his office. Section 19 of the Act requires previous sanction of persons who are removable from office. Section 19 of the Act requires previous sanction of persons who are removable from office. The stand taken by the petitioner, if accepted, would lead to a situation where the petitioner shall have the protection under section 19 of the Act all through his life which was not intended while engrafting section 19 of the Act. 20. In any view of the matter, Mr. P. N. Pandey submits that the petitioner could have been removed from the office of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor, the order taking cognizance without the sanction of the Chancellor is illegal. He points out that in fact Chancellor was approached to grant sanction which he declined, still the learned Judge had taken cognizance of the offence, which is illegal. 21. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Nayak V/s. A.R. Antulay (1984)2 SCC 183 ) wherein in paragraph 23 it has been held as follows:- "......The legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that that authority alone would be able, when facts and evidence are placed before him, to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either frivolous or speculative. That authority alone would be competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the office which the public servant holds, how that power could be abused for corrupt motive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competent authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the office and whether the same has been abused or misused. It is the vertical hierarchy between the authority competent to remove the public servant from that office and the nature of the office held by the public servant against whom sanction is sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therefore, permit inference of knowledge about the function and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse by the public servant. That is why the Legislature clearly provided that that authority alone would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office." 22. I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Pandey. 23. It is common ground that at the time when the learned Judge had taken cognizance, petitioner was not holding the office of the Vice Chancellor and even if by virtue of Section 18(12) of the Universities Act he continues to be the life member of the Senate, but he is not removable from that office by the Chancellor and further the allegation made against the petitioner is for the period when he was the Vice- Chancellor of the University. The allegation is not in relation to an act done by him as a life member of the Senate. 24. In the result, I do not find any merit in this application and it is dismissed accordingly.