JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - The State of Punjab has filed these applications under Section 439(2) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Criminal Procedure Code) for setting aside order dated 16.11.2002 vide which Special Judge, Patiala extended the benefit of Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code to the respondents subject to certain conditions. 2. The respondents have been named as accused in FIR Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 dated 5.9.2002 registered by Vigilance Bureau, Patiala for offences under Section 8/12 read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the basis of statements made by Shri Prem Sagar and Shri Randhir Singh during the course of investigation of FIR No. 24 dated 30.4.2002 registered at Police Station, Vigilance Bureau, Flying Squad, Patiala against Shri Ravinderpal Singh Sidhu, the then Chairman of Punjab Public Commission, Patiala (for short, the Commission) in connection with what has come to be known as recruitment scam of unusual magnitude. 3. The thrust of the allegation levelled against the respondents is that they had paid huge amount of bribe to Shri Ravinder Pal Singh Sidhu for ensuring their own selection or selection of their relatives for appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch). FIR No. 64 relates to the candidates who had appeared for selection for appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). FIR No. 65 concerns the candidates who were in Government service but had appeared in the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) examination. FIR No. 66 relates to those who are appointed to the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) as fresh candidates. Those who were recruited to the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) by nomination have been named as accused in FIR No. 67. FIR No. 68 relates to the candidates whose results of Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) examination have not been declared. One of the accused, namely, Gursharanbir Singh is said to have paid bribe to the Chairman of the Commission for appointment of his brother. 4. All the respondents applied for anticipatory bail. FIR No. 68 relates to the candidates whose results of Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) examination have not been declared. One of the accused, namely, Gursharanbir Singh is said to have paid bribe to the Chairman of the Commission for appointment of his brother. 4. All the respondents applied for anticipatory bail. Learned Special Judge, Patiala disposed of their applications by a common order dated 16.11.2002 and extended the benefit of Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code to the respondents subject to the condition that they will join investigation as and when required; they shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence; they shall surrender their passports and they shall not leave the country without prior permission of the Court. 5. Shri R.S. Cheema, Senior Counsel appearing for the State argued that learned Special Judge, Patiala gravely erred in extending the benefit of Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code to the respondents ignoring the fact that absence of their custodial interrogation may frustrate the object of unearthing the scam which has unprecedented social dimensions. Shri Cheema submitted that the allegations levelled against the respondents are of extremely serious nature and argued that it is in public interest that they are subjected to thorough investigation while in custody. He pointed out that some of the candidates were supplied question papers in advance while others were favoured at the time of interview and a designed attempt was made by the then Chairman of the Commission to pollute the entire process of selection for illegal considerations. He further submitted that denial of custodial interrogation of the respondents will seriously prejudice the prosecution and will shake the public confidence in the system of administration of justice. In support of his arguments, Shri Cheema relied on State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 253; Directorate of Enforcement and another v. P.V. Prabhakar Rao, 1997 SCC (Crl.) 978 ; State v. Anil Sharma, 1997 SCC (Crl.) 1039 ;Dukhishyam Benupani, Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate (FERA) v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, ; Puran etc. etc. v. Ram Bilas and another, JT 2001(5) SC 226 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bimal Krishna Kundu and another, JT 1997(8) SC 382. 6. etc. v. Ram Bilas and another, JT 2001(5) SC 226 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bimal Krishna Kundu and another, JT 1997(8) SC 382. 6. Sarv Shri R.S. Ghai and Baldev Singh, Senior Advocates and other learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that learned Special Judge, Patiala extended the benefit of Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code to their clients after a thread-bare consideration of the entire matter and argued that there is no justification for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to them. Shri Ghai pointed out that the entire case against the respondents is based on the statements of Randhir Singh Dheera and Prem Sagar who were named as accused in FIRs No. 7 and 24 registered against Shri Ravinder Pal Singh Sidhu and on the basis of their statements, the respondents cannot be convicted. Shri Baldev Singh read out the grounds on which the State has sought cancellation of the anticipatory bail and argued that there is no justification for exercise of power by this Court under Section 439(2) read with Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code because no tangible evidence is available with the prosecution to connect the respondents with the recruitment scam. Learned counsel emphasised that there is no allegation against the respondents that during the intervening period, they had interfered with the prosecution or abused the concession granted by Special Judge, Patiala. In support of their arguments, Sarv Shri Ghai and Baldev Singh relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathsinh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, 1984 Crl. L.J. 160; Dolat Ram and others v. The State of Haryana, 1995(1) All India Law Reporter 1; Mahant Chand Nath Yogi v. State of Haryana, 2003(1) RCR (Criminal) 764 and of this Court in Daljit Kaur v. Jasbir Singh and others, 1995(2) C.L.R. 370. The other learned counsel adopted the arguments of Shri Ghai and Shri Baldev Singh and submitted that there is no valid ground for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to their clients. 7. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments and perused the record. 8. An application for grant of bail in non-bailable case at the initial stage and an application for cancellation of bail already granted in such a case are required to be dealt with on different footings by applying different yard-sticks. 7. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments and perused the record. 8. An application for grant of bail in non-bailable case at the initial stage and an application for cancellation of bail already granted in such a case are required to be dealt with on different footings by applying different yard-sticks. While granting bail in a non-bailable case, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the motive for committing an offence, its gravity and social ramification. However, for cancellation of bail already granted, there must exist very cogent and over-whelming circumstances which warrant an order depriving the accused of his liberty. It is not possible to prepare an exhaustive list of the grounds on which bail can be cancelled but some of the well-recognised grounds on which power under Section 439(2) Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised are : "(i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity; (ii) interferes with the course of investigation; (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence of witnesses; (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation; (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country; (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety." 9. In Bhagirathsinh Judejas case (supra), the Supreme Court reversed an order passed by the learned Single Judge of Gujarat High Court cancelling the bail granted to the appellant who was charged with the allegation of committing an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and observed : "One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him that the victim attacked was a social and political worker and therefore the accused should not be granted bail but we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be considered so over- riding as to permit interference with a discretionary order of the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tempering with evidence." 10. In Dolat Rams case (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by this Court under Section 439(2) Criminal Procedure Code cancelling the bail granted to the appellants who were accused in a case involving dowry death. The proposition of law laid down in that case reads thus : "Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial." (Emphasis added). 11. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial." (Emphasis added). 11. In Mahant Chand Nath Yogis case (supra), the Supreme Court noted the proposition laid down in Dolat Rams case (supra) and quashed an order passed by this Court cancelling the bail granted to the appellant by Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code The facts of that case were that the appellant was named as an accused in FIR No. 17 dated 24.1.1999 registered under Sections 302/120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25/54/59 of the Arms Act. He filed an aplication under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code on 20.3.2001 in the Sessions Court. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari granted anticipatory bail on 9.4.2001 for six weeks. The same was later on confirmed by an order dated 6.6.2001. That order was set aside by the High Court on an application filed by the State under Section 439(2) read with Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code While setting aside the order of the High Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made a detailed reference to the orders passed by the trial Court and the High Court and observed : "After perusing the orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judges dated 9.4.2001 and 5.6.2001 and records, we do not get any impression that the judicial discretion in grating anticipatory bail was exercised either erroneously or on any irrelevant consideration. The serious contention advanced before us by the learned Public Prosecutor is that for further investigation of the case custodial interrogation of the appellant is very much required. While stating the facts in the beginning, we have noticed that the appellants joined investigation whenever required and as a matter of fact they were interrogated on two occasions for sufficient time. The appellants were named as accused for committing offence under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code almost after a period of four and half months from the dated of the murder that too based on the disclosure statement of hardened criminal, the statement of Kishan on whose statement the appellants were involved in the offence was proved to be false and police got him discharged. The submission of the learned Public Prosecutor that earlier investigation made by the police officers and scrutinized by the superiors was faulty and mala fide is not a ground to put against the appellants at this stage. The appellant No. 1 has also alleged that he is falsely involved in the case because of political rivalry and he was threatened for extracting money; in that regard he had also made complaint to the police seeking protection. Unfortunately, the High Court in the impugned order dated 21.12.2001, cancelling the anticipatory bail granted to the appellants and in the subsequent order dated 22.2.2002, did not consider the contentions raised on behalf of the parties objectively and in proper perspective and did not deal with the reasons recorded and consideration made by the learned Additional Sessions Judges in the orders dated 9.4.2001 and 5.6.2001 granting anticipatory bail. The High Court has simply observed in the order dated 21.12.2001 that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, had not taken all facts into account and that he granted anticipatory bail to the appellants on 9.4.2001 when the case was at initial stage. We find this statement is factually incorrect looking to the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the records of the case. The learned Sessions Judge had taken pains to notice the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and that of the case was not at the initial stage. The High Court has simply stated that the order of the learned Sessions Judge is based on exercise of judicial discretion in an erroneous manner. A considered order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge supported by reasons in exercise of judicial discretion does not become erroneous by merely dubbing or calling it as such. In our view, in the light of what is stated above, both the orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 9.4.2001 and 5.6.2001 after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case to the extent required for exercise of judicial discretion in the matter of granting bail are sustainable. The Judicial discretion exercised in granting anticipatory bail, in our opinion, is neither perverse nor erroneous. On the other hand, they are based on relevant considerations supported by reasons. The Judicial discretion exercised in granting anticipatory bail, in our opinion, is neither perverse nor erroneous. On the other hand, they are based on relevant considerations supported by reasons. The High Court has observed : "It is alleged in the present case that the appellant No. 1 wielded great influence and had obtained bail by dubious means." This observation is not based on any finding. When the learned Additional Sessions Judges have passed the orders granting anticipatory bail exercising judicial discretion, there is no warrant to say that such an order of bail is obtained by dubious means. The High Court, except referring to two decisions as to the position of law, failed to notice the facts and relevant aspects of the case on hand to apply them." 12. In Daljit Kaurs case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court rejected the petition filed under Section 439(2) Criminal Procedure Code for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to respondents No. 1 and 2 who were accused of committing offences under Sections 363/366/376/302/201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code by Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar. The learned Single Judge observed that gravity of the offence is an important factor but that by itself cannot justify cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted by the competent court by assigning cogent reasons. 13. If the facts of the cases in hand are examined in the light of the guiding principles laid down in the afore-mentioned decisions, we are inclined to agree with learned counsel for the respondents that the State has failed to make out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Section 439(2) Criminal Procedure Code A perusal of the impugned order shows that while granting anticipatory bail to the respondents, Special Judge, Patiala relied on the following factors : (i) there is no allegation against any of the respondents for accepting bribe; (ii) all of them had joined investigation and also expressed their readiness to cooperate with the investigating agency; (iii) those who are in Government service are still continuing on the reverted posts; (iv) none of the accused has tried to pollute the course of investigation or administration of justice by attempting to leave the country or by going underground; and (v) none of them is alleged to have interfered with the on-going investigation. 14. 14. It is not the case of the State that any of the afore-mentioned factors are non-existent. It is also not the case of the State that any recovery is to be effected from the respondents. That apart, no material has been placed before the Court to prima facie show that the respondents are likely to misuse the concession granted by Special Judge, Patiala. Therefore, we do not find any justification for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents by learned Special Judge, Patiala who has assigned cogent reasons for exercising discretion under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code in their favour. 15. Before concluding, we may advert to the judgments relied upon by Shri Cheema. In P.V. Prabhakar Raos case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the legality of the order of anticipatory bail passed by a learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their Lordships noted that the allegation levelled against the respondent was extremely serious and even the learned Single Judge felt that the materials already collected were capable of stretching an accusing finger towards him and observed : "The learned Single Judge has taken into account the fact that all other accused arrested in connection with this case have been released on bail. But they were released on bail only on the failure of the investigating agency to complete the investigation within the time prescribed in the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code. How could this respondent take advantage of that fact ? We cannot overlook that the respondent too has contributed to the non-completion to the investigation. Completion of investigation could be achieved only by interrogating all the persons involved as well as acquainted with the matter and after collecting all material evidence procurable. So the learned Single Judge should never have counted this point in favour of granting anticipatory bail to the respondent. The most glaring feature which even the respondent did not repudiate is the magnitude of the criminal conspiracy hatched, the ingenuity with which the cabal was orchestrated and the meticulousness with which it was implemented and the colossal amount of foreign exchange siphoned off from the country. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law. When the learned Single Judge himself felt, after going through the records in this case, that the materials already collected were capable of stretching an accusing finger towards the respondent, it was not at all a proper exercise of the discretion by favouring him with an order of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code." 16. In Anil Sharmas case (supra), their Lordships took cognizance of the apprehension expressed by the Central Bureau of Investigation that the respondent, who was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh and was also a minister for 3 years and held that the High Court should not have exercised discretionary power under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code for granting anticipatory bail to him. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the peculiar facts of that case are reproduced below : "Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrust with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders. The High Court has approached the issue as thought (though ?) it was considering a prayer for granting regular bail after arrest. The consideration which should weigh with the Court while dealing with a request for anticipatory bail need not be the same as for an application to release on bail after arrest. At any rate the High Court ought not to have side-stepped the apprehension expressed by the CBI that the respondent would influence the witnesses. The consideration which should weigh with the Court while dealing with a request for anticipatory bail need not be the same as for an application to release on bail after arrest. At any rate the High Court ought not to have side-stepped the apprehension expressed by the CBI that the respondent would influence the witnesses. The apprehension was quite reasonable when considering the high position which the respondent held and in the nature of accusation relating to a period during which he held such office." 17. In Purans case (supra), the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by the High Court cancelling the bail granted to the appellants in a dowry death case and observed : "It has been held that generally speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. It is, however, to be noted that this Court has clarified that these instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record, a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any reasons. Such an order would be against principles of law. Interest of justice would also require that such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. It must be remembered that such offences are on the rise and have a very serious impact on the society. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial Court has to be corrected." 18. In Arun Kumar Bajorias case (supra), the Supreme Court criticized the order passed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court which not only restrained the officials of the Directorate of Enforcement from arresting the respondent but also fixed the time and place for carrying out the interrogation and observed : "Plea that the respondent made himself available for interrogation for several days after being armed with an order preventing his arrest is not of much relevance now because that it not an aspect which can be taken advantage of by the respondent in this case. Similarly, the plea that the respondent is a sick person is not enough to claim pre-arrest bail order. In view of the allegations against the respondent any further loss of time would further impair the effectiveness of the enquiry and/or investigation in to those allegations. Considering the nature and seriousness of the allegations as well as largeness of the amount involved, the order of the City Sessions Judge should not remain alive." 19. In Jagjit Singhs (supra), the Supreme Court withdrew the concession of bail granted to the respondent who was accused of committing an offence under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Credits Act, 1923 and observed : "It is true that two of the persons who were prosecuted along with the respondent were released on bail prior to the commitment order; but the case of the respondent is obviously distinguishable from their case inasmuch as the prosecution case is that it is the respondent who is in touch with the foreign agency and not the other two persons prosecuted along with him. The fact that the respondent may not abscond is not by itself sufficient to induce the court to grant him bail in a case of this nature. Further, as the respondent has been committed for trial to the Court of Session, it is not likely now that the trial will take a long time. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondent is erroneous and should be set aside." 20. In Bimal Krishna Kundus case (supra), the allegation levalled against the respondents was that they had leaked the question papers of the examinations to be conducted by Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission. The learned Single Judge of the High Court noted that the allegation levelled against the respondents were of extremely serious nature but granted bail. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court and observed : "We are strongly of the opinion that this is not a case for exercising the discretion under Section 438 in favour of granting anticipatory bail to the respondents. It is disquieting that implications of arming respondents, when they are pitted against this sort of allegations involving well orchestrated conspiracy, with a pre-arrest bail order, though subject to some conditions, have not been taken into account by the learned single judge. It is disquieting that implications of arming respondents, when they are pitted against this sort of allegations involving well orchestrated conspiracy, with a pre-arrest bail order, though subject to some conditions, have not been taken into account by the learned single judge. We have absolutely no doubt that if respondents are equipped with such an order before they are interrogated by the police it would greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing all the ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as a consequence. Having apprised himself of the nature and seriousness of the criminal conspiracy and the adverse impact of it on "the career of millions of students", learned single judge should not have persuaded himself to exercise the discretion which Parliament had very thoughtfully conferred on the sessions judges and the High Courts through Section 438 of the Code, by favouring the respondents with such a pre-arrest bail order." 21. In our opinion, the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the State were decided in the backdrop of their peculiar facts and none of them lays down a proposition of law inconsistent with the principles laid down in Bhagirathsinh Judejas case (supra) or Dolat Rams case (supra). Therefore, those judgments cannot be relied upon for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents. 22. On the basis of above discussion, we hold that the State has failed to make out a case for interference with the order passed by learned Special Judge, Patiala under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code and these applications are liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Applications dismissed.