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2003 DIGILAW 901 (KAR)

T. K. HARIHARAN v. MANJULA RAMASWAMY

2003-10-29

A.V.SRINIVASA REDDY

body2003
A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision petition the petitioner calls in question the concurrent findings recorded by the Court below in allowing the petition filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21 (l) (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the old Act' for short ). ( 2 ) THE respondent-landlord filed the petition under Section 21 (1) (p) of the old Act on the ground that the petitioner-tenant had come in possession of an apartment bearing No. D2, G. 15, Brindavan Apartments, K. R. S. Road, Mysore of which he is the owner. It is the further case of the respondent-landlord that the petitioner-tenant is residing there. The learned Single Judge of the Rent Court allowed the petition and granted an order of eviction. The petitioner took the matter in revision before the Court below. The Court below having dismissed the revision upholding the finding of the Rent Court, the present revision is preferred by the petitioner. ( 3 ) I have heard the petitioner-in-person and learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord. ( 4 ) THE old Act was repealed by virtue of Section 70 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 ('the Acf for short) which came into force on 31st December, 2001. The provision in the Act which corresponds to Section 21 (l) (p) of the old Act is Section 27 (2) (j ). The said clause reads:" (J) that the tenant, his spouse or a dependent son or daughter ordinarily living with him has whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence or as the case may be a commercial premises: provided that the Court may in appropriate cases allow the tenant to vacate the premises within such period as he may permit but not exceeding one year from the date of passing of the order of eviction". The clause speaks of acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and it is not even required by law that the tenant should actually be residing in the alternate premises in order to entitle the landlord to get an order of eviction under this clause. It is enough for the landlord, for purposes of getting an order of eviction under this clause, to show to the satisfaction of the Court that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of a residence. It is enough for the landlord, for purposes of getting an order of eviction under this clause, to show to the satisfaction of the Court that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of a residence. Let me now examine whether in the given facts of the case the Courts below were right in granting the order of eviction to the landlord. ( 5 ) THE petitioner challenges the order of eviction mainly on the ground that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The very same issue was raised by him in the earlier proceedings between the parties in H. R. C. No. 198 of 1992. It was held in the earlier proceedings that the petitioner is the tenant under the respondent. The matter was taken in Rent (Revision) No. 221 of 1995 and it was ultimately held that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. The said finding had become final and conclusive. In this revision it is sought to be urged by the petitioner that the premises that was involved in H. R. C. No. 198 of 1992 is different from the premises involved in H. R. C. No. 143 of 2000. Such a contention cannot be allowed to be urged at this stage because it was never the case of the petitioner that he is a tenant of the landlord in respect of two premises and the finding recorded in Rent (Revision) No. 221 of 1995 which became final and binding on him relates to some other premises and, therefore, it could not be held to operate against him in these proceedings which is in respect of a different premises. Admittedly, the petitioner is a tenant of the respondent-landlord in respect of a certain premises of which the respondent had become owner thereof by virtue of the will executed in her favour by her father, the original owner. That being the case the contention now taken by the petitioner in these proceedings that the order passed in the earlier proceedings between the parties could not have been looked into or relied upon by the Courts below for deciding the issue of existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in these proceedings cannot be countenanced at all. What is sought to be done by the petitioner in the present proceedings is to set up a new tenancy in respect of a premises other than the premises in which he is a tenant and in respect of which premises the Courts had held in the previous proceedings that there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Such a stand cannot be countenanced at all in law because it is nobody's case that the petitioner is a tenant under the respondent-landlord in respect of two premises. Section 61 of the Act governs matters which have become final and it stipulates:"61. Decisions which have become final not to reopened. The court or the Controller shall summarily reject any application under this Act which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in the former proceeding under this Act or under any of the enactments repealed by Section 70". In the light of the decision in H. R. R. P. No. 221 of 1995 which has become final and conclusive as between the petitioner and respondent, it is not now open to the petitioner to reopen the issue and contend anything to the contrary. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, the jural relationship of landlord and tenant being a forgone conclusion, what remains to be seen is whether the impugned orders of the Courts below suffer from any illegality requiring the interference of this Court in this revision proceeding. The provision in the Act which corresponds to Section 21 (1) (p) of the old Act is Section 27 (2) (j ). The said provision reads: "27. Protection of tenants against eviction. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Judge or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, save as provided in sub-section (2 ). (2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely. (2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely. (j) that the tenant, his spouse or a dependent son or daughter ordinarily living with him has whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence or as the case may be a commercial premises: provided that the Court may in appropriate cases allow the tenant to vacate the premises within such period as he may permit but not exceeding one year from the date of passing of the order of eviction". The petitioner has in unequivocal terms admitted in his evidence before the Rent Court as per Ex. P. 4 that he purchased the property on behalf of his son in the year 2000 and that he is residing therein. He also admitted that he had written two letters asking the respondent to pay him Rs. 2,00,000/- if she wants him to leave the compound of the house. His stand appears to be despite the fact that he had purchased the flat and is residing there, keeping the petition premises under lock and key, that he is still entitled to resist the eviction petition. Having once suffered an adverse order in the previous proceedings on the question of existence of jural relationship between the respondent and himself, he again seeks to rake up that issue in these proceedings. Such a stand cannot be permitted to be taken by him in these proceedings in the light of Section 61 of the Act. The respondent having convincingly established that the petitioner has come into possession of an alternate suitable accommodation, she becomes entitled in law to an order of eviction under clause (j) of Section 27 (2) of the Act. Therefore, the concurrent findings passed by the Courts below on the point, which are based on the unqualified admissions made by the petitioner himself in the course of his evidence before the Rent Court, cannot be interfered with in exercise of the limited jurisdiction under section 115 of the CPC. I find no merit in this revision under Section 115 of the CPC. ( 7 ) THE petitioner has cited a number of decisions for my consideration. I find no merit in this revision under Section 115 of the CPC. ( 7 ) THE petitioner has cited a number of decisions for my consideration. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I find no necessity to refer to those decisions. The principles laid down in those decisions have been arrived at by the Courts in the course of determining issues which arose for their consideration in those cases and the principles so laid down cannot be applied to the case on hand as similar issues do not arise for the Court's consideration in this case. Unless similar issues are involved in this case, the principles laid down in those decisions would have no application to the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) IN the result, I find no merit in this revision and it is, accordingly dismissed. The petitioner-tenant is given three months' time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent-landlord. The respondent is entitled to receive the rents that are in deposit. --- *** --- .