Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. In this petition, the petitioner has made the fol lowing substantive prayers:- "(i) a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 23.10.2001, Annexure P/11, passed by respondent No. 2 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner-company has been dismissed without passing a speaking and reasoned order and the order of recovery dated 26.2.2002, Annexure P/12, passed by respondent No. 3 whereby the petitioner company has been directed to deposit the house tax as assessed by the Municipal Committee, which is totally illegal and arbitrary. (ii) a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the house tax assessment demand for the years, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 amounting to Rs. 43,21,275/- and Rs. 42,78,140.68 raised vide demand bills dated 12.10.1999 and 25.5.2000 respectively, Annexure P/2 and P/4 and also for quashing the notice dated 7.12.2000, Annexure P/6, vide which the petitioner company has been directed to deposit the amount against the aforesaid demands (Annexure P/2 and P/4) within seven days, as the same are against law and the said demands have been raised without following the principles of natural justice." 2. Although, the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders and notices on various grounds and respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 have tried to defend the exercise undertaken by the competent authority of Municipal Council, Dhariwal (respondent No. 3) under Section 68-A(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (for short, the Act) to re-assess the value of the petitioners property and the demand notices impugned in this petition, we do not consider it necessary to deal with and decide the issues raised by the parties because after hearing learned counsel and perusing the record, we are convinced that order dated 23.10.2001 (Annexure P11) passed by Deputy Director, Urban Local Bodies, Amritsar (respondent No. 2) dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 68-A read with Section 85 of the Act is vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, it does not satisfy the requirement of a speaking order and is liable to be quashed on that ground. 3. A perusal of the record shows that C.W.P. No. 17378 of 2000 filed by the petitioner for quashing bills dated 12.10/1999 and 25.5.2000 and notice dated 7.12.2000 raised/issued by respondent No. 3 was dismissed on 15.3.2001 as withdraw with liberty to file appeal. 3. A perusal of the record shows that C.W.P. No. 17378 of 2000 filed by the petitioner for quashing bills dated 12.10/1999 and 25.5.2000 and notice dated 7.12.2000 raised/issued by respondent No. 3 was dismissed on 15.3.2001 as withdraw with liberty to file appeal. The operative part of that order reads as under: "Hence, the writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file appeal. We also give liberty to the petitioner to file an application under Section 85(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 for condonation of delay and hope that the appellate authority will dispassionately and objectively consider its request for condonation of delay keeping in view the averments made therein." 4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 68-A read with Section 85 of the Act against assessment list/order dated 30.8,1999 and also prayed for condonation of delay. Respondent No. 3 opposed the prayer of the petitioner for condonation of delay. The parties also filed written arguments. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 dismissed the appeal by recording the following order: "B.I.C. Limited Mills Dhariwal submitted the appeal against the assessment order of house tax dated 30.8.1999 of Municipal Council, Dhariwal under Section 68-A of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and condonation of delay under Section 85(1) dated . 27.3.2001 which was submitted in my Court on 10.4.200,1. The Municipal Council, Dhariwal submitted its reply to the appeal on 31,3.2001 and in response to which M/s B.I.C. Limited, Dhariwal submitted reply on 6.7.2001. Both the parties were heard on the given dates for which M/s B.J.C. Limited and Municipal Council, Dhariwal submitted the written arguments on 1.8.2001 and 14.9.2001 respectively. I, Bhupinder Singh, P.C.S., Deputy Director, Urban Local Bodies, Amritsar, after hearing both the parties and considering the written arguments dismiss the appeal of M/s B.I.C. Limited, Dhariwal dated 27.3.2001." 5. The requirements of recording of reasons and communication thereof to the affected person has been treated as a part of the duty of judicial and quasi-judicial authorities to comply with the rules of natural justice. This implies that the concerned authority must decide the lis by applying its mind to the facts of the case, the material/evidence produced by the parties and arguments, if any, made on their behalf and this must be reflected in the form of reasons to be recorded in writing. This implies that the concerned authority must decide the lis by applying its mind to the facts of the case, the material/evidence produced by the parties and arguments, if any, made on their behalf and this must be reflected in the form of reasons to be recorded in writing. In this connection, we may refer to the decisions of the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, Conciliation Officer and Anr., A.I.R. 1970 Gujarat 1, and a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1984. In Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai (supra), P.N. Bhagwati J., as his Lordship then was, speaking for the Full Bench, observed as under: "The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary from the rule of the law which constitutes one of the basic principles of the Indian Constitutional set up. The administrative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre-existing legal norms to factual situations. Now the necessity of giving reasons is an important safeguard to ensure observance of the duty to act judicially. It introduces clarity, checks the introduction of extraneous or irrelevant considerations and excludes or, at any rate, minimises arbitrariness in the decision-making process. Another reasons which compels making of such an order is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. These Courts have the power under the said provisions to quash by certiorari a quasi-judicial order made by an Administrative Officer and this power of review can be effectively exercised only if the order is a speaking order. In the absence of any reasons in support of the order, the said courts cannot examine the correctness of the order under review. The High Court and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits of the law. The result would be that the power of judicial review would be stultified and no redress being available to the citizen, there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice. The High Court and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits of the law. The result would be that the power of judicial review would be stultified and no redress being available to the citizen, there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice. If this requirement is insisted upon, then they will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction." 6. In S.N. Mukherjees case (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reviewed various judicial precedents on the subject and laid down the following proposition: "The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court and the High Court to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand point of policy and expediency. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decisions are of no less significance. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decisions are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." 7. If the validity of order Annexure P.11 is tested on the touch-stone of the propositions laid down in the above noted decisions, we do not find any difficulty in invalidating the same on the ground that it does not satisfy the requirement of a speaking order and is, therefore, violative of the rules of natural justice. Respondent No. 2 did make a brief reference to the factual matrix of the case but dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic order, albeit without assigning any reason. He did not even refer to the points raised by the petitioner in the memo of appeal, what to say of dealing and deciding the same by assigning reasons. 8. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed and order Annexure P.11 is quashed with a direction to respondent No. 2 to decide the petitioners appeal afresh within a period of 3 months. 8. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed and order Annexure P.11 is quashed with a direction to respondent No. 2 to decide the petitioners appeal afresh within a period of 3 months. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 2 on July 22, 2003". 9. We also direct that stay order dated 17.5.2003 passed by this Court shall remain operative till the decision of the appeal filed by the petitioner.