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2003 DIGILAW 903 (BOM)

Maharashtra Apex Corporation Ltd. v. Bindu Synthetics Ltd. & others

2003-08-22

A.M.KHANWILKAR

body2003
JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:—By this Chamber Summons, the applicant prays that the Warrant of Attachment dated 7th December, 2001 issued by this Honble Court in Execution Application No. 626 of 2001 in respect of residential flat situated at B-14, Vasant Mahal, Marine Drives, C-Road, Mumbai be raised and/or stayed. The Chamber Summons was originally filed by the applicants mother Mrs. Bindu Amar Sheth, as the applicant was minor at the relevant time on 29th July, 2002. During the pendency of this Chamber Summons, the applicant has become major in February, 2003, and therefore, formal amendments have been carried out on 7th August 2003, whereby, the applicant himself is now pursuing the present proceedings. 2.The Warrant of Attachment was issued by this Court on 7th December, 2001 in execution proceedings taken out on the basis of Award passed against the respondents on 10th June, 2000 in Manipal Arbitration Petition No. 120 of 1999. The respondent No. 2 is the father of the applicant. According to the applicant, he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat as the same has been bequeathed to him by his grandmother Sunanda Sheth by Codicil dated 21st March, 1998. It is further asserted that Sunanda was the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat when the Codicil was executed by her on 21st March, 1998. It is not in dispute that the suit flat was originally tenanted premises, but in due course of time, the occupants of the building formed Vasant Mahal Co-operative Society and in turn, the society has become the owner of the said property. The flat was then allotted to the applicants grandfather in the name of Ambalal Sheth H.U.F. and share certificates were issued on that basis on 30th July, 1974. Ambalal Sheth was the father of respondent No. 2 and grandfather of the applicant herein. Ambalal Sheth was the Karta of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. who was the member of the society and allotted flat in question. The respondent No. 2 was married to Mrs. Bindu Amar Sheth and the applicant was born out of that wedlock on 7th February, 1985. Later on, on 15th September, 1989, the Karta of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F., Shri Ambalal Sheth expired intestate. The respondent No. 2 was married to Mrs. Bindu Amar Sheth and the applicant was born out of that wedlock on 7th February, 1985. Later on, on 15th September, 1989, the Karta of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F., Shri Ambalal Sheth expired intestate. After the death of Ambalal Sheth, the suit flat was transferred in the name of his widow Sunanda, the grandmother of the applicant-obviously being the representative of the H.U.F. It is stated that on 28th February 1998, oral partition was arrived at between the respondent No. 2 Amar Sheth and Sunanda Sheth. The said partition was recorded by partition deed on 5th March, 1998. As per the said partition deed, the suit flat has been given exclusively to Sunanda along with other assets and liabilities of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. Whereas, the respondent No. 2 was provided only cash of Rs. 10,000/- towards his share. It is asserted that this was a total partition between the members of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. After this partition, said Sunanda assumed that she was exclusive owner of the suit flat and therefore, executed Codicil on 21st March, 1998 bequeathing the flat to the applicant who was then a minor. Sunanda expired on 10th April, 1998; and after her death, the flat has been transferred in the name of the applicant. In the interregnum, the respondent No. 2 was party to certain business transactions which were entered between the respondent No. 1 and the petitioners. The respondent No. 2 is the Director of the respondent No. 1. Those transactions were effected sometime in March, 1996 and since the same were not honoured, arbitration proceedings were entered, upon reference at the instance of the petitioners in June, 1999. In the said arbitration proceedings, ex parte Award has been passed against the respondents on 10th June, 2000 and that Award has been allowed to become final. With a view to get the said Award executed, the petitioners have taken out execution proceedings before this Court, in which, the suit flat came to be attached on the premise that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the said flat. With a view to get the said Award executed, the petitioners have taken out execution proceedings before this Court, in which, the suit flat came to be attached on the premise that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the said flat. The applicant was minor at the relevant time, therefore, his mother Bindu Amar Sheth (wife of respondent No. 2) filed the present Chamber Summons for raising of the said attachment on the ground that the applicant was the exclusive and absolute owner of the suit flat and the respondent No. 2 had no concern with the same in any manner. 3.This Chamber Summons has been resisted by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, the partition between the respondent No. 2 and her mother Sunanda is illegal and has been effected only with a view to defeat the claim of the creditors. The petitioners further assert that Sunanda was not and could not become the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat and for which reason, she could not have bequeathed the entire flat in favour of the applicant herein. It is therefore submitted that since the claim of the applicant is resting on the said document, that will obviously not give any right, title or interest to the applicant to claim that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat. In the circumstances, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that neither partition, nor the transfer in favour of the applicant is valid and it is open to the petitioners to assert that the said transactions are voidable at their instance as the principal purpose of the said transaction was obviously to defeat the claim of the creditors. On this basis, the present Chamber Summons is being resisted by the petitioners and instead, it is contended that the order of attachment is properly passed and no interference is warranted. 4.During the course of arguments, learned Counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the Warrant of Attachment has been issued in this case in a casual manner and without even ascertaining the basic statutory requirement. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court (D.G. Karnik, J.) dated 25th June, 2002 in Chamber Summons No. 241 of 2002 in (Ms. 4.During the course of arguments, learned Counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the Warrant of Attachment has been issued in this case in a casual manner and without even ascertaining the basic statutory requirement. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court (D.G. Karnik, J.) dated 25th June, 2002 in Chamber Summons No. 241 of 2002 in (Ms. Aarti S. Bajaj v. Deepak Nichani and Shantibai Lalchand Nichani)1, reported in 2003(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)764, to contend that in such a case, the Warrant of Attachment should be set aside. Learned Counsel further submits that in any case, there is no sufficient material on record to accept the claim of the petitioners that the transfer of suit flat in favour of the applicant has been effected with intention to defeat the rights of the creditors and in absence of this material, the transfer in favour of the applicant, cannot be ignored. Whereas, the Court will have to presume that the same is valid. Learned Counsel for the applicant further contends that it was obligatory on the part of the petitioners to specifically assert in the execution proceedings itself before resorting to Warrant of Attachment that the transfer of flat in favour of the applicant was with intent to defeat the rights of the creditors and since that has not been done in the present case, the Court will have to raise the attachment order, as obviously, it proceeded on the premise that the respondent No. 2 was the owner of the suit flat and which fact is now countered on the basis of materials placed on record by the applicant. These are the only submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant. 5.On the other hand, Counsel for the petitioners contend that the decision relied upon by the applicant in the case of Aarti S. Bajaj (supra), is of no avail because in the present case, the Warrant of Attachment has been issued on 7th December, 2001 much before the said decision was rendered. Learned Counsel contends that if at all, the said judgment will have prospective application, it cannot be the basis to question the Warrant of Attachment which came to be issued in anterior point of time. Learned Counsel contends that if at all, the said judgment will have prospective application, it cannot be the basis to question the Warrant of Attachment which came to be issued in anterior point of time. Moreover, it is contended that in the present case, the substance of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the applicant is not the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat and if that claim was to be accepted, then it necessarily follows that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the suit flat, for which reason, the Warrant of Attachment as issued, can be justified. Learned Counsel further submits that although the petitioners have not specifically stated during the execution proceedings that the flat has been transferred in the name of the applicant herein, because the petitioners reasonably believed that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the said flat-as it is established from the record that the respondent No. 2 is occupying the said flat as his residence alongwith his family consisting of his wife Bindu and son-the applicant herein. Learned Counsel therefore, submits that since the applicant has for the first time asserted in the present proceedings by way of this Chamber Summons that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat, it is open to the petitioners to counter that position and even at this stage, it is open for the petitioners to contend that the transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable at their instance, as it is more than clear that the entire transaction is illegal and obviously entered with a view to defeat the claim of the creditors. Learned Counsel further submits that the applicant being the son of the respondent No. 2, is obliged to discharge his pious obligation. Even if the applicant is interested in the suit flat independently or along with respondent No. 2 in that case also, the suit flat can be subjected to execution proceedings in relation to the Award passed against the respondent No. 2, which is in the nature of a decree. Even if the applicant is interested in the suit flat independently or along with respondent No. 2 in that case also, the suit flat can be subjected to execution proceedings in relation to the Award passed against the respondent No. 2, which is in the nature of a decree. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 282 in (S.M. Jakati and another v. S.M. Borkar and others)2, as well as in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 727 in (Faqir Chand v. Sardarni Harnam Kaur)3, to buttress the contention that for the debt of the father, the son is personally liable to repay, as it is not the case of the applicant that the debt incurred by the father was for illegal purpose or tainted and immoral. 6.It is relevant to note that although the respondents have been duly served, they have not chosen to appear in the present proceedings. The respondent No. 2, as mentioned earlier, is the father of the applicant. Although the present Chamber Summons was initially filed by Bindu Amar Sheth, namely, the wife of respondent No. 2, now the applicant himself is pursuing the present Chamber Summons, having become major. The respondent No. 2 has not chosen to appear before the Court. Moreover, none of the parties insisted for adducing oral evidence in this application. Accordingly, the matter will have to be decided on the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits filed by the rival parties. 7.It is established from the record that the respondent No. 2 was and is staying in the suit flat alongwith the applicant and his wife Bindu Sheth. 8.After considering the rival submissions, broadly, following points would arise for my consideration: "(i) Whether the Warrant of Attachment dated 7th December, 2001 is vitiated because of non-compliance of relevant provisions in terms of the decision of this Court in Aarti S. Bajaj v. Deepak Nichani dated 25th June, 2002? (ii) Whether the petitioners are precluded from contending that the transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable, having failed to assert that position in the first instance when the Warrant of Attachment was sought for? (iii) Whether the applicant is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat, as claimed? (ii) Whether the petitioners are precluded from contending that the transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable, having failed to assert that position in the first instance when the Warrant of Attachment was sought for? (iii) Whether the applicant is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat, as claimed? (iv) Whether the transfer of the suit flat in favour of the applicant is hit by section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and can be avoided by the petitioners? (v) Whether the suit flat is liable to be attached in relation to the liability of the respondent No. 2 arising out of the Award/decree?" POINT (i) : 9.In so far as the first objection raised on behalf of the applicant, I find no substance therein. No doubt, this Court has observed that it is obligatory for the Prothonotary and Senior Master to comply with the basic requirements and to ensure that the application as filed, is in conformity with the said requirements. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the application as filed and the order issuing Warrant of Attachment dated 7th December, 2001, cannot be vitiated on account of the said non-compliance. In the first place, the decision of this Court in Aarti S. Bajaj (supra) will have to be given prospective application. In the present case, the Warrant of Attachment was already issued on 7th December, 2001. Whereas, the said decision has been rendered on 25th June, 2002. In any case, the record of the present case would establish the position that the petitioners had invoked the remedy of Warrant of Attachment on the premise that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the suit flat. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 is occupying the suit flat alongwith his wife Bindu and son Mihir-applicant herein. If that is so, it was reasonable for the petitioners to proceed on the assumption that the respondent No. 2 had interest in the suit flat and therefore, recourse has been taken to the remedy of Warrant of Attachment in relation to the liability of respondent No. 2 arising out of the Award dated 10th June, 2000. In that sense, the order of issuance of Warrant of Attachment cannot be faulted, and in any case, cannot be said to be void ab initio, as is contended by the applicant. In that sense, the order of issuance of Warrant of Attachment cannot be faulted, and in any case, cannot be said to be void ab initio, as is contended by the applicant. In the circumstances, I see no substance in this objection, but to my mind, it is only an argument of desperation. POINT (ii) : 10.The next aspect is whether the petitioners are precluded from asserting that the transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable at their instance, having failed to take such a stand in the first instance. Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court in (SBI Home Finance Limited v. Credential Finance Limited and others)4, reported in 2001(2) All.M.R. 1. To my mind, the ratio of this decision is that the plea such as the transfer being voidable under section 53 if raised, it is obligatory on the Executing Court to adjudicate the said issue (see para 17 of this decision). The question is: at what stage, such a plea can be raised? It is not in dispute that in the present case, it was not so raised when the application for Warrant of Attachment was moved. However, the same has been taken only after the applicant approached this Court with a specific plea that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat. To my mind, there is no inhibition in any of the provisions so as to preclude the petitioners from raising that plea after the applicant had for the first time claimed before this Court that the suit flat exclusively and absolutely belongs to him. If such a plea was not to be taken by the applicant, then there was no occasion for the petitioners to assert that the purported transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said plea became available to the petitioners only because the applicant approached this Court with a specific case that he is the absolute owner of the suit flat and for which purpose, placed reliance on the transfer in his favour on account of the Codicil dated 21st March, 1998 executed by his grandmother Sunanda Sheth. The said plea became available to the petitioners only because the applicant approached this Court with a specific case that he is the absolute owner of the suit flat and for which purpose, placed reliance on the transfer in his favour on account of the Codicil dated 21st March, 1998 executed by his grandmother Sunanda Sheth. In the circumstances, I am of the view that nothing prevents the petitioners to assert at this stage of the proceedings that the transfer in favour of the applicant is voidable at their instance under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. POINT (iii) to (v) : 11.That takes me to the merits of the arguments in respect of whether the applicant is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit flat. I propose to deal with all the other issues together, because the arguments and the opinion to be expressed in relation to those issues are overlapping. Before we proceed to examine whether the applicant is the absolute and exclusive owner and can claim to have become so, on account of the Codicil executed in his favour dated 21st March 1998, we will have to go back to the period from 1974. It is not in dispute that the suit flat was originally tenanted accommodation in which Ambalal Sheth and his family consisting of Sunanda (wife), respondent No. 2 (the son) and his wife Bindu were occupying the same. The occupants of the said building then formed a Co-operative Housing Society by name Vasant Mahal Co-operative Housing Society and the said society in turn, purchased the entire building. In other words, the society became the owner of the building as well as the flat in question and the said flat was allotted to Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. as a member of that society, as is reflected from the share certificate No. 40 in respect of the suit flat. That happened on 30th July, 1974. Accordingly, it is not in dispute that the suit flat belonged to Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. At the relevant time, the co-parceners of the said H.U.F. were Ambalal Sheth himself, as the Karta and the respondent No. 2. The applicant was however, born in the said family on 7th February, 1985. With the birth of the applicant, he also became the co-parcener along with his father and grandfather and had interest by birth in the joint family property. The applicant was however, born in the said family on 7th February, 1985. With the birth of the applicant, he also became the co-parcener along with his father and grandfather and had interest by birth in the joint family property. Accordingly, after February 1985, the co-parceners of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. were Ambalal Sheth himself, his son-respondent No. 2 and the applicant herein. However, Ambalal Sheth expired on 15th September, 1989 intestate. After the death of Ambalal Sheth, who was the Karta, naturally, the respondent No. 2 being the eldest co-parcener, became the Karta of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. and the other co-parcener was the applicant herein. It, however, appears from the record that respondent No. 2 Amar Sheth and his mother-wife of Ambalal Sheth i.e. Sunanda Sheth entered into oral partition on 20th February, 1998 and later on recorded the said arrangement by a partition deed dated 5th March, 1998. Indeed this partition deed is an unregistered document. Besides, on plain language of the partition deed, which is placed on record, it proceeds on the premise that the members of the Hindu Undivided Family of the Ambalal Sarabai Sheth have decided to totally partition all the assets and liabilities of the Hindu Undivided Family. The partition is however only between the two members namely, the respondent No. 2, who was the Karta at the relevant time and Sunanda, the member (not a co-parcener) of the said H.U.F. The claim of the applicant who was also the co-parcener in the said family, has not been considered or referred to at all. In that sense, the purported partition as effected, is clearly illegal. Be that as it may, after the said partition, the said Sunanda proceeded on the premise that she has become the absolute owner of the suit flat and on that basis, executed Codicil on 21st March, 1998 bequeathing the suit flat to the applicant herein, who was minor at the relevant time. Obviously, it cannot be said that Sunanda was the absolute owner of the suit flat, either in fact or in law, when the Codicil was executed in favour of the applicant. The purported partition deed obviously could not have ignored the claim of the applicant, who was one of the co-parcener. Obviously, it cannot be said that Sunanda was the absolute owner of the suit flat, either in fact or in law, when the Codicil was executed in favour of the applicant. The purported partition deed obviously could not have ignored the claim of the applicant, who was one of the co-parcener. Moreover, it is rightly argued on behalf of the petitioners that female member of the H.U.F. cannot resort to partition, but it is only when the co-parceners of H.U.F. decide to go for partition that she would get share in the property, which has to be determined as per her entitlement. Even for this reason, the said purported partition cannot be said to be a legal document. Besides, as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioners, the partition seems to be only a paper arrangement, as it is seen that the entire assets of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. have been given to the share of Sunanda Sheth, except a paltry sum of Rs. 10,000/- only to the respondent No. 2 in cash. The Counsel for the applicant justified this partition on the basis that along with the entire assets, the liabilities of the H.U.F. were also to be borne by Sunanda and therefore, it was in the nature of package that all the assets of the H.U.F. have been given to Sunanda. However, what is relevant to note is that the suit flat has been valued only at Rs. 55,733/-. The justification given by the applicant is that the said value is a book value of the flat. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the flat which is admeasuring more than 1000 square feet and situated in a prime locality of Mumbai near Churchgate Railway Station, by no stretch of imagination, it could be valued around Rs. 55,000/- only in 1998. What is intriguing to note is that the respondent No. 2 has not participated in the proceedings before the arbitrator nor has chosen to appear in the present application. Whereas, this Chamber Summons was taken out by the wife of the respondent No. 2 to espouse the cause of their son, the present applicant. 55,000/- only in 1998. What is intriguing to note is that the respondent No. 2 has not participated in the proceedings before the arbitrator nor has chosen to appear in the present application. Whereas, this Chamber Summons was taken out by the wife of the respondent No. 2 to espouse the cause of their son, the present applicant. Taking the totality of the circumstances on record, it appears that the respondent No. 2 has made calculated move all along and for which reason also, there is force in the argument of the petitioners that the partition was actually a paper transaction, so as to defeat the claim of the creditors. Interestingly, even after the purported partition, Sunanda continued to stay in the suit flat along with her son respondent No. 2 and his family. In that sense, all the family members continued to enjoy the property given to the share of Sunanda in the purported partition in the same manner as before. Besides, the so-called partition has been effected in March 1998, whereas, the business transaction was entered by the respondent No. 1 company, of which, the respondent No. 2 was the Director in March 1996. The respondents were making part payment from time to time, however, as there were certain disputes, the arbitration proceedings were entered in June, 1999. Viewed in this perspective, it is reasonable to accept the argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that keeping in mind the fall-out of the said transaction, and because the respondent No. 2 was to become personally liable, the purported partition between him and his mother Sunanda was effected in March, 1998. Understood thus, there is substance in the plea taken on behalf of the petitioners that the purported partition is voidable at their instance, as it has been effected with an intent to defeat the claim of the creditors. Even on this reasoning, the purported partition deed can be ignored. A priori, Sunanda has had no absolute and exclusive right in the suit flat and naturally could not have bequeathed the entire flat in favour of the applicant herein; in which case, the claim of the applicant with regard to the suit flat becomes questionable. 12.There is another facet which needs to be discussed as to why the applicant is not entitled for the relief as claimed in this Chamber Summons. 12.There is another facet which needs to be discussed as to why the applicant is not entitled for the relief as claimed in this Chamber Summons. As observed earlier, from the admitted evidence, it follows that on the death of Ambalal Sheth, the Karta of the H.U.F. on 15th September, 1989, the respondent No. 2 being the eldest male co-parcener, became the Karta of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F., of which, the applicant was also the co-parcener since February, 1985 after his birth. Accordingly, no partition could have been effected only between the respondent No. 2 and his mother (Sunanda) who was only a member of the H.U.F. and not a co-parcener. Be that as it may, the purported partition in no way even adverts to the legitimate claim of the applicant in the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. For that reason, the partition would be of no avail, though claimed to have been executed between respondent No. 2 and his mother, since deceased. As observed earlier, the partition is also questionable because it appears that entire assets of the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. have been given to the share of Sunanda Sheth, whereas, what is earmarked for the respondent No. 2 Amar Sheth is, only sum of Rs. 10,000/- in cash out of the total assets of Rs. 10,65,935/-. As mentioned earlier, the value of the suit flat is obviously grossly undervalued only at Rs. 55,733/-. To my mind, the said suit flat continued to remain the property of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. and its status as H.U.F. property remained unaltered. In that sense, the respondent No. 2 and the applicant being co-parceners, have share and interest in the said flat. After the death of Ambalal Sheth, by virtue of deeming provision contained in section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, his wife Sunanda was entitled to get notional share in the suit flat, but Sunanda having expired on 10th April, 1998, even that interest has been reverted back in the co-parcenery property. In such a situation, the respondent No. 2 as well as the applicant would continue to hold the property belonging to Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. as co-parceners. In such a situation, the respondent No. 2 as well as the applicant would continue to hold the property belonging to Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. as co-parceners. If that is so, it was open to the petitioners to take recourse to attachment of such a property, so as to realise the undivided share of the respondent No. 2 in Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. Insofar as the applicant is concerned, he was minor at the relevant time and has now become major in February 2003. Being the son of respondent No. 2, he is liable to discharge the liability incurred by his father on account of pious obligation; and in such a case, it is open to the petitioners to proceed against his share or interest in the property as well, for discharging the liability arising out of the Award/Decree, for which the respondent No. 2 was personally and vicariously liable because it is not the case of the applicant that the debt incurred by the respondent No. 2 (father) was for illegal purpose or tainted and immoral. This legal position can be deduced from the decisions of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioners in S.M. Jakati another v. S.M. Borkar others (supra) and Faqir Chand v. Sardarni Harnam Kaur (supra). On the above reasoning, no fault can be found with the order of attachment and the same can be sustained, the fact that the records of the Society would indicate that the applicant alone is the member and having been allotted the suit flat notwithstanding. From the admitted facts as discussed above, since the property continues to have the character of Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F., the transfer effected in favour of Sunanda in the records of the society qua the suit flat in November, 1992 is only ascribable to her status as representative of H.U.F. and in no other capacity. Even the transfer in favour of the applicant which is founded on the Codicil dated 21st March, 1998 issued by Sunanda on the premise that she was the absolute and exclusive owner thereof, which is, however, incorrect basis, the parties will have to be relegated to the original position that the suit flat belongs to the Ambalal Sheth, H.U.F. 13.Accordingly, I find no substance in the Chamber Summons. Hence, the same deserves to be dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly. Hence, the same deserves to be dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly. 14.It is relevant to note that the matter was adjourned from time to time as the parties were exploring the possibility of settlement. During the negotiations, it appears that the petitioners were willing to accept the offer made by the respondent No. 1 company that the total outstanding amount under the Award/Decree will be discharged in 24 equal monthly instalments, but the same was not finally accepted because the respondent No. 1 insisted that the order of issuance of warrant of attachment should be vacated and instead all the respondents including the applicant as well as the mother of the applicant Bindu Sheth would give undertaking to this Court that they shall not deal in any manner with the suit flat till they were in a position to discharge the agreed settlement amount. Whereas, according to the petitioners, it was not possible to accede to that request. On the other hand, the petitioners insisted that the attachment should continue because there was no other security referred to the petitioners and in the event, the respondents or the applicant was to commit any default or even violate the undertaking given to this Court, there was no arrangement, by which, the petitioners interest could be secured regarding the remaining outstanding amount. As the parties were unable to resolve this controversy amicably, I had no option out to decide the matter on merits by this judgment. 15.At this stage, learned Counsel for the applicant prays that operation of this order be stayed, so as to enable the applicant to take up the matter in appeal, if so advised. 16.Parties to maintain status quo with regard to the suit property for a period of six weeks from today. 17.It is made clear that in the meantime, it will be open to the parties to once again persuade themselves to amicably resolve the matter, if so advised. 18.All concerned to act on the ordinary copy of this order, duly authenticated by the Personal Secretary. Chamber summons dismissed. -----