( 1 ) THE appellants are the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 14 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Krishna District at Machilipatnam. They filed the said suit for partition of properties mentioned in Schedules A, B and C by metes and bounds, between themselves and the defendants and to allot 1/6th share by taking good and bad qualities into consideration in all the properties. The said suit was decreed partly to the extent the defendants conceded and dismissed the rest of the claim of the plaintiffs. Hence this appeal. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal the defendant No. 1 died. But a Memo was filed in the Court that the other defendants represent his estate and no other legal heirs need be brought on record. The counsel appearing for the defendants also brought to our notice that the defendant No. 1 executed a registered Will in the year 1999 before his death. This fact need not detain us from examining the correctness or otherwise of the Judgment, since the Will is subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and pending appeal the same is subject to the result of the appeal. ( 3 ) THE parties are referred as arrayed in the plaint. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant No. 1 and one Kotanagayya were the sons of one Pedavullakki of Chintaguntapalem. But that the said Pedavullakki having addicted to vices shifted from place to place and ultimately after the death of his wife, he lived with his two sons. With his brother-in-law Jagapathi at Pedana for some time and thereafter his whereasbouts were not known. The defendant No. 1 had a brother apart from 4 sons. Sajja Lokeswara Rao, father of the 1st plaintiff and husband of the 2nd plaintiff was his first son. The plaintiffs contended that the properties described in A-schedule and B-schedule were acquired with the nucleus of the joint family find and also from joint exertions of all the members of the family. Even if the properties are held to be self acquired properties. The defendant No. 1 blended his properties into the joint family property and made improvements to the property, since the properties in C-schedule were purchased in the name of family members of Defendant No. 1 after filing the suit for partition, they are also to be treated as joint family properties. The defendant No. 1 blended his properties into the joint family property and made improvements to the property, since the properties in C-schedule were purchased in the name of family members of Defendant No. 1 after filing the suit for partition, they are also to be treated as joint family properties. It is also one record that plaintiff No. 2 was married to the said Lokeswara Rao on 18-03-1976 and after giving birth to plaintiff No. 1. Mr. Lokeswara Rao died on 15-5-1978. During life time of Mr. Lokeswara Rao, while defendant No. 1 was doing cloth business in Partnership with one Pichuka Gopalakrishna Murthy, the joint family of the defendant No. 1 represented by late Lokeswara Rao along with his grand-father Guthi Kotenjaaneyulu started a separate business in the name and style of Ravindra Textiles. After the death of Mr. Lokeswara Rao, disputes have arisen between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendants on the other hand and the plaintiffs were forced to leave the house of the defendants within 8 months thereafter. Hence they were forced to file a suit for partition of the family properties. ( 4 ) THE specific case of the plaintiff is that whatever acquisitions that were made by the defendant No. 1 from his childhood, they were all through joint exertion of all the members of the family. At any rate defendant No. 1 blended the properties that were acquired by him into the joint family property and hence they are entitled for partition of the properties. The suit was contested by the defendants. ( 5 ) AS per the written statement filed by Defendant No. 1, all the properties acquired are his self-acquired properties except item No. 1 of A-schedule properties covered by Ex. A6, dated 2-7-1971 purchased by the grand-father of Mr. Lokeswara Rao in his name on 2-7-1971 and item No. 2 of B-schedule business started by Mr. Lokeswara Rao along with his grand-father Guthi Kota Anjaneyulu in the name of Ravindra Textiles. He also stated that he is not claiming any share in these two items of properties, since they are absolute properties of late Lokeswara Rao. The rest of the properties in A-schedule and B-schedule are self-acquired properties by him and as far as C-schedule properties are concerned, they were purchased by his wife his second son and himself long after the death of his son Mr. The rest of the properties in A-schedule and B-schedule are self-acquired properties by him and as far as C-schedule properties are concerned, they were purchased by his wife his second son and himself long after the death of his son Mr. Lokeswara Rao. Hence the plaintiffs cannot claim any share in any of the properties except the 2 items of properties which are the exclusive properties of late Lokeswara Rao. The defendant No. 1 filed additional written statement in February, 1987 stating that his father along with his four other brothers was having a tiled house at Bandar which was in a dilapidated condition and the same was sold to DW2, their paternal uncle for Rs. 300/- in the year 1965. It is also his case, that the amount of Rs. 100/- which he got out of the sale proceeds of this building was given to his younger brother Kota Nagaiah. At any rate, the nucleus said to have been there is not sufficient to acquire the properties shown in the schedule. Hence the same cannot be considered as a nucleus in developing the family properties. He filed another additional written statement on 12-9-1986 claiming coparcenery rights for his daughter, who was brought on record as 6th respondent, after the State Act 13 of 1986 came into force. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the above averments, the following issues were framed:- issues: 1. Whether the item 1 to 5 of plaint A-schedule joint family properties of partners? 2. Whether the items Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint B-schedule are the business of joint family of the partners? 3. Whether the items 2 to 5 of plaint A-schedule and item 1 of plaint D are separate properties of 1st defendant? 4. Whether late Lokeswara Rao divided from joint family in 1976? 5. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to partitioned and separate possession of this share in plaint schedule properties as claimed? 6. To what relief? additional ISSUES FRAMED ON 3-3-86: 1. Whether the plaint C-schedule properties were purchased by the 1st defendant in his favour and in favour of defendants 2 and 5 with the joint family income? 2. Whether the plaint C-schedule property is also liable for partition? 3. Whether the extents given in the plaint in respect of items 1, 3 and 4 of the plaint C-schedule are not correct? 4. 2. Whether the plaint C-schedule property is also liable for partition? 3. Whether the extents given in the plaint in respect of items 1, 3 and 4 of the plaint C-schedule are not correct? 4. Whether the defendants are not in possession of item, 1-3 and 4 of the plaint C-schedule? 5. Whether the item 2 of the plaint C-schedule is the separate property of the 1st defendant? 6. Whether the items 5 and 6 of plaint C-schedule are the separate properties of the 5th defendant? additional, ISSUES FRAMED ON 12-9-1986: 1. Whether item III of C-schedule is the separate property of the 2nd defendant? 2. Whether item IV of C-schedule is the separate property of the 5th defendant? 3. Whether the 6th defendant is entitled to a share in the family properties? ( 7 ) WHILE plaintiff got herself examined as PW1 and examined her father as PW2 to prove her case and marked Ex. A1 to A15. The defendant No. 1 got himself examined as DW1, his paternal uncle as DW2 to show that there is no sufficient nucleus and that she purchased the ancestral house and also one Kotaiah as D. W. 3 to prove that he sold the house covered by Ex. A6 dated 2-7-1971 to late Lokeswara Rao and the sale consideration was paid by his grand-father and marked Ex. B1 to B-15 to prove their case. ( 8 ) THE trail court after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, accepted the plea of the defendants that except item-I of A-schedule properties, item-2 of B-schedule business are the exclusive properties of late Lokeswara Rao and the rest of the properties are the self-acquired properties of defendant No. 1 and other defendants and dismissed the suit to that extent. On additional issue No. 3, the trial Court held that the question of giving a share in the properties of Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 does not arise, since the Court held that they are their self acquired properties. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal would be whether the plea of the defendants that the properties shown in the 3 schedules are his self-acquired properties or joint family properties and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a share in the properties as contended by them. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal would be whether the plea of the defendants that the properties shown in the 3 schedules are his self-acquired properties or joint family properties and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a share in the properties as contended by them. ( 9 ) BEFORE we analyse the evidence on record, it is useful to refer to the Judgments cited by Mr. Rayudu, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, for the proposition that no presumption can be drawn that merely a members of joint family possess the property, it cannot be treated as joint family property, unless it is proved that there is adequate nucleus for making acquisitions and then only the onus shifts to the person who claims that the property is his self-acquired property in MUDIGOWDA GOWDAPPA SANKH AND OTHERS v. RAMCHANDRA REVGOWDA SANKH (DEAD) BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ANOTHER AIR 1969 SC 1076 the Supreme Court held as follows:- we pass on to consider the next question arising in this appeal, viz. , whether the High Court was right in holding that the 12 pieces of lands were joint family properties and were not the self-acquisition of Goudappa. The case of the appellants was that these lands were self-acquisition of Goudappa, but the respondents contended that they were joint family properties. The law on this aspect of the case is well settled. Of course there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparecenery property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is however subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus sifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. ( 10 ) THE next case cited by Mr. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus sifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. ( 10 ) THE next case cited by Mr. Rayydy is REDDI ANJANEYULU v. KARRA ANJAMMA AND ANOTHER 1998 (2) ALT 127 for the same proposition i. e. , that the person who contends that it is a joint family property has to prove that sufficient nucleus is there for acquiring the property in the name of any member of the joint family. ( 11 ) IN the above case, the learned Judge having reviewed the case law and having held that the person claiming that the property is joint family property should prove that sufficient nucleus for acquiring property in the name of any member of joint family observed as follows:- ( 12 ) WHEN the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. ( 13 ) THESE observations made by Sri Justice K. S. Shrivastav in this case cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case, since the lower Court committed an error in appreciating the evidence on record. ( 14 ) IN KAMALA DEVI v. PRABHAWATTI DEVI (Smt) AND OTHERS (2001) 10 SCC 602 , the Supreme Court rules that when a finding was recorded that there was no joint family nucleus, the question of blending any property acquired by an individual of the joint family does not arise. ( 14 ) IN KAMALA DEVI v. PRABHAWATTI DEVI (Smt) AND OTHERS (2001) 10 SCC 602 , the Supreme Court rules that when a finding was recorded that there was no joint family nucleus, the question of blending any property acquired by an individual of the joint family does not arise. But at the same time, in G. NARAYANA RAJU v. G. CHAMARAJU AIR 1968 SC 1276 and MALLESAPPA BANDEPPA DESAI v. DESAI MALLAPPA AIR 1961 SC 1268 , the Supreme Court rules as follows:- when the joint family continues with joint mess then, acquisition of any property out of the personal income would be deemed to have been put in the hotchpot which takes the character or blends such property to be ancestral property. ( 15 ) MR. Rayudu, relied on another Judgment in K. V. NARAYANAN v. K. V. RANGANADHAN AND OTHERS AIR 1976 SC 1715 case, wherein their Lordships held as follows;- property separate or self-acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with intention of abandoning his separate claim therein but the question whether a coparcener has done so or not is entirely a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case. It must be established that there was a clear intention on the part of the coparcener to waive his separate rights. Such an intention cannot be inferred merely from the physical mixing of the property with his joint family property or from the fact that other members of the family are allowed to use the property jointly with himself or that the income of the separate property is utilized out of generosity or kindness to support persons whom the holder is not bound to support or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, for an act of generosity or kindness cannot ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation. The mere fact that the properties were not separately entered by the coparcener in the account books or that no separate account of the earnings from these properties was maintained by him cannot rob the properties of their character of self-acquired properties. The mere fact that the properties were not separately entered by the coparcener in the account books or that no separate account of the earnings from these properties was maintained by him cannot rob the properties of their character of self-acquired properties. So also the mere fact that some amount out of the joint family funds was used for discharge of the debts is also of no consequence. ( 16 ) FROM the above, it is seen whether an individual member of a coparcenery had an intention of abandoning his separate claim and blended the property with the joint family property is purely a question of fact and the mere fact that there is some nucleus is not sufficient to prove that the properties acquired at a later stage will acquire status of a joint family property, unless that nucleus is sufficient to make further improvements to the property. ( 17 ) KEEPING the above principles in mind, if we analyse the evidence on record by a periphery reading of the evidence one has to agree with the contention of the defendant for the reason that he was forced to eke out his livelihood from his childhood for the entire family by selling eatables for some time and thereafter taking 2 looms on lease, on which himself and his mother used to weave cloths and sell them, while his brother was attending the school. It is also on record that from 1951 onwards, he was acquiring properties in his name. He has also categorically stated that having stated his earning with two looms, he improved his income by taking about 27 looms on rent and he got the cloth woven by engaging hired labour. Since 1951 onwards he was acquiring properties in his name. ( 18 ) ANOTHER most important factum is, that when himself and his brother were living together, he purchased a house under Ex. A3. Admittedly this document stands in the name of his brother. Now the defendants offers an explanation that after some time his brother shifted to some other place and he purchased the share of his brother in this house. But when he purchased, for what amount he purchased the house, no evidence whatsoever is forthcoming. Likewise no evidence is forthcoming, whether there was any partition between Defendant No. 1 and his brother, since when his brother started living separately. But when he purchased, for what amount he purchased the house, no evidence whatsoever is forthcoming. Likewise no evidence is forthcoming, whether there was any partition between Defendant No. 1 and his brother, since when his brother started living separately. Even if we hold that the dilapidated house that was sold under Ex. A5 to the paternal uncle of defendant No. 1 (DW2) was not fetching any income and they were not staying in the house, the house purchased by defendant No. 1 himself and his brother in 1951 constitutes sufficient nucleus to carryon his business of weaving clothe on looms. Hence this property constitutes joint family property nucleus. Thereafter the story of success and for a long time he was making money by hiring the looms, which may not require much money to carryon, the business and on the sale of woven cloth on these looms, he made fortune. The mere fact that the purchase of this house Ex. A3 by him and his brother and the improvement made thereof definitely constitute a nucleus for improving his business. At any rate Mr. Lokeswara Rao is none other than his son and it cannot be said that he has not joined his father in improving the family business. Hence the acquisitions made have to be considered as joint exertions. Hence dependents of Mr. Lokeswara Rao cannot be thrown out by contending that the properties are self-acquired properties by him. ( 19 ) IT is also not in dispute that his father-in-law Gutti Kota Anjaneyulu having lost his wife, joined him in 1963 and was helping him in his business. That way he was also contributing to the income of the family. It is true that under Ex. A6, dated 2-7-1971 a tiled house was purchased for a sum of Rs. 2,500/- in the name of late Lokeswara Rao when he was minor. The explanation that was offered by the defendant was that his father-in-law contributed the amount for purchase of the house. Admittedly his father-in-law was having 4 grand-sons, grand daughters and he started living with the defendant from 1963 onwards. It is known why he purchased the property only in the name of late Lokeswara Rao. No explanation whatsoever is forthcoming for this act of Anjaneyulu. Further, the defendant pleaded that late Lokeswara Rao was living with his grand-father in the house covered by Ex. A6 after purchase. It is known why he purchased the property only in the name of late Lokeswara Rao. No explanation whatsoever is forthcoming for this act of Anjaneyulu. Further, the defendant pleaded that late Lokeswara Rao was living with his grand-father in the house covered by Ex. A6 after purchase. At the same time in the evidence he stated that after purchase of the house, his father-in-law brought one Chandra Mouli, his paternal uncles grand-son, who was given in marriage to the 2nd daughter of the defendant and his father-in-law started living with him in that house. ( 20 ) NEXTLY he stated that the deceased Lokeswara Rao was married in the year 1976 and thereafter he started living with his wife in a portion of that house (item-1 of A-schedule property ). If the house was purchased by the grand-father in the name of deceased Lokeswara Rao, it is highly doubtful why his father-in-law brought his paternal uncles grand-son who was again married to the daughter of Defendant No. 1 and kept him in that house. Nextly except stating that late Lokeswara Rao started living separately after the marriage, absolutely no reasons whatsoever were given for leaving the house. On the other hand, the specific case of PW1 is that till she left the house, there used to be a common mess for all of them. In fact Voters List of 1977 was marked as Ex. A-15 to show that the deceased Lokeswara Rao was living separately. It is true that while defendant No. 1 along with his wife and father-in-law was living in H. No. 15-38, deceased Lokeswara Rao and his wife were living in House No. 15-38a. From this it is seen that the father-in-law is residing with Defendant No. 1, but not with Lokeswara Rao. At any rate, the voters list is of the year 1977. From this it is seen that the version given by the defendant No. 1 that his father-in-law purchased the property in the name of Lokeswara Rao and he started living with him has no legs to stand. On the other hand, he himself admitted that from 1963 i. e. , after the death of his wife, his father-in-law started living with him. On the other hand, he himself admitted that from 1963 i. e. , after the death of his wife, his father-in-law started living with him. ( 21 ) IT is also not in dispute that the defendant has taken LIC policy in the name of Lokeswara Rao and after his death, 5th defendant the mother of Lokeswara Rao claimed a share in the insurance policy amount. The defendant has not given any explanation whey he has taken the insurance policy in the name of his son. ( 22 ) FURTHER according to him, his father-in-law purchased the property in the year 1971 in the name of the deceased Lokeswara Rao at the time when he was studying 10th Class. Thereafter Mr. Lokeswara Rao discontinued his studies. It is also his case that from 1971 onwards, he was not assisting his father in the family business and wandering in the streets. If the son is not really assisting the father, he would not have made his son to establish a business along with his grand-father in the name and style of Ravindra Textiles in 1975. It is now on record, that the defendant No. 1 initially started business with Mr. P. Gopalakrishna Murthy in the year 1974 and thereafter Mr. Lokeswara Rao and his grand-father started another business in the name and style of Ravindra textiles. It is not uncommon in business community to start separate business while continuing as the members of the joint family for a variety of reasons. One of the main reason would be to avoid taxes. It is also interesting to note that the defendant stated that he has given Rs. 2,500/- to his deceased son Lokeswara Rao as gift to start the business. He also admitted in the witness box that the business was closed after Mr. Lokeswara Rao was died and his father-in-law was collecting the amount due to the firm and settling the accounts. It is interesting to note that the defendant produced the Accounts Books of Ravindra Textile and got them marked to prove that he paid the amount to Mr. Lokeswara Rao. The explanation offer by him is very interesting, which reads as follows:- ( 23 ) IT is not true to say that all these books are with me from the beginning and item II of B-schedule is a joint family business. As the Advocate enquired about those books. Lokeswara Rao. The explanation offer by him is very interesting, which reads as follows:- ( 23 ) IT is not true to say that all these books are with me from the beginning and item II of B-schedule is a joint family business. As the Advocate enquired about those books. I went and enquired and brought them. In that house, my daughter and son-in-law and their children are living. On the next day after completion of the evidence of PW2, I went and though the books from the house of Lokeswara Rao and they were located on the wall with other damaged books. The business books of my father-in-law were also located at that place. ( 24 ) HAD Mr. Lokeswara Rao went out of the family and started living separately with his wife and child, the question of DW1 entering into their house in 1987 when so much bad blood is flowing between the members of the family does not arise. It is also interesting to see that it is not the plaintiffs that are living in the house, but Mr. Chandra Mouli and his wife i. e. , none other than his daughter are living in the house. If this property belongs to Mr. Lokeswara Rao exclusively and when there are disputes between the plaintiffs and the defendants definitely the plaintiffs would not have allowed Mr. Chandra Mouli and his wife to live in the house owned by them. The defendant has cleverly developed a story of separation of Mr. Lokeswara Rao from the family, taking advantage of the situation that Ex. A6 stands in the name of the deceased Lokeswara Rao and starting business in the name of Lokeswara Rao. Except the oral testimony of defendant No. 1 no evidence whatsoever was brought on record to show that his father-in-law was having sufficient monies and he was doing business on his own. Had his father-in-law is having a separate business of his own and income normally no father-in-law would prefer to live in the house of the son-in-law, since that is not the custom in a Hindu family. On the other hand, in all probability, the father-in-law having lost his wife, and having no means might have joined his son-in-law who was flourishing by that time and helped him in his business. Hence it is difficult to hold that the house Ex. On the other hand, in all probability, the father-in-law having lost his wife, and having no means might have joined his son-in-law who was flourishing by that time and helped him in his business. Hence it is difficult to hold that the house Ex. A6 was purchased by the grand-father of Lokeswara Rao. There cannot be any difficulty in holding that the house was purchased in the name of Mr. Lokeswara Rao by defendant No. 1 himself. Accordingly we hold that the oral evidence of DW. 3 on this aspect does not inspire confidence. ( 25 ) FURTHER, from the voters list, it is seen that while the house in which he is living is given bearing No. 15-38, the house in which Mr. Lokeswara Rao was living is bearing No. 15-38a. In all probability, both the houses are contiguous and they are abutting to each other. ( 26 ) THE other assertion that the son i. e. , Mr. Lokeswara Rao was not assisting him from 1971 onwards, after stopping studies till he established the business of his own cannot be given any credence, as defendant No. 1 climbed the ladder of success through hard work, he would not have allowed his children to go vagrant and he would have definitely used the services of his children in his avocation. He also categorically admitted that he is having 27 looms and he engaged hired labour to weave the cloth on these looms. At any rate if Lokeswara Rao is leading a wayward life, he would not have given the money to start business at a very young age of 20 years. Hence we hold that the son of Lokeswara Rao was also assisting his father in his business throughout and Ravindra Textiles owned by the joint family of Defendant No. 1. ( 27 ) IT is also interesting to note that the defendant in his evidence states that while giving a sum of Rs. 2,500/- to the deceased Lokeswara Rao, he has also given Rs. 2,500/- to his second son who was studying 6th Class at that time and the amount was returned to defendant No. 2. With that amount, the suit schedule property item-3 of C-schedule property was purchased for a sum of Rs. 5,920/- apart from investing Rs. 2,500/- to the deceased Lokeswara Rao, he has also given Rs. 2,500/- to his second son who was studying 6th Class at that time and the amount was returned to defendant No. 2. With that amount, the suit schedule property item-3 of C-schedule property was purchased for a sum of Rs. 5,920/- apart from investing Rs. 7,000/- in the new business started by defendant No. 1 along with his 2nd son in the name and style of Sajja Gangadharudu and sons in 1981. When the amount was returned, how much amount and with what interest the amount was returned is not known. The fact remains that Rs. 5,920/- for which item-3 of C-schedule property was purchased and the amount invested in the family business i. e. , Rs. 7,000/- comes to nearly Rs. 13,000/ -. We are sure that even if the amount was rapaid with compound interest at 24%, the amount would not have fetched that much amount. Defendant No. 1 invested the story of giving gift to Lokeswara Rao and his second son, to contend that Lokeswara Rao started business independently and the joint family has nothing to do with his business and to justify the action of him in purchasing item-3 of C-schedule property and making investment in the name of his second son. Otherwise he has no income of his own to make these acquisition. ( 28 ) WITH regard to the purchases made by his wife in 1981, the defendant states that his wife was having a house at Kappaladoddi and the same was sold for a sum of Rs. 300/- in 1964 under Ex. B3. He also stated that his wife sold her gold and silver and credited about Rs. 1,500/- in the business of her father. He has spoken several things to show that his wife was having properties and they were invested in the business before she purchased the property, which cannot be given credence. ( 29 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, we hold that the house covered by Ex. A3, dated 11-08-1951 constitutes joint family nucleus, that apart the acquisitions were made by the defendant with the joint exertions of not only his family members, but his father-in-law and his son-in-law as seen from the evidence, Coupled with the fact that the defendant himself has taken LIC policy in favour of the deceased son. A3, dated 11-08-1951 constitutes joint family nucleus, that apart the acquisitions were made by the defendant with the joint exertions of not only his family members, but his father-in-law and his son-in-law as seen from the evidence, Coupled with the fact that the defendant himself has taken LIC policy in favour of the deceased son. All these things will clinchingly establish that even if there is a semblance in the contention of the defendant that the suit scheduled property is his self acquired property, we have no hesitation in holding that Defendant No. 1 blended the property into the joint family property and as such they cannot be treated as self-acquired properties at this juncture. ( 30 ) IN result the appeal is allowed and the suit is decreed as prayed for the Judgment and Decree of the court below is set aside. ( 31 ) AFTER the Judgment was pronounced in the open Court in this case on 09-07-2003. Sri M. Y. K. Rayudu, learned counsel appearing for the respondents brought to our notice that his plea that first respondents daughter is entitled for a share in the joint family properties was not adverted to. Therefore, we directed the office to post the matter under the caption For Being Mentioned for today. ( 32 ) THIS Appeal having been set down for being mentioned on this the Twenty First Day of July 2003, pursuant to the plea of the Respondent counsel, and upon perusing the said plea, and the order dated 9-7-2003 and made herein, and upon hearing the arguments of the above counsels. ( 33 ) WE have heard both the counsel. It is not in dispute that the eldest son of first defendant i. e. Lokeswararao died in the year 1978 and thereafter within nine months, the present suit for partition was filed by his legal heirs. During the pendency of the suit, the Hindu Succession Act was amended by State Act 13 of 1986 called as Hindu Succession (A. P. Amendment) Act, 1986 and Section 29-A conferring coparcenary rights on the unmarried daughters was introduced if no partition has taken place as on the date of amendment. This amendment came into force on 5-9-1985 i. e. , during the pendency of the suit. Thereafter an additional written statement was filed on behalf of the daughter 6th Defendant claiming a share in the property of first defendant. This amendment came into force on 5-9-1985 i. e. , during the pendency of the suit. Thereafter an additional written statement was filed on behalf of the daughter 6th Defendant claiming a share in the property of first defendant. But the trial Court taken the view that the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of first defendant and the question of constituting coparcenary does not arise and as such, she is not entitled for a share in the property. Accordingly, her claim was rejected. Now in the appeal, we have taken the view that the suit schedule properties are joint family properties and are available for partition between the family members of the first defendant. ( 34 ) NOW the question, whether the amendment is applicable to pending cases seeking partition of the family properties. The Honble Supreme Court in S. SAIREDDY vs NARAYANA REDDY (1991) 3 SUPREME COURT VSDRD-617 held that in a suit for partition if no final decree is passed, the unmarried daughters are also entitled for a share in the properties since no final decree was passed before coparcenary came into existence immediately after the amendment of Hindu Succession Act and as such the rights of the unmarried daughters cannot be taken away on the ground that the suit for partition was filed before the amendment Act came into force. It is useful to extract paras 7 and 8 of the judgment which are as follows: 7. The question that falls for our consideration is whether the preliminary decree has the effect of depriving respondents 2 to 5 of the benefits of the amendment. The learned counsel placed reliance on clause (iv) of Section 29-A to support his contention that it does. Clause (ii) of the section provides that a daughter shall be allotted share like a son in the same manner treating her to be a son at the partition of the joint family property. However, the legislature was conscious that prior to the enforcement of the amending Act, partitions will already have taken place in some families and arrangement with regard to the disposition of the properties would have been made and marriage expenses would have incurred etc. The legislature, therefore, did not want to unsettle the settled positions. However, the legislature was conscious that prior to the enforcement of the amending Act, partitions will already have taken place in some families and arrangement with regard to the disposition of the properties would have been made and marriage expenses would have incurred etc. The legislature, therefore, did not want to unsettle the settled positions. Hence it enacted clause (iv) providing that clause (ii) would not apply to a daughter married prior to the partition or to a partition which had already been effected before the commencement of the amending Act. Thus if prior to the partition of family property a daughter had been married, she was disentitled to any share in the property. Similarly if the partition had been effected before September 5, 1985 the date on which the amending Act came into force, the daughter even though unmarried was not given a share in the family property. The crucial question, however, is as to when a partition can be said to have been effected for the purposes of the amended provision. A partition of the Joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, viz. , by a family settlement by a registered instrument of partition, by oral arrangement by the parties, or by a decree of the Court. When a suit for partition is field in a Court, a preliminary decree is passed determining shares of the members of the family. The final decree follows, thereafter, allotting specific properties and directing the partition of the immovable properties by metes and bounds. Unless and until the final decree is passed and the allottes of the shares are put in possession of the respective property, the partition is not complete. The preliminary decree which determines shares does not bring about the final partition. For, pending the final decree the shares themselves are liable to be varied on account of the intervening events. In the instant case, there is no dispute that only a preliminary decree had been passed and before the final decree could passed the amending Act came into force as a result of which clause (ii) of Section 29-A of the Act became applicable. This intervening event which gave shares to respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying shares of the parties like any supervening development. This intervening event which gave shares to respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying shares of the parties like any supervening development. Since the legislation is beneficial and placed on the statute book with the avowed object of benefiting women which is a vulnerable section of the society in all its stratas, it is necessary to give a liberal effect to it. For this reason also, we cannot equate the concept of partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case with a mere severance of the status of the joint family which can be effected by an expression of a mere desire by a family member to do so. The partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case is undoubtedly a partition completed in all respects and which has brought about an irreversible situation. A preliminary decree which merely declares shares which are themselves liable to change does not bring about any irreversible situation. Hence, we are of the view that unless a partition of the property is effected by metes and bounds, the daughters cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred by the Act. Any other view is likely to deprive a vast section of the fair sex of the benefits conferred by the amendment. Spurious family settlements, instruments of partitions not to speak of oral partition will spring up and nullify the beneficial effect of the legislation depriving a vast section of women of its benefits. 8. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that since the final decree had no been passed and the property had not been divided by metes and bounds, clause (iv) to Section 29-A was not attracted in the present case and the respondent-daughters were entitled to their share in the family property. Following the above Judgment of the Supreme Court we hold that the unmarried daughter of first defendant who is sixth respondent herein, is entitled to coparcenary rights and a share has to be allotted to her along with other coparceners. ( 35 ) IN the result, we hold that the coparcenary of Gangadharudu consists of himself, his four sons and a daughter. Admittedly during the pendency of appeal, Gangadharudu died and the respondents brought to our notice that he executed a registered Will for the properties held by him. ( 35 ) IN the result, we hold that the coparcenary of Gangadharudu consists of himself, his four sons and a daughter. Admittedly during the pendency of appeal, Gangadharudu died and the respondents brought to our notice that he executed a registered Will for the properties held by him. Eventhough he executed the Will for the entire property, now by virtue of our orders, the Will has to be restricted to the property that falls to his share and the legal representatives of Lokeswara Rao wont get share in that property since he executed a Will bequeathing the properties that fell to his share to the other legal heirs of him. The result in the appeal as pronounced on 9th July, 2003 remains the same even after allowing a share to the 6th defendant, since the plaintiffs claimed on 1/6th share in the properties held by the 1st defendant. The trial Court shall pass final decree as per the directions given above, if necessary by working out equities.