AJIT J. GUNJAL, J. ( 1 ) THE Appellant in this appeal was the petitioner in the Writ Petition. In this appeal, the appellant has called in question the correctness of the Order dated September 19, 2000 made in the Writ Petition No. 15020 of 2000 by the learned single Judge confirming the order dated October 29, 1999 made in I. D. (LCM) No. 64/1994 by the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and back-wages from the date of termination of service till the date of reinstatement with all consequential benefits. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are as follows: the Appellant in this Appeal is the assistant Executive Engineer, Public Works department. The respondent is the Karnataka state Government Daily Wage Employees' federation [hereinafter referred to as 'the federation']. The State Government, by means of its order dated September 24, 1994, was being of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists between the appellant and the federation, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Mangalore under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act']. The dispute referred was as to whether the Appellant was justified in terminating the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai from service with effect from May 27, 1985? and, if it is not justified, for what relief the said smt. Nirmala Bai was entitled to? ( 3 ) THE case of the Federation is that Smt. Nirmala Bai was working as helper from november 1, 1983 till May 27, 1985 continuously for a period of more than 240 days on daily-wage of Rs. 9 (Rupees nine only); and with effect from May 28, 1985 her services came to be abruptly terminated without any prior notice and without payment of any compensation and in violation of the provisions under Section 25-F of the Act. It is also the case of the Federation that refusal to give work to smt. Nirmala Bai from May 28, 1985 is wholly unjustifiable, illegal and therefore she is entitled for reinstatement with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and back-wages. However, the claim made by the federation was seriously disputed by the appellant in the course of the proceedings before the Labour Court. Nirmala Bai from May 28, 1985 is wholly unjustifiable, illegal and therefore she is entitled for reinstatement with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and back-wages. However, the claim made by the federation was seriously disputed by the appellant in the course of the proceedings before the Labour Court. However, it was admitted by the Appellant that Smt. Nirmala bai was working on daily-wage basis but without any appointment order and her appointment being purely on daily-wage basis, she was not entitled to seek for relief of reinstatement with back-wages. It was also contended that the regular appointment in the establishment of the Government departments was required to be made only after complying with the selection process and since Smt. Nirmala Bai's appointment was not made complying with the selection process, she had no right to seek reinstatement to duty. It was also further contended that the appellant not being an 'industry' and Smt. Nirmala Bai not being a 'workman', the dispute referred was without jurisdiction and therefore the Labour court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The Labour Court, on consideration of the material on record took the view that Smt. Nirmala Bai had put in more than 240 days of service and as such the Appellant was not justified in terminating her service. In the light of the said conclusion, the Labour Court passed an award for reinstatement of Smt. Nirmala Bai into service with continuity of service and back-wages and all other consequential benefits. The Labour Court, however, reserved liberty to the appellant to terminate the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai after reinstatement, in accordance with law. The award passed by the labour Court was affirmed by the learned i single Judge. Aggrieved by the said order, as noticed by us earlier, this Writ Appeal is filed. ( 4 ) WE have elaborately heard Smt. Ratna n. Shivayogimath, learned Government pleader, appearing for the Appellant and Sri K. Govindaraj, learned counsel appearing for the federation. The learned Government Pleader challenging the correctness of the Award passed by the Labour Court as well as the order made by the learned single Judge, made four submissions. Firstly, she submitted that since the Public Works Department is a Department of Government of Karnataka, the same cannot be treated as an 'industry' and Smt. Nirmala. The learned Government Pleader challenging the correctness of the Award passed by the Labour Court as well as the order made by the learned single Judge, made four submissions. Firstly, she submitted that since the Public Works Department is a Department of Government of Karnataka, the same cannot be treated as an 'industry' and Smt. Nirmala. Bai, who was employed on daily wage basis cannot be treated as a 'workman', the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is liable to be quashed as one passed without jurisdiction. Elaborating this submission she pointed out that the Labour Court ought to have held that the provisions of Section 25-F has no application to the facts of the case of Smt. Nirmala Bai as she is not a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act. In support of this submission, the learned government Pleader relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of executive Engineer (State of Karnataka) v. K. Somasetty AIR 1997 SC 2663 : 1997 (5) SCC 434 : 1997-II-LLJ-698 and also the Division bench judgment of this Court in the case of centre for Development of Telematics v. D. Suresh 2003- III-LLJ-755 (Kant), in the case of karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. B. B. Tabusi 2001-II-LLJ-1319 (Kant ). Secondly, she submitted that on account of inordinate delay of nine years in raising the dispute the Labour Court has seriously erred in law in directing reinstatement of Smt. Nirmala bai with back-wages and continuity of service. It is the submission of the learned Government pleader that the Labour Court was totally unjustified in directing the appellant to pay back-wages for the period during which she has not worked, when admittedly, there was delay and laches on her part in raising the dispute. Thirdly, she submitted that the finding recorded by the Labour Court that Smt. Nirmala Bai was in service continuously for 240 days, which was affirmed by the learned single Judge, is totally erroneous in law and contrary to the evidence on record. It is her submission that the reading of the evidence on record by the Labour Court is totally perverse in law. It is her submission that the reading of the evidence on record by the Labour Court is totally perverse in law. She also pointed out that when the recruitment Rules of the State Government provides for the procedure of making recruitment, if an order is made directing reinstatement of Smt. Nirmala Bai, who even according to the Federation, had worked only for a period of one and half years, it will result in denying of equal opportunities to other members of the public who are entitled to be considered for appointment in State service. It is also her submission that it will give scope for back-door entry into State service on account of the favouritism shown by the officers of the state. Finally, she submitted that since the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai was taken as a helper on daily-wage basis in a time-bound project and her service has been discontinued after the completion of the Project, she is not entitled to seek for reinstatement to duty as there is no Project in existence where her services could be utilised. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, Sri K. Govindaraj, learned counsel appearing for the Federation strongly supported the impugned award passed by the labour Court as well as the Order passed by the learned single Judge. He pointed out that when the Labour Court, on consideration of the material on record had found that Smt. Nirmala bai has put in more than 240 days of continuous service and in the light of the said conclusion had directed her reinstatement with continuity of service and back-wages and when the said award was affirmed by the learned single judge, there is absolutely no justification for us to interfere against the said award in his appeal. It is his submission that there is no merit in the submission of the learned government Pleader that Smt. Nirmala Bai is not a 'workman'. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Nagappa Hanumanthappa Lamani v. Management of Sericulture Department 2002-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-1399 (NOC) (Kant) : ilr 2002 Kar 3573. It is his submission that there is no merit in the submission of the learned government Pleader that Smt. Nirmala Bai is not a 'workman'. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Nagappa Hanumanthappa Lamani v. Management of Sericulture Department 2002-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-1399 (NOC) (Kant) : ilr 2002 Kar 3573. ( 6 ) IN the light of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the only question that would arise for our consideration in this Appeal is as to whether the award passed by the Labour Court, which is affirmed by the learned single Judge, is liable to be quashed. ( 7 ) SO far as the first submission of the learned Government Pleader that Public Works department is not an 'industry' and Smt. Nirmala bai is not a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2 (s) of the Act is concerned, we find considerable force in the said submission. Even according to the evidence of Smt. Nirmala Bai in the course of the proceedings before the Labour i Court, she has stated that she has joined the service with the appellant as a helper and there was no appointment order issued to her and she was being paid a daily-wage of Rs. 9 when she had joined the service. In this connection, it is i useful to refer to her evidence, which reads as hereunder "i am the party workman in this case, I had joined the service of the II party on november 1, 1983 as a helper. There is no appointment order in writing. I was being paid daily wages of Rs. 9 when joined the service. I was being paid wages through vouchers obtaining my signature on wage register. I have rendered my services honestly without any complaint uptill May 27, 1985 continuously. On May 27, 1985 - assistant Executive Engineer No. 1 sub-division PWD asked me not to come for work from May 28, 1985, there was no order in writing terminating my services. " from the evidence of Smt. Nirmala Bai, it is clear that her services were utilised as a helper on payment of daily wage of Rs. 9 by the appellant from November 1, 1983 to May 27, 1985, that is for a period of one and a half, years. " from the evidence of Smt. Nirmala Bai, it is clear that her services were utilised as a helper on payment of daily wage of Rs. 9 by the appellant from November 1, 1983 to May 27, 1985, that is for a period of one and a half, years. While it is the case of the appellant that' she was not in continuous service, it is the case of Smt. Nirmala Bai that she was in continuous service. Whatever that be, the fact remains that the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai was taken on. daily-wage basis in a Government Department,' ;'. e. the Public Works Department. The Public works Department of the Government cannot be treated as an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2 (s) of the Act. In our view, we are supported by the judgment of the Hon'ble Su-' preme Court in the case of Union of India v. Jai narain Singh 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 672 : 1996- e-LLJ-750, in the case of State of Himachal pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma AIR 1996 SC 1565 : 1996 (7) SCC 562 , in the case of Executive' engineer (State ofkamataka) (supra ). In the said decisions the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that the State is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the observation made at paragraph 3 of the judgment in the case of Executive Engineer (State of Kamataka) (su- pra), which reads as hereunder 1997-II-LLJ-698 at p. 699:"3. It is now well settled legal position that the Irrigation Department and telecommunication Department are not an 'industry' within the meaning of definition under the Industrial Disputes Act as held in: union of India v. Jai Narain Singh and in suresh Kumar Verma. The function of public welfare of the State is a sovereign function. It is the constitutional mandate under the Directive Principles, that the government should bring about welfare state by executive and legislative actions. Under these circumstances, the State is not an 'industry' under the Industrial Disputes act. Even otherwise, since the Project has been closed, the respondent has no right to the post since he had been appointed on daily wages. It is brought to our notice that the respondent has been reinstated. Under these circumstances, the State is not an 'industry' under the Industrial Disputes act. Even otherwise, since the Project has been closed, the respondent has no right to the post since he had been appointed on daily wages. It is brought to our notice that the respondent has been reinstated. The order of the reinstatement has been placed before us which indicates that at the threat of contempt of Court, the order has been enforced. It is stated therein that it is subject to the final order of this Court in this appeal. " [emphasis supplied] in the case of Jai Narain Singh (supra), in the course of the judgment at paragraph 2, the hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows 1996-II-LLJ-750 at p. 750: "2. . . . . We have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the Central Ground Water board is not an industry. The contrary finding rendered by the Tribunal in the impugned order is incorrect. It follows section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will have no application. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. However, we may add that having regard to the length of service of the respondent, this is a fit case in which the appellant must take sympathetic attitude and appoint him as a fresh candidate as a Helper and his service is to reckon only from the date of his appointment. We are informed by the learned counsel for the respondent that the said post has been re-designated as technical Operator (Drilling ). The appointment order should be issued on or before March 31, 1994. We make it clear that he shall have no claim for back wages in relation to the earlier service rendered by him. " ( 8 ) THEREFORE, we are of the view that the dispute raised by the Federation before the labour Court under the provisions of the Act, was not maintainable. Further, for the same reason the conclusion reached by the Labour court that the termination of services of Smt. Nirmala Bai on the ground that the same came to be in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act is also unsustainable. This aspect of the matter has been completely overlooked by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. This aspect of the matter has been completely overlooked by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. On this short ground, the award passed by the labour Court and also the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) SO far as the second submission of the learned Government Pleader that the claim made by the Federation for reinstatement of smt. Nirmala Bai should have been rejected on the ground that the said claim was made by the federation long lapse after termination of service is concerned, no doubt, it is the case of smt. Nirmala Bai that she gave several representations to the appellant seeking her reinstatement into service. But the fact remains that at the instance of the respondent the dispute was referred by the Government to the Labour court by means of its order dated September 24, 1994, that is after long lapse of 9 years. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K. P. Madhavankutty air 2000 SC 839 : 2000 (2) SCC 455 : 2000-1- llj-561 has observed that whether a stale claim can be made in respect of an industrial dispute after a lapse of considerable period of time. At para 6 of the judgment the Hon'ble supreme Court has held thus at p. 563 of LLJ:"6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. As to when dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was i no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. "on this ground also the award of the Labour court and also the order passed by the learned single Judge is liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) SO far as the third contention of the learned Government Pleader that the finding recorded by the Labour Court that Smt. Nirmala bai was in service continuously for 240 days, which was affirmed by the learned single Judge, is totally erroneous in law and contrary to the i evidence on record, is concerned, Smt. Nirmala bai who was examined as WW1 in her evidence, has asserted that she was in continuous service from November 1, 1983 to May 27, 1985. However, Sri Rajendra, Assistant Executive engineer, who was examined as MW-1, has, no doubt asserted that Smt. Nirmala Bai has not worked continuously for a period of 240 days in his evidence. However, he has admitted that she was in service from November 1, 1983 to May 27, 1985. The Labour Court, on consideration of material on record, has found that Smt. Nirmala bai has worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days. The said finding is accepted by the learned single Judge. Under these i circumstances we do not find any justification to take a different view from the one taken by the learned single Judge accepting the finding recorded by the Labour Court. Therefore, we are constrained to negative the third contention urged by the learned Government Pleader. The said finding is accepted by the learned single Judge. Under these i circumstances we do not find any justification to take a different view from the one taken by the learned single Judge accepting the finding recorded by the Labour Court. Therefore, we are constrained to negative the third contention urged by the learned Government Pleader. ( 11 ) AS regards the fourth submission of the learned Government Pleader that the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai was taken as a helper on daily wage basis in a time bound project and since there is no project in existence, she cannot seek for reinstatement to duty is concerned, there is no evidence placed before the Labour Court on this aspect of the matter. Further, MW-1, Sri Rajendra has not stated that services of Smt. Nirmala Bai was taken for a project and after the completion of the project her services were not continued. No doubt, he asserts that her services were taken as and when it was needed. Under these circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the order of reinstatement cannot be made on the sole ground that the Project for which the services of Smt. Nirmala Bai came to be appointed is no longer in existence. Therefore, this contention is rejected. ( 12 ) IN the light of the conclusion reached by us, as stated above, on the ground first and second urged by the learned Government pleader, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to succeed in this appeal and the award passed by the Labour Court and the order made by the learned single Judge is liable to set aside. Therefore, we make the following order order Annexure-A dated October 29, 1999 made in ID (LCM) No. 64 of 1994 by the labour Court, Mangalore is hereby quashed and consequently ,the order dated september 19, 2000 made in Writ Petition no. 15020 of 2000 by the learned Single judge is also set aside. ( 13 ) IN terms stated above, this appeal is allowed and disposed of. However, no order is made as to costs. --- *** --- .