JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:---Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records. 2. Rule. By consent, the Rule is made returnable forthwith. 3. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Industrial Court in a proceeding under section 101(2-A) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, hereinafter called "the said Act". The Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court has rejected the application filed by the petitioner for dismissal of the respondent from the service of the petitioner on various charges of misconduct. 4. Placing reliance in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of (Mill M. Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay v. Baxi (J.A.) and another)1, reported in 1962(II) L.L.J. 326 and of the Apex Court in (Martin Burn Ltd. v. Banerjee (R.N.))2, reported in 1958(I) L.L.J. 247 , (Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Barhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. and others)3, reported in 1964(II) L.L.J. 426 and of the learned Single Judge of this Court in (Bhartiya Arogya Nidhi Sheth Kantilal C. Parikh General Hospital v. Bombay Labour Union and another)4, reported in 2001(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)868 the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the courts below erred in totally ignoring the scope of inquiry under section 101(2-A) of the said Act as well as ignoring that the action proposed against the respondent was not solely on the ground of participation or instigation of illegal strike and in dismissing the application on that count and, therefore, the impugned order warrants interference. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, while distinguishing the decisions sought to be relied upon and drawing attention to section 101(1)(g) of the said Act submitted that in the absence of prior declaration of the strike being illegal, there was no occasion for the petitioner to take action of dismissal against the respondent for the alleged participation or instigation of the strike and considering the same, no fault can be found with the impugned order and, therefore, there is no case for interference in writ jurisdiction. 5. Section 101(2-A) of the said Act provides that no employer shall dismiss, discharge or reduce any protected employee save with the express permission in writing of the Labour Court. 5. Section 101(2-A) of the said Act provides that no employer shall dismiss, discharge or reduce any protected employee save with the express permission in writing of the Labour Court. The explanation to the said sub-section provides that for the purposes of the said sub-section, a "protected employee" in relation to any industry means any employee who being an office bearer of a union connected with the industry is recognised as such in accordance with the rules made under the said Act dealing with the provisions of law contained in section 33(2)(b) as well as 33(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This Court as well as the Apex Court in number of decisions has laid down the law relating to the scope of inquiry by the Court or Tribunal dealing with the applications filed by the employees for necessary permission in terms of the said provision of law and it is well settled that the scope of inquiry under those provisions of law is restricted to ascertain whether the materials on record, prima facie, establish the case of the employer and that the action is not mala fide. The powers of the Labour Court under the said Act are not that of the Appellate Court but primarily from the point of view of having a check over any mala fide action on the part of the employer and to avoid victimisation of the labour. At the same time, it does not seek to interfere with the disciplinary powers of the employer for the misconduct of the employees, which can be established by following the procedure known to the law. At the same time, it does not seek to interfere with the disciplinary powers of the employer for the misconduct of the employees, which can be established by following the procedure known to the law. The Apex Court in Martin's case (supra), while dealing with the subject of nature and scope of inquiry before the Labour and Industrial Tribunal under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 has reiterated the rulings of the Apex Court in the earlier decisions including the decision in the matter of (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mill Ltd. v. Pandit Ram Sarup and others)5, reported in 1957(I) L.L.J. 17 wherein, it was held thus: "The Tribunal before whom an application is made under that section has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workmen but has only got to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer in the matter of altering the conditions of employment to the prejudice of the workman or his discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted. A prima facie case has to be made out by the employer for the lifting of such ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimisation." (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court therein has further observed that "we have, therefore, got to consider whether in the instant case a prima facie case was made out by the appellant for terminating the service of the respondent and whether in giving the notice dated 11th November, 1955 terminating the respondent's service the appellant was motivated by unfair labour practice or victimisation." (Emphasis supplied) 6. Considering the nature and scope of the inquiry under section 101(2-A) of the said Act, and bearing in mind the decision of the Apex Court, it is, therefore, clear that the Court dealing with an application under the said provisions of law has to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for terminating the services of the employee and whether the action is not motivated by any unfair labour practice or victimisation and whether the procedure laid down for such action has been followed or not. Needless to say that the Court has also to ascertain whether there is any violation of basic principles of natural justice in the process of seeking to terminate the services of the employee. Applying the tests, if a prima facie case is made out, the Court will have no option but to grant permission for the proposed action by the employer. The Court cannot embark on the detailed inquiry as if sitting in appeal against the proposed action by the employer in exercise of the powers under section 101(2-A) of the said Act and any such exercise by the Labour Court would be illegal and would result in its order being declared as bad in law. 7. Bearing in mind the law on the aspect, certainly, and as fairly submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents, the Labour Court could not have ventured to blame the petitioner for failure to examine the traffic officer before the Labour Court when such officer was already examined during the inquiry before the Inquiry Officer and all materials in that regard were placed before the Labour Court. The Labour Court needs to be reminded that it cannot function as the Court of Appeal against the decision of the employer while dealing with the matter under section 101(2-A) of the said Act. Hence, the finding arrived at by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Industrial Court regarding failure to establish the charges solely on the ground of non-examination of the traffic officer cannot be sustained. 8. The dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner is, apparently, mainly on the ground that the appellant had failed to obtain declaration that the strike or stoppage of the work was illegal prior to taking disciplinary action against the respondent on the ground of either going on strike or instigating the strike and, in this connection, reference is made to Clause (g) of section 101(1) of the said Act by the Labour Court. Undoubtedly, section 101(1)(g) of the said Act provides that no employer shall dismiss, discharge or reduce any employee or punish him in any other manner by reason of the circumstance that the employee has gone on or joined or instigated the strike which has not been held by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court to be illegal under the said provisions of the said Act. Being so, any action taken for joining or instigating a strike on the ground that it was illegal may be said to be premature in the absence of declaration that the strike or stoppage was illegal. However, in a case where an employee is charge-sheeted not only on account of joining or instigating the strike which is alleged by the employer to be illegal but also for the other types of misconduct, can it be said that the Labour Court would be justified in rejecting the application under section 101(2-A) of the said Act even in cases where such other charges are held to be proved by the employer and in that regard, the permission was sought for dismissal of the employee, merely because there was no prior declaration of the strike to be illegal? 9. The Division Bench of this Court in Mill Mazdoor Sabha's case (supra) holding that the view taken by the Industrial Court regarding the illegality of dismissal of the employee to be not correct and referring to section 101(1)(g) of the said Act and in a case where the employee was charge-sheeted for willful insubordination in the course of strike by the employees, held that: "Clause (a) of the Standing Order 21 makes willful insubordination or disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order an act of misconduct. Under Clause (b) striking work in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is also an act of misconduct. Willful insubordination is therefore a separate offence from striking work in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act. The fact that a particular act may fall under both the clauses would not prevent the employer from taking action under either of them." (Emphasis supplied) 10. It is thus clear that merely because an act which is alleged to be a misconduct on the part of the employee could warrant an action under more than one provision, but one of such provisions falls within the category of Clause (g) of section 101(1) of the said Act, that would not prohibit the employer from proceeding to take disciplinary action and to seek necessary permission under section 101(2-A) of the said Act. 11. 11. The Apex Court, in Burhanpur Tapti Mill's case (supra), while interpreting the expression "strike rendered illegal" in section 42 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, observed that: "Prima facie, it appears that it is only where the strike in which the employee has participated does not come within the meaning of the provisions of section 40 that the employer is prohibited from taking action against him. The prohibition operates only when a strike is not "rendered illegal" under an provisions of the Act. That, it is urged by the respondent employer, is the same thing as saying that the prohibition operates only where the strike is not illegal within the meaning of the provisions of section 40 of the Act. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the words "rendered illegal" in section 42(1)(g) should properly be construed as "held illegal". It has to be noticed in this connection that section 41 of the Act provides a machinery under which not only the State Government but any employer or employee can approach the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court for a decision whether a strike or a lockout of which notice has been given or which has taken place is illegal. According to the appellant, it is only after, on such an application, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has decided that a strike is illegal, that the employer can take action. We are unable to see any justification for such a construction. It is clear to us that the phrase "rendered illegal" in section 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words "held illegal" used in sections 43, 44 and 45." Though the learned Advocate for the petitioner is justified in contending that the decision is purely on the aspect of the meaning of the expression "rendered illegal" in section 42 of the Statute, which was under reference before the Apex Court, it also refers to the well established principle of law that while dealing with the scope of a provision of law, the courts, under the guise of interpretation, can neither enlarge nor reduce the scope of powers given to the Tribunal under such statute. Bearing the same in mind and the observations of the Apex Court in relation to the scope of restrictions imposed on the powers of the employer and applying the same to the case in hand and bearing in mind the provisions of the said Act, it can safely be concluded that the restrictions imposed under section 101(1)(g) are only in relation to the disciplinary action pursuant to participation in the strike which has not been held to be illegal and not in relation to the actions which can be shown as misconduct otherwise than under the said clause. 12. In the case in hand, it is also to be noted that the charge-sheet against the respondent was on account of the following misconduct alleged against him:- (1) Willful disobedience or insubordination whether alone or in combination with others to any lawful and reasonable order of superior, 20(a) (2) Illegal stoppage or going on illegal strike or abetting, inciting, instigating or acting in furtherance of such strike or stoppage. 20(b) (3) Being within the premises of the undertaking after authorized working hours, without permission or without reasonable cause. 20(za) (4) Wilful slowing down in performance of work either by himself or in company with others, or abetment of or instigation in such slowing down or wrongful interference with the work of others. 20(zf) The application filed by the petitioner under section 101(2-A) of the said Act, clearly reveals the charges which were levelled against the respondent. The proposed action also discloses the punishment for the charges under the Standing Order Nos. 20(a), 20(b), 20(za) and 20(zf) which squarely relate to the above quoted alleged misconduct on the part of the respondent. Apparently, the charges of insubordination were not in relation to either participation or joinder or instigation of any strike, either illegal or otherwise. The allegations of misconduct also include wilful disobedience or insubordination as also wilful slowing down in performance of the work and interference with the work of others. Being so, it was not appropriate and in consonance with the provisions of law for the Labour Court and the Industrial Court to reject the application solely on the ground that there is no compliance of the provisions of section 101(1)(g) of the said Act. Being so, it was not appropriate and in consonance with the provisions of law for the Labour Court and the Industrial Court to reject the application solely on the ground that there is no compliance of the provisions of section 101(1)(g) of the said Act. It was necessary for the Labour Court to apply its mind to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out in relation to the charges under other provisions of the Standing Order which do not relate to or are covered by the provisions of law contained in section 101(1)(g) of the said Act and thereupon decide the application in accordance with the provisions of law. Clearly, both the courts have failed to exercise their jurisdiction in that regard. 13. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent that the evidence would disclose that though the charges are framed in a manner as if they are not in relation to the participation in the strike, they infact relate to the activities relating to the strike. Undoubtedly, the Labour Court has not even considered this aspect while deciding the matter nor the Industrial Court has applied its mind to the same. It was necessary for the courts below to apply their mind to the said aspect of the case and arrive at appropriate finding in that regard before disposing the application. Failure in that regard also amounts to failure to exercise the jurisdiction in the manner it was required to be exercised while dealing with the application under section 101(2-A) of the Act. As regards the decision of the learned Single Judge in Bhartiya Arogya Nidhi Sheth Kantilal's case (supra), as rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondent, it was delivered in totally different set of facts and being so, it is not applicable to the case in hand. 14. It is also to be noted that the Labour Court while rejecting the application has observed that "So also it is not necessary to cite all the judgments relied upon by both the parties." The Labour Court needs to be reminded that any judicial adjudication cannot be disposed of ignoring the contentions sought to be raised in the matter. If the contentions are not tenable, it is necessary for the adjudicating authority to say so with reasons. If the contentions are not tenable, it is necessary for the adjudicating authority to say so with reasons. But the decisions of the higher Court which are binding upon the lower authority or the Court when cited before it, they cannot be ignored and the lower authority or the Court has to apply its mind to the same and it is also necessary for the authority or the Court to record reasons as to why the decisions are not necessary to be considered. The decisions cited by the learned Advocates for the parties in the course of arguments are required to be considered and referred to in the judgment to be passed by the authority or the courts below and if they are not relevant for the decision, it is for the authority or the Court to say so in so many words with reasons but it is not permissible to ignore such decisions. Certainly if totally irrelevant decisions are cited and Court's time is wasted on that count, nothing prohibits the Court from imposing costs on the party responsible for waste of time of the Court. 15. For the reasons stated above, the impugned orders passed by the courts below are hereby quashed and set aside and matter is remanded to the Labour Court to decide the application afresh, after hearing the parties and in accordance with the provisions of law and bearing in mind the observations hereinabove. It is made clear that all the contentions are kept open. Considering the fact that the application was filed in the year 1997, the Labour Court is expected to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, and in any case within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court, after hearing the parties. 16. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 17. Certified copy be expedited. Order accordingly. -----