JUDGMENT - BRAHME P.S., J.:---The applicant, Vijay Balkrishna Ingle, has filed this revision application challenging the judgment and order passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Akola on 6-4-1999 in Criminal Appeal No. 66/1994 arising out the judgment and order passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Akola, in Sessions Trial No. 10/1994 passed on 14-10-1994, where under the Appellate Court confirmed conviction of applicant for offence under sections 498-A and 306 I.P.C. and modified sentence as sentencing to imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for four months and rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, respectively. 2.As per prosecution case, deceased Sunanda was married to applicant on 24-5-1991 and that applicant used to ill-treat her by beating her on suspecting her character and also accusing that she was having illicit relations with elder brother Manohar. That on 15-11-1991 in early morning, appellant assaulted her giving slaps and caused mental tormentation by persistent accusation as to her character. So that Sunanda committed suicide by setting herself on fire in the house. She was removed to the Hospital. She sustained 90% burns and on 18-11-1991 she died. 3.Applicant was tried before Assistant Sessions Judge for offences under sections 498-A and 306 I.P.C. in respect of suicidal death of Sunanda. The prosecution relied on Dying Declarations Exhibit 15 and Exhibit 24, as also oral Dying Declaration made to Sushilabai, mother of Sunanda to establish cruelty meted to her and due to that she admittedly committed suicide. The trial Court Judge, accepting this evidence held the appellant guilty for offences under sections 498-A and 306 I.P.C. and accordingly convicted and sentenced him. 4.The applicant challenged the said judgment of conviction and sentence passed by Assistant Sessions Judge by preferring Criminal Appeal No. 66/1994 before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Akola, who by his judgment and order dated 6-4-1999 confirmed the conviction of the appellant for the said offences. However, the order of sentence was modified as stated earlier. 5.I have heard Mr. Mardikar, learned Counsel for the applicant and Mr. Ahirkar, learned A.P.P. for respondent-State. 6.As the prosecution case mainly hinges on written Dying Declarations Exhibits 15 and 24, it is necessary to reproduce the same for proper appreciation. However, the order of sentence was modified as stated earlier. 5.I have heard Mr. Mardikar, learned Counsel for the applicant and Mr. Ahirkar, learned A.P.P. for respondent-State. 6.As the prosecution case mainly hinges on written Dying Declarations Exhibits 15 and 24, it is necessary to reproduce the same for proper appreciation. e`R;wiwoZ tckuh 1fukkuh 15 4 ÄVuk dkh ÄMyh% ek>s o ek>s irh ukes fot; ckyd`".k baXkGs ;kapskh vk"kk< efgU;k iklwu njjkst ldkGh o la?;kdkGh HkkaM.k gksr gksrs ek>s irh eyk iki ykor gksrs ek>s o ek>s tsBkps euksgj ckyd`".k baXkGs g;kaps vuSfrd laca/k gksr gksrs vkh R;kauk okjaokj kadk ;sr gksrh o R;keqGs HkkaM.k gksr gksrs vkt fn- 15 11 1991 jksth eyk ldkGh 4 oktrk ek>s irh fot; ;kauh eyk Äjkr 4 5 FkkiMk Xkkykr ekjY;k- uarj rs laMklyk Xksys ;keqGs ek>s MksD;koj ifj.kke >kyk o eh Lorgwu jWkdsy vaXkkoj Äsrys gh ÄVuk ldkGh 4 30 rs 5 oktrkph vlsy o vkXkisVhph dkMh ykowu tkGwu Äsrysss- R;kosGh ek>s Äjkr lklw uankckbZ] lkljk ckyd`".k] tsB euksgj gs >ksiys gksrs- ek>k ygku fnj foB~By ;kuh eh vksjMY;keqGs R;kapsdMs /kkor ;sowu R;kauh ek>s vaXkkoj lkrjh Vkdwu fo>oys ----- eyk ek>;k uo ;kus vkRrkp nok[kkU;kr ek>h HksV Äsowu eyk ngkr fnyh dh tj eh myVh tckuh fnyh rj rs Lor% vkRegR;k djrhy rsOgk rw tckuh cjkscj ns- 5 rwEgh Lor%gwu tkGwu Äsrys dk; uojk ck;dkspk usgeh gksr vl.kk ;k HkkaM.kkeqGs o ek>s o ek>s vuSfrd lac/k vlkos vkh ek>s uo ;kyk usgeh kadk ;sr vlY;keqGs eh Lorgwu jWkdsy vaXkkoj Äsowu tkGwu Äsrys- 2e`R;wiwoZ tckuh fukkuh 24 ek>k uojk eyk geskkA^^usgeh^^A eyk iki ykor gksrs R;k dkj.kko:u usgeh ekj>ksM djhr vls R;k =klkyk daVkGwu eh Lor% vkt Rkk- 15 11 1991 ps igkVs va- 4 rs 5 ldkGh oktsP;k lqekjkl vaXkkojps Lor% ÄklysV vksrwu Äsmu tkGwu Äsrys- eyk uo ;kfkok; dks.kpkp =kl uOgrk^^- 7.Mr. Mardikar, submitted that both the courts below committed serious error in law in holding that the Sunanda was subjected to cruelty by the applicant as contemplated under section 498-A of I.P.C. There is no material evidence to demonstrate that, there was ill-treatment to her during period of three days prior to the date of occurance at the hands of the applicant. In so far as the previous circumstances and the allegations as to ill-treatment meted out to her, even if it is accepted to have been established on the evidence on record, the said ill-treatment was condoned by the deceased Sunanda and therefore, there was no cause for her to commit suicide. That Sunanda while she was in the hospital was surrounded by many persons including her mother-Sushilabai. In such a situation in the absence of any other piece of evidence, there is reason to say that whatever statement she has made in the dying declaration was outcome of tutoring to her by her mother-Sushilabai and also as a result of pressure being exerted by police. The version of witness-Sushilabai regarding ill-treatment cannot be accepted for many reasons. In the first place it is not plausible that during a short span when she lived with her husband in the matrimonial home such type of cause for ill-treatment and that too of accusation of illicit relations with the elder brother of the applicant. Secondly witness Sushilabai did not lodge complaint against the applicant though according to her deceased Sunanda had disclosed to her earlier that the applicant was ill-treating her on that cause. Therefore, bare statement of witness-Sushilabai before the Court about the ill-treatment and cause for ill-treatment, without there being disclosure about the same specifically to the police when her statement was recorded and there being no corroboration to it by other evidence, can not stand to the reason. Therefore, learned Counsel submitted that the finding recorded by the courts below as to ill-treatment and cruelty is not at all substantiated by evidence on record. The learned Counsel further submitted that even accepting that there was ill-treatment and cruelty by the applicant, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the applicant instigated the deceased Sunanda to commit suicide. If that is so, then the offence under section 306 is not at all made out. Therefore applicant can not be held guilty for offence under section 306 I.P.C. 8.Mr. Ahirkar learned A.P.P. submitted that the finding of fact as to allegations of cruelty has been arrived at by the courts below on the basis of cogent evidence on record. The authenticity as well as truthfulness of the dying declarations has been duly established on the evidence on record. Ahirkar learned A.P.P. submitted that the finding of fact as to allegations of cruelty has been arrived at by the courts below on the basis of cogent evidence on record. The authenticity as well as truthfulness of the dying declarations has been duly established on the evidence on record. The fact that the applicant made accusations to his wife Sunanda making aspersions on her fidelity and that too raising suspicion that she was having illicit relations with his elder brother, is itself sufficient cause to drive Sunanda to commit suicide. Therefore, according to him there is no justification to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below much less in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Disclosure made by witness Sushila in her evidence about ill-treatment meted out to her daughter-Sunanda and factum physical ill-treatment caused to her stated by her in her dying declaration Exhibit 15 on the day of occurrence, do spell out the instigation and also intention on the part of the applicant for driving Sunanda to commit suicide. The learned A.P.P. placed reliance on decision of the Apex Court in 2003 All.M.R.(Cri.) 556, (State of Karnataka v. Shareef)1, wherein it is held that dying declarations recorded by police personnel cannot be discarded. There is no requirement of law that the dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate. Learned A.P.P. also placed reliance on the decision of our High Court in 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 996, (Puran Babu Chavan v. State of Maharashtra)2, wherein it is held that when all necessary ingredients of a valid dying declaration exists conviction can be solely based on such dying declaration. He urged that the revision application merits no consideration at all and so the same should be dismissed. 9.As regards the reliability of dying declaration the law laid down by the Apex Court in (Laxmi v. Om Prakash)3, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2383 there could be no debate on it. The Apex Court has observed "One of the important tests of the reliability of the dying declaration is a finding arrived at by the Court as to satisfaction that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and capable of making a statement at the point of time when the dying declaration purports to have been made and/or recorded. The statement may be brief or longish. The statement may be brief or longish. It is not the length of the statement but the fit state of mind of the victim to narrate the facts of occurrence which has relevance. If the Court finds that the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate the facts was impaired or the Court entertains grave doubts whether the deceased was in a fit physical and mental state to make the statement, the Court may in the absence of corroborative evidence lending assurance to the contents of the declaration, refuse to act on it." 10.So far as the first dying declaration Exhibit 24 is concerned, it was objected to by the defence on the ground that it was recorded by the Police Officer and that he did not ascertain from the Medical Officer or Doctor attending patient Sunanda that whether the victim Sunanda was in fit state of mind to make statement or not. So far as the first objection is concerned, the learned A.P.P. has rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in 2003 All.M.R.(Cri.) 556(S.C.) (supra) wherein it is held that there is no requirement of law that dying declaration must be necessarily made to the Magistrate and that dying declaration though recorded by the police personnel can not be discarded. As regards the second objection it is true that when P.S.I. Shankar Rupane recorded the dying declaration, Doctor was not present, nor the Doctor had certified that the victim Sunanda was in fit condition to make statement. But evidence of witness Shankar Rupane (P.W. 3) goes to show that he himself did ascertain from the victim that she was in a position to talk and after ascertaining that fact he recorded her statement as per narration made by her. It is significant to note that when he went to the rural hospital, first he enquired whether Medical Officer was present in the hospital, as he did not find Medical Officer in the hospital at that time, he proceeded to record the statement of victim after himself ascertaining the fitness and capability of the victim to make a statement. It is a matter of record that after he recorded the statement, the victim was immediately shifted to Civil Hospital, Akola and there her dying declaration was recorded in the presence of Medical Officer. It is a matter of record that after he recorded the statement, the victim was immediately shifted to Civil Hospital, Akola and there her dying declaration was recorded in the presence of Medical Officer. In such circumstances there is no reason to doubt the testimony of Police Officer when he has candidly stated that he himself ascertained the fitness and capability of deceased to make the statement. There was no reason for the Police Officer to record a false statement. Nothing has been brought on record in his evidence that the victim was tutored or pressured or influenced by any person or any of her relations to make a statement. It has come in the evidence of witness Shankar Rupane that in the Rural Hospital her relatives were present. It is again a matter of record that her mother Sushilabai was not present there in the rural hospital. Therefore, there was no question and occasion also for any of the relations of deceased Sunanda to tutor her to make statement. In addition to that both the courts below have accepted the evidence of witness Shankar Rupane holding him to be an independent witness and also witness of truth. Therefore, no error has been committed by the Courts below in accepting Dying Declaration Exhibit 24. 11.The dying declaration Exhibit 15 recorded by the Naib Tahsildar - Pralhad Ahir (P.W. 2) is doubted by the Counsel for the applicant on the ground that the deceased was under treatment of sedatives and as such she must not have been in a fit state of mind and health to make a statement. The authenticity of that statement Exhibit 15 is also doubted or questioned on the ground that Sushilabai mother of the victim was present with the deceased and that the statement recorded of the victim was likely to be the result of tutoring by Sushilabai. It is not disputed that said statement Exhibit 15 was recorded in the presence of the Medical Officer-Dr. Prakash Joshi. In his evidence he has clinchingly stated that before her statement was recorded he examined her and found her to be fit to make statement and accordingly he made endorsement by issuing certificate Exhibit 28. Dr. Joshi has further made it clear in his evidence that after the statement was recorded he examined her and issued certificate Exhibit 29. In his evidence he has clinchingly stated that before her statement was recorded he examined her and found her to be fit to make statement and accordingly he made endorsement by issuing certificate Exhibit 28. Dr. Joshi has further made it clear in his evidence that after the statement was recorded he examined her and issued certificate Exhibit 29. On the dying declaration Exhibit 15 which is to the effect that the patient is conscious throughout the recording of statement Dr. Joshi has been cross-examined at length by the defence but his evidence remained unshaken so far as this aspect is concerned. In the nature of things Dr. Joshi has no reason to give false certificate that the patient was fit to make a statement. Therefore accepting evidence of Dr. Joshi and Pralhad Ahir submission of learned Counsel that deceased being under treatment of sedative medicine, was not in a state of making statement does not hold good. 12.The evidence of P.W. Pralhad Ahir, on material particulars remained unshaken. Admittedly he recorded statement in the presence of Dr. Joshi. There is absolutely no reason for this witness to record such statement to involve the applicant. Therefore, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the applicant, that the victim Sunanda was tutored, by her mother-Sushila and that her statement was the result of pressure being brought by her and police, does not stand probable and plausible. Both the courts therefore, have committed no error in accepting the evidence of witness Prakash Joshi and Pralhad Ahir in respect of dying declaration Exhibit 15. I have no hesitation to say that the deceased Sunanda was very much conscious and in fit state of health when her statement was recorded. The statement made by her as contained in Exhibit 15 is statement made by her of her own volition on being questioned by witness Pralhad Ahir. In this connection it is worth to note that in the cross-examination Dr. Joshi it has been brought by defence that nobody except himself and Executive Magistrate was present near the patient Sunanda while recording the dying declaration. It is again pertinent to note that the version of witness Pralhad Ahir that Sunanda was fit to make statement and that was also ascertained by the Medical Officer Dr. Joshi after examining the patient, is not at all controverted by the defence. It is again pertinent to note that the version of witness Pralhad Ahir that Sunanda was fit to make statement and that was also ascertained by the Medical Officer Dr. Joshi after examining the patient, is not at all controverted by the defence. Therefore, there is absolutely no reason to discard the evidence of both the witnesses. Thus, accepting the evidence of both these witnesses, authenticity as well as truthfulness of the dying declaration Exhibit 15 is clinchingly established. Learned A.P.P. has rightly placed reliance on decision of our High Court in 2003 All.M.R.(Cri.) 649 (supra) wherein it is held that when all necessary ingredients of a valid dying declaration exists, the Court can accept the same by placing implicit reliance on it and conviction can be solely based on such dying declaration. 13.Once it is found that both the dying declarations satisfied the test, there is no hurdle in placing reliance on them. So far as the first dying declaration-Exhibit 24 is concerned, witness-Shankar Rupane stated in his evidence regarding what was disclosed by the deceased to him and the same is correctly reflected in it. The statement in dying declaration Exhibit 24 specifically speaks of constant physical and mental torture to the victim by the applicant and that too on the ground that the applicant was accusing her of having illicit relations with his elder brother. She has also disclosed in clear terms that the torture was unbearable to her. 14.In the second dying declaration Exhibit 15, there is detailed narration as to factum of physical and mental torture the victim was subjected to by the applicant during the period she lived with him in the matrimonial home. She did state that even before occurrence, the applicant slapped her, for the same reason of accusation, raising suspicion of her character for which she felt much. 15.Besides this disclosure in written dying declarations, there is oral dying declaration by the victim which she made to her mother Sushila. In her evidence witness Sushila stated that her daughter-deceased-Sunanda complained of physical torture by the applicant every day on the ground of suspecting her character accusing her that she was having illicit relations with his elder brother. 15.Besides this disclosure in written dying declarations, there is oral dying declaration by the victim which she made to her mother Sushila. In her evidence witness Sushila stated that her daughter-deceased-Sunanda complained of physical torture by the applicant every day on the ground of suspecting her character accusing her that she was having illicit relations with his elder brother. Deceased also told her that in the morning on the day of occurrence applicant assaulter her by giving slaps for the same reason of accusations as to her character and so she decided to end her life. Evidence of witness Sushila came to be objected by the defence on the ground that the witness, though was aware about the ill-treatment and harassment to her daughter did not lodge a complaint to the police. Much has been made about not giving report to the police by witness Sushila, as regards the harassment and cruelty caused to her daughter when the same was disclosed to her during her earlier visits to parental house. In this context the learned Counsel also pointed out some omissions in her evidence which according to the learned Counsel are so material as to falsify the claim of witness as regards the factum of cruelty. I have gone through the evidence of witness Sushila with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the applicant and I have carefully scrutinized her evidence with due circumspection having regard to the fact that the witness Sushila being mother, was closely related to the deceased. But having regard to the statement of the deceased in dying declaration Exhibits 15 and 24, which lends assurance to what was stated by witness Sushila before the Court, I do not find any reason to discard her testimony, merely because the witness did not give report to the police earlier in respect of ill-treatment meted out to her daughter and because of the same infirmity in her evidence, vis a vis her statement recorded by the police. Though witness Sushila was cross-examined thoroughly by the defence, on material particular, her evidence remained undisturbed. I have already discarded the submissions of the defence that the second dying declaration Exhibit 15 was obtained by the police either due to pressure by witness Sushila or due to deceased being tutored by witness Sushila. Though witness Sushila was cross-examined thoroughly by the defence, on material particular, her evidence remained undisturbed. I have already discarded the submissions of the defence that the second dying declaration Exhibit 15 was obtained by the police either due to pressure by witness Sushila or due to deceased being tutored by witness Sushila. If that possibility is totally ruled, out then there is no reason to accept the evidence of witness Sushila. It is matter of record, inspite of there being cruelty to her, deceased did return to matrimonial home on the last occasion, three days before the date of occurrence. This fact itself goes to show that the victim returned to the matrimonial home despite the fact that she was subjected to harassment by her husband but with the hope that her husband would improve. Even defence is taking advantage of the fact that victim had returned to the matrimonial home and lived with the applicant for three days and thereby cruelty meted out to the deceased was condoned. If that is so then there was justification for witness Sushila not to report the matter to the police. But the facts which emerge from the evidence of witness Sushila sufficiently indicate that what was felt by deceased when she returned to the matrimonial home was merely a ray of hope. In fact as disclosed by her in the dying declarations inspite of she having returned to the matrimonial home, harassment and ill-treatment to her continued and even on the date of occurrence, prior to the deceased having committed suicide, there was physical assault on her by the applicant about which she has emphatically stated in her dying declaration Exhibit 15. Therefore, evidence of witness Sushila inspires confidence and trial Court has rightly accepted her evidence. It goes without saying that, her evidence further lends assurance to the veracity of the statement made by the victim in her dying declarations Exhibits 15 and 24. If that is so, then on the evidence on record, the factum of cruelty, physical and mental by the applicant to the deceased is clinchingly established. It goes without saying that, her evidence further lends assurance to the veracity of the statement made by the victim in her dying declarations Exhibits 15 and 24. If that is so, then on the evidence on record, the factum of cruelty, physical and mental by the applicant to the deceased is clinchingly established. The courts below are perfectly right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant has committed offence under section 498-A by subjecting the deceased to cruelty as contemplated under section 498-A of I.P.C. 16.Learned Counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the decision of our High Court in 2001 All.M.R.(Cri.) 840, (Nandlal Datta Pardesi and others v. State of Maharashtra)4, wherein it is held that in case of concurrent of finding of lower courts about the guilt of the accused- husband under sections 306, 498-A, the interference by the High Court in revision is justified if finding is not based on cogent evidence, but by drawing inference not arising from material on record. The prosecution laid down in this case cannot be disputed. But this decision is of no assistance to the applicant when as I have found that the concurrent finding recorded by the courts is based on the evidence on record. In the decision which is relied upon this Court found that finding was not based on cogent evidence. It was based on by drawing inferences not arising from materials on record. In that case for factum of cruelty reliance was placed on the letter alleged to have been written in the handwriting of the deceased. But at the trial, the basic fact that the said letter was written by deceased therein has not been established. Therefore, the courts below in that case reached to the conclusion regarding cruelty merely on the basis of inferences and that finding was not based on evidence of inferences and that finding was not based on evidence on record. It is in that set of facts and state of evidence on record, there was justification for the High Court to interfere in the matter in its revisional jurisdiction as stated earlier. In the case before hand when factum of cruelty is established on the basis of cogent and acceptable evidence, there was no improper exercise of jurisdiction by the courts below. In the case before hand when factum of cruelty is established on the basis of cogent and acceptable evidence, there was no improper exercise of jurisdiction by the courts below. Hence there is no scope for this Court to interfere with the finding of fact as to cruelty as contemplated under section 498-A of I.P.C. 17.As regards the conviction of the appellant for offence under section 306 I.P.C., the learned Counsel for the applicant vehemently submitted that there must be reasonable certainty to indicate that the husband abetted suicide of wife by instigating her to do so and merely because the husband is found guilty for offence under section 498-A, he should not necessarily be held guilty for offences under section 306 of I.P.C. on the basis of same evidence. He also submitted that the conviction under section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the wife. Mere harassment or cruelty to wife in the absence of intentional or actual abetment is not abetment to commit suicide as envisaged under sections 306 of I.P.C. and 107 of I.P.C. To substantiate his contention, learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in 1) 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)433 , (Rameshkumar appellant v. State of Chhatisgarh)5, 2) 2002(2) Cri.L.J. 2796, (Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar appellant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, respondent)6, and also decisions of our High Court in 1) 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 554 , (Shankar Mangelal Lokhande v. The State of Maharashtra)7, and 2) 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 1367 , (State of Maharashtra v. Tanaji Shamrao Shalke)8, (supra). 18.Section 306 I.P.C. provides that if any person commits suicide, who ever abets the commission of such suicide shall be liable to be punished. The ingredients of abetment are set out in section 107 of I.P.C. as under: "107. 18.Section 306 I.P.C. provides that if any person commits suicide, who ever abets the commission of such suicide shall be liable to be punished. The ingredients of abetment are set out in section 107 of I.P.C. as under: "107. Abetment of a thing.---A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.---Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.---Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.---Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing." 19.In the case before hand the prosecution has placed reliance on dying declarations Exhibits 15 and 24 as well as oral dying declaration to witness Sushila to substantiate the fact that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty and further caused abetment to her to commit suicide. The prosecution has relied on section 113-A of the Evidence Act which reads as under: "113-A---Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.---When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.---For the purpose of this section, cruelty shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code." This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. 20.Abetment of a thing is an act of encouraging, inciting or aiding another. One can incite, by any means of language, direct or indirect whether it takes the form of expression, or insinuation. 20.Abetment of a thing is an act of encouraging, inciting or aiding another. One can incite, by any means of language, direct or indirect whether it takes the form of expression, or insinuation. To "instigate" another person to commit suicide to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act. What acts would amount to instigate or incitement will depend on particular facts of each case. The present case is not one which may fall under clauses, second and third of section 107 of I.P.C. The case has to be decided having regard to the first clause i.e. whether the applicant abetted the suicide by instigating her to do so. It is pertinent to note that under the first clause a person is said to have abetted the doing of things who instigated a person to do a thing. A person can instigate, encourage, or incite by any means of language, direct or indirect. Even cruelty meted out to a wife, having regard to the facts of the case is sufficient to spell out the instigation on the part of the husband to his wife to commit suicide. 21.The Apex Court in 2001(9) S.C.C. 618 (supra) while considering the scope of presumption to be raised under section 113-A of Evidence Act has observed: "However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the above said circumstances, the Court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution." 22.Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory. It is only permissible as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the above said three circumstances, shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution." 22.Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory. It is only permissible as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the above said three circumstances, shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn. Before the presumption may be drawn, the Court shall have regard to "all the other circumstances of the Case." The Apex Court further stated that "consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the Court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression "the other circumstances of the case" used in section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption". The Apex Court further observed: "Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. Inspite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in section 113-A is defined in section 4 of the Evidence Act which says "Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume the fact, it may either record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it." 23.The Apex Court in that case, having regard to recitals of the diary written by the deceased namely "I Smt. Seema Dubey ashamed of my own faults I am committing suicide. Nobody is responsible and none should be harassed for it". Contents of the letter and dying declaration found that because of disinclination on the part of the accused to drop the deceased at her sisters residence, the deceased felt disappointed, frustrated and depressed and that she was overtaken by a feeling of shortcomings which she attributed to herself, she was overcome by forceful feeling generating within her that in the assessment of her husband she did not deserve to be his life partner. The Apex Court also took into consideration the conduct of the accused who tried to put off the fire and also took his wife to the hospital. These factors improbabilised the theory of husband having abetted suicide. The Apex Court also took into consideration the conduct of the accused who tried to put off the fire and also took his wife to the hospital. These factors improbabilised the theory of husband having abetted suicide. Therefore, the Apex Court found that the circumstances attending the case did not spell cut abetment to commit suicide by accused-husband. Apex Court on facts and circumstances of the case found that no presumption under section 113-A can be raised and no evidence and material was available on record wherefrom an inference of the accused-appellant having abetted the commission of the suicide may necessarily be drawn. The Apex Court also observed that the totality of the circumstances discussed, especially the dying declaration and the suicide notes left by the deceased herself which fall for consideration within the expression "all the other circumstances of the case" employed in section 113-A of Evidence Act, do not permit the presumption there under being raised against the accused. As such the Apex Court set aside conviction of the accused under section 306 of I.P.C. while maintaining his conviction for offence under section 498-A I.P.C. 24.In the decision of the Apex Court in 2002 Cri.L.J. 2796 (supra), it has been held that the presence of mens rea is necessary concomitant of instigation. On facts of the case it was found that the deceased committed suicide after two days of quarrel, during which the accused uttered the words telling the deceased "to go and die". Suicidal note left by the deceased was showing that he was in great stress and depression. In such facts and circumstances, the Apex Court found that the utterance of said words would not constitute ingredients of "instigation". So having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court found that offence under section 306 of I.P.C. was not made out. As there was no material on record to infer even that there was instigation by the accused. It is in this context the Apex Court has observed that the presence of mens ria is necessary concomitant for instigation. 25.The Counsel for the applicant, placed reliance on the decision of the High Court in 2000 All.M.R.(Cri.) 10 (supra) wherein it is held that mere harassment or cruelty to wife in absence of intentional or actual abetment is not abetment of suicide. 25.The Counsel for the applicant, placed reliance on the decision of the High Court in 2000 All.M.R.(Cri.) 10 (supra) wherein it is held that mere harassment or cruelty to wife in absence of intentional or actual abetment is not abetment of suicide. In that case the wife committed suicide as she was fed up of her life due to frequent physical assaults by her husband. They were married about 12 years prior to the incident. Neither by any word nor his action or conduct, the accused-husband was alleged to have instigated, aided or abetted the deceased for commission of suicide. In such circumstances, the Court found that the trial Court erred in drawing inference of abetment of suicide on the basis of evidence on record about the frequent physical assaults made by the appellant on the person of the deceased. So it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether physical harassment by husband to his wife spells out instigation on the part of the husband to his wife who has committed suicide. It is very difficult to agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the applicant on the basis of this decision of our High Court to hold that in every case of physical assault by husband to wife will not amount to instigation to the wife to commit suicide. No general proposition has been laid down. Nor such general proposition could be laid down that mere harassment or cruelty to wife in absence of intentional or actual abetment is not abetment of suicide. In other words if on facts and circumstances of a case, where there is physical harassment or cruelty to wife, intentional or actual instigation for abetment could be spell out, offence under section 306 of I.P.C. as to abetment of suicide is made out. 26.In other decision of this Court reported in 2003 All.M.R.(Cri.) 884 (supra) it is held that the allegations of ill-treatment on account of mistakes committed by deceased wife in her domestic activities and agricultural work by itself not sufficient even to infer that it would be likely to drive the wife to commit suicide, so as to attract the rigours of sections 306 or 493-A of Indian Penal Code. The proposition laid down is based on facts and circumstances of the case wherein it is found that the wife was reprimanded for mistakes committed by her and because of that she committed suicide. In such set of facts ill-treatment meted out to her was found to be not the cause for her to commit suicide, that is how it is said in the judgment that it can not be inferred that it would be likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. Therefore, it will depend upon the facts of each case, whether to draw inference of abetment or instigation to commit suicide to the wife. In view of this legal position, I do not find it necessary to refer to other decisions of other High Courts relied upon by the Counsel for the applicant. It is suffice to say that if on the facts of each case, the Court has come to the conclusion that there was no instigation or abetment by the husband to the wife to commit suicide in that case, offence under section 306 I.P.C. is not made out. 27.It is established on the evidence on record that the deceased was subjected to cruelty, physical and mental by the applicant on the ground that she was having illicit relations with his brother. Though the deceased Sunanda lived with the applicant in matrimonial home for a short span of five months, there was persistent mental and physical tormentation to her by him. It is also spelt out from the recitals of the dying declarations Exhibits 15 and 24 that physical and mental torture to the deceased by the applicant was almost everyday and it was intentionally done by the applicant resulting into complete break-down of the marriage, showing inclination on the part of the applicant not to have any chance of reconciliation between them. Deceased has expressed in dying declaration Exhibit 15 that due to persistent physical and mental torture by the applicant to her, she committed suicide. It is also disclosed by the deceased in the dying declaration Exhibit 15 that on the day of occurrence in the morning the applicant again raised quarrel with her and that too on account of accusations in which he was making allegations that she was having illicit relations with his elder brother. It is also disclosed by the deceased in the dying declaration Exhibit 15 that on the day of occurrence in the morning the applicant again raised quarrel with her and that too on account of accusations in which he was making allegations that she was having illicit relations with his elder brother. In that quarrel the applicant has alleged to have physically assaulted the deceased by giving 4-5 slaps. This physical and mental torture on that day had grave impact on her mind and as stated by her she felt much and therefore she decided to commit suicide. 28.Admittedly, the brother of the applicant extinguished fire and took the deceased to the hospital. The applicant himself did not reach his wife Sunanda to the hospital, nor he did any act to prevent her from burning herself. All his effort during the trial was that of denial and to get himself absolved. In the dying declaration Exhibit 24, deceased has emphatically stated that except her husband, no one harassed her. In the dying declaration Exhibit 15, deceased has stated that her husband on seeing her in the hospital, threatened that in case she gives statement involving him, he would commit suicide. Nothing is brought on record by the defence even to spell out that deceased was a women of sensitive nature. There is nothing brought on record to show that she was over-taken by shortcomings which she attributed to herself and that she was overcome by forceful feeling generating within herself that she did not deserve to be the life partner of the applicant. The version of deceased in the dying declaration Exhibit 15 as to what happened just before she decided to commit suicide by burning herself, thus spelt out of the proximate cause provoking her to commit suicide. 29.Apart from physical torture mental harassment caused to her which was touching to her fidelity, so deep-rooted, that it left fatal blow on her mind which led her to put an end to her life. We can imagine the state of her mind as also the impact on her of persistent mental tormentation of such a nature touching her fidelity and that too during the span of five months of marriage. She was recently married with the applicant as such being a newly married bride she had dream of happy, contented marital life. We can imagine the state of her mind as also the impact on her of persistent mental tormentation of such a nature touching her fidelity and that too during the span of five months of marriage. She was recently married with the applicant as such being a newly married bride she had dream of happy, contented marital life. But as the ways of providence could be false and heinous accusations on her by the applicant, almost left fatal death blow on her and shattered her dream and persistence of the same coupled with the physical torture was sufficient in all probability to drive her to commit suicide. It is not a case of routine marital discord between the husband and wife on account of very routine and frequent quarrels arising out of egoistic nature of spouses. Nor there is any evidence to show that deceased was really a woman of bad character. The allegation which the applicant was making accusing her having illicit relations with his brother was itself very nasty and in all probability the result of such allegations being made up only and in pursuance thereof she being persistently physically assaulted, must have grave impact on her mind, she must have been looked down by the members of her in-laws house. In such circumstances and set of facts, it appears very plausible to say that the facts and circumstances do spell out of intention on the part of the applicant to have instigated and provoked the deceased by intentionally making nasty allegations coupled with physical torture provoked her to commit suicide. Therefore, the courts below have committed no error in holding the appellant guilty for committing offence under section 306 of I.P.C. 30.So far as the sentence is concerned, the Appellate Court has already taken a lenient view in the matter by reducing substantive sentenced to R.I. for 5 years for offence under section 306 of Indian Penal Code. Taking into consideration the nature of the offence, it would not be appropriate to take further lenient view in the matter of sentence. The revision application, therefore, merits no consideration. I pass the following order. ORDER The revision application is dismissed. The applicant who was granted bail on admission of this revision application, shall surrender before the trial Court within four weeks from today to serve out the sentence. Revision dismissed. -----