JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This revision is directed against the order, dated 13.11.2002, passed by learned Additional District Judge, (Adhoc) No. 2 Kamrup, Guwahati, in Misc. Appeal No. 9 of 2001, allowing the appeal and granting injunction by setting aside the order, dated 19.03.2001, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 3, Guwahati, in Misc. Case No. 52 of 1999, arising out of Title Suit No. 153/99, whereby the learned Trial Court had declined to make absolute the order of temporary injunction earlier granted in favour of the Plaintiffs-opposite party. 2. In a narrow compass, the material facts and various stages, which have led to the present revision, may be set out as follows: (i) The Plaintiffs-opposite party instituted Title Suit No. 153/99 aforementioned seeking decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants (that is, the revision Petitioners), their employees, etc., from using the front space of their building, located on the eastern side, by parking car or other vehicles, the case of the Plaintiffs being, briefly stated thus: The Plaintiffs have constructed a multistoried building on their land having 27, numbers of ownership flats. Out of these flats, 18 numbers of flats, located on the 3rd, 4th and 5th floors of the said building, known as Shiv Apartments, were sold out to the Defendants company for use and occupation of their employees. As per the map, which is approved by the Guwahati Municipal Corporation, provision for car parking had been made on the southern side of the building. Upon taking possession of the flats, the employees of the Defendants started residing in the said flats and used to park their cars on the southern side of the building given to them as a parking place. After some months, the relation between the Plaintiffs, who have been in occupation of two numbers of flats in the same building, and the employees of the Defendants became strained and they started harassing the Plaintiffs, which led to the institution of several suits. Thereafter, the Defendants and their employees have started parking their vehicles in front of the building, that is, on the eastern side of the building causing inconvenience to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs, therefore, instituted the suit. Thereafter, the Defendants and their employees have started parking their vehicles in front of the building, that is, on the eastern side of the building causing inconvenience to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs, therefore, instituted the suit. (ii) Pending disposal of the suit, the Plaintiffs made an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure seeking temporary injunction restraining the Defendants, their employees, etc. from parking their vehicles on the front side of the said building and it is this application, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 52/99. Learned Trial Court initially passed an interim order of temporary injunction as had been prayed for by the Plaintiffs. (iii) The Defendants contested the suit and also the prayer for injunction, their case being, thus: The Plaintiffs have no locus standi to file their petition as all the owners have not been made party and no injunction should be granted against the Defendants inasmuch as the Defendants are co-owners and have equal rights over the land and they have the right to park their vehicles at the vacant portion of the space inasmuch as the Defendants have purchased 45% share of the land along with 18 numbers of flats. As the land is undivided, the opposite party have joint rights, title over and interest the entire 3 kathas of the land. If temporary injunction is granted, as prayed for, the opposite party will suffer irreparable loss. 3. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, learned trial Court passed the order, dated 19.03.2001, aforementioned vacating the ad-interim temporary injunction and rejected the prayer for granting injunction. The learned appellate Court, as indicated hereinabove, set aside the order, dated 19.03.2001, aforementioned and made absolute the ad-interim order of injunction. Feeling aggrieved, the Defendants have approached this Court in revision. 4. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned order. I have heard Mr. B.P. Katakey, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendants-Petitioners and Mr. R.L. Yadav, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs-opposite party. 5. It has been submitted by Mr. Feeling aggrieved, the Defendants have approached this Court in revision. 4. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned order. I have heard Mr. B.P. Katakey, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendants-Petitioners and Mr. R.L. Yadav, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs-opposite party. 5. It has been submitted by Mr. Katakey that the learned appellate Court has failed to note that the power of appellate Court, while considering an application for injunction, which has been turned down, is very limited inasmuch as the power to grant or not to grant injunction is discretionary, the appellate Court will not interfere with an order declining to grant injunction unless the order appealed against is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, perverse or without due regard to the principles governing grant of injunction. It is also submitted by Mr. Katakey that the learned appellate Court has misconceived the law relating to prima facie case inasmuch as it failed to note that there is a distinction between a prima facie case for trial and a prima facie case for the purpose of granting of injunction. In case of injunction application, points out Mr. Katakey, mere prima facie case is not enough and the Petitioner seeking injunction must also show that there is a strong case for granting such an injunction of fair chance of success in suit. In this regard, however, there is, according to Mr. Katakey, absolutely no discussion in the impugned order and the impugned order proceeds the premises that since issues have been framed, wherein the rights of the parties to use the disputed space for parking will be decided, there was a prima facie case for trial and also for granting injunction. 6. It is also pointed out by Mr. Katakey that the Courts have deprecated the practice of granting such a relief at the stage of injunction or interim stage, which is tantamount to giving the principal relief sought for in the petition for no better reason than the fact that a prima facie case has been made out. Support for this contention is sought to be derived Mr. Katakey from the case of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Company Private Limited and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 257 . 7. In the case at hand, submits Mr. Support for this contention is sought to be derived Mr. Katakey from the case of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Company Private Limited and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 257 . 7. In the case at hand, submits Mr. Katakey, the Plaintiffs clearly stated that the Defendants had started parking their vehicles on eastern side of the building despite objections raised by the Plaintiffs and on the basis of these pleadings, the Plaintiffs prayed for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants, their employees, etc., from using the eastern side of the said building for the purpose of parking their vehicles, etc. This relief, which was the principal relief, points out Mr. Katakey, has been granted by the learned appellate Court, vide its impugned order, in favour of the Plaintiffs, at the initial stage itself, which was as good as decreeing the suit of the Plaintiffs. Exercise of such a discretion, contends Mr. Katakey, is a glaring example of granting of principal relief by an interim order, which has been consistently deprecated by the Apex Court. It is also submitted by Mr. Kataki that the Defendants company is owner of 45% of the land and 18 numbers of flats standing thereon and as a joint owner of the property, they have the right to use every inch of vacant space of the land on which the building stands. There is absolutely nothing in the agreement between the parties, contends Mr. Katakey, that the Defendants' company will be using only southern side of the building for the purpose of parking and no parking will be allowed on the eastern side, particularly, when the Plaintiffs themselves, admittedly use the eastern side of the building for the purpose of parking their vehicles. 8. In the case at hand the learned appellate Court has, submits Mr. Katakey, contrary to any agreement existing between the parties and ignoring the basis principles governing grant of injunction, passed the impugned order allowing the prayer for injunction and caused thereby serious miscarriage of justice and hence, the impugned order may be set aside. 9. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. Yadav has submitted the impugned order is an order, which has not disposed of the suit and hence, such an order is not revisable under the law inasmuch as the proviso to Section 115(1) Code of Civil Procedure allows, according to Mr. 9. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. Yadav has submitted the impugned order is an order, which has not disposed of the suit and hence, such an order is not revisable under the law inasmuch as the proviso to Section 115(1) Code of Civil Procedure allows, according to Mr. Yadav, interference in revision with only such orders, which, if the same had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have disposed of the suit or the proceeding. 10. It is also submitted by Mr. Yadav that the Plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing before the learned Courts below that they had a strong prima facie case for trial as well as for granting of injunction inasmuch as the Defendants had, without having any right to use the eastern side of the building, started parking car there despite objections raised by the Plaintiffs and hence, left with no option, the Plaintiffs had to take shelter of the Court and seek, as a temporary measure, prohibitory injunction restraining the Defendants from using the eastern side of the building. 11. Let me, first, deal with the question whether the impugned order is a revisable order or not. 12. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it is of paramount importance to note that Clause (b) of the Proviso to Section 115(1) has been deleted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. 13. The question, therefore, is as to what will be the effect of the deletion of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 115(1)? The answer to this question is not very difficult to seek. 14. 13. The question, therefore, is as to what will be the effect of the deletion of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 115(1)? The answer to this question is not very difficult to seek. 14. In the past, i.e., before the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, came into force, an order, which suffered from jurisdictional error, could have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 if the order under challenge was likely to cause failure of justice or irreparable loss or injury to the party approaching the revisional court, but with Clause (b) of the Proviso to Section 115(1) having been deleted under the new Act, the implication is that even if an order suffers from jurisdictional error or causes failure of justice or irreparable injury to the party approaching the Court, the order will not be interfered with in revision unless the order, which is sought to get revised, is such that had the order been made in favour of the party applying for revision, it would have terminated the suit or the proceeding. 15. It is, now of immense importance to note that a careful reading of the proviso to Section 115(1) will show that this proviso applies in the case of orders, which are interlocutory in nature and not final orders concluding the proceeding or determining the suit. If during the course of progress of a suit or proceeding, an order is made, which suffers from jurisdictional error, the party aggrieved may apply under Section 115(1) for revision, but such an order will not be interfered with in revision, even if the same is ex facie without jurisdiction, unless the order is such, which would have, if the order had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, finally disposed of the suit or the proceeding. In other words, if the order is such, which even if interfered with, will not terminate the progress of the suit or of the proceeding, the order will not be interfered with. It, therefore, logically follows that a final order, which disposes of the suit or the proceeding, cannot fall within the ambit of the proviso to Section 115(1). To a final order, the limitations imposed by the proviso to Section 115(1) on the revisional exercise of powers of the High Court will not apply. 16. It, therefore, logically follows that a final order, which disposes of the suit or the proceeding, cannot fall within the ambit of the proviso to Section 115(1). To a final order, the limitations imposed by the proviso to Section 115(1) on the revisional exercise of powers of the High Court will not apply. 16. In short, from a bare reading of the proviso to Section 115(1), it becomes abundantly clear that for revising an interlocutory order passed during the progress of the suit or proceeding, the condition precedent is that the order, which is sought to be revised, is an order, which, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or the proceeding. No such condition precedent can exist in the case of a final order, which suffers from jurisdictional errors or satisfies the conditions laid down in Clause (a), (b) and/or (c) to Sub-section (1) of Section 115. 17. Thus, the proviso to Section 115(1) will apply to interlocutory orders alone. I am guided to adopt this view from the law laid down in Prem Bakshi's and Ors. v. Dharam Dev and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 2 , case (supra), wherein the Apex Court has observed thus:" Under Clause (a), the High Court would be justified in interfering with an order of a subordinate Court if the said order finally disposes of the suit or the proceeding." By way of illustration, we may say that if a trial Court holds by an interlocutory order that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case or that suit is barred by limitation, it would amount to finally deciding the case and such order would be revisable. (Emphasis is added) 18. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that the expression "any case, which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court", occurring in Section 115(1), does not necessarily mean final orders, but will also include interlocutory orders, which determine the rights of the parties. Reference, in this regard, may be made to Major SS Khanna v. Brij FJ Dillon ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ). However, the interlocutory order will be interfered with in revision, if the order is such, which, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have terminated the suit or the proceeding. Reference, in this regard, may be made to Major SS Khanna v. Brij FJ Dillon ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ). However, the interlocutory order will be interfered with in revision, if the order is such, which, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have terminated the suit or the proceeding. As far as the anal orders deciding the case is concerned, the limitation contained in the proviso to Section 115(1) will not, as indicated hereinabove, apply. 19. I am also fortified in coming to the above conclusion from the observations made in Sri K. Anjaneya Settty v. Sr HK Ranggiatra Setty (AIR 2002 Kant 387), which run as follows: Therefore, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which confers a supervisory role on this Court has to be exercised at an interlocutory stage prior to judgment and decree and against orders which are not covered under Order 43 Code of Civil Procedure and would have the effect of deciding the case between the parties. Therefore, it necessarily follows it has to be against an interlocutory order passed in a suit. From the stage of institution of the suit till its final disposal by way of a judgment and decree there are various stages in a suit where the court is called upon to decide several important rights of the parties. The said rights may be substantial or procedural deciding such rights, interlocutory orders are passed and if these orders tends to decide the rights of the parties conclusively and finally, then, the correctness or legality of the order as set out in Section 115 has to be gone into by this Court in its jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis is supplied) 20. In view of the fact that the order impugned in this revision is an order, which has finally disposed of the application made under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure and when against such an order, no further appeal is provided for, the order, in question, can be examined to determine if the same needs interference in revision. 21. In the above view of the matter, this revision is, undoubtedly, maintainable. 22. 21. In the above view of the matter, this revision is, undoubtedly, maintainable. 22. Coming to the merit of the impugned order, it needs to be emphasized that injunction is an equitable relief and the norms for exercise of such power is fairly well established. As is well known, injunction is a relief founded in equity. The power to grant or decline injunction essentially lies in the realm of discretion of the Court. The norms for exercise of such powers are no longer vague and indefinite. It is well-acknowledged that before a Court grants injunction, it must ascertain if the Plaintiff seeking injunction has a prima facie case to go for trial, whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of grant or refusal of injunction and whether irreparable loss and injury will be caused to the Plaintiff if injunction is refused. Coupled with these conditions precedent, the Court has also ascertain if question of public interest is involved. These conditions precedent have been accepted as the cardinal principles to be considered by the Court, while adjudicating the rival claims of the parties made for and against grant of injunction. In fact what are the settled principles governing grant of injunction are not difficult to state; the difficulty, however, lies in applying the se principles to the facts of the given case. The power to grant and/or refuse injunction is a drastic power and may have the effect of causing serious consequences on the party against whom the injunction is granted. This discretionary power has, therefore, to be exercised with the great circumspection, care and caution. 23. In a catena of cases, the Apex Court has laid down the scope of the appellate Court's power to interfere with the grant or refusal of injunction. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1990) Supp. SCC717, the Apex Court has held that unless discretion has exercised by the trial Court arbitrarily, capriciously, whimsically or without due regard to the established principles governing the grant and/or refusal of injunction, the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below. A view possible on the facts of the case, if adopted by the trial Court, must be allowed to prevail, notwithstanding the fact that the appellate Court, on the same facts, might be inclined to take Anr. view. A view possible on the facts of the case, if adopted by the trial Court, must be allowed to prevail, notwithstanding the fact that the appellate Court, on the same facts, might be inclined to take Anr. view. If, however, the view taken by the trial Court is neither possible nor a reasonable one at all, the appellate Court can interfere. 24. In short, since an order of injunction lies in the realm of discretion of the Court based on equity, the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion unless the trial Court has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, whimsically, perversely or ignoring the settled principle of law governing the grant or refusal of orders of injunction. If two views are possible on the basis of the facts pleaded by the parties, the appellate Court will not substitute its views in place oft he views of the trial Court. Reference made by Mr. Katakey to the case of Wander Limited (supra) is, therefore, not wholly misplaced inasmuch as the Apex Court has laid down therein as follows: 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere with tin, exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principals of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified. In interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. (Emphasis is supplied) 25. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. (Emphasis is supplied) 25. In the case at hand the learned appellate Court has given no indication that the learned trial Court's order suffers from arbitrariness or is whimsical or perverse or is against the acknowledged principles governing the grant or refusal of injunction and/or that the view taken by the learned trial Court was wholly impossible to sustain. 26. It is also of utmost importance to note that in the case at hand it was the case of the Plaintiffs themselves that the Defendants had started using the eastern side of the building for the purpose of parking their vehicles, etc. In other words, on the day, when the Plaintiffs had approached the Court, the Defendants were already using the disputed space. Thus, the order of injunction, though issued in the form of prohibitory injunction, has, in fact, the effect of changing the status-quo as it existed on the date of institution of the suit. In such a case, the Court has to be very slow and ensure that the case, which the Plaintiffs have set up, is of a higher standard than that of a prima facie case, which is, normally, required for granting of prohibitory injunction. Reference made, in this regard, by Mr. Katakey to the case of Dorab Cawasji Wardan v.Coomi Sorab Wardan and Ors. (AIR 1990SC867) is not misplaced inasmuch as in this case, while dealing with the kind of the injunction order that has been passed in the present case, the Apex Court has laid down as follows: 14. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of s' an injunction to a party who fails or would tail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The Plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 27. I am also constrained to point out that the Apex Court has deprecated the practice of granting such interim orders, which practically give the principal relief sought for in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out. In the case at hand the Plaintiff had sought for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from using the eastern side of the building for the purpose of parking their vehicles, etc. Pending disposal of the suit, the Plaintiffs approached the Court for similar relief by way of temporary injunction. With the impugned order, the learned appellate Court has given the relief, which the Plaintiffs so sought for, and this was as good as granting the principal relief to the Plaintiffs despite the fact that the Defendants were, admittedly, on the day of the institution of the suit, making use of the said space, particularly, when the Plaintiffs had placed nothing before the Court to show any agreement existing between the parties indicating directly or indirectly that the Defendants were not entitled to use the said space and when the Plaintiffs were, themselves, admittedly, using the said space for parking. 28. 28. Coupled with the above, it is also important to note that the balance of convenience was in favour of maintaining the status quo inasmuch as the inconvenience caused to the Defendant by not allowing them to use the eastern side of the building till disposal of the suit was obviously much more than what had been caused to the Plaintiffs, particularly, when it was clear from the reading of the plaint as well as the application for injunction that it was not the case of the Plaintiffs that no one will be allowed to use the eastern side of the building. This apart, it had been asserted in their written objection by the Defendants that there was no provision for parking of car for flat owners of the building of the southern side. Their further case was that they had been using the eastern side of the building without any obstruction since the date of their purchase. Hence, it was a disputed question of fact as to whether the Defendants had recently started using the space available on the eastern side of the building for the purpose of parking, etc. or they had been using the same since the time they had come to occupy the flats. Since there is no indication in the impugned order that assertions of the Defendants stood ex facie belied by the materials on record, the view of the learned trial Court not to make absolute the temporary injunction cannot be said to be perverse, arbitrary, whimsical or capricious 29. As regards as the Plaintiffs' contention, raised, for the first time, in the appeal, that if the eastern side of the building is allowed to be used by the Defendants, it will amount to violation of the bye-law of the Municipality, suffice it to the mention here that the assertion was not grounded on the plaint or partition for injunction. It was a mixed question of fact and law as to whether the use of the eastern side of the said building will amount to violation of bye laws of the Municipality, but this aspect of the matter finds no mention in the pleading of the Plaintiffs. Without such a pleading, prayer for grant of injunction could not have been so readily allowed. 30. Without such a pleading, prayer for grant of injunction could not have been so readily allowed. 30. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, what attracts my eyes, most prominently, is that the learned appellate Court has concluded that there is a prima facie case for granting injunction on account of the fact that on the question whether Defendants had the right to use the space, in question, an issue has been framed. The view so taken by the learned appellate Court is not entirely incorrect, but merely because of the fact that triable issues have been framed, an injunction order cannot automatically follow. The object of granting injunction primarily is to maintain status quo as on the day of institution of the suit until the time the Court gives its decision on the triable issues. If the injunction order, sought for, will result into asking the parties to change the status quo, as has been done in the case at hand a very high degree of prima facie case is required to be established by the party seeking such an order of injunction. In other words, a prima facie case for the purpose of granting of such mandatory nature of injunction means that there are fair chances of success of the suit in favour of the Plaintiff. There is, however, no discussion at all, in this regard, in the impugned order nor is there any indication in the impugned order that injunction, if refused would frustrate the suit. 31. Coupled with the above, it is also pertinent to note that there is absolutely nothing in the pleadings of the Plaintiffs to show that the use of the eastern space of the said building will amount to violation of the Municipal Bye-laws. Far from this, the Plaintiffs themselves asserted, in Para 11 of their plaint, that the front side of the building is used by the Plaintiffs and their men and that by parking vehicles there, the Defendants were causing inconvenience to the Plaintiffs in using the entire front side of the building. This apart, there was nothing before the learned appellate Court to show that the Plaintiffs had the absolute right to use the said open space. 32. This apart, there was nothing before the learned appellate Court to show that the Plaintiffs had the absolute right to use the said open space. 32. Because of what have been discussed above, I am firmly of the view that the views adopted by the learned trial Court were neither arbitrary nor capricious and since, while exercising the powers, under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, the learned trial Court had acted in exercise of its discretionary powers, the learned appellate Court ought not to have substituted its views in place of the views of the learned trial Court without indicating as to how the learned trial Court's declining to grant injunction was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or perverse. 33. Situated thus, I am firmly of the view that if the impugned order is allowed to stand good on record, it will cause serious miscarriage of justice. 34. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. 35. Considering the matter in its entirety, the learned trial Court is hereby directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order and if need be, learned trial Court may hold day to day hearing of the suit. The parties to the suit are hereby directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 17.3.03 for further necessary order. 36. No further notice need be served on the parties as this order is pronounced in the presence of the learned Counsel for the parties. 37. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.